The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.

United States Government, 1861 - Part 1

UNITED STATES. The population of the United States is numbered at the end of each ten years. The first census was taken in 1790, at which time the whole population was 3,929,827. The last census was taken in the month of June, 1860. The whole population, consisting of white, free colored, and slave, and the ratio of increase of each class since the previous census in 1850, were as given below.

The election for a President of the United States took place on the 4th of November, i860. The candidate of the Republicans was Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois. The distinctive principle which he represented was the non-extension of slavery to the territories of the United States, and its speedy removal from all places belonging to, or under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.

Stephen A. Douglas was the candidate representing the principle of non-intervention, which was understood to mean that Congress should not interfere with the question of slavery

CENSUS OF 1860. […]  Chart

Page 697 or no slavery in a territory, but that it should be left to the inhabitants to determine when they assembled in convention to form a State constitutions. The friends of Mr. Douglas consisted of a portion of the Democratic party.

John C. Breckinridge was the candidate representing the principle of protection to slavery in the territories, regarding slaves as a species of property recognized in the Constitution of the United States. After the territories become States, the whole question is under their control. The friends of Mr. Breckinridge constituted that portion of the Democratic party which did not support Mr. Douglas.

John Bell was the candidate of a party whose platform was " the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws."

The vote of the people at the election was as follows: Lincoln, 1,857,610; Douglas, 1,365,976; Breckinridge, 847,953; Bell, 590,631.

The Government of the United States at this time was composed of the following officers:

President.—James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania.

Vice-president.—John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky.

Secretary of State.—Lewis Cass, of Michigan.

Secretary of the Treasury.—Howell Cobb, of Georgia.

Secretary of War.—John B. Floyd, of Virginia.

Secretary of the Navy.—Isaac Toucey, of Connecticut

Secretary of the Interior.—Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi

Postmaster-General.—Joseph Holt, of Ky.

Attorney-General.—John S. Black, of Pennsylvania.

The movements in South Carolina early attracted the attention of the Government. Some of its members were doubtless informed that measures leading to secession would be immediately taken after the day on which the presidential election was held; others probably apprehended some movements of this nature, but were not informed what they would probably be. As early as the 20th of November the Attorney-General sent a reply to some questions respecting which his opinion had been asked by the President. These questions related to the obligation of citizens to obey the laws; to the power of the Government for the collection of duties, for the protection of public property, and to put down unlawful combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. On the first question the view taken by the Attorney-General was expressed in these words:

The will of a State, whether expressed in its constitution or laws, cannot, while it remains in the Confederacy, absolve her people from obeying the just and constitutional requirements of the Central Government. Nor can any act of the Central Government displace the jurisdiction of a State, because the laws of the United States are supreme and binding only so far as they are passed in pursuance of the Constitution. I do not say what might be effected by mere revolutionary force. I am speaking of legal and constitutional right. This is the view always taken by the Judiciary, and so universally adopted that the statement of it may seem common-place.

With regard to the collection of duties at any port, his views were as follows:

Where the law directs a thing to be done, without saying how, that implies the power to use such means as may be necessary and proper to accomplish the end of the Legislature. But where the mode of performing a duty is pointed out by statute, that is the exclusive mode, and no other can be followed. The United States have no common law to fall back upon when the written law is defective. If, therefore, an Act of Congress declares that a certain thine shall be done by a-particular officer, it cannot be done by a different officer. The agency which the law furnishes for its own execution must be used, to the exclusion of all others. For instance, the revenues of the United States are to be collected in a certain way, at certain established ports, and by a certain class of officers; the President has no authority, under any circumstances, to collect the same revenues at other places, by a different sort of officers, or in ways not provided for. Even if the machinery furnished by Congress for the collection of the duties should by any cause become so deranged or broken up that it could not be used, that would not be a legal reason for substituting a different kind of machinery in its place.

The law requires that all goods imported into the United States within certain collection districts shall be entered at the proper port, and the duty thereon shall be received by the collector appointed for and residing at that port. But the functions of the collector may be exercised anywhere at or within the port; there is no law which confines him to the customhouse, or any other particular spot. If the customhouse were burnt down, he might remove to another building; if he were driven from the shore, he might go on board a vessel in the harbor. If he keeps within the port he is within the law.

The right of the Government over public property is thus explained:

It is believed that no important public building has been bought or erected on ground where the Legislature of the State in which it is, has not passed a law consenting to the purchase of it and ceding the exclusive jurisdiction. This Government, then, is not only the owner of those buildings and grounds, but by virtue of the supreme and paramount law, it regulates the action and punishes the offences of all who are within them. If any one of an owner's rights is plainer than another, it is that of keeping exclusive possession and repelling intrusion. The right of defending the public property includes also the right of recapture alter it has been unlawfully taken by another. President Jefferson held the opinion, and acted upon it, that he could order a military force to take possession of any land to which the United States had title, though they had never occupied it before, though a private party claimed and held it, and though it was not then needed nor proposed to be used for any purpose connected with the operations of the Government. This may have been a stretch of Executive power; but the right of retaking public property in which the Government has been carrying on its lawful business, and from which its officers have been unlawfully thrust out, cannot well be doubted; and when it was exercised at Harper's Ferry, in October,-l859, every one acknowledged the legal justice of it.

The next question asked of the Attorney-General, was the most important of all the inquiries. His view of it is interesting, as it comprises the ground upon which the succeeding Administration relied at the commencement of its military operations.

I come now to the point in your letter which is probably of the greatest practical importance. By the act of 1807 you may employ such parts of the land and naval forces as you shall judge necessary for the purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed, in all cases where it is lawful to use the militia for the same purpose. By the act of 1795 the militia may be called Forth "whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed in any States by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by Page 698 the power rested in the marshals." This imposes upon the President the sole responsibility of deciding whether the exigency has arisen which requires the use of military force; and in proportion to the magnitude of that responsibility will be his care not to overstep the limits of his legal and just authority.

The laws referred to in the act of 1795 arc manifestly those which are administered by the judges and executed by the ministerial officers of the courts for the punishment of crime against the United States, for the protection of rights claimed under the Federal Constitution and laws, and for the enforcement of such obligations as come within the cognizance of the Federal Judiciary. To compel obedience to these laws the courts have authority to punish all who obstruct their regular administration, and the marshals and their deputies have the same powers as sheriffs and their deputies in the several States in executing the laws of the States. These are the ordinary means provided for the execution of the laws, and the whole spirit of our system is opposed to the employment of any other except in cases of extreme necessity, arising that of great and unusual combinations against them. Their agency must continue to be used until their incapacity to cope with the power opposed to them shall be plainly demonstrated. It is only upon clear evidence to that effect that a military force can be called into the field. Even then its operations must be purely defensive. It can suppress only such combinations as arc found directly opposing the laws and obstructing the execution thereof. It can do no more than what might and ought to be done by a civil posse, if a civil posse could be raised large enough to meet the same opposition. On such occasions, especially, the military power must be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority, since it is only in aid of the latter that the former can act at all.

But what if the feeling in any State against the United States should become so universal that the Federal officers themselves (including judges, district attorneys, and marshals) would be reached by the same influences and resign their places? Of course the first step would be to appoint others in their stead, if others could be got to serve. But, in such an event, it is more than probable that great difficulties would be found in filling the offices. We can easily conceive how it might become altogether impossible. We are therefore obliged to consider what can be done in case we have no courts to issue judicial process, and no ministerial officers to execute it. In that event troops would certainly be out of place, and their use wholly illegal. If they are sent to aid the courts and marshals, there must be courts and marshals to be aided. Without the exercise of those functions, which belong exclusively to the civil service, the laws cannot be executed in any event, no matter what may be the physical strength" which the Government has at its command. Under such circumstances, to send a military force into any State with orders to act against the people would be simply making war upon them.

