The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.

United States Army Operations, 1862, Part 5

General Tyler in his report thus explains his proceedings: "From Colonel Daum I learned the enemy had eighteen pieces of artillery, planted so as to completely command all the approaches to the town, and from the engagement with General Carroll that morning, had obtained the range of the different points. Immediately on the arrival of my command, Colonel Daum urged an attack with the combined force of infantry and artillery, to which 1 so far consented as to order the infantry into position under cover of a thick wood which skirted the road, and commenced observing the enemy's position myself, which appeared to me one to defy an army of 50,000 men. I at once sent for Colonel Carroll, Lieut.-Colonel Schriber, Capts. Clark and Robinson, who had been over the ground; they all agreed in the opinion that an attack would result in the destruction of our little force."

The infantry was ordered back to bivouac for the night, and early in the morning General Tyler was informed that the enemy were advancing evidently with the intention of outflanking him on his left. Forces were ordered up to counteract this movement, which was sucessfully done. The enemy retired into the woods, and a part crossed over and joined the forces attacking the right wing. The engagement now became very heavy on the right, additional troops having been brought up on both sides. Under cover of this conflict, the enemy threw another force into the woods, pressed down upon the battery on the left, and with a sudden dash captured it. The contest continued until General Tyler, perceiving additional reënforcements for the enemy approaching, about ten o'clock ordered his troops to fall back, with a view of retreating until he should meet reinforcements. The retreat, he says, "save the stampede of those who ran before the fight, was as orderly as the advance." The number of his force is stated at three thousand, and that of the enemy much larger. This was evidently the rear guard of General Jackson's army, which had been engaged, and some reënforcements were sent back to it. General Jackson retired from before General Fremont on Sunday night, and on Monday morning crossed the bridge at Port Republic, and while the main body continued to retreat, General Tyler was thus held in check.

Meanwhile General Fremont, as has been stated, commenced his march for Port Republic that morning, with his army in battle array. During the afternoon his whole army reached the river opposite the town, and he learned that a portion of General Shields's division had engaged the enemy on both Sunday and Monday on the other side of the river. During the inarch of General. Fremont's forces from the battle field of the preceding day to the river, they could hear brisk cannonading, and sec the heavy volumes of smoke arising from the valley where the contest was going on. When they arrived the Confederate force was gone. Thus closed the pursuit of General Jackson with a portion of the forces of four major-generals of the U. S. army on his line of retreat, beside those of Brigadier-General Shields. The loss of men on both sides occasioned by this expedition was not very great either in killed, wounded, or prisoners. No accurate details arc at present accessible; but the destruction of Federal stores was vast. On the night of the arrival of General Fremont's forces at the river, an alarm was raised in camp. Horses were harnessed, and men placed Page 113 in a condition for an immediate movement, bat affaire finally became quiet, and part of a night's rest was obtained. On the nest morning, the 10th, orders to march were issued, and the army was soon in motion back to Harrisonburg, a distance of twelve miles, which it reached in a pitiless storm during the afternoon. On Wednesday it moved eighteen miles to New Market, and on Thursday reached Mt. Jackson, seven miles, and encamped for rest. Some forces of General Jackson's army returned to Harrisonburg almost as soon as the Federal troops had left it. The division of General Shields also fell back to New Market.

The force of General Jackson was generally estimated by his opponents at twenty-five thousand men. The following regiments were included in it: the 1st, 2d, 10th, 13th, 21st, 25th, 31st, 33d, 37th, 42d, 52d, 57th, and 58th Virginia; the 6th, 8th, and 9th Louisiana; 1st Maryland; 21st North Carolina; 16th Mississippi, and 15th Alabama regiments of infantry, and the 2d regiment of Confederate infantry, and Major Wheat's battalion of Louisiana Tigers. The cavalry included the 2d, 6th, 7th Virginia, 1st Maryland, about twenty-eight companies. The artillery exceeded thirty pieces in number.

The force of General Fremont, on leaving Franklin, was stated to be about twenty-thousand men. Throughout the entire period of this expedition the storms of rain were incessant, and the roads in an unusually bad condition.

A review of the facts thus stated shows that there was no concert of action between the forces actively engaged in the pursuit. The controlling head, the War Department, from which the orders to pursue issued, was too far distant from the scene of operations.

