The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.

United States Army Operations, 1862, Part 7

After the battle at Corinth and the pursuit of the Confederate force, the troops of General Grant returned to their respective positions. General Rosecrans, on the 25th of October, was ordered from Corinth to Cincinnati to take command of the forces preparing for a new campaign. On the 4th of November the forces of General Grant advanced from Jackson and Bolivar to Lagrange, 3 miles east of Grand Junction on the Cairo and New Orleans railroad. The scattered forces of Generals Van Dorn and Price had rallied and were within 20 miles of the same place, at Cold Water and Holly Springs, Mississippi. Their numbers had not been increased by reënforcements, but they had been rendered more effective by concentration. The forces of General Grant had been slightly increased by the new levies. His army was required to garrison Columbus, Humboldt, Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, and Grand Junction, and was now designated as the army of west Tennessee. The position of the army was unchanged until near the end of November. It required reënforcements and supplies. Active efforts were made to repair the Memphis railroad in order that supplies might be brought from that point instead of Columbus in Kentucky. The distance to the latter place is 138 miles, and to the former, from Lagrange, 49 miles. On the south a small body of troops was thrown forward a few miles to Davis's Mills, and on the west a heavy force had been stationed at Moscow. On the 28th, however, the advance of General Hamilton's corps began to move in the direction of Holly Springs, which place was reached on the 29th. By the 1st of December, General Grant's forces had arrived and were chiefly encamped at Lumpkin's Mills, south of Holly Springs, and 7 miles north of the Tallahatchie river. The Confederate force had retired to the river. At the same time that the movement was commenced from Davis's Mills, a division of General Curtis's army left Helena,

Page 157  Arkansas, for the purpose of making a flank movement on the Confederate force on the Tallahatchie and getting in their rear, and thus cutting off their retreat while the main army advanced upon them. On the river extensive fortifications had been thrown up as if for the purpose of making a determined stand against the progress of the Federal army. These, however, were abandoned on December 1 by General Van Dorn, and his forces retired farther south. It was supposed that information of the flank movement from Helena led to the evacuation of his strong position on the Tallahatchie. On the 2d his rear guard passed through Abbeville, and on the 3d through Oxford, with some sharp skirmishes with the Federal advance. On the 4th General Grant's headquarters were at Oxford. The main body of the army was at Abbeville. As it advanced, the bridges and culverts of the railroad were" repaired, the track restored, and the cars run. At the same time the Confederate force continued to fall back toward Grenada, presenting only a strong rear guard.

Meantime the expedition from Helena abovementioned, moved on the 27th of November with seven thousand men under General Alvin P. Hovey. On the next day he crossed the Tallahatchie. The passage was disputed by Confederate pickets without loss. On the 30th a second skirmish occurred at the Yacknapatapha, after the crossing of which the Confederate forces retired toward Coffeeville. The next movement of General Hovey was to cut the Mississippi Central railroad and the telegraph line. The railroad line was destroyed for a considerable distance. The Confederate communication on the Mississippi and Tennessee railroad for a short distance was next cut near Panola, by a cavalry force sent out by General Hovey under Colonel Washburn. In executing this order, on December 1, Colonel Washburn unexpectedly encountered a cavalry force near Oakland, on the Mississippi and Tennessee railroad, and a sharp skirmish ensued. The superiority of the Federal artillery soon put an end to it, and the Confederate forces retired in the direction of Coffeeville, with a loss of five killed, several wounded, and about fifty taken prisoners. The loss of Colonel Washburn was fifteen men wounded and fifteen horses killed. The steamboats and small craft on the Tallahatchie river were destroyed, and two locomotives and some cars on the railroad, and the expedition then returned to Helena. The effect of this movement was to cause the Confederate force under General Pemberton to fall back from the Tallahatchie, evacuate Grenada, and retire toward Canton, under the impression that the entire command of General Grant was very strong. The effect of the return of this force to Helena was to restore the confidence of the Confederate general Van Dorn, and an attack upon General Grant's rear, in order to cut off his supplies, was immediately organized, and on the 20th, while General Grant's headquarters were at Oxford, an attack by surprise was made on the garrison at Holly Springs, thirty miles north, by a considerable force of cavalry, to whom the place was surrendered. The prisoners were paroled, the immense stores collected there for General Grant's army were destroyed, also a large quantity of cotton which had been purchased of the people in the vicinity. On the same day a similar attack was made at Davis's Mills, a little farther north, which was bravely repulsed. Near Jackson, in Tennessee, previously the headquarters of General Grant, an attack was made on the 19th by a body of cavalry with artillery, under Colonel Forrest. It was first made upon a train loaded with wood. The telegraph wire was also cut,

This page contains a map of New Orleans- Mississippi River Area.

Page 158 and the road destroyed. On the next day Humboldt was captured, and an attack was made on Trenton, which was soon surrendered by Colonel Fry in command. The railroad depot was burned with all the stores and cotton in it. Other stations on the road, as Dyer, Rutherford, and Keaton, were taken on the same day. The purpose was to destroy every bridge on the railroad from Columbus to Corinth and Grand Junction, and "thus cut off the route for supplies to General Grant's army. The consequence of destroying his depot of supplies, and disturbing his line of communication, was to make General Grant fall back upon Holly Springs. Subsequently Colonel Forrest's force was entirely routed by Colonel Sweeney.

Meanwhile troops had been collected at Cairo and Memphis, for an expedition against Vicksburg. This had been done within the department of General Grant, and the commander of the expedition, General Sherman, was stationed at Memphis in the same department, and under the command of General Grant. It was an object of General Grant's movements into Mississippi, just related, to reach Jackson in the rear of Vicksburg, and thus cooperate with General Sherman. In this design he was unsuccessful, and obliged to fall back in consequence of the attacks on his line of communication. After falling back upon Holly Springs, a division of his troops was sent to join General Sherman. The future proceedings of General Grant and of this Expedition properly belong to the record of 1863.

The second campaign in Kentucky and Tennessee during the year was virtually ended. The forces of General Grant were reduced by a detachment of ten thousand men to aid General Sherman in the capture of Vicksburg, which was a part of the new campaign.

Meanwhile the calls of the President for six hundred thousand additional troops were producing their effect. Vast forces were gathering, and new campaigns were about to commence. The great march of the Northwest sweeping everything before it to the Gulf of Mexico, was now to be made. The Government had found that the Western people would bear no longer with its futile efforts to open the Mississippi and to seize the Southern valley. "What we need," said President Lincoln, "is a military success; " money and men had been promptly furnished to the full extent of the request.

This new campaign contemplated the advance of a powerful army under General Rosecrans through Tennessee into Alabama; the movement of a military and naval expedition from Cairo upon Vicksburg; the cooperation of an expedition under General Banks from Now Orleans, and thence into Texas; and an advance from Missouri upon Arkansas; and also from Kansas upon the Indian country and northern Texas. Thus the Federal Government would not only open the Mississippi river, but occupy all the Southwestern States, and reduce the Confederate forces to the limits of the Atlantic States.

On the 25th of October, General Rosecrans was ordered to Cincinnati to take command of the army of the Ohio, as already stated. This command consisted of what remained of the splendid army of General Buell, reenforced by new but raw levies, until it became the second army in size of the United States. The preparation for his campaign was no ordinary effort.

The new troops were to be drilled, disciplined, and made reliable; equipments, arms, horses, and stores of every kind were needed.

The country in which he proposed to march had just been swept of its forage by two armies—that of General Buell, and that of General Bragg. His supplies must come from the States of the Northwest. Only two routes existed for their conveyance: the Cumberland river, which was at too low a stage of water for successful navigation, and the Louisville and Nashville railroad, on which the bridges had been burned, and the tunnel at Gallatin destroyed. The work of preparation and organization was vigorously begun, and his army soon began to move southward. On the 1st of November General Rosecrans moved to Bowling Green, and on the 5th three divisions of General McCook's corps moved farther on their way to Tennessee.

The commanders of the corps of the whole army were Generals Thomas, McCook, Rousseau, and Crittenden. On the 7th the corps of General McCook passed through Nashville.