The existing laws put and keep the Federal Government strictly on the defensive. You can use force only to repel an assault on the public property, and aid the courts in the performance of their duty. If the means given you to collect the revenue and execute the other laws be insufficient for that purpose, Congress may extend and make them more effectual to that end.

If one of the States should declare her independence, your action cannot depend upon the rightfulness of the cause upon which such declaration is based. Whether the retirement of a State from the Union be the exercise of a right reserved in the Constitution or a revolutionary movement, it is certain that you have not in either case the authority to recognize her independence or to absolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or the other States in convention assembled, must take such measures as may be necessary and proper. In such an event I see no course for you but to go straight onward in the path you have hitherto trodden, that is, execute the laws to the extent of the defensive means placed in your hands, and act generally upon the assumption that the present constitutional relations between the States and the Federal Government continue to exist, until a new order of things shall be established, either by law or force.

On the right of Congress to make war upon a State, and require the President to carry it on, the views of the Attorney-General were also given. Subsequent events attach interest to these views, which they would otherwise hardly possess. They were doubtless the opinions which controlled the action of the Administration until the close of its term.

Whether Congress has the constitutional right to make war against one or more States, and require the Executive of the Federal Government to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from the other States, is a question for Congress itself to consider. It must be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor are there any words in the Constitution which imply it Among the powers enumerated in Article I., section 8, is that " to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water." This certainly means nothing more than the power to commence and carry on hostilities against the foreign enemies of the nation. Another clause in the same section gives Congress the power " to provide for calling forth the militia," and to use them within the limits of the State. But this power is so restricted by the words which immediately follow, that it can be exercised only for one of the following purposes: 1. To execute the laws of the Union; that is, to aid the Federal officers in the performance of their regular duties. 2. To suppress insurrections against the States; but this is confined by Article IV.,sec.4, to cases in which the State herself shall apply for assistance against her own people. 3. To repel the invasion of a State by enemies who come from abroad to assail her in her own territory. All these provisions are made to protect the States, not to authorize an attack by one part of the country upon another; to preserve their peace, and not to plunge them into civil war. Our forefathers do not seem to have thought that war was calculated " to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." There was undoubtedly a strong and universal conviction among the men who framed and ratified the Constitution that military force would not only be useless but pernicious as a means of holding the States together.

If it be true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of general hostilities carried on by the Central Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would be ipso facto an expulsion of such State from the Union. Being treated as an alien and an enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly. And if Congress shall break up the present Union by unconstitutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility between different sections of the country, instead of the "domestic tranquillity" which the Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry on a contest like that?

The right of the General Government to preserve itself in its whole constitutional vigor by repelling a direct and positive aggression upon its property or its officers cannot be denied. But this is a totally different thing from an offensive war to punish the people for the political misdeeds of their State government, or to prevent a threatened violation of the Constitution, or to enforce an acknowledgment that the Government of the United States is supreme. The States are colleagues of one another, and if some of them shall conquer the rest and hold them as subjugated provinces, it would totally destroy the whole theory upon which they are now connected.

During the month of November, the State of South Carolina had passed an act requiring a State Convention to assemble on the 17th of December. Preparations were commenced in other States bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, to secure similar conventions. These preparations consisted of proclamations by the Governors calling an extra session of the legislatures, or of the demonstrations of citizens in favor of the same object. Evidently a boastful and violent spirit was becoming aroused, which was determined to effect a separation of the States, of the Union. Its development could be seen almost daily, and the first apprehensions awakened were, that it might acquire so much force and violence as to overwhelm those sentiments of attachment to the Union, which were known to be alive in the bosom of the mass of the people in each of the Southern States. In the border States of Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, the love for the Union was supposed to be sufficient to check the violence of every hostile passion, and retain them under the Federal Government, unless new motives for secession should arise. So it for a time proved. But in those farther south, the Union demonstrations, although numerous, could not withstand the torrent of passion with which they were assailed. The calm and manly eloquence of Stephens, uttered at the request of members of the Legislature of Georgia, on the evening of November 14, was soon forgotten amid the excitement of passion that followed, and he himself was swept away by it. At that hour, standing in the hall of the House of Representatives of Georgia, he said:

"I look upon this country, with our institutions, as the Eden of the world, the paradise of the universe. It may be that out of it we may become greater and more prosperous, but I am candid and sincere in telling you that I fear if we rashly evince passion, and without sufficient cause shall take that step, that instead of becoming greater or more peaceful, prosperous, and happy—instead of becoming gods, we will become demons, and at no distant day commence cutting one another's throats. This is my apprehension. Let us, therefore, whatever we do, meet these difficulties, great as they are, like wise and sensible men, and consider them in the light of all the consequences which may attend our action. Let us see first clearly where the path of duty leads, and then we may not fear to tread therein."

He then proceeded to meet and refute the popular argument in favor of secession in these direct and plain words:

"The first question that presents itself is, Shall the people of the South secede from the Union in consequence of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency of the United States? My countrymen, I tell you frankly, candidly, and earnestly, that I do not think that they ought. In my judgment, the election of no man, constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any State to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still in 'maintaining the Constitution of the country. To make a point of resistance to the Government, to withdraw from it because a man has been constitutionally elected, puts us in the wrong. We are pledged to maintain the Constitution. Many of us have sworn to support it. Can we, therefore, for the mere election of a man to the Presidency—and that too in accordance with the prescribed forms of the Constitution—make a point of resistance to the Government without becoming the breakers of that sacred instrument ourselves, by withdrawing ourselves from it? Would we not be in the wrong? Whatever fate is to befall this country, let it never he laid to the charge of the people of the South, and especially to the people of Georgia, that we were untrue to our national engagements. Let the fault, and the wrong rest upon others. If all our hopes are to be blasted, if the Republic is to go down, let us be found to the last moment standing on the deck, with the Constitution of the United States waving over our heads. Let the fanatics of the North break the Constitution, if such is their fell purpose. Let the responsibility be upon them. I shall speak presently more of their acts; but let not the South, let us not be the ones to commit the aggression. We went into the election with this people. The result was different from what we wished; but the election has been constitutionally held. Were we to make a point of resistance to the Government and go out of the Union on that account, the record would be made up hereafter against us."

Hours passed during which a crowded audience listened to his arguments and eloquence in favor of the Union. Three months later, and this man becomes the Vice-President of a Southern Confederacy. The Union, in his view, is dissolved, the past is forgotten, the future spreads a glorious vision before his eyes. (See CONFEDERATE STATES, page 129.)

The secession of the Southern States was not accomplished by a movement of the people. It was a preconceived and arranged purpose on the part of many prominent public men, cherished until the favorable hour should come for its execution! The hour thus selected was that upon which the election of Mr. Lincoln took place. Then the plan was put in execution without regard to the forms of law, or the numbers of the Union men.

The Congress of the United States assembled on the 3d of December, 1860, (see CONGRESS U. S.,) and the Message of President Buchanan was immediately delivered. (See PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.) In this Message he denied in strong and unanswerable language the right of secession, and indicated his purpose to collect the revenue and defend the forts of South Carolina.