It should be stated in this connection, that on the very day on which General Jackson attacked the 1st Maryland under Colonel Kenly at Front Royal, the 23d of May, the Confederate General, Heath, in the we;tern part of the Mountain Department, advanced rapidly and boldly with nearly three thousand men and attacked Colonel Crook, acting Brigadier-General, at Greenbrier Bridge, thirty-five miles from McDowell, and nine miles from Camp Alleghany. The command of Colonel Crook consisted of the 36th and 44th Ohio and some batteries. The advance of General Heath was met with so much vigor and promptness, that his forces were soon defeated, with the loss of «his four pieces of artillery, and one hundred and fifty killed and wounded, and three hundred stand of arms, and a number taken prisoners. On his retreat, the Greenbrier Bridge was burned to check or prevent pursuit. This affair occurred on the day previous to the reception of the order by General Fremont to march to the aid of General Banks. The ill success of this enterprise was such that it failed to cause any diversion from General Fremont's command.

This exploit of General Jackson, undoubtedly one of the most brilliant and successful of the war, if its objects are considered, introduced into the whole campaign in Virginia a disturbing element of considerable magnitude. It diverted large masses of men from movements designed to accelerate events on the peninsula, delayed the advance of General McClellan, and deprived him of the reënforcements he expected. The time required for the transfer of troops in the South and Southwest, where the Confederate campaign had been a failure, to Richmond, the most important position of the Confederacy, was thus gained, and when General McClellan was next prepared to move, he found the enemy in accumulating force in front of him.

On the 25th of May, General McClellan issued a general order which was read throughout the camps, directing the troops as they advanced beyond the Chickahominy, to be prepared for battle at a moment's notice, and to be entirely unencumbered, with the exception of ambulances —to carry three days' rations in their haversacks, leaving their knapsacks with their wagons, which were on the eastern side of the river, carefully parked. Besides practical directions as to conduct, this order says to officers and soldiers: "Let them bear in mind that the Army of the Potomac has never yet been checked, and let them preserve in battle perfect coolness and confidence, the sure forerunners of success. They must keep well together, throw away no shots, but aim carefully and low, and above all things rely upon the bayonet."

The divisions from the corps of Generals Heintzelman and Keyes were among the first to cross the Chickahominy. They took a position on the right bank somewhat advanced therefrom. The right wing rested near Now Bridge, the centre at Seven Pines, and the left flank on the White Oak Swamp. General Sumner's corps remained on the east side of the river. On the 30th, the Confederate General Johnston made arrangements for an attack upon the Federal army, for the purpose of cutting off, if possible, the corps of General Heintzelman and Keyes before they could be joined by General Sumner, he selected the divisions of Generals Longstreet, Huger, G. W. Smith, D. H. Hill, and Whiting. His plan was that Generals Hill and Longstreet should advance by the road to Williamsburg and make the attack in front, and that General Huger should move on the road to Charles City and attack in flank the troops assailed by Generals Hill and Longstreet. General Smith was ordered to the junction of the New Bridge road and the Nine Mile road, and to be in readiness to fall on the right flank of General Keyes and to cover the left of General Longstreet. The forces of Generals Hill, Longstreet, and Smith were in, position early on the morning of Saturday, May 31, and waited until afternoon for General Huger to get into position. Prince de Joinville, who was a competent spectator, thus describes the scenes which followed this attack:

"At the moment it was thus attacked the Page 114 Federal army occupied a position Laving the form of a V." The base of the V is at Bottom Bridge, where the railroad crosses the Chickahominy. The left arm stretches toward Richmond, with this railroad and the road from that city to Williamsburg. There stood the left wing, composed of four divisions echeloned, one behind the other, between Fair Oaks and Savage stations, and encamped in the woods on both sides of the road. The other arm of the V, the right, follows the left bank of the river; that is the right wing. There are these five divisions and the reserve. Should one desire to communicate from one extremity to the other of those two wings, going by Bottom's Bridge, the way is very long, not less than 12 or 15 miles. In an air line the distance, on the contrary, is very trifling, but between the two arms of the V flows the Chickahominy. It was to connect both arms, in the space between them, that the construction of 3 or 4 bridges had been undertaken, only one of which was serviceable on the 31st of May. It had been built by General Sumner, nearly halfway between Bottom's Bridge and the most advanced point of the Federal lines. It saved the army that day from a disaster." The other bridges were not ready. They were structures of logs, and time was required to build them. The approaches were always bad, and the tedious labor of corduroying long distances was necessary.