The Louisville and Nashville railroad was completed on the 8th to Mitchellsville on the northern line of Tennessee. On the 10th, General Rosecrans arrived at Nashville, and from that time to the close of the year he was constantly engaged in concentrating, reorganizing, reequipping, and disciplining his army, accumulating supplies by the railroad, of which there was only a single track, and preparing for a forward movement. As early as the 25th of November, the Confederate army manifested a purpose to contest the occupation of middle Tennessee. The railroad bridge at Bridgeport was repaired and troops hurried to Murfreesborough. General Joseph Johnston had been placed in command of this Confederate department, although unable to engage in active field operations. The Confederate forces were stationed at Lavergne, Murfreesborough, McMinnville, &c. Their numbers, under General Bragg, were estimated at forty-five thousand effective men. He had been led to believe by the spies of General Rosecrans that the latter intended to go into winter quarters at Nashville, and had despatched one body of cavalry under General Forrest to cut off General Grant's communication, and another body under Colonel Morgan to cut the communication of General Rosecrans in Kentucky, and also a body of infantry to the Confederate army of Mississippi. This appeared to be the opportunity for General Rosecrans to strike an effective blow. At this time, the Federal army Page 159 occupied a line of about ten miles on the southeasterly front of Nashville facing south, the right resting on the right of the Franklin turnpike, the centre extending out to Breakville on the Nolinsville turnpike, and the left covered by Mill Creek, some six or eight miles from Nashville, with outposts describing an irregular semicircle, covering a distance of nine miles from the city. To this front the Confederate army presented its force with outposts about two miles distant. General E. Kirby Smith's corps, with part of Colonel Morgan's cavalry, occupied the Confederate right; the corps of General Polk, with Colonel Wheeler's cavalry brigade, occupied the centre at Lavergne; General Hardee's corps at Triune and Nolinsville, with Colonel Wharton's cavalry in front, occupied the left. On the night of the 25th, Christmas, the determination for an advance the next day was made. The respective columns were so disposed as to move down Wilson's, the Nolinsville, Murfreesborough, and Jefferson turnpikes. The general plan was to move a brigade down Wilson's turnpike to protect the right, while General Negley should endeavor to turn the Confederate left and get into its rear; General McCook’s corps was to press directly upon General Hardee at Nolinsville and Triune, while General Crittenden pushed down the Murfreesborough and Jefferson turnpikes. At dawn on the 26th, the troops broke up camp with wild shouts and poured along the highways. General McCook's corps marched steadily down the road with skirmishers widely spread out. The Confederates resisted sharply, but were steadily driven, the Federal loss being small. General Crittenden advanced to Lavergne without opposition. The Confederates retired rapidly before his skirmishers. On the next day, the 27th, the Confederate force continued to retire as the Federals advanced with sharp skirmishing. At four o'clock p. k., the Confederate right had been driven over the bridge across Stewart's Creek, on the Jefferson turnpike, which they were prevented from destroying. They were also driven over the bridge across the same creek on the Murfreesborough turnpike so rapidly as to be unable to destroy it. Both structures came into the possession of the Federal forces, all the columns of which had now closed up. It was now apparent from the course of the Confederate retreat that their purpose was to concentrate near Stone Creek or river. On Sunday the 28th, General Thomas advanced his camp across Stewart's Creek, and joined the left. Next day, General McCook moved within seven miles of Murfreesborough, and General Crittenden moved within three miles, General Negley advanced to the centre, and General Rousseau's division was placed in reserve, on the right of General Crittenden. On the 30th, General McCook advanced through thickets, stubbornly resisted by the Confederates, and pressed General Hardee's corps in his front in line of battle. The front of this Confederate corps crossed the Federal right obliquely, in a position which, if extended, would flank it. The centre, under General Negley, was slightly advanced into a cedar wood, and was engaged in reconnoitering under sharp resistance, and in cutting roads through the dense forest to open communication with the right. The left was in a line corresponding with the course of Stone river. The right division of General McCook now faced to the southeast, and two brigades were thrown out on the extreme right, somewhat in reserve. The Confederate force was concentrated within two miles of Murfreesborough, with its right resting on the Lebanon turnpike, thence extending west across Lytle's Creek and the Nashville turnpike, and under the command of General Leonidas Polk. It consisted of three divisions under Generals Cheatham, Breckinridge, and Buckner. The Confederate centre was composed of three divisions of General E. Kirby Smith; the left was under the command of General Hardee, and rested on the Franklin and Murfreesborough road. This position of the Confederate army gave to it the advantage of strong natural fortifications, with their centre effectually masked by almost impenetrable cedar forests. Constant skirmishing was going on between both forces, and it was manifest that another day would witness the impending battle. At this time assaults were made by cavalry on the Federal rear, and several trains were captured. During the night it was evident that the Confederate forces were massing on the right of General Rosecrans, and his plan was formed to give ground a little, if necessary, on that wing, and to advance the left at the same time into Murfreesborough. The execution of this purpose was prevented by the great force of the Confederate attack on the right.

Early on the morning of the 31st, the attack was made along the entire line of the Federal right under General McCook. The weather was foggy, and the appearance of the Confederate force was sudden. No preparations up to this time for an advance or an assault had been made. An attack very early in the morning had been anticipated; but as it did not come, a degree of carelessness and indifference had taken possession of both officers and men, and all precautions were in a degree abandoned. The opposing lines of the two hostile wings had formed on the opposite sides of a valley which narrowed toward the Federal left. General McCook’s corps consisted of three divisions which formed this line. On the left was the division of General Sheridan, in the centre that of General Davis, and on the right that of General Johnson. The attack was made along the entire front at once by the Confederate force, rapidly advancing in double columns. Before the divisions of Generals Johnson and Davis could form, the Confederate batteries opened upon them, and their infantry soon after became engaged at short range, rapidly advancing and preparing to charge bayonets. Two batteries of General Johnson's division were taken before a gun was fired; and the irregular fire of Page 160 the others, many of which had no horses near at hand, and the desultory fire of the incomplete line did not cause the Confederate line to waver, much less repulse it. One brigade of General Johnson's was broken and fled to the rear, leaving the artillery they should have supported, and the men were shot down at the guns. The rest of the division fell back, and with them a few of the guns. The line of General Davis's division, which was attacked at the same time, was also imperfectly formed. In vain it attempted to hold its position. Like that of General Johnson, it was crushed and broken, and three entire batteries lost. The division of General Sheridan, when first assailed, withstood the shock, and forced back the Confederate line; but when the division of General Davis was driven back it stoutly resisted, and endeavored to hold the position until the others could be rallied in the rear, and advanced to its support. The effort, however, was unsuccessful, and like the others, his division retreated. The divisions of Generals Johnson and Davis had in the mean time formed in the rear, and endeavored to stay the Confederate progress. They were unsuccessful, but maintained their line and fell back in good order, and again formed at the first good position. In like manner General Sheridan proceeded. No guns were captured after the first assault, and the mass of prisoners was taken during this retreat. The object of General Bragg was to turn the right flank, but this failed. General Rosecrans, on the other hand, prepared to stop the progress of the Confederates on his right, without exposing his centre and left to immediate danger. His left wing could not be advanced to Murfreesborough, because his right was gone. He, therefore, massed his artillery upon his centre, at the probable point of assault. These movements were concealed by forests, and were unperceived by the enemy. General Negley now ordered forward the advance of the centre, consisting of two small brigades to protect the retreating forces of General McCook. These were supported by the division of General Rousseau, and served to check the Confederate force in its pursuit of the right wing. As the enemy approached these brigades, they retired slowly. The former, unsuspecting it to be a decoy, rushed forward, and were received with such a cross-fire of double shotted canister from two batteries and a volley from a brigade, as caused their line to waver for a moment. It dashed forward again. In the mean time General Rousseau had come up on the right of General Negley, and his regular troops on his left advanced at the moment when the right of the Confederate left wing dashed forward. The combined fire of General Negley's force and of the regular troops drove the Confederate main force back with terrible loss, and a large number of Confederate prisoners were taken. The struggle was maintained a few moments, when the Federal force under orders fell back, and the Confederate line, flushed with success, and consisting of their centre and right of left wing, rushed in overwhelming mass upon the batteries which had been so placed as to rake them in almost every direction. A horrible slaughter ensued. The Confederate line wavered, fell back, and attempted to rally. On another discharge, they fled from the fire which they could not face. Meanwhile General McCook had got into line on the right of General Rousseau, and received reinforcements of artillery, and was ready for another attack. The Confederate force had now fallen back, and a suspension of fire took place along the entire line. It was midday. The Federal line had been driven back between two and three miles, thirty pieces of artillery had been lost, and the dead and wounded with many prisoners were in Confederate hands. The spirit of the troops was still resolute.

These movements had somewhat changed the position of the Federal line. The left and centre recovered their position at right angles to the Murfreesborough road and across it. They extended from the river to the distance of a mile west of it. The right wing had fallen back until it was nearly parallel to this road, and extending from Stewart's Creek to the right of General Rousseau. The Confederate left was opposite the Federal right and a few hundred yards from it. In this position both of General Rosecrans's flanks were protected by streams with good bridges and fords in his rear.

About three o'clock, the battle opened again by a Confederate attack upon the Federal centre and left. Although this was made by largo masses, yet such was the favorable position occupied by the Federal line on a crest or ridge of ground, and such was the strength of its batteries that no advantage was gained by the Confederates. The slaughter on both sides was great and the contest very determined. It continued until five o'clock when the exhausted armies suspended operations for the night. This was so clear and beautiful that some batteries continued their fire. The result of the day was that the Federal right had been driven in almost upon the left, and a change of front had been made under fire, leaving in possession of the Confederate troops that part of the field. They also held the ground occupied in the morning by the Federal pickets on the left, which wing had receded to draw the Confederate troops on. During this time the communication to Nashville had often been cut off, and a strong force of Confederate cavalry had made a dash in the Federal rear within a mile of the front, and captured a considerable amount of hospital stores. The ammunition train of the right wing was twice captured and twice retaken. The Federal loss on that day was estimated at three thousand killed and wounded, twenty-five pieces of artillery, and a large number of prisoners. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was not less.