The attitude of South Carolina already excited the apprehensions of the Government. The subject of sending reënforcements to the Page 700 forts in the harbor of Charleston, had evidently been under consideration in the Cabinet, but was deferred or delayed by the action of Secretary Floyd. On the other hand, fears of these reënforcements were entertained by the authorities of that State, and on the 9th of December, a part of the delegation in Congress gave their assurances to the President that there would be no immediate attempt to possess them. (See page 654 for copy of their statement.) Assurances were given by the President, as it is stated, that there should be no change in the position of the troops at Charleston.

On the 10th of December, the Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb, resigned his office and immediately left Washington for his residence in Georgia, where he was soon after elected a member of the State Convention, and subsequently chosen as a delegate to the Confederate Congress, and appointed a brigadier-general in the Confederate army. This resignation was followed four days afterwards by that of the Secretary of State, Lewis Cass. The explanation given in the official paper was in these words:

"To avoid all misconstruction or misstatement of the reasons which caused this event, we have taken pains to ascertain the true cause. It is not that General Cass differed from the President in regard to any portion of his late Message. On the great question of coercing a State to remain in the Union by military force, the President and General Cass were perfectly united in opinion. The difficulty arose from the fact that General Cass insisted that a naval and military force should be sent immediately to Charleston to reenforce the forts in that harbor; and that the President was of opinion that there was no necessity for any such measure, in order to secure the forts against attack. This being the President's conviction, he would not sanction a movement which might lead to collision arid bloodshed in the present excited state of feelings in South Carolina and other Southern States, and at a time when every friend of the Union is using his best efforts to prevent its dissolution, or, if that be not possible, to avert the adoption of any measure which would render its reconstruction hopeless."

General Cass was the oldest member of the Cabinet. In early life, he emigrated from his native State, New Hampshire, to Ohio, and subsequently rose to distinction as Governor of the Northwestern Territory, which became the State of Michigan. He was subsequently a member of the Cabinet of President Jackson, a minister to Paris, senator from the State of Michigan, and democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1848. He was succeeded as Secretary of State, by Attorney-General Black. The office vacated by Mr. Cobb was filled by the appointment of Philip F. Thomas, of Maryland.

The question which arose between the President and General Cass was doubtless the most difficult one ever before the Cabinet. At this time the State Convention of South Carolina had not assembled. No overt act had been committed, no official step had been taken except the passage of an act by the Legislature calling a State Convention, which had often been done in nearly all the States. Immediately upon the opening of the session of Congress, measures had been introduced into each House for the purpose of stopping the progress of the secession movement, and healing the difficulties of the country. The propositions of Mr. Crittenden were before the Senate, and a flood of measures of reconciliation, so far as it could be done by a declaration of sentiments, was brought forward in the House. Meantime the' people began to move in every Northern, Middle, and the upper tier of the Southern States, in favor of a settlement of the difficulties. It was an indisputable fact, at this time, that the vote cast for Mr. Douglas, numbering 1,365,976, and that cast for Mr. Bell, numbering 590,631, and the vote for Mr. Breckinridge in the free States, numbering 284,422, making a total of 2,241,029, was unanimously in favor of a peaceable and reasonable settlement of all difficulties with any of the Southern States. The vote for Mr. Lincoln was 1,857,610, of which at least one-fourth would have approved of such a, peaceable settlement of the difficulties as might have been satisfactory to all the Southern States, whose complaints were founded upon questions connected with slavery. Of the vote given to Mr. Breckinridge in the slaveholding States, numbering 563,531, more than one-fourth of it desired a peaceable settlement upon such terms as would have been satisfactory to the friends of conciliation and compromise in the Northern States. Thus the voice of the people of the country at this time was overwhelmingly in favor of conciliation, forbearance, and compromise. The remainder of those who voted for Mr. Breckinridge were determined upon secession if it could be accomplished, and a portion of those who voted for Mr. Lincoln were determined that there should be no concession, on the ground that the Constitution and the laws were sufficient for the emergency. This state of public sentiment continued for some time, and those in favor of an adjustment indicated a decided opposition to coercive measures against the Southern States. The view which they then entertained of coercion was subsequently expressed in the emphatic words of Mr. Douglas: "You must do one of two things: either settle the difficulty amicably, or by the sword. An amicable settlement is a perpetuation of the Union. The use of the sword is war, disunion, and separation, now and forever." Meantime the Government, in its endeavors to act in conformity to these views of the country, manifested the most extreme forbearance, even in the presence of acts which, if proceeding from a foreign power, would, by common consent, have resulted in immediate war.

On the 20th of December, 1860, the ordinance of secession was passed by the State Page 701 Convention of South Carolina, and immediately afterwards commissioners were appointed to proceed to Washington to negotiate for a peaceable surrender, by the Federal Government, of the forts and other public property within the limits of the State. (See SOUTH CAROLINA.)

About this time, on the 26th of December, Major Anderson transferred his garrison from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor. (See FORTS, page 315, also SUMTER and CHARLESTON.) The movement excited intense indignation among the active secessionists. It was the first flash across their minds of the idea that the United States might fight before the matter was ended. This movement of Major Anderson was made upon his own responsibility, and in view of the weakness of his former position, and the excitement which existed in the city of Charleston.

Major Anderson is a native of the State of Kentucky, and entered the army as a second lieutenant by brevet, in the Second Artillery, in 1845; in 1847 he was brevetted a major. He was ordered to the forts in Charleston harbor, in August, 1860.

The resignation of Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, followed immediately upon this movement of Major Anderson. His letter of resignation and the reply of the President were as follows:

                               WAR DEPARTMENT, December 29, 1860.

Sir: On the morning of the 27th inst. I read the following paper to you in the presence of the Cabinet:

COUNCIL CHAMBER, EXECUTIVE MANSION.

Sir.: It is evident now from the action of the Commander of Fort Moultrie, that the solemn pledges of the Government have been violated by Major Anderson. In my judgment but one remedy is now left us by which to vindicate our honor and prevent civil war. It is in vain now to hope for confidence on the part of the people of South Carolina in any further pledges as to the action of the military. One remedy is left, and that is to withdraw the garrison from the harbor of Charleston. I hope the President will allow me to make that order at once. This order, in my judgment, can alone prevent bloodshed and civil war. (Signed.)

                                           JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.

I then considered the honor of the Administration pledged to maintain the troops in the position they occupied, for such had been the assurances given to the gentlemen of South Carolina, who had a right to speak for her. South Carolina, on the other hand, gave reciprocal pledges that no force should be brought by them against the troops or against the property of the United States. The sole object of both parties in these reciprocal pledges was to prevent a collision and the effusion of blood, in the hope that some means might be found for a peaceful accommodation of the existing troubles, the two Houses of Congress having both raised committees looking to that object. Thus affairs stood until the action of Major Anderson, taken unfortunately while the commissioners were on their way to this capital, on a peaceful mission looking to the avoidance of bloodshed, has complicated matters in the existing manner. Our refusal or even delay to place affairs back as they stood under our agreement, invites a collision and must inevitably inaugurate civil war. I cannot consent to be the agent of such a calamity. I deeply regret that I feel myself under the necessity of tendering to you my resignation as Secretary of War, because I can no longer hold it under my convictions of patriotism, nor with honor, subjected as I am to a violation of solemn pledges and plighted faith.

With the highest personal regard,

I am most truly yours,

JOHN B. FLOYD.

To His Excellency the President of the United States.

_______

THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY.