"It was against the left wing of the army that every effort of the enemy was directed. That wing had its outposts at Fair Oaks station, on the York river railroad, and at a place called Seven Pines, on the "Williamsburg road. There the Federals had thrown up a redoubt in a clearing, where a few houses were to be seen, and constructed abatis, to increase the field for sharpshooting of the troops posted there. The rest of the country was completely covered with woods. The previous day there had been a frightful storm, with torrents of rain, and the roads were frightful.

"All at once, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the weather being dark and gloomy, a very spirited fusilade is heard. The pickets and sentries are violently driven in ; the woods which surround Fair Oaks and Seven Pines are filled with clouds of the enemy's sharpshooters. The troops rush to arms and fight in desperation; but their adversaries' forces constantly increase, and their losses do not stop them. The redoubt of the Seven Pines is surrounded, and its defenders die bravely. Col. Bailey, of the artillery, among others, there upon his pieces finds a glorious death. In vain Generals Keyes and Naglee exhaust themselves in a thousand efforts to keep their soldiers together: they are not listened to. In this moment of confusion they perceive a little French battalion, known as the Garde Lafayette, which has remained in good order. They rush to it, place themselves at its head, charge the enemy and retake a battery. The battalion loses (J fourth of its men in this charge; but. like true Frenchmen, always and everywhere the same, they cry, "They can call us the Garde Lafourchette now?" alluding to an offensive nickname that had been given them.

"Meanwhile Heintzelman rushes to the rescue with his two divisions. As at Williamsburg, Kearney arrives in good time to reestablish the fight. Berry's brigade, of this division, composed of Michigan regiments and an Irish battalion, advances firm as a wall into the midst of the disordered mass which wanders over the battle field, and does more by its example than the most powerful reënforcements. About a mile of ground has been lost, fifteen pieces of cannon, the camp of the division of the advanced guard, that of General Casey; but now we hold our own. A sort of line of battle is formed across the woods, perpendicularly to the road and the railroad, and there the repeated assaults of the enemy's masses are resisted. The left cannot be turned, where is the White Oak Swamp, an impassable morass; but the right may be surrounded. At this very moment, in fact, a strong column of Confederates has been directed against that side. If it succeeds in interposing between Bottom's Bridge and the Federal troops, which hold beyond Savage's Station, the entire left wing is lost. It will have no retreat, and is doomed-to yield to numbers; but precisely at this moment— that is to say, at 6 o'clock in the evening—new actors appear on the scene. General Sumner, who has succeeded in passing the Chickahominy, with Sedgwick's division, over the bridge constructed by his troops, and who, like a brave soldier, has marched straight through the woods to the sound of the cannon, arrived suddenly on the left flank of the column with which the enemy is endeavoring to cut off Heintzelman and Keyes.

"He plants in the clearing a battery which he has succeeded in bringing with him. They are not those rifled cannon, the objects of extravagant admiration of late, good for cool firing and long range in an open country: these are the true guns for a fight—twelve-pound howitzers,* the old pattern, throwing either a round projectile, which ricochets and rolls, or a heavy package of grape. The simple and rapid discharging of these pieces makes terrible havoc in the opposing ranks. In vain Johnston sends against this battery his best troops, those of South' Carolina—the Hampton Legion among others. In vain he rushes on it himself; nothing can shake the Federals, who, at nightfall, valiantly led by General Sumner in person, throw themselves upon the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and drive him furiously, with frightful slaughter and fear, back as far as Fair Oaks Station.

"Night put an end to the combat. On both sides nothing was known of the result of the battle but what each one had seen with his

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* They were "Napoleon" guns. —[Ed.

own eyes. Friends and enemies, lost in woods they were unacquainted with, lay down amid heaps of dead and wounded, wherever darkness overtook them. The fatigue of this obstinate struggle as well as the obscurity of the night had imposed on the combatants one of those tacit truces so frequent in war.

"Evidently Johnston had flattered himself, in throwing all his forces on the four divisions of the left wing, that he could annihilate them before any aid could come to them from the main body of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. For the moment he had recoiled before the energetic resistance of those four divisions, and also before the furious and unforeseen attack of Sumner's troops. No doubt he had counted on the terrible storm of the previous day to have swelled the Chickahominy so as to render the establishment of a bridge impossible, or to sweep away in its overflowing waters those already established; but the capricious river baffled his plans, as it did some hours later those of his adversaries. The effect of the deluge was not immediate; the rise in the water delayed its appearance 24 hours. Was this unhoped-for delay turned to account with all desirable activity on the part of the Federals? That is a question which will remain always in dispute, as are so many others of the same kind, which form one of the necessary chapters of the history of most great battles.