On Thursday the 1st of January, 1863, the line of General Rosecrans was restored to its Page 161 original position by the success of General McCook’s efforts to recover and hold it, on the third attempt. The division on the extreme left 'was also moved across Stone river. The position on the right wing was intrenched and the communications in the rear completed. On the morning of the 2d, sharp demonstrations were made along the whole Federal line by the Confederate army, but nothing serious was attempted until three o'clock in the afternoon. At that time the Confederate force burst in mass upon the division across Stone river, as if having discovered the intention of General Rosecrans to advance it in their rear. This attacking force consisted of their entire right wing. The three brigades of the Federal division under Colonel Beatty were prepared for the attack and stood their ground manfully, but the overwhelming force finally drove them back across the creek. General Negley's division, which had been formed in reserve ns if for this occasion, now advanced, supported by the division of General Davis and the pioneer battalion of Morton. The most bitter conflict of the battle now ensued. Both sides massed their batteries and used them with desperate vindictiveness. The Confederate line wavered and fell back. General Davis was ordered to cross the stream, and Colonel Sirwell of the 78th Pennsylvania, placing his hat on the point of his sword, led the way with a shout. Colonel Beatty's division followed. An overwhelming and irresistible charge was made on the Confederate line, and it broke and fled. A battery was captured, and a stand of colors. The entire division of General Negley followed up rapidly, and General Rosecrans's whole line immediately advanced. The Confederate right wing was now broken, and the Federal force was gaining the Confederate flank, when resistance on its part became vain and the entire force receded with the loss of many prisoners. The next morning found the Federal line intrenched in its advanced position, but a storm was raging. Quiet prevailed through the day, excepting one or two conflicts resulting in the capture of a confederate breastwork. On the next morning the Confederate army had retired from Murfreesborough, which was subsequently occupied by General Rosecrans. Two divisions were soon sent forward in pursuit of the forces of General Bragg, who fell back to Tullahoma. The Federal loss was 8,485 killed and wounded, and 8,600 missing. The Confederate loss is not known.

The original plan of General Rosecrans to turn the right of the Confederate army and cut off its retreat, was entirely defeated by the failure of the right wing to maintain itself. The subsequent movements of the army of the Cumberland, properly belong to the history of the year 1863.

The conclusion of the campaign in Virginia remains to be described. Immediately after the battle of Antietam, the Confederate army retired across the Potomac and occupied strong positions on its right bank. All hopes that the State of Maryland would unite her destinies with the Southern Confederacy were now banished. The invasion had been made by crossing, the Potomac within a limit of twelve miles, which is about a mile above the Point of Rocks and five miles below the Monocacy aqueduct on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. The army then marched through fields, woods, and roads for Frederick. The line of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal for twelve miles presented a scene of desolation. It was tapped at five places. Several floodgates were cut to pieces, and from heights above large boulders of rock were dislodged and thrown into the canal. An unsuccessful attempt was made to blow up the aqueduct at Monocacy. The telegraph lines and the track of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad were much injured. The bridge at Monocacy and portions of the abutments were destroyed. Private property did not escape. Fences were torn down and fields laid desolate.

The influence produced by the activity of the militia of Pennsylvania in responding to the call of the governor to aid in the defence of that State, is acknowledged by General McClellan in the following letter:

                          HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

                                         SHARPSBURG, September 27, 1862.

GOVERNOR: I beg to avail myself of almost the first moment of leisure I have had since the recent battles to tender to you my thanks for your wise and energetic action in calling out the militia of Pennsylvania for its defence, when threatened by a numerous and victorious army of the enemy. Fortunately circumstances rendered it impossible for the enemy to set foot upon the soil of Pennsylvania, but the moral support rendered to my army by your action was none the less mighty.

In the name of my army and for myself I again tender to you our acknowledgments for your patriotic course. The manner in which the people of Pennsylvania responded to your call and hastened to the defence of their frontier no doubt exercised a great influence upon the enemy.

I am, very respectfully and sincerely, yours,      

                                       GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

                                                  Major-General U. S. Army.

    His excellency A. G. Curtis,

                     Governor of Pennsylvania.

The army of General McClellan remained on the north bank of the Potomac in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Harper's Ferry. On the 1st of October it was visited by President Lincoln, who was cordially received and tarried until the 4th. On the 7th General McClellan issued the following order relative to the Proclamation threatening emancipation of the Southern slaves:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OR THE POTOMAC, October 7, 1862.

General Order, 163.—The attention of the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac is called to General Orders, No. 139, War Department, September 24, 1862, publishing to the army the President's proclamation of September 22.

 A proclamation of such grave moment to the nation, officially communicated to the army, affords to the General commanding an opportunity of defining specifically to the officers and soldiers under his command the relation borne by all persons in the military service Page 162 of the United States toward the civil authorities of the Government.

The Constitution confides to the civil authorities— legislative, judicial, and executive—the power and duty of making, expounding, and executing the Federal laws. Armed forces are raised and supported simply to sustain the civil authorities, and ore to be held in strict subordination thereto in all respects. The fundamental law of our political system is essential to the security of our republican institutions, and should be thoroughly understood and observed by every soldier.

The principle upon which and the objects for which armies shall be employed in suppressing rebellion must be determined and declared by the authorities, and the Chief Executive, who is charged with the administration of the national affairs, is the proper and only source through which the views and orders of the Government can be made known to the armies of the nation.

Discussion by officers and soldiers concerning public measures determined upon and declared by the Government, when carried beyond the ordinary, temperate, and respectful expression of opinion, tend greatly to impair and destroy the discipline and efficiency of the troops, by substituting the spirit of political faction for the firm, steady, and earnest support of the authority of the Government, which is the highest duty of the American soldier. The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls.

In thus calling the attention of this army to the true relation between the soldiers and the Government, the General commanding merely adverts to an evil against which it has been thought advisable during our whole history to guard the armies of the Republic, and in so doing he will not be considered, by any right-minded person, as casting any reflection upon that loyalty and good conduct which have been so fully illustrated upon so many battle-fields.

In carrying out all measures of public policy this army will, of course, be guided by the same rules of mercy and Christianity that have ever controlled its conduct toward the defenceless.

                                    By command of Major-General McCLELLAN.

                                                           Jas. A. Hardie, Lieut.-Colonel,

                                            Aide-de-Camp and Act'g Ass't Adj.-General.

On Monday night, October 10, a body of Confederate cavalry of about twenty-five hundred, under General Stuart, suddenly appeared at Chambersburg, Penn., and occupied the place. The Government storehouses and machine shops were burned by. them; also the Cumberland Valley railroad depot. On the next day General Stuart marched to Emmettsburg, thence to Woodsborough,1 New Market, and Monrovia, which place he reached early on Sunday morning. Thus far his force had gathered about one thousand horses. He next pushed for the Potomac, at Noland's Ford, at the mouth of the Monocacy; but finding a Federal force there, he divided his troops and crossed at different places, chiefly at Conrad's Ferry, and six miles below the Monocacy. The entire distance of his march north of the Potomac, was a little over ono hundred miles. A large number of Federal troops were put in motion to effect his capture, but without success. Reconnoissances made on the 16th and 17th discovered the Confederate army occupying a position extending from Bunker Hill to the Shenandoah river.

It had been expected that General McClellan would take the forces of General Pope's shattered army and march into Maryland and conquer the victorious Confederate force and pursue them even to Richmond. The inactivity of his army after the battle of Antietam became a subject of complaint. It was overlooked that the low water in the Potomac required time to line its north shore with troops to prevent another invasion of Maryland. It was overlooked that most of his troops had been in active service in the field during the previous six months, and might require most important supplies. On the 6th of October the following despatch was sent by the general-in-chief, General Halleck, to General McClellan:

                                       WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6,1862.

Major-General McClellan:

I am instructed to telegraph to you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operation, you can be reinforced with 80,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river. Also, to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I nm directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

                                      H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

According to the report of General Halleck, General McClellan disapproved of the plan of crossing the Potomac south of the Blue Ridge, and said that he would cross at Harper's Ferry and advance on "Winchester. The advance, however, did not take place until the 26th of October. It became the subject of speculation on the part of the public as to the real nature of the causes of delay. Subsequently, upon the removal of General McClellan from the command of the army, on the 7th of November, the following letter was published:.

                                                HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,      

                                                        WASHINGTON, October 28,1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

SIR: In reply to the general interrogatories contained in your letter of yesterday; I have to report:

1st. That requisitions for supplies to the army under General McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefs of bureaus here; that is, for quartermasters' supplies, by his chief quartermaster on the Quartermaster-General; for commissary supplies, by his chief commissary on the Commissary-General, Ac. No such requisitions have been, to my knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none upon the General-in-Chief.

2d. On several occasions General McClellan has telegraphed to me that his army was deficient in certain supplies. All these telegrams were immediately referred to the beads of bureaus, with orders to report. It was ascertained that, in every instance, the requisitions had been immediately filled, except one, where the Quartermaster-General had been obliged to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, tents, Ac, oof having a full supply here. There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neglect or delay, in any department or bureau, in issuing all supplies asked for by General McCELLAN, or by the officers of his staff. Delays have occasionally occurred in forwarding supplies Page 163 by rail, on account of the crowded condition of the depots, or of a want of can; but whenever notified of this, agents have been sent out to remove the difficulty. Under the excellent superintendence of General Haupt, I think these delays have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is usual with freight trains. An army of the size of that under General McClellan will frequently be for some days without the supplies asked for, on account of neglect in making timely requisitions and unavoidable delays in forwarding them and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments. From all the information I can obtain, I am of opinion that the requisitions from that army have been tilled more promptly, and that the men, as a general rule, have been better supplied than our armies operating in the West The latter have operated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation. In fine, I believe that no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours.

3d Soon after the battle of Antietam General McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements, in order that, if he moved between the enemy and Washington, reinforcements could be sent from this place. On the first of October, finding that he proposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantages of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the 6th of October he was peremptorily ordered to "cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good." It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since this order was given.

4th. In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side.

5th. On the 7th of October, in a telegram in regard to his intended movements, General McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the first, fifth, and sixth corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as* shelter tents. No complaint was made that any requisitions had not been filled, and it was inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies.