                                          Washington, Dec. 31, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR: I have received and accepted your resignation of the office of Secretary of War"; and not wishing to impose upon you the task of performing its mere routine duties, which you have so kindly offered to do, I have authorized Postmaster-General Holt to administer the affairs of the Department until your successor shall be appointed.

                 Yours, very respectfully,

                            JAMES BUCHANAN

Hon. John B. Floyd,

Secretary Floyd is a native of the State of Virginia; he has been a representative in Congress, Governor of his native State, and member of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet. Subsequently an indictment was found against the ex-Secretary by the Grand Jury of the District of Columbia as being privy to the abstraction of certain bonds amounting to more than $800,000, in the custody of the Department of the Interior, in the latter part of the year 1860. The report of the proceedings in this matter is very summary. On the 10th of March, 1861, in the Criminal Court at Washington, in the case of John B. Floyd, ex-Secretary of War, for conspiracy in attempting to defraud the Government, District Attorney Ould moved to enter a nolle prosequi. He stated that he believed the conspiracy existed with Godard Bailey alone, and also, that as Mr. Floyd had been summoned and requested to testify before a congressional committee in relation to the matter, he could not be prosecuted by the Court, according to its ruling in the case of Russell.

Mr. Carlisle thought it was proper to state that his client (Mr. Floyd) had come here ready to answer the charges brought against him; but hearing of the decision with regard to Russell, he (Carlisle) had, upon his own responsibility, and without consultation with any one, thought proper to bring the matter before his Honor. He hoped the motion of the District Attorney would be allowed.

The Judge stated that he would take time to examine the indictment, and some other technicalities of the case. He gave a decision on the 20th, dismissing the case.

The agency of the Secretary in improving the military condition of the Southern States, filling the arsenals with arms, and preventing the occupation of the forts by the United States forces, was most important to the Confederacy. Before the close of the year he was appointed a brigadier-general in the Confederate army, and was in command at several skirmishes in Western Virginia.

On the 29th of December the commissioners from South Carolina, Messrs. Barnwell, Adams, and Orr, addressed a letter to President Buchanan, stating that they were authorized and empowered to treat with the Government of Page 702  the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light-houses, and other real estate, with their appurtenances, in the limits of South Carolina; and also for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other property held by the Government of the United States, as agent of the Confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member, and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between that commonwealth and the Government at Washington.

They further laid before the President an official copy of the ordinance of secession, by which the State of South Carolina, as they said, "has resumed the powers she delegated to the Government of the United States, and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence." They then proceed to say:

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this ordinance, and that we were prepared to enter upon this negotiation with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general advantage, and a future of good will and harmony, beneficial to all the parties concerned.

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came here the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our arrival here an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not only without, but against your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another—thus altering to a most important extent the condition of affairs under which we came.

Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us of all doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to any arrangement by which our mutual interests may be amicably adjusted.

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.

The reply of the President is dated on the 30th. He alludes to his Message to Congress on the 3d of December, in which his position was defined, he states that he could meet them only as private gentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition they might have to make to that body. He then refers to that portion of their letters which speaks of the events of the previous twenty-four hours, and the change in their position, and says:

This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my Message of the 3d of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it "has been purchased for a fair equivalent, by the consent of the Legislature of the Slate, for the erection of forts, mag. azines, arsenals, 4c., and over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation,' has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the henus of the assailants." This being the condition of the parties on Saturday, December 8, four of the representatives from South Carolina called upon me, and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best means of preventing a collision between the parties, for the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so, accordingly, and on Monday morning, the 10th inst., three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives of South Carolina, with a single exception. (See page 654.)

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark that at the time the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word "provided," as it might be construed into an agreement on my part, which I never would make. They said that nothing was further from their intention—they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed. The event has proven that they nave faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received a line from any of them, or from any member of the Convention on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to reenforce the forts in the harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might be still preserved, and (hot time might be thus given for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge.

But I acted in the same manner as I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible. The world knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made "in their relative military status." Bearing upon this subject I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th inst., to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice until the 21st inst. (See FORTS AND ARSENALS, Moultrie.)

The President then proceeds to say that Major Anderson acted on his own responsibility in removing to Fort Sumter, (see PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, Message of January 8,) and justice required that he should not be condemned without a hearing. He then states that his first promptings, on hearing of the removal of Anderson, were to order him to return to Fort Moultrie, but before any steps could be taken to secure the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities, the latter took possession of the abandoned fort, and the other vacant ones. After describing the occurrences, the President thus proceeds:

It is under all these circumstances that I am urged Page 703 immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and I am informed that without this negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do—this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No such allusion had been made in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference is that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer there in command of all of the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his position from one of them to another.

At this point of writing, I have received information by telegraph from Captain Humphreys, in command of the arsenal at Charleston, that" it has to-day (Sunday, the 8Uth) been taken by force of arms. It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to this arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.

Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add, that whilst it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the public property of the United States, against hostile attacks, from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defence can be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston.

To this letter of the President the commissioners sent a reply, dated January 1, 1861. It is devoted to an examination of the main Points of the President's letter, and insists that he was under a pledge to preserve the status of affairs in Charleston harbor previous to the removal of Major Anderson to Fort Sumter, and insisting that he should observe this pledge. This communication was returned by the President, with the following indorsement upon it: "This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it."

After the departure of the South Carolina delegation, Messrs. Wm. Porcher Miles and Lawrence M. Keitt published at Charleston, S. C., a narrative entitled, "A statement of what transpired between the President and the South Carolina delegation," in relation to the reënforcement of Major Anderson. The following extract shows that the understanding on the subject between the President and representatives of the State was not, even in the opinion of the latter, in the nature of a pledge on either side:

The very fact that we, the representatives from South Carolina, were not authorized to commit or "pledge" the State, were not treating with the President as accredited ministers with full powers, but as gentlemen assuming, to a certain extent, the delicate task of undertaking to foreshadow the course and policy of the State, should have made the President more ready to strengthen our hands to bring about and carry out the course and policy which he professed to have as much at heart as we had. While we were not authorized to say that the Convention would not order the occupation of the forts immediately after secession, and prior to the sending on of commissioners, the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, could most positively say that, so long as South Carolina abstained from attacking and seizing the forts, he would not send reinforcements to them or allow their relative military status to be changed. We were acting in the capacity of gentlemen holding certain prominent positions, and anxious to exert such influence as we might possess to effect a peaceful solution of pending political difficulties, and prevent, if possible, the horrors of war. The President was acting in a double capacity; not only as a gentleman, whose influence in carrying out bis share of the understanding or agreement was potential, but as the head of the army, and, therefore, having the absolute control of the whole matter of reinforcing or transferring the garrison at Charleston. But we have dwelt long enough upon this point. Suffice it to say that, considering the President as bound in honor, if not by treaty stipulation, not to make any change in the forts, or to send reinforcements to them unless they were attacked, we of the delegation who were elected to the Convention felt equally bound in honor to do every thing on our part to prevent any premature collision. This Convention can bear us witness as to whether or not we endeavored honorably to carry out our share of the agreement.

Affairs now continued to grow worse. The hope of an amicable adjustment was diminished by every hour's delay, and as the prospect of a bloodless settlement passed away, the public distress became more and more aggravated. The Treasury was without money, add could obtain it only at twelve per cent, interest. The military force of the Government was almost entirely on the western frontier, and the vessels of the navy were in active service in distant stations, or required immediate repairs. (See NAVY.)