"It was only at one o'clock in the afternoon that the action had commenced. We had waited some time to ascertain if the attack on that side was not a feint, intended to draw the Federal troops to that point while the bulk of the enemy's forces was hastening to debouch on the left. bank. We had been promptly relieved of our uncertainty by the violence of the attack and by the reports of the aeronauts, who saw the entire Confederate army marching to the point of attack.

"Then Sumner had received orders to cross the water with his two divisions. He had executed the movement with rapidity, marching at the head of his column, without any other guide than the sound of the cannon, and he arrived at the right moment and at the critical place. But some persons thought then, and still think, that if, at the moment Sumner received the order to cross the river, the same order had been given to all the divisions of the right wing, it would have been practicable. We fancy what might have happened if, in place of throwing 15,000 men on Johnston's flank, 60,000 had been thrown. Sumner's bridge, doubtless, would not have answered for the crossing of so many. At midnight the tail end of his column was still crossing, struggling against all the difficulties which bridges formed of trunks of trees that turn under the feet, muddy sloughs and a dark night—the darkness rendered still deeper by the thickness of the woods—present to horses and artillery. Several bridges were, however, ready to be thrown across at other points. It was necessary to work without a moment's loss to construct them, and not be disturbed by the obstacles the enemy would not have failed to present to the undertaking. A brigade was displayed for full effect and scarecrow fashion, opposite the points naturally marked out for crossing; but the stake was so large, the result so important, and the occasion itself so unforeseen and so favorable for playing a decisive part, that nothing,' in our opinion, should have prevented that operation from being attempted.

"Here, again, was evident that American slowness which belongs much more to the character of the army than that of its chief. It was not until 7 o'clock in the evening that the idea of securing all the bridges without delay, and causing the whole army to cross at daybreak to the right bank of the Chickahominy, was entertained.

"It was now too late. Four hours had been lost, and the. opportunity—that moment be fleeting, in war as in other circumstances—had gone. The rise, on which Johnston had vainly counted, and which had not hindered Sumner from crossing, came on during the night. The river rose suddenly from two feet, and continued to swell with rapidity, carrying away the new bridges, tearing up and sweeping off the trees which formed the planking of Sumner's bridges, and covering the entire valley with its overflowing waters. Nothing could cross.

"At the earliest dawn of day the combat was resumed with great fury on the left bank. The enemy came on in a body, but without order or method, and rushed upon the Federals, who, knowing that they were inferior in numbers and without hope of being supported, did not attempt to do more than resist and hold their ground. They fought with fierce determination on both sides, without any noise, without any cries, and whenever they were too hardly pressed they made a charge with the bayonet. The artillery, placed on the eminences in the rear, fired shell over the combatants. Ah I I could have wished that all those who, forgetful of the past, and impelled by I do not know what kind of egotistical calculation, have lavished their encouragement on the fatal rebellion of slaveowners, could have been present at this fratricidal struggle. I could have wished them, as a punishment, a sight of this terrible battle field, where the dead and dying were piled up by thousands. I wished that they could have seen those temporary ambulances formed around the few habitations found here and there. Oh! what misery—oh what suffering! The ambulances had something about them particularly horrible. The houses were altogether too few to contain the smallest proportion of the wounded, and they were therefore compelled to lay them outside; but although they did not make any complaints, and bore their fate with the most stoical courage, their exposure in one position beneath the rays of the sun of the middle Page 116 of June soon became intolerable. They were then to be seen putting forth all their remaining strength, and crawling to seek a little shade. I will always remember a bed of roses, whose sweet-scented flowers I was admiring while conversing with one of my friends, when he drew my attention to one of these unfortunate men, who had just died beneath its bushes. We looked at each other without saying a word, the heart being oppressed with the most painful emotion. Mournful scenes, from which the pen of the writer", like the eye of the spectator, hastened to turn away.

"Toward midday the Are gradually diminished, then ceased. The enemy retreated; but the Federals were not in a position to pursue them. No one then knew what a loss the Southerners had just suffered in the person of their commander, General Johnston, who was severely wounded. It was to his absence that was owing, in a great measure, the unskilful attacks against the Federal army in the morning. When the firing ceased at" midday, the Confederates, tired of the prolonged strife which they had been sustaining, and being no longer commanded, wore, it is said (for in the midst of these immense woods one sees nothing, and is. compelled to guess everything), in a state of inextricable confusion. Who can say what would have been the result if at this moment the 35,000 fresh troops left on the other side of the Chickahominy had appeared on the flank of this disordered mass after having successfully crossed the bridges?