On the 11th he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies sent by rail had been delayed. As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint, and they reported that everything had gone forward. On the same date (the 11th) he spoke of many of his horses being broken down by fatigue. On the 12th he complained that the rate of supply was only "one hundred and fifty horses per week for the entire army there and in front of Washington."

I immediately directed the Quartermaster-General to inquire into this matter and report why a larger supply was not furnished. General Meigs reported on the 14th that the average issue of horses to General McClellan's army in the field and in front of Washington for the previous six weeks had been 1,459 per week, or 8,754 in all. In addition, that large numbers of mules had been supplied, and that the number of animals with General McClellan's army on the upper Potomac was over thirty-one thousand. He also reported that he was then sending to that army all the horses he could procure.

On the 18th General McClellan stated, in regard to General Meigs's report that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing:  General Meigs may have ordered these articles to be forwarded, but they have not reached our depot, and, unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is made by the department of which General Meigs is the head, they might as well remain in New York or Philadelphia, so far as this army is concerned." I immediately called General Meigs's attention to this apparent neglect of his department. On the 25th he reported, as the result of his investigation, that 48,000 pairs of boots and shoes had been received by the quartermaster of General McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and Hagerstown: that 20,000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry depot on the 21st; that 10,000 more were on their way, and 15,000 more ordered. Colonel Ingalls, aide-de-camp and chief quartermaster to General McClellan, telegraphed, on the 25th: "The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated, I think, and certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of regimental and brigade commanders." On the 24th he telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General that the clothing was not detained in cars at the depots: "Such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted. I have ordered more than would seem necessary from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions, so far as clothing is concerned. Our department is not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I foresee no time when an army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles."

In regard to General McClellan's means of promptly communicating the wants of his army to me or to the proper bureaus of the War Department, I report that, in addition to the ordinary mails, he has been in hourly communication with Washington by telegraph.

It is due to General Meigs that I should submit herewith a copy of a telegram received by him from General McClellan.

          Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                               H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

                                  Received, October 22,1862—9 40 p m.

From McLellan’s Headquarters.

To Brigadier-General Meigs: Your despatch of this date is received. I have never intended, in any letter or despatch, to make any accusation against yourself or your department for not furnishing or forwarding clothing as rapidly as it was possible for you to do. I believe that everything has been done that could be done in this respect. The idea that I have tried to convey was, that certain portions of the command were without clothing, and the army could not move until it was supplied.

                                                    G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General

Nothing has been made public on the part of General McClellan alluding to or explaining the causes of the delay of the movements of the army. Strict justice requires that, in estimating the importance of the preceding letters, the testimony of General Burnside on a subsequent page should be considered. It was generally understood that (Jen. McClellan's movement was delayed by the want of clothing and other supplies, and especially on account of his deficiency in cavalry and artillery horses. The purchase and forwarding of these was going on even up to the day of his crossing the Potomac. One army corps did not receive its clothing until it had commenced its inarch in Virginia. It was stated by several commanders that they made every effort to get the clothing for their troops, repeatedly sent teams to the railroad depots for it, and until a short time previous to the marching of the army they were invariably told that the clothing had not arrived.

Early on the 26th of October a cavalry force, under Colonel Pleasanton, crossed the Potomac on the now pontoon bridge at Berlin, and moved on in the direction of Purcellville. Soon after the corps of General Burnside began to cross in light marching order, followed by an immense train of wagons, and took a position near Lovettsville. On the next day a heavy reënforcement joined him. About the same Page 164 time the Confederate force prepared to abandon the line of the Potomac and to fall back. The crossing of the Federal troops was now constant, until the entire army was south of the river. On the 80th of October General Sedgwick advanced from Bolivar Heights, and crossed the Shenandoah in the direction of Shannondale, and General Hancock pushed forward, pressing on the Confederate lines in front of Charlestown. General Burnside moved along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, followed by the corps of General Porter.

The situation of the respective forces nt this time was as follows: The Federal army reenforced by the divisions of Generals Sigel and Sickles, who had advanced from "Washington, occupied all the region cast of the Blue Ridge, with the right resting ou Harper's Ferry, and the left extending nearly to Paris, on the road from Aldie to Winchester. The centre was at Snickersville; with Snicker's Gap in its possession. The Confederate line was on the south side of the Blue Ridge, with the Shenandoah river immediately in its front, extending from Front Royal down to Charlestown, with the great body of their troops massed between Berryville and Winchester. On the 4th Ashby's Gap was occupied without opposition by the Federal troops. The cavalry corps, under Colonel Pleasanton, pushed on from Piedmont, and occupied Marguette, holding the approaches to Manassas and Chester Gap, on the left side of the Blue Ridge. The condition and spirit of the army at this time were unequalled by that of any force before organized. On the 6th General McClellan's headquarters were at Rectortown near Front Royal. The army was steadily advancing and the Confederate force falling back, with some skirmishing. Warrenton was occupied by the Federal troops on the same day. On the 7th a severe snow storm commenced, and continued i throughout the day. On the 8th the bridge at Rappahannock Station was taken and held by General Bayard. On the night of the 7th, near midnight, General Buckingham arrived, from Washington, at General McClellan's tent, and delivered to him an order from President Lincoln, to surrender the command of the army to General Burnside, and to report himself immediately at Trenton, the capital of the State of New Jersey. This order was entirely unexpected by General McClelan, and probably by every officer of the army. The only reasons for it which have officially appeared, will be found in the above letter of General Halleck, dated October 28, which was given to the public a few days after this removal.

General McClellan immediately wrote the following address to his troops preparatory to his departure:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

CAMP NEAR RECTORTOWN, VIRGINIA, November 7.

Officers and Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac:

An order of the President devolves upon Major-General Burnside the command of this army. In parting from you I cannot express the love and gratitude I bear to you. As au army yon have grown up in any care. In you I hare never found doubt or coldness. The battle you have fought under my command will probably live in our Nation s history. The glory you have achieved over mutual perils and fatigues; the graves of our comrades fallen in battle and by disease; the broken forms of those whom wounds and sickness hare disabled; the strongest associations which can exist among men unite us by an indissoluble tie. We shall ever be comrades in supporting the Constitution of our country and the Nationality of its people.

(Signed)                           GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

                                                      Major-General U. S. A.

The next day was devoted by General McClellan to the transfer of his command to General Burnside. The most cordial feelings existed between the two officers, the latter of whom accepted a promotion which he had before twice declined, only upon the peremptory order of the War Department. On Sunday evening his officers assembled at his tent, for a final parting of commander and officers. It was such a scene of deep feeling as could occur only where officers reposed the highest confidence in their commander, who had led them successfully through some of the most fearful battles of modern wars. Monday was occupied in passing among the various camps, reviewing the troops, and taking a final leave of both officers and men. A spectator of these scenes has summed them up in these words:

"As General McClellan, mounted upon a fine horse, attended by a retinue of fine-looking military men, riding rapidly through the ranks, gracefully recognized and bid a farewell to the army, the cries and demonstrations of the men were beyond bounds—wild, impassioned, and unrestrained. Disregarding all military forms they rushed from their ranks and thronged around him with the bitterest complaints against those who had removed from command their beloved leader."

On the next day, the 10th, he withdrew, taking the railroad cars at Warrenton. On reaching Warrenton Junction a salute was fired.

The troops, which had been drawn up in line, afterward broke ranks, when the soldiers crowded around him and many eagerly called for a few parting words. He said in response, while on the platform of the railroad depot, "I wish you to stand by General Burnside as you have stood by me, and all will be well. Good-bye." To this there was a spontaneous and enthusiastic response. The troops were also drawn up in line at Bristow's Station and Manassas Junction, where salutes were fired and he was complimented with enthusiastic cheers. On reaching Washington he proceeded immediately to the depot, and passed on to Philadelphia and Trenton, where he arrived early on the 12th.

What was now the military aspect? The movement of General McClellan's army, after crossing the Potomac, was toward Gordonsville. This made a movement on the part of the Confederate general Lee necessary in order to prevent the Federal army from getting between him and Richmond. For this purpose he attempted to move from Winchester through the Page 165 gaps of the Pine Ridge to Culpeper. The larger part of his force had passed through, when the gaps were taken and held by General McClellan. At the same time General Sigel had advanced from Washington, and lay near the Blue Ridge, covering at once Washington, observing the gaps to the Rappahannock, and protecting the railroad communication, to that river. The bridge at Rappahannock Station had already been seized by the cavalry, under General Bayard. The available force of General McClellan was about one hundred and twenty thousand men; that of General Lee consisted of about sixty thousand able men at Culpeper and Gordonsville, and thirty thousand in the Shenandoah Valley, near Strasburg. The distance from Warrenton to Gordonsville is about fifty miles, and from Warrenton to the Rapidan, thirty-five miles; from Strasburg to Gordonsville, by Staunton and Charlottesville, one hundred and thirty-five miles; and by the only other practicable route, one northwest of Gordonsville, and perpendicular to General McClellan's line of advance, about one hundred miles. In his position it was necessary for General Lee to defend the line of the Rapidan, or endeavor to effect a junction with the force in the Shenandoah Valley, under General Jackson, or fall back upon Richmond, in a country without a line of defence, with General McClellan close upon him, leaving General Jackson to shift for himself. The defence of the Rapidan was impracticable from the course of the river from the Alexandria railroad to the Bine Ridge. The efforts to join General Jackson would have uncovered Richmond, and the attempt to fall back on Richmond would have at least hazarded the demoralization of his army, and enabled General McClellan to turn the defensible parts of the Rappahannock, and the line of the North Anna. The appointment of General Burnside was followed by the organization of a portion of the army into divisions, and a movement to concentrate it at Fredericksburg. On the 12th General Burnside issued the following address to the army:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, November 10, 1862.