On the 8th of January the President sent a Message to Congress, urging its immediate attention to the state of affairs. After alluding to the views advanced in his former Message, he said:

This left me no alternative, as the chief Executive officer under the Constitution of the United States, but to collect the public revenues and to protect the public property, so far as this might be practicable, under existing laws.

This is still my purpose. My province is to execute, and not to make the laws. It belongs to Congress exclusively to repeal, to modify, or to enlarge their provisions to meet exigencies as they may occur. I possess no dispensing power.

I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any State; and I am perfectly satisfied that the Constitution has wisely withheld that power even from Congress. But the right and the duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the Federal officers in the execution of their legal functions, and against those who assail the property of the Federal Government, are clear and undeniable.

But the dangerous and hostile attitude of the States towards each other has already far transcended and cast in the shade the ordinary Executive duties already provided for by law, and has assumed such vast and alarming proportions as to place the subject entirely above and beyond Executive control. The fact cannot be disguised that we are in the midst of a great revolution. In all its various bearings, therefore, I commend the question to Congress, as the only human tribunal, under Providence, possessing the power to meet the existing emergency. To them exclusively belongs the power to declare war, or to authorize the employment of military force in all cases contemplated by the Constitution, and they alone possess the power to remove grievances which might lead to war, and to secure peace and union to this distracted country. On them, and on them alone, rests the responsibility.

Referring to the principle which had thus far governed his conduct, he said:

At the beginning of these unhappy troubles I determined that no act of mine should increase the excitement in cither section of the country. If the political conflict were to end in a civil war it was my determined Page 704 purpose not to commence it, nor even to furnish an excuse for it by any act of this Government. My opinion remains unchanged, that justice as well as sound policy require us still to seek a peaceful solution of the questions at issue between the North and the South. (See PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.)

On the 8th of January, Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, the Secretary of the Interior, during Mr. Buchanan's administration, resigned. He had telegraphed to Charleston and other places at the South that no more troops would be sent to Charleston for the present, and learning that more had then been ordered, bethought that his honor had been compromised, and therefore resigned. From the correspondence between him and Mr. Buchanan, it appears that the former had mistaken the action of the Cabinet. Mr. Thompson, on tendering his resignation, addressed the President as follows:

Sir: It is with extreme regret I have just learned that additional troops have been ordered to Charleston. This subject has been frequently discussed in Cabinet Council; and when on Monday night, 31st of December ultimo, the orders for reinforcements to Fort Sumter were countermanded, 1 distinctly understood from you that no order of the kind would be made without being previously considered and decided in Cabinet. It is true that on Wednesday, January 2, this subject was again discussed in Cabinet, but certainly no conclusion was reached, and the War Department was not justified in ordering reinforcements without something more than was then said. I learn, however, this morning, for the first time, that the steamer Star of the West sailed from New York last Saturday night with two hundred and fifty men, under Lieutenant Bartlett, bound for Fort Sumter. Under these circumstances I feel myself bound to resign my commission, as one of your constitutional advisers, into your hands.

              With high respect, your obedient servant, &c.

  To this President Buchanan replied on the next day:

  SIR: I have received and accepted your resignation on yesterday, of the office of Secretary of the Interior.

On Monday evening, 31st December, 1860, I suspended the orders which had been issued by the War and Navy Departments to send the Brooklyn with reënforcements to Fort Sumter. Of this I informed you on the same evening. I stated to you my reason for this suspension, which you knew, from its nature, would be speedily removed. In consequence of your request, however, I promised that those orders should not be renewed "without being previously considered and decided in Cabinet." This promise was faithfully observed on my part. In order to carry it into effect I called a special Cabinet meeting on Wednesday, 2d January, 1861, in which the question of sending reinforcements to Fort Sumter was amply discussed both by yourself and others. The decided majority of opinions was against you. At this moment, the answer of the South Carolina "Commissioners" to my communication to them of 31st December was received and read. It produced much indignation among the members of the Cabinet. After a further brief conversation I employed the following language: "It is now all over, and reinforcements must be sent." Judge Black said, at the moment of my decision, that after this letter the Cabinet would be unanimous, and I heard no dissenting voice. Indeed, the spirit and tone of the letter left no doubt on my mind that Fort Sumter would be immediately attacked, and hence the necessity of sending reinforcements there without delay.

Whilst you admit "that on Wednesday, January 2, this subject was again discussed in Cabinet," you say, "but certainly no conclusion was reached, and the War Department was not justified in ordering reinforcements without something more than was then said." You are certainly mistaken in alleging that "no conclusion was reached." In this your recollection is entirely different from that of your four oldest colleagues in the Cabinet. Indeed, my language was so unmistakable that the Secretaries of War and the Navy proceeded to act upon it without any further intercourse with myself than what you heard, or might have heard me say. You had been so emphatic in opposing these reinforcements that I thought you would resign in consequence of my decision, f deeply regret that you have been mistaken in point of fact, though I firmly believe honestly mistaken. Still, it is certain you have not the less been mistaken.

                                              Yours, very respectfully.

On his return home to Mississippi, he was welcomed by a number of neighbors and friends, to whom he made an address, stating the opinions which existed in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet.

He said that there was "no serious difficulty" in the Cabinet until after the presidential election, when there arose a discussion upon the rights and powers of the General and State Governments. On the right of a State to secede, the Cabinet split at once; but on the right of the General Government to coerce a State, all agreed in the negative. Mr. Thompson held strongly to the right to secede, but kept his place, in the hope, as he says, of preserving peace. He agreed with the President that it was his duty to enforce the laws and hold public property, but held that the army and navy could only be used as a posse to aid the civil authority, and as all the civil and executive officers in South Carolina had resigned, there could be no attempt to uphold the laws. He held, also, that the forts in the seceding States could not be occupied as military posts without endangering the peace of the country. He not only pressed this view of the subject, but insisted that the President had no right to reinforce the defences in Charleston harbor. He says: "As I was writing my resignation, I Bent a dispatch to Judge Longstreet, that the Star of the West was coming with reinforcements. The troops were thus put on their guard, and when the Star of the West arrived she received a warm welcome from booming cannon, and soon beat a retreat."

Philip F. Thomas, of Maryland, who had been appointed Secretary of the Treasury, on the resignation of Howell Cobb, of Georgia, on the 10th of December, 1860, discharged the duties of the office one month, and on the 11th of January tendered his resignation. His statement of reasons for this step is important, so far as it manifests any of the views entertained by the Cabinet at this time. He writes to President Buchanan:

MY DEAR SIR: It has not been in my power, os you are aware, to agree with you and with a majority of your constitutional advisers in the measures which have been adopted in reference to the present condition of things in South Carolina; nor do I think it at all probable that I shall be able to concur in the views which you entertain, so far as I understand them, touching the authority, under existing laws, to enforce the collection of the customs at the port of Charleston.

To avoid embarrassment on the one hand, and the exposure of himself to just criticism by those who knew his views, his resignation was tendered, &c. To this the President replied, accepting the resignation, by saying, " I very much regret that circumstances, in your opinion, have rendered this necessary."

On the same day John A. Dix, of New York, was appointed Secretary of the Treasury, and confirmed by the Senate. He was a citizen of, Page 705 New York, had belonged to the array in the war of 1812, was subsequently a Senator in Congress, and at the time of his appointment held the office of post-master at New York City. Subsequently, on the 16th of May, he was made a major-general in the army, and commanded a force stationed at Baltimore.