In accordance with General Orders, No. 182, issued by the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. Patriotism, and the exercise of my every energy in the direction of this army, aided by the full and hearty cooperation of it3 officers and men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, insure its success.

Having been a sharer of the privations, and a witness of the bravery of the old Army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully identified with them in their feelings of respect and esteem for General McClellan, entertained through a long and most friendly association with him, I feel that it is not as a stranger I assume command.

To the 9th army corps, so long and intimately associated with me, I need say nothing. Our histories are identical. With diffidence for myself, but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and determination of the gallant army now intrusted to my care, I accept its control, with the steadfast assurance that the just cause must prevail.

              [Signed]                                A. E. BURNSIDE.

                                                     Major-General Commanding.

On the 12th the general-in-chief (Halleck) and General Meigs proceeded from Washington to the headquarters to confer with General Burnside. On the same day the advance of the army was across the Rappahannock and fifteen miles south of Warrenton. On the 14th General Burnside issued the following order reorganizing a portion of his army:

                     HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

                        WARRENTON (VIRGINIA), November 14, 1862

General Order, No. 184.

 First The organization of a portion of this army in three grand divisions is hereby announced. These grand divisions will be formed and commanded as follows:

The Second and Ninth Corps will form the right grand division, and will be commanded by Major-General . V. Sumner.

The First and Sixth Corps will form the left grand division, and will be commanded by Major-General W. Lt. Franklin.

The Third and Fifth Corps will form the centre grand division, and will be commanded by Major-General Joseph Hooker.

The Eleventh Corps, with such others as may hereafter be assigned to it, will constitute a reserve force, under the command of Major-General F. Sigel.

Assignments of cavalry and further details will be announced in future orders.

     By command of Major-General BURNSIDE.

                                                   S. Williams, A. A.-G.

A movement was made at this time by General Jackson for the purpose of detaching a portion of the army of the Potomac. He occupied all the roads west and north of Winchester as far as Big Cacapon Bridge on the northwestern turnpike, and from Pughtown to Bath and Hancock. He was thus looking westward, at the same time he was in a position to cross the Potomac. His movement failed to effect his design.

Meanwhile the mass of General Lee's forces retired to Gordonsville. On the 16th the forces of General Burnside began to move for Fredericksburg, as had been previously determined in consultation on the 12th between Generals Halleck and Burnside. On the 15th the evacuation of Warrenton and the adjacent places was commenced, and by the morning of the 18th it was entirely completed. The advance was led by General Sumner. At the same time supplies were sent to Aquia Creek, and the repairs of the railroad track to Fredericksburg commenced, and the army concentrated at Falmouth opposite Fredericksburg.

The march to Richmond, it appeared, was to be made by the route from Fredericksburg. This city is on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and sixty-five miles distant from Richmond. It is connected with the latter place by a railroad, of which there is a double line nearly to Hanover Junction, twenty-three miles from Richmond. The railroad crosses the Mattapony river at Milford, thirty-seven miles from Fredericksburg, and the Pamunkey, twenty-five miles from Richmond, besides a number of smaller streams. Between Falmouth, where the Federal army concentrated, and Richmond there are two main and two minor lines of defence Page 166 The first that of the Rappahannock river. Above Falmouth its abrupt banks, which are lined with high hills, difficult of access, and its narrow fords and rocky bottom render a rapid crossing for a large force almost impossible. Below, the valley of the river expands, spreading often into spacious plains, while the winding course of the stream forms numerous necks of land, easily commanded from the north side, and giving secure crossing places, and ample ground for the formation of troops. At Fredericksburg the north commands the south bank and much of the distance, which is a mile and a half, to the frowning hills or table land beyond. But these heights equally command this intermediate plain, and are unassailable in front except by infantry. Next in the rear and twelve miles distant, is the line of the Po river and Stannard's Marsh, which is hardly available except to hold a pursuing foe in check. The North Anna is about forty miles from the Rappahannock, and affords another principal line of defence. It is a deep and rapid stream, with a narrow valley. The table land on its north bank is about ono hundred feet above the bed of the river, and about one hundred and fifty on the south hank. The extension of its line after it turns to join the South Anna, and becomes the Pamunkey, presents scarcely less obstacles than the river itself, so well is the ground guarded by swamps and flanked by streams. The last and a minor line of defence is the South Anna river, with the southern commanded by the northern bank, and too near the North Anna for a second formation by a force that has been badly defeated. Numerous small streams parallel to the line of advance present suitable points for resistance, and protect foes attacking the line of communication, while the bridges over them are weak points necessary to be securely guarded. By the 20th a considerable force had reached Falmouth. General Sumner on the next day sent to Fredericksburg the following summons to surrender:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. November 21, 1862.

To the Mayor and Common Council of Fredericksburg:

GENTLEMEN: Under cover of the houses of your city shots have been fired upon the troops of my command.

Your mills and manufactories are furnishing provisions and materials for clothing for armed bodies in rebellion against the Government of the United States; your railroads and other means of transportation are removing supplies to the depots of such troops.

This condition of things must terminate, and by direction of General Burnside, I accordingly demand the surrender of the city into my hands, as the representative of the Government of the United States, at or before five o'clock this afternoon.

Failing an affirmative reply to this demand by the hour indicated, sixteen hours will be permitted to elapse for the removal from the city of women and children, the sick and wounded, and aged, &c.; which period having expired, I shall proceed to shell the town.

Upon obtaining possession of the city, every necessary means will be taken to preserve order and secure the protective operation of the laws and policy of the United States Government.

I am, very respectively your obedient servant,     

                                                         E. V. SUMNER,

                                             Brevet Major-General U. S. army,

                                           Commanding Eighth Grand Division.

In reply the mayor of the city, M. Slaughter, stated that the firing complained of occurred in the suburbs, and was the act of the Confederate officer in command, for which neither the citizens nor authorities were responsible. The other matters complained of, he said, should no longer exist, and proceeded thus: "The civil authorities of Fredericksburg have no control; but I am assured by the military authorities of the Confederate army near here that nothing will be done to infringe the conditions herein named, as to matters within the town; but the latter authorities inform us that, while their troops will not occupy the town, they will not permit yours to do so."

The late hour at which the summons was received rendered it impossible to remove the women and children in the time allowed.

The reply of General Sumner to the mayor was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT GRAND DIVISION. CAMP NEAR                FALMOUTH, November 21,1862.  

To the Mayor and Common Council of Fredericksburg:

Your letter of this afternoon is at hand, and in consideration of your pledge that the acts complained of shall cease, and that your town shall not be occupied by any of the enemy's forces, and our assertion that a lack of transportation renders it impossible to move the women, children, sick, wounded, and aged, I am authorized to say to you that our batteries will not open upon the town at the hour designated. General Patrick will meet a committee of representatives from your town to-morrow morning at nine o'clock at the Lacy House.

Very respectfully your obedient servant.

                                                              E. V. SUMNER,

                              Brevet Major-General Commanding Division.

An interview was subsequently held as above mentioned, which resulted in the following note from General Sumner:

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT GRAND DIVISION, November 22, 1862.

To the Mayor and Common Council, Fredericksburg:

I am authorized to say that so long as no hostile demonstration is made from the town it will not be shelled. I have also to say that there will be no firing upon the cars before 11 o'clock p. m. to-morrow.

I am, gentleman, your obedient servant,

                                                                  E. V. SUMNER,

                           Brevet Major-General U. S. A., Commanding.

The firing upon the cars of the railroad above mentioned was in consequence of the belief that they were used to remove military stores from Fredericksburg.

As General Burnside's army concentrated on the north bank, General Lee's forces concentrated on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg. Had the pontoon bridges required been nt hand when the advance reached Falmouth, the line of the Rappahannock would have been taken without opposition. Then, with proper supplies and bridges, thirty of the sixty miles to Richmond would have been placed within the reach of General Burnside, and perhaps a lodgment Page 167 have been effected on the banks of the North Anna. Nearly thirty days elapsed before the pontoons arrived and the bridges were completed. The ensuing military operations were investigated by a committee of Congress, before whom General Burnside testified as follows:

General Halleck came down to see me on the 11th of November. On the 9th I made out a plan of operations, in accordance with the order of General Halleck, which directed me not only to take the command, but also to state what I proposed to do with it. That plan I wrote on the morning of the 9th of November, and sent it by special messenger to Washington. I can furnish the committee a copy of that plan if they desire it I do not have it here now.

Question.—State the substance of it, if you please. That may do as well.

Answer.—I stated, in substance, that I thought it advisable to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Warrenton, to make a small movement across the Rappahannock as a feint, with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe we were going to march in the direction of Gordonsville, and then to make a rapid movement of the whole army to Fredericksburg, on this side of the Rappahannock.

As my reasons for that, I stated that the farther we got into the interior of Virginia, the longer would be our line3 of communication and the greater would be the difficulty we would have in keeping them open, as the enemy bad upon our right flank a corps that almost at any time could, by a rapid movement, seriously embarrass us. If we were caught by the elements so far from our base of supplies, and at the same time in the enemy's country, where they had means of getting information that we had not, it might, I thought, prove disastrous to the army, as we had but one Tine of railway by which to supply it.

In moving upon Fredericksburg we would all the time be as near Washington as would the enemy, and after arriving at Fredericksburg, we would be at a point nearer to Richmond than we would be even if we should take Gordonsville. On the Gordonsville line, the enemy, in our opinion, would not give us a decisive battle at any place this side of Richmond. They would defend Gordonsville until such time as they felt they had given us a check, and then with so many lines of railroad open to them, they would move upon Richmond or upon Lynchburg, and in either case the difficulty of following them would be very great.

In connection with this movement I requested that barges filled with provisions and forage should be floated to Aquia Creek, where they could easily be landed; that materials be collected for the reconstruction of the wharves there, and that all the wagons in Washington that could possibly be spared should be filled with hard bread and small commissary stores, and, with a large number of beef cattle, started down to Fredericksburg on the road by way of Dumfries; and that this wagon train and load of cattle should be preceded by a pontoon train large enough to span the Rappahannock twice. I stated that this wagon train could move in perfect safety, because it would be all the time between our army and the Potomac; or in other words our array would be all the time between the enemy and that train. But at the same time I said that if a cavalry escort could not be furnished from Washington, I would send some of my cavalry to guard the train.

On the morning of the 14th of November, feeling uneasy with reference to the pontoons, as I had not heard of their starting, I directed my chief engineer to telegraph again in reference to them.

He telegraphed to General Woodbury or to Major Spaulding. It subsequently appeared that that was the first they ever had heard of any wish to have the pontoon train started down to Fredericksburg, although the authorities in Washington bad had my plans sent to them on the 9th of November; and it had also been discovered by General Halleck and General Meigs, at my headquarters, on the night of the 11th and 12th of November; and after discovering it fully there, they sat down and sent telegrams to Washington, which, as I supposed, fully covered the case, and would secure the starting of the pontoon trains at once. I supposed, of course, that those portions of the plan which required to be attended to in Washington would be carried out there at once. I could have sent officers of my own there to attend to those matters, and perhaps I made a mistake in not doing so, as General Halleck afterward told me that I ought not to have trusted to them in Washington for the details.

In reply to the telegram I had ordered to be sent, General Woodbury telegraphed back that the pontoon train would start on Sunday morning probably, and certainly on Monday morning, which would have been on the 16th and 17th of November, and would have been in time. They did not, however, start until the 20th, and on that day it commenced raining, which delayed them so much and the roads became so bad that when they got to Dumfries they floated the pontoons off the wagons. We then sent to Washington for a steamer, and carried them down to Aquia Creek by water, sending the wagons around by land. The pontoons did not get here until the 22d or 23d of November.

On the 15th of November I started the column down the road to Fredericksburg, not knowing anything about the delay in the starting of the pontoons, because the telegram announcing the delay did not reach Warrenton Junction until I had left to come down here with the troops, and that telegram did not reach me until I arrived here on the morning of the 19th, when it was handed to me by an orderly who had brought it down to Warrenton Junction.

After reaching here I saw at once that there was no chance for crossing the Rappahannock with the army at that time. It commenced raining and the river before to rise—not to any great extent, but I did not know how much it might rise. There were no means of crossing except by going up to the fords, and it would be impossible to do that because of the inability to supply the troops after they should cross.

General Sumner, with his command, arrived here in advance. He sent to mc, asking if he should cross the river. He was very much tempted to take his own men across to Fredericksburg by a ford near Falmouth, as there was no enemy there except a very small force. I did not think it advisable that he should cross at that time.

The plan I had in contemplation was, if the stores and these bridges had come here as I expected, to throw Sumner's whole corps across the Rappahannock, fill the wagons with as many small stores as we could, and having beef cattle along for meat, then to make a rapid movement down in the direction of Richmond and try to meet the enemy and fight a battle before Jackson could make a junction there. We knew that Jackson was in the valley, and felt confident that there was force enough on the upper Rappahannock to take care of him. We felt certain that as soon as the enemy knew of our crossing down here, the force of Jackson would be recalled, and we wanted to meet this force and beat it before Jackson could come down on our flank and perhaps cripple us.

I had recommended that some supplies should be sent to the mouth of the Rappahannock with a view of establishing a department at Port Royal. After we had advanced to Fredericksburg, and after the first delay in starting the pontoons, I think they were sent as quickly as they could have been, and the supplies and quartermasters' stores have been always m' as great abundance as we could have expected, for after the 19th of November the roads were particularly bad. Horses and mules were sent down to us, so that our cavalry and teams were in very good condition.

After it was ascertained that there must be a delay, and that the enemy had concentrated such a force Page 168 as to make it very difficult to cross, except by a number of bridges, we commenced bringing up from Aquia Creek all the pontoons we could. After enough of them had been brought up to build the bridges, I called several councils of war to decide about crossing the Rappahannock. It was at first decided to cross at Shinker's Neck, about twelve miles below here, but our demonstration was simply for the purpose of drawing down there as large a force of the enemy as possible.

I then decided to cross here because, in the first place, I felt satisfied that they did not expect us to cross here but down below. In the next place I felt satisfied that this was the place to fight the most decisive battle, because if we could divide their forces by penetrating their lines at one or two points, separating their left from their right, then a vigorous attack with the whole army would succeed in breaking their army in pieces.

The enemy had cut a road along on the rear of the line of the heights where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour round through a bad country. I obtained from a colored man from the other side of the town information in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. 1 wanted to obtain possession of the new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting their lines in two. And then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front, and drive them out of the works.

By Mr. Gooch: Do I understand you to say that it was your understanding that General Halleck and General Meigs, while at your headquarters in Warrenton, and before you commenced the movement of your army, sent orders to Washington for the pontoons to be immediately forwarded to Falmouth?

Answer: That was my understanding, certainly.

Question: In your judgment, could the pontoons have been forwarded to you in time for you to have crossed the Rappahannock when you expected, if all possible efforts had been made by "those charged with that duty?

Answer: Yes, sir, if they had received their orders in time.

Question: Did the non-arrival of these pontoons at the time you expected prevent your crossing when you expected to cross and interfere with the success of your plans?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Thus it was the design of General Burnside that the pontoons should leave Alexandria on November 11, and arrive at Falmouth at the same time with the advance of his army. The right grand division reached Falmouth on November 17. The pontoons left Alexandria on November 19, and arrived at Fredericksburg after the movements of General Burnside had not only become known, but after General Lee had advanced his forces from Gordonsville to the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, and had fortified them. They were not used until the night of December 10.

A plan for the movements of General Burnside had now been arranged between President Lincoln, General Halleck, and himself, by which it was determined that the army should move across the Rappahannock at a certain place and at a certain time. This was departed from by General Burnside, who was induced to move the army across at a different place and at an earlier day. His reasons for this change he thus states in his report:

During my preparations for crossing at the place I had first selected, I discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down the river and elsewhere, thus weakening his force in front, and also thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg, and I hoped by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place to separate by a vigorous attack the forces of the enemy on the river below from the force behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, in which case we could fight him with the greatest advantage in our favor. To do this we had to gain a height on the extreme right of the crest, which height commanded a new road lately made by the enemy for the purpose of more rapid communication along his lines; which point gained, his position along the crest would have been scarcely tenable, and he could have been driven from them easily by an attack on his front in connection with a movement in rear of the crest.

During the night of the 10th of December, therefore, the pontoons were conveyed to the river, and the artillery to the number of one hundred and forty-three pieces was placed in position opposite the city. Between four and five o'clock on the morning of the 11th, the work of building four bridges was commenced. One was to he made at the point where the railroad bridge formerly crossed, and two others opposite the city but nearer Falmouth, and the fourth nearly two miles below for the crossing of the left wing under General Franklin. A dull haze so obscured the movement, that it was not discovered for some time by the Confederate pickets. The bridges were thus partly constructed, when a brisk and deadly fire of musketry from along the banks of the river and windows of the houses was opened, which compelled the workmen to stop. They fled to the cover of the surrounding hills where they formed again, and about six o'clock the work was recommenced. The Confederates had now become aroused to a sense of what was going forward, and with reinforcements of sharpshooters swarmed the opposite bank and houses. The pontonniers, nothing daunted by the hot fire poured upon them, went bravely to work. A storm of bullets covered them. The planks and boats were riddled by every volley. Once more they were compelled to withdraw, and again fell back to the cover of the ridge of hills running parallel with the river. Orders were now given to the artillery to open fire on the city. The Federal batteries commenced an almost simultaneous bombardment, directing their fire chiefly at the houses in which the sharpshooters had concealed themselves. At the first fire they became untenable, and the riflemen retreated to the rear of the town, and took shelter behind the buildings unharmed. The fire of the artillery, which commenced at seven o'clock, was continued incessantly until one o'clock. The fog somewhat obscured its results, but bodies of the Confederates with great stubbornness still kept within the city. The Confederate batteries on the heights in the rear continued silent. Not a gun was fired. About ten o'clock, the workmen were again formed for a third attempt to build the bridges. Volunteers Page 169 joined them from the 8th Connecticut. Some planks were seized and carried out to the end of a string of boats and placed in position, when a galling fire from sharpshooters in rifle pits near the edge of the water again interrupted them, and they were recalled. Meantime the bombardment was continued, and several houses in the city had taken fire. In the afternoon, several pontoon boats, loaded with volunteers from the 7th Michigan and 19th Massachusetts, were sent over. They chased the Confederate sharpshooters from their hiding places, and the bridges were finished without further interruption. On the other side a scene of destruction presented itself. The walls of houses were breached, roofs had fallen in, and the interiors were destroyed.