The views entertained by the Government from this period until the 4th of March, were stated explicitly by Secretary Dix in his speech at the great meeting at Union Square in New York City on the 20th of April ensuing. Coming from a member of the Cabinet during the time of which he speaks, they are entitled to unreserved credit. His words were these:

"And here, fellow-citizens, it is important that we should clearly understand the position of the late Administration on this question. It is due to this Administration, as well as the last, that we should all understand it. I shall be very brief, but I must ask your close attention for the few moments that will be needed. On the 3d of December last, in his annual Message to Congress, the late President made a strong and unanswerable argument against the right of secession. He also indicated his purpose to collect the revenue and defend the forts in South Carolina. In a special Message to Congress, on the 8th of January, he declared (I use the language of the Message)—' The right and the duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the Federal officers in the execution of their legal functions, and against those who assail the property of the Federal Government, are clear and undeniable.' The authorities of South Carolina were repeatedly warned that, if they assailed Fort Sumter, it would be the commencement of civil war, and they would be responsible for the consequences. The last and most emphatic of these warnings is contained in the admirable answer of Mr. Holt, Secretary of War, to Mr. Hayne, the commissioner from South Carolina, on the 6th of February. It is in these words: 'If, with all the multiplied proof which exists of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault Fort Sum. ter, and peril the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our common country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibility.' I believe the letter from which I have read this extract has never been published, for I, as a member of the Administration at the time it was written, have a right to say that it had the cordial approval of the late President and all his constitutional advisers. And this brings me to the point I wish to make. I violate no confidence in making it. It is this: if South Carolina had tendered war to the late Administration as she has to this—I mean by a hostile and deadly assault—it would have been unanimously accepted."

The President states, in his letter accepting the resignation of Secretary Thompson, that on the 2d of January, in Cabinet meeting, it was decided to reenforce Fort Sumter. On the 5th the steamer Star of the West left New York with men, arms, and ammunition on board, and arrived off Charleston on the 9th, (see STAR OF THE WEST,) was fired upon, and returned. This proceeding was consistent with the position taken by the President in his Message of January 8, and his correspondence with the retiring secretaries.

Meantime, on the 4th of January, an order was issued to all the available troops at Leavenworth, Kansas, to be ready to march to Fort McHenry at Baltimore. The order to march was given on the 7th. On the 7th a small force was sent to Harper's Ferry armory. A regiment of volunteers had been offered from Westchester, Penn., on the 6th. On the same day a salute in honor of Major Anderson was fired at Schenectady, New York On the 10th the steamer Joseph Whitney left Boston with stores and troops for the Tortugas and other forts in Florida.

The occupation of Fort Sumter by a little garrison of Federal troops, and the waving of the Stars and Stripes daily over its walls in the harbor of Charleston, gave great annoyance to the authorities of South Carolina. The sovereignty and independence of South Carolina was not an accomplished fact, while that emblem of another power floated without her consent over a portion of the State territory. Accordingly, on the 11th of January, a demand for the surrender of the fort was made by Governor Pickens on Major Anderson, who declined to comply, from want of authority. (See SUMTER.) On the same day I. W. Hayne, Attorney-General of South Carolina, was despatched as an envoy of the State to Washington, to demand the surrender of the fort by the President of the United States. On his arrival in Washington, ten Senators in Congress from seceding States advised him to delay action until those States should have formed a Confederacy. They offered to propose to the President that Fort Sumter should not be reenforced in the mean time. On this condition he acceded to their request. Those Senators, through Messrs. Fitzpatrick, Mallory, and Slidell, having laid the correspondence before the President, received through Secretary Holt a reply dated on the 22d of January.

Mr. Holt stated that the President had considered that correspondence, in which it appeared that their suggestions to Mr. Hayne to withhold his demand on the President, had received a clear and explicit answer from Mr. Hayne himself, in these words:

I am not clothed with power to make the arrangements you suggest; but provided you can get assurances, with which you are entirely satisfied, that no reinforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the public peace will not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards South Carolina, I will refer your communication to the authorities of South Carolina, and, withholding the communication with Page 706 which I am at present charged, will await further instructions.

Mr. Holt then states that the President has endeavored to perform his duties in such a manner as to preserve the peace and prevent bloodshed. His sole object has been to act strictly on the defensive, and to authorize no movement against the people of South Carolina, unless clearly justified by a hostile movement on their part.

In regard to the proposition of Colonel Hayne, "that no reënforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the public peace will not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards South Carolina," it is impossible for him to give any such assurances. The President has no authority to enter into such an agreement or understanding. As an executive officer, he is simply bound to protect the public property, so far as this may be practicable; and it would be a manifest violation of his duty to place himself under engagements that he would not perform this duty either for an indefinite or a limited period. At the present moment, it is not deemed necessary to reinforce Major Anderson, because he makes no such request, and feels quite secure in his position. Should his safety, however, require reinforcements, every effort will be made to supply them.

In regard to an assurance from the President "that the public peace will not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards South Carolina," Mr. Holt said: "The answer will readily occur to yourselves. To Congress, and to Congress alone, belongs the power to make war, and it would be an act of usurpation for the Executive to give any assurance that Congress would not exercise this power, however strongly he may be convinced that no such intention exists."

This correspondence was forwarded to Charleston, and the Governor of South Carolina, ordered Mr. Hayne to deliver his letter forthwith. The demand of Mr. Hayne was urged on these grounds:

South Carolina, as a separate independent sovereign, assumes the right to take into her own possession every thing within her limits essential to maintain her honor or her safety, irrespective of the question of property, subject only to the moral duty requiring that compensation should be made to the owner. This right she cannot permit to be drawn into discussion. As to compensation for any property, whether of an individual or a Government, which she may deem it necessary, for her honor or safety, to take into her possession, her past history gives ample guarantee that it will be made, upon a fair accounting, to the last dollar.

In another part of his letter he speaks in terms of similar purport, as follows:

She (South Carolina) rests her position on something higher than mere property. It is a consideration of her own dignity as a sovereign, and the safety of her people, which prompts her to demand that this property should not longer be used as a military post by a Government she no longer acknowledges. She feels this to be an imperative duty. It has, in fact, became an absolute necessity of her condition.

On the 6th of February, Mr. Holt gave a final reply, in which he said:

The proposal now presented to the President, is simply an offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and contents as property of the United States, sustained by a declaration, in effect, that if she is not permitted to make the purchase, she will seize the fort by force of arms. As the initiation of the negotiation for the transfer of property between friendly Governments, this proposal impresses the President as having assumed a most unusual form. He has, however, investigated the claim on which it professes to be based, apart from the declaration that accompanies it. And it may be here remarked that much stress has been laid upon the employment of the words "property" and "public property" by the President in his several messages. These are the most comprehensive terms which can be used in such a connection, and surely, when referring to a fort or any other public establishment, they embrace the entire and undivided interest of the Government therein.

The title of the United States to Fort Sumter is complete and incontestable. Were its interest in this property purely proprietary, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, it might probably be subjected to the exercise of the right of eminent" domain; but it has also political relations to it of a much higher and more imposing character than those of mere proprietorship. It has absolute jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it stands. This jurisdiction consists in the authority to "exercise exclusive legislation" over the property referred to, and is therefore clearly incompatible with the claim of eminent domain now insisted upon by South Carolina. This authority was not derived from any questionable, revolutionary source, but from the peaceful cession of South Carolina herself, acting through her Legislature, under a provision of the Constitution of the United States. South Carolina can no more assert the right of eminent domain over Fort Sumter than Maryland can assert it over the District of Columbia. The political and proprietary rights of the United States in either case rest upon precisely the same ground.

The President, however, is relieved from the necessity of further pursuing this inquiry by the fact that, whatever may be the claim of South Carolina to this fort, he has no constitutional power to cede or surrender it. The property of the United States has been acquired by force of public law, and can only be disposed of under the same solemn sanctions. The President, as the head of the Executive branch of the Government only, can no more sell and transfer Fort Sumter to South Carolina, than he can sell and convey the capitol of the United States to Maryland, or to any other State or individual seeking to possess it. His Excellency the Governor is too familiar with the Constitution of the United States, and with the limitations upon the powers of the Chief Magistrate of the Government it has established, not to appreciate at once the soundness of this legal proposition. 

The question of reinforcing Fort Sumter is so fully disposed of in my letter to Senator Slidell and others, under date of the 22d of January—a copy of which accompanies this—that its discussion will not now be renewed. I then said: "At the present moment it is not deemed necessary to reenforce Major Anderson, because he makes no such request. Should his safety, however, require reinforcements, every effort will be made to supply them." I can add nothing to the explicitness of this language, which still applies to the existing status. The right to send forward reënforcements, when in the judgment of the President the safety of the garrison requires them, rests on the same unquestionable foundation as the right to occupy the fortress itself.

In the letter of Senator Davis and others to yourself, under date of the 15th ultimo, they say: "We, therefore, think it especially due from South Carolina to our States—to say nothing of other slave-holding States—that she should, as far as she can consistently with her honor, avoid initiating hostilities between her and the United States, or any other Power;" and you now yourself give to the President the gratifying Page 707 assurance that " South Carolina has every disposition to preserve the public peace;" and, since he is himself sincerely animated by the same desire, it would seem that this common and patriotic object must be of certain attainment. It is difficult, however, to reconcile with this assurance the declaration on your part that "it is a consideration of her (South Carolina's) own dignity as a sovereign, and the safety of her people, which prompts her to demand that this property should not longer be used as a military post by a Government she no longer acknowledges, and the thought you so constantly present that this occupation must lead to a collision of arms and the prevalence of civil war.

Fort Sumter is in itself a military post, and nothing else; and it would seem that not so much the fact as the purpose of its use should give to it a hostile or friendly character. This fortress is now held by the Government of the United States, for the same objects for which it has been held from the completion of its construction. These are national and defensive; and were a public enemy now to attempt the capture of Charleston or the destruction of the commerce of its harbor, the whole force of the batteries of this fortress would be at once exerted for their protection. How the presence of a small garrison, actuated by such a spirit as this, can compromise the dignity or honor of South Carolina, or become a source of irritation to her people, the President is at a loss to understand. The attitude of that garrison, as has been often declared, is neither menacing nor defiant, nor unfriendly. It is acting under orders to stand strictly on the defensive, and the Government and people of South Carolina must well know that they can never receive aught but shelter from its guns, unless, in the absence of all provocation, they should assault it, and seek its destruction. The intent with which this fortress is held by the President is truthfully stated by Senator Davis and others, in their letter to yourself of the 15th January, in which they say: "It is not held with any hostile or unfriendly purpose towards your State, but merely as property of the United States, which the President deems it his duty to protect and preserve."

If the announcement so repeatedly made of the President's pacific purposes in continuing the occupation of Fort Sumter until the question shall have been settled by competent authority, has failed to impress the Government of South Carolina, the forbearing conduct of his Administration for the last few months should be received as conclusive evidence of his sincerity. And if this forbearance, in view of the circumstances which have so severely tried it, be not accepted as a satisfactory pledge of the peaceful policy of this Administration towards South Carolina, then it may be safely affirmed that neither language nor conduct can possibly furnish one. If, with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault Fort Sumter, and peril the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our common country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibility.

                         Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

The question of safety to South Carolina is set aside, and her right and title to the possession of the fort thus denied by the Secretary with unanswerable force. It was at this time believed to be impossible that the authorities of South Carolina would incur the tremendous responsibility of commencing hostilities at Charleston by an attack on the handful of men shut up in the fort—the surrender of which had been thus demanded.

On the 19th of January, the Legislature of Virginia passed the series of resolutions which led to the Peace Conference at Washington on February 4. (See page 178, also PEACE CONFERENCE.) Under one of the resolutions, ex-President Tyler was appointed a commissioner to the President of the United States, and John Robertson a commissioner to the State of South Carolina, and the other States that had seceded, or should secede, with instructions to request the President of the United States, and the authorities of such States, "to agree to abstain, pending the proceedings contemplated, from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms between the States and the Government of the United States."

On the 24th of January, ex-President Tyler called upon President Buchanan to discharge the duties of his mission. On his return to Virginia he made a report to the Legislature, respecting his mission. So much of this report as serves to explain the views of the President, and thereby those of the Government, was as follows:

On the next morning, nt the hour of ten, I repaired to the President's mansion, and met from him a warm and cordial reception. I lost no time in handing him your letter of appointment, attested by the seal of the State and the legislative resolutions. He said that they were the first full copies of the resolutions which he had seen; and, after reading them, be remarked that he considered them very important, and was good enough to add that, being borne by myself, he should feel it his duty to make them the subject of a special Message to Congress. Either I suggested, or he voluntarily remarked, most probably the latter, that he should accompany them with a strong recommendation to Congress, with whom, he said, rested the entire power over the subject of war or peace, to abstain from all action of a hostile character until Virginia should have had a fair opportunity to exert all her efforts to preserve the public peace and restore harmony to the Union. I said to him that my mission was to him; that he was commander-in-chief of the army and navy; could regulate the movements of soldiers and ships in peace and in war, and that every thing Virginia desired was that the status quo should be observed.

I represented to him that the people of Virginia were almost universally inclined to peace and reconciliation; that I need not inform him of the sacrifices the State had made for the Union in its initiation, or of her instrumentality in the creation of the Constitution; that her efforts to reconstruct or preserve depended, for their success, on her being permitted to conduct them undisturbed by outside collision. He replied that he had in no measure changed his views as presented in his annual Message; that he could give no pledges; that it was his duty to enforce the laws, and the whole power rested with Congress. He complained that the South had not treated him properly: that they had made unnecessary demonstrations by seizing unprotected arsenals and forts, and thus perpetrating acts of useless bravado, which had quite as well been left alone. I suggested to him that while those things were (I admitted) calculated to fret and irritate the Northern mind, yet he would see in them only the necessary results of popular excitement, which, after all, worked no mischief in the end, if harmony in the States was once more restored; that the States wherein the seizures had been made would account for all the public property, and that, in the mean time, the agencies for its preservation were only changed. He repeated his views of the obligations which rested on him; could give no pledges but those contained in his public acts, and recurred again to the proceedings of the Legislature and his intention to send them to Congress in a special Message, accompanied with a strong Page 708 recommendation to avoid the passage of any hostile legislation. I asked if I might be permitted to see the sketch of the Message, to which he unhesitatingly replied that he would take pleasure in showing it to me next morning.

Much more occurred in the course of an interview which lasted for an hour and a half, all, however, relating exclusively to the above topics, and I loft him entirely satisfied with the result of my interview. The President was frank and entirely confiding in his language and whole manner. A moment's reflection satisfied me that if the Message contained the recommendation to Congress to abstain from hostile legislation, I was at liberty to infer a similar determination on his part of a state of quietude.