No sooner were the bridges completed than the troops began to cross, and before dusk General Sumner's grand division had gone over, and a section of General Hooker's. All had rations for three days, and blankets for a bivouac. The grand division of General Franklin, consisting of the corps of Generals Reynolds and Smith, crossed over at the lower bridge, which was built earlier in the day without interruption, as there was a plain before it which the artillery could easily have swept. The troops commenced crossing again early on the morning of the 12th without molestation. Some sharp resistance had been made by the Confederate soldiers to those who crossed on the previous day, but these were driven out of the city or killed. During the afternoon fire was opened upon the city by the Confederate batteries on the nearest heights, which was replied to by the Federal batteries, and soon ceased. The occupation of Fredericksburg had cow been successfully made. No greater opposition had been presented by the forces of General Lee than was sufficient to tempt the Federal troops to press forward with greater ardor.

The next movement was to drive the Confederate forces from their positions on the heights. These positions consisted of two lines of batteries, one a mile in rear of the other, and both overlooking the city. They extended, in the form of a semicircle, from Port Royal to a point about six miles above Fredericksburg. Their right wing, under General Jackson, extended from Port Royal to Guinney's Station on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad; the centre, under General Longstreet, extended to the telegraph road; the left, under General Stuart, was west of Massaponax Creek. A reserve corps was commanded by General A. P. Hill. This was the force which had fought at Richmond and in Maryland.

Friday night and Saturday morning, the 18th, were spent by General Burnside in making a proper disposition of his forces. The left was occupied by General Franklin with his grand division, the centre by General Hooker, and the right by General Sumner.

The right of General Franklin rested on the outskirts of the city, his centre was advanced about a mile from the river, and his left was on the Rappahannock, about three miles below. The action commenced on the extreme left by an annoying fire from a Confederate battery, which the 9th New York was ordered to charge and capture. In this attempt they were repulsed. A brigade was brought to their aid by General Tyler, and another attempt made, but the fire was so deadly that it failed of success. The battle now became more general, and another attempt was made to capture the battery. No advantage was gained at this time, but a severe loss was suffered. The conflict now extended along the whole line of the left, and a desperate effort was made to drive the Confederates across the Massaponax Creek by turning their position. The ground was contested most obstinately, but the Confederates gradually fell back, occasionally making a most desperate stand, until night, when General Franklin had succeeded in gaining nearly a mile, and his troops occupied the field. The right of General Franklin's division, under General Reynolds, encountered the fire of the Confederate artillery on the heights, and although the conflict was most deadly, no advantage was gained.

On the right, under command of General Sumner, the action commenced about ten o'clock and was furious during the rest of the day. The Confederate forces occupied the woods and hills in the rear of the city, from which it soon became evident they could not be driven except at the point of the bayonet. The charge was ordered to be made by the division of General French supported by that of General Howard. Steadily the troops moved across the plain, until they were within a dozen yards of the ridge, when they were suddenly met by a galling fire from the Confederate infantry posted behind a stone wall. For a few minutes the head of the column exhibited some confusion; but quickly forming into line it retired back to a ravine within musket shot of the Confederates. Here they were reenforced by fresh troops who fearlessly advanced to their aid under a most destructive fire of artillery. The line of assault was now formed again, and with bayonets fixed and a double-quick step, they rushed forward to seize the Confederate artillery. From the first step they encountered a terrific fire of infantry and artillery. No veterans could face that shock. They were thrown into confusion and brought to a sudden halt. At this juncture the centre quivered, faltered, and fled in disorder, but was afterward rallied and brought back. Three times was the attack thus made to dislodge those batteries. But each time it was in vain. The ranks of the storming party, shrunk to small limits, retired, The entire force of his artillery was now brought by General Sumner to bear upon the enemy, and thus the contest was kept up until dark. At night the Confederate force occupied their original position, and the wounded and the dead remained where they Page 170 had fallen. Every attempt to remove them by the Federal troops was defeated by the Confederate infantry.

In the centre, under the command of General Hooker, skirmishing commenced early in the morning; and during the forenoon, while the fog prevailed, a terrific contest, chiefly with artillery, was kept up on both sides. The Confederate position appeared to be invulnerable to artillery, and about noon preparations were made for storming it. The troops marched steadily up within musket shot of the batteries, and were there met by such a destructive fire of artillery and rifles as drove them back with a heavy loss. Reinforcements were obtained, and the attempt to take the batteries was repeated in the afternoon, but without success. The contest continued with great fierceness until night. About half past five the firing of . musketry ceased, but that of the artillery continued until long after dark.

On the next day, Sunday the 14th, both armies remained comparatively quiet. Some skirmishing and artillery fire took place for a short time. General Burnside sent the following despatch to President Lincoln early in the morning:

                                 HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC,

                       FOUR O'CLOCK, A. M., December 14.

The President: I have just returned from the field. Our troops are all over the river and hold the first ridge outside the town and S miles below. We hope to curry the crest to-day. Our loss is heavy—say 5,000.

                                                A. E. BURNSIDE,

                                           Major-General Commanding.

On Monday, both armies continued in the same position. The Confederates had strengthened some of their works. During the ensuing night, the army evacuated Fredericksburg and retired across the river to its former position. The artillery crossed first, followed by the infantry, the last of whom left about daylight. The pontoon bridges were then removed and nil communication cut oft'. The movement was not perceived by the Confederates until it was too late to do any injury to the retreating force. The following is the despatch of General Burnside announcing this movement:

                                     HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC,

                         SIX O'CLOCK P. M., December 16,1862.

Major-General Halleck: The army was withdrawn to this side of the river because I felt the position in front could not be carried, and it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse would have been disastrous to us. The army was withdrawn at night, without the knowledge of the enemy, and without Toss either of property or men.

                                                    A. E. BURNSIDE,

                                             Major-General Commanding.

The Federal loss was as follows: General Sumner's division on the right, killed, 473; wounded, 4,090; missing, 748, Total, 5,311,

General Hooker's division on the centre, killed, 326; wounded, 2,468; missing, 754. Total, 3,548.

General Franklin's division on the left, killed, 339; wounded, 2,547; missing, 576. Total, 8,462.

Grand total, killed, 1,138; wounded, 9,105; missing, 2,078. Total, 12,321.

The Confederate loss was comparatively small, having been sheltered by their works.

General Burnside, in his report to the general-in-chief, thus explains his defeat:

How near we came to the accomplishment of our object future reports will show. But for the fog, and the unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy 24 hours to concentrate his forces in his strong position, we would almost certainly have succeeded, in which case the battle would have been, in mv opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success. Failing in accomplishing the main object, we remained in order of battle two days, long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds to fight me with his infantry, after which we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, without the loss of men or property.

As the day broke our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade—not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.

To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing in the face of the enemy, I owe everything. For the failure in the attack, I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible.

To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayer for their comfort and final recovery.

The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible.

Thus closed the third campaign against Richmond. No further hostile demonstrations were made by either army during the year. On the 31st of December, the Confederate general Lee issued the following address to his troops:

            HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  

                                                                    December 21, 1862.

General Order, No. 38.

1. The General commanding takes this occasion to express to the officers and soldiers of the army his high appreciation of the fortitude, valor, and devotion displayed by them, which, under the blessing of Almighty God, have added the victory of Fredericksburg to the long lists of their triumphs.

An arduous march, performed with celerity under many disadvantages, exhibited the discipline and spirit of the troops and their eagerness to confront the foe.

The immense army of the enemy completed its preparations for the attack without interruption, and gave battle in its own time, and on ground of its own selection.

It was encountered by less than twenty thousand of this brave army, and its columns, crashed and broken, hurled back at every point with such fearful slaughter thot escape from entire destruction became the boast of those who had advanced in full confidence of victory.

The war is not yet ended. The enemy is still numerous and strong, and the country demands of the army a renewal of its heroic efforts in her behalf. Nobly has it responded to her call in the past, and she will never appeal in vain to its courage and patriotism. The signal manifestations of Divine mercy that have distinguished the eventful and glorious campaign of the year just closing, give assurance of hope that, under the guidance of the same Almighty hand the coming Page 171 year will be no leas fruitful of events that will insure the safety, peace, and happiness of our beloved country, and add new lustre to the already imperishable name of the Army of Northern Virginia,

                                             R. E. LEE, General.

As a part of the campaign against Richmond undertaken when General Burnside took command of the army in Virginia, the efforts which were made to cut the Confederate line of communication between Richmond and the southwestern States, should be stated. There are three lines of railroad running south and southwest. The one running southwest passes through southwestern Virginia, eastern Tennessee, northern Alabama, and connects with roads to western Tennessee and to New Orleans. One line running south connects Richmond with Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, and parts of Alabama. A southern line from Richmond, recently completed, passes through central North Carolina and South Carolina. By cutting the former of these roads at Cumberland Gap, reinforcements and supplies could not be brought from the southwest to the Confederate army under General Lee. Neither could reinforcements be taken from General Lee's army to General Bragg at Murfreesborough. By cutting the second line the most direct communication between Richmond and the principal cities of the Confederate States was destroyed.

At the time when General Rosecrans was prepared to move from Nashville to attack the Confederate army near Murfreesborough, an expedition was sent into east Tennessee to destroy the railroad, in order to prevent any reënforcements to General Bragg from Richmond. General Carter, with a force of cavalry numbering one thousand men, left London, in Kentucky, on December 21. They entered Virginia between Cumberland Gap and Pound Gap, and advanced within six miles of Bristol, burned the bridges across the Halston and Watauga rivers, and tore up portions of the track, destroying the rails for a distance of nearly one hundred miles, almost to Jonesborough. They captured nearly five hundred prisoners, seven hundred stand of arms, and a large amount of stores. They reached Manchester, Kentucky, on the 6th of January, having lost only ten men. The enterprise was a most hazardous one.