Friday, 25. I waited on him again the following morning, and he lost no time in reading me so much of the sketch of the proposed Message as related to the recommendation to Congress. I suggested no change or alteration, believing it to be amply sufficient, and became only anxious for its presentation to Congress, he said he should have it all prepared to be submitted to his Cabinet on that day, and would send it in the next day. On the afternoon of the same day (Friday 25) I was waited on by the Secretary of State and the Attorney-General, who stated that they had called upon me, at the request of the President, to express his regret that, in consequence of the adjournment over to Monday, he would not be able to send in the Message until Monday.

While in conversation with those gentlemen, which chiefly turned on the condition of public affairs, I was startled by the receipt of a telegraphic despatch from Judge Robertson, my co-commissioner, dated at Charleston, South Carolina, inquiring into the foundation of a rumor which had reached that place that the steamship Brooklyn, with troops, had sailed from Norfolk. I immediately handed over the despatch to the gentlemen, with the suitable inquiries. The Attorney-General said, in substance: "You know, sir, that I am attached to the law department, and not in the way of knowing any thing about it." The Secretary of State said that he had heard and believed that the Brooklyn had sailed with some troops, but he did not know when she sailed, or to what point she was destined. I then said: "I hoped that she had not received her orders since my arrival in Washington." On this point the gentlemen could give me no information, but expressed no doubt but that the President would give me the information if requested.

I excused myself to them, and, immediately withdrawing to the adjoining room, I addressed to the President a note, which Mr. Stanton, the Attorney-General, kindly volunteered to bear in person and without lapse of time to the President. In a short time afterwards Mr. Stanton returned to inform me that he had carried the note to the President's house, but, for a reason not necessary here to state, he could not see the President, but had placed it in the hands of his servant to be delivered at the earliest opportunity. The reply of the President reached me at half-past 11 o'clock that night. In the interim I had despatched by telegraph to Judge Robertson the information I had collected, and upon the opening of the Telegraph office the next morning, (Saturday,) the material part of the President's reply relating to the sailing of the Brooklyn, viz., that she had gone on an errand of "mercy and relief," and that she was not destined to South Carolina. The orders for the sailing of the ship, as will be seen, were issued before I reached Washington. After receiving the letter, and willingly adopting the most favorable construction of its expressions, I resolved to remain in Washington until after Monday, when the Message would go to the two Houses. I listened to its reading in the Senate with pleasure.

The following is the letter of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Tyler relative to the steamer Brooklyn:

                                                             January 25,1861.

MY DEAR SIR: I have just received your note. The orders were given to the Brooklyn, I believe, on Monday or Tuesday last; certainly before your arrival in this city. She goes on an errand of mercy and relief. If she had not been sent it would have been an abandonment of our highest duty. Her movements are in no way connected with South Carolina. Your friend, very respectfully.

The resolutions of Virginia were sent to Congress accompanied by a Message, in which the President expressed his gratification on the occasion and his views of his own position. (See page 178.) It is manifest that from the 3d of December to this period, the views of the Government had been openly and constantly asserted relative to its position. In the Message of the President at the commencement of the session of Congress; in the correspondence with the retiring secretaries, and with the three commissioners from South Carolina; in the Message of the 8th of January; in the correspondence with Commissioner Hayne; in the interview with ex-President Tyler, and the subsequent Message to Congress, and in the speech of Secretary Dix at Union Square, the Government appears firm and steadfast, and unchangeable in its position of forbearance and conciliation, refusing all pledges, and determined to use military force if any violence should be manifested against its authority. Under such a state of facts, it is difficult to conceive of any grounds to sustain the implication contained in the Message of President Lincoln to Congress, on the 4th of July, in which he thus speaks of the reënforcement of Fort Pickens:

"An order was at once directed to he sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received just ono week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was, that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred from tho. Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the late Administration, (and of the existence of which the present Administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention,) had refused to land the troops."

So President Davis, in his Message to the Confederate Congress on the 20th of July, thus refers to these remarks of President Lincoln:

"Fortunately for truth and history, however, the President of the United States details with minuteness the attempt to reenforce Fort Pickens, in violation of an armistice, of which he confessed to have been informed, but only by rumors, too vague and uncertain to fix the attention of the hostile expedition despatched to supply Fort Sumter."

It is worth while to note how far the position of the Administration responded to the public sentiment of the country at this time. Congress was in session. Numerous propositions for an adjustment of difficulties were under consideration in the House. A less Page 709 number were awaiting the action of the Senate, and particularly the Crittenden Compromise. No progress was made in the bill to give the President men and money. The Peace Conference had just convened; Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri were represented in that body, indicating a strong and powerful sentiment in favor of a peaceful solution of the difficulties in that very portion of the country whose sympathies were with the South in preference to the North —and who were certain, if a violent division must come, to join the South. New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Cincinnati, the largo centres of wealth, demanded a course of conciliation and compromise. New Jersey, and a large portion of all the Middle and Western States opposed coercive measures, and were ready to make sacrifices to preserve the Union, although, if a violent division came, their first sympathies were with the North, and were sure to place them in array against the South. Even in Faneuil Hall, at Boston, on the 4th of February the following resolution was adopted:

Resolved, That this meeting depends for the return of the seceding States and the permanent preservation of the Union on conciliatory counsels, and a sense of the benefits which the Constitution confers on all the States of the Confederacy, and not on military coercion; and that it shrinks with horror from the thought of civil war between the North and South.

Such was the nature of all the active measures proposed in the existing state of affairs. Meantime, the Legislatures of New York and Ohio had passed resolutions, tendering to the Government all their resources in men and money for its support. But it was not expected that these would be called for unless some hostile and violent act was committed by the secessionists against the authority of the Government. Nevertheless, it was soon apparent that no party to the difficulty could succeed in procuring an acquiescence in all the constitutional and legislative arrangements it might deem necessary to secure a pacification of the others on the question of slavery. The Government seemed to be threatened with overthrow on points rather of political punctilio than practical concern. On the one hand, the Republicans insisted that they could not and would not listen to any terms of pacification at a time when the people of a portion of the Southern States stood with arms in their hands, and in the attitude of practical rebellion against the Federal Government. On the other hand, the Southern leaders justified their revolutionary proceedings on the ground that a portion of the Northern States had nullified the Constitution and laws of the land by the passage of their personal liberty laws, (see PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS,) and violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the civil compact existing between the States by the election of a "sectional" candidate to the Presidency. The Republicans also sturdily refused to give any consideration to propositions involving the assumption that there could be, under the particular sanction of Federal law, any thing like property in man. The Southern leaders, on the contrary, contended that property in slaves should, in all Federal relations, be placed on the same footing as any other property. To the former, the paramount idea appeared now to be the recognition of the slave only as a person. To the latter the paramount idea appeared to be the recognition of the slave only as property. The fact was, and still is, that the slave in the different relations which he sustains, is both a person and property, and in the former of these characters, he counts as a modified element of political power recognized in the Constitution of the United States. But in the excitement and turbulence of the hour, reason and common sense were lost sight of, and these hair-splitting discriminations engrossed the attention even of Congress itself. Neither party to these views appear on the record of events, as having performed at this time any act aiming directly and solely to the restoration of peace and union throughout the country. Amid such conflicts, by which the Union men of the Border States were paralyzed, the term of Mr. Buchanan's Administration closed. The original national drama was over. The curtain had fallen. The nature of the new period of existence to be opened on the morrow no man comprehended.


Source: The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.