The expedition against the second line of railroads was undertaken in North Carolina. It forms the only subsequent military movement of importance, in addition to those heretofore described, which was made in that department during the year. It was a inarch upon Goldsborough, and the destruction of the railroad at that place. This is the line connecting Charleston and Savannah with Richmond. General J. G. Foster, who commanded the department after the departure of General Burnside, took charge of the expedition. The force consisted of four brigades under Colonels "Wessels, Amory, Stevenson, and Lee; the 3d New York and 1st Rhode Island batteries; also sections of the 28d and 24th New York Independent batteries, and the 3d New York cavalry. It left Newbern on the morning of December 11, and moved on the Kinston road fourteen miles. Some parts of the road were obstructed by felled trees. On the next morning it advanced to the Vine Swamp road, having some sharp skirmishing with a small Confederate force. At this point three companies of cavalry were sent np the Kinston road as a demonstration, and the main force took the Vine Swamp road, thereby avoiding the obstructions and the Confederate forces. It was delayed to build the bridge over Beaver Creek, where the 51st Massachusetts and a section of artillery were left to hold it, and support the cavalry on the main road, and halted at a distance of four miles. The next morning the main column advanced, turning to the left and leaving the road it was upon to the right. At the intersection the 46th Massachusetts and a section of a battery were left as a feint and to hold the position. On reaching Southwest Creek a Confederate force was found posted on the opposite bank, about four hundred strong, and with three pieces of artillery. The creek was not fordable, and ran at the foot of a deep ravine. Under the protection of a battery the 9th New Jersey effected a passage and formed on the opposite bank, where it was afterward supported by the 85th Pennsylvania. This caused the Confederate force to retire with some skirmishing. On the next day an advance upon Kinston was made, and the Confederate force found posted in a strong position about one mile from the place. An attack was at once made with the 9th New Jersey in advance, and the position taken. The Confederate force retired across the Neuse river, with a loss of four hundred prisoners. On crossing, the bridge was set on fire, but soon extinguished by the advance of General Foster. The bridge was immediately repaired, and the column crossed, and occupied the town of Kinston. With constant skirmishing the force of General Foster continued to advance until the 17th, when it reached Goldsborough. Hero it burned two trestle-work culverts, destroyed a train of four railroad cars, water station, depot, &c, and some small arms, which it was unable to carry off. After destroying other bridges, and capturing some small positions that had been occupied by a Confederate force, the expedition successfully returned to Newbern. This enterprise was very skilfully executed. In connection with movements upon Richmond it would have possessed considerable importance, but in the absence of such movements it only served to interfere for a few days with one line of the Confederate internal communication.

These expeditions, although successful in themselves, secured no important advantages as the great movement upon Richmond had, in the mean time, been suspended. They were useful reconnoissances, and the former may have Page 172 delayed the arrival of reinforcements from General Lee to General Bragg before the battle of Murfreesborough. They developed the importance of these roads to the Confederate Government, and proved that their permanent loss would have caused serious embarrassment to it.

Some military movements took place during the year, which have not been stated in the preceding pages, as they were rather isolated operations than a part of the campaign at the time progressing.

On the 6th of September a body of Confederate troops surprised the garrison at Washington in the department of North Carolina. A vigorous resistance was made, and the attacking party was repulsed with a loss of thirty-three killed, and nearly one hundred wounded. The Federal loss was eight killed, and thirty-three wounded.

On the 22d of October an expedition was sent out from Port Royal in the department of the South, which was then under the command of General Mitchell, to destroy the trestle-work bridges of the Charleston and Savannah railroad across the Pocotalico, Tullifinny, and Coosawhatchie, tributaries of the Broad river, and to make a reconnoissance of these streams. The expedition was under the command of Generals Brannan and Terry. The main body of the troops was landed at Mackey's Point, about fifteen miles from the railroad, and marched seven miles inland, where the Confederates were met in force. After a sharp fight of an hour they retired to a point two miles distant and made a second stand. From this point they again fell back to the village of Pocotalico, and having burned the long bridge across the stream, they were inaccessible. Meanwhile Colonel Barton, with three hundred and fifty men, penetrated to the railroad at Coosawhatchie, and destroyed some of the rails, cut the telegraph wire, and fired upon a train containing troops. The engagement by the main force was severe, and the Federal loss was thirty-two killed, and one hundred and eighty wounded. The Federal force retired on the next day, having failed in the object of the expedition, except the reconnoissance. The Confederate loss has not been stated.

On the 5th of August an attack was made on Baton Rouge, in the Department of the Gulf, which was under the command of General Butler. The Federal force at this city was under command of Brigadier-General Williams. The Confederate force making the attack was under the command of General John C. Breckinridge. The contest was sharp and bloody, and the attack was successfully repulsed. The Federal loss was ninety killed, and two hundred and fifty wounded. Among the killed was General Williams. Three hundred of the Confederates were reported to have been killed and buried by the force of General Williams. The city was subsequently evacuated by the Federal force on May 16.

On the 24th of October Brigadier-General Weitzel commanded an expedition from New Orleans to the west bank of the Mississippi in the La Fourche district. An engagement took place with a considerable Confederate force on the next day, about nine miles from Donaldsonville, in which they were defeated with the loss of their commander, and a large number killed and wounded, and two hundred and sixty-eight prisoners. The Federal loss was eighteen killed, and sixty-eight wounded. The entire district was subsequently occupied by the force of General Weitzel. (See Louisiana). For further military operations, see New Mexico and Minnesota. Some serious conflicts with guerilla troops took place in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri For the particulars, see Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. The following list of the most important military .events, with the date when they occurred, presents a more summary view of the great magnitude of the simultaneous operations: Burnside sails January 12

Mill Springs (Kentucky), battle January ID

Cedar Keys (Florida), captured January 16

Fort Henry (Kentucky), captured February 6

Roanoke Island (North Carolina), captured February 7

Elisabeth (North Carolina.), captured February 8

Edenton (North Carolina.), captured February 12

Springfield (Missouri), captured February 14

Donelson (Kentucky), captured February 16

Bowling Green (Kentucky), evacuated February 17

Fayetteville (Arkansas), occupied February 13

Clarksville (Tennessee), occupied February l9

Winton (North Carolina), occupied February 20 Nashville (Tennessee), occupied February 24

Columbus (Kentucky), evacuated March 1

Fernandina (Florida), captured March 8

St, Mary (Florida), captured March 8

Pea Ridge (Arkansas), battle March 6,

7 Brunswick (Georgia), captured March 8

Jacksonville (Florida), captured March 12 St.

Augustine (Florida), captured March 14

Newbern (North Carolina.), captured March 14

New Madrid (Missouri), captured March 14

Washington (North Carolina.), captured March 25

Shiloh (Tennessee), battle April 6. 7

Island No. 10, evacuated April 7

Huntsville (Alabama), captured April 8

Decatur and Stevenson (Alabama), captured April 9

Fort Pulaski (Georgia.), captured April 11

Fort Macon (North Carolina.), captured April 25

New Orleans, captured April 26

Yorktown (Virginia), evacuated May 6

Williamsburg (Virginia), evacuated May 6

Pensacola (Florida), evacuated. May 9

Norfolk, captured May 10

Baton Rouge, occupied May 27

Corinth (Mississippi), evacuated Mav 2'.»

Fair Oaks (Virginia), battle May 31

Fort Pillow, evacuated June 5

Memphis (Tennessee), surrenders June 6

Cross Keys, battle June 8

Cumberland Gap, occupied June 18

Seven days before Richmond June25,&c.

Malvern Hill, battle July 1

Baton Rouge, attack August 5

Cedar Mountain, battle August  9

Rappahannock Bridge August 28

Centreville (Virginia), battle August 28

Manassas (Virginia), battle August 80

Chantilly (Virginia). battle September 1

Mumfordsville (Kentucky), battle September 14

South Mountain, battle September 14  

Antietam, battle September 17

Iuka (Mississippi), battle September 19

Corinth (Mississippi), battle October 4

Perryville (Kentucky), battle October 8

Holly Springs (Mississippi) November 13

Cane Hill (Arkansas), battle November 28

Crawford's Prairie (Arkansas), battle December 7

Fredericksburg Virginia battle December 18

Murfreesboro (Tennessee), battle December 31

What has been accomplished by the military operations of the year:—The State of Missouri hits been relieved from invasion by the Confederate force. Half of Arkansas has been permanently occupied. The Confederate force has been driven from the Mississippi river except at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Western and Middle Tennessee have been occupied, and the former and part of the latter held. Western Virginia has been retained by the Federal Government. Maryland exhibited her preference for the Union. Norfolk and Yorktown have been taken and held. The cities and towns on the coast of North Carolina, with few exceptions, are occupied by a Federal force. Fort Pulaski, commanding the entrance to Savannah, was captured, and the important points on the coast of Florida occupied. Pensacola and New Orleans were also taken, and nearly all of Louisiana brought under Federal control. The forces of the North have slowly but firmly advanced upon every side of the Confederacy, and permanently hold every important position which they have gained. The battle of Antietam secured the border States, and decided the physical supremacy of the Union in favor of the North. (The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1861, vol. 1. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868, pp. 24-184.)


Source: The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.