"Such is the history of this singular battle, which, although complicated by incidents superior to human will, must not be taken otherwise than as a type of American battles. The conflict was a bloody one, for the North had lost 5,000 men, the South at least 8,000; but the results were barren on one side as on the other. Although the losses of the enemy were much greater than those of the Federals, the result was especially distressing to the latter. They had lost a rare opportunity of striking a decisive blow. These occasions did not return, and therefore, in the circumstances in which they were placed, the result was against them."

The crossing of General Sumner's corps commenced about four o'clock in the afternoon. At that time the head of the advance, General Gorman's brigade, turned from the swamps on the left bank of the river to cross by the bridge built by General Sumner,—a battery moved next, then General Burns's brigade, then artillery, and finally General Dana's brigade, all of General Sedgwick's division. In consequence of the morasses, all the batteries except Kirby's were left behind; but all the troops except the 19th Massachusetts, which was detached to assist the artillery, were moved swiftly onward to the scene of action. General Richardson's division was detained until quite late in the evening by the obstructed causeway. At seven o'clock, it was in the position to which it had been assigned. It took no part in the battle on Saturday.

Now was the time to capture the city. The retreat of the army caused great consternation at Richmond. The Confederate force had retired in confusion, and if they had been sharply followed up, the gates of the city would have been reached, if friend and foe had not gone in together. It is useless to speculate on possibilities. The force with which General McClellan commenced his march had been diminished before Yorktown and Williamsburg, and by constant skirmishing. It garrisoned Yorktown and Williamsburg, and occupied the White House, and the line of the railroad. It had received no reinforcements up to this time except the division of Franklin. It was also impossible for him to move the corps of Generals Porter and Franklin over the Chickahominy at the decisive moment, as even the bridge on which General Sumner had crossed had been 60 far destroyed by the river, which was swollen by the rains of Friday and Saturday, that it was impassable for a single horseman. The three corps which had been engaged in the battles of Saturday and Sunday were too much cut up and wearied, by their conflict with superior numbers, to be able to pursue the retreating Confederates, particularly as they might probably have been met at the outworks of the city by fresh troops, in numbers fully equal to themselves, and a strong artillery in position. He was in no condition to risk anything. He had fought the enemy in equal or superior numbers, and they had retired in confusion. The corps of General McDowell, if on hand now, might have taken Richmond, but without it the commanding general was not strong enough to risk its immediate attack. There were other considerations to govern his conduct. He was leading an invading army without reserves to fall back upon. A repulse would have ended in serious, if not complete disaster. Such a result to the peninsular campaign would have, been fatal to the cause to which the Army of the Potomac was devoted. It would have convinced foreign powers that there was such a degree of military strength in the Confederacy as to render the immediate recognition of its independence both safe and politic. But there was probably ono consideration which outweighed all others, and exerted a decisive influence upon the movements. This was the certain and safe reception of sufficient supplies. The single line of railroad was not capable of transporting, them. The horses were kept on half forage, and if the distance had been increased, the army itself would have suffered. What hope was there of holding Richmond, even if it had been taken, with a line of transportation not capable of bringing forward sufficient to sustain the army, and one which, from the inadequate force to guard it, was liable at any moment to be broken up? Finally, for many days after the battle, the fields and roads were in such condition as to render it impossible to move any amount of artillery over them. To have advanced without Page 117 it would have placed infantry in front of works armed with heavy guns.

The danger of his position was soon demonstrated to the commanding general. It was determined in Richmond at this time, to penetrate the lines of the Federal army, and make a full and thorough reconnoissance of its position and strength. For this purpose, early on the 8th of June, General J. E. B. Stuart, with the 1st, Colonel Fitz Hugh Lee; 9th, Colonel F. H. Fitz Hugh Lee; and 4th Virginia cavalry, Lieut. Gardner; the Jeff. Davis troop, with two pieces of flying artillery, a 12-pound howitzer, and a 6-pound rifled English piece, numbering about fifteen hundred men, left Richmond and proceeded down the Charlottesville turnpike. That night they encamped at Ashland, not deeming it safe to proceed after dusk, and communicated by signal rockets with Richmond. As soon as day dawned, they proceeded carefully and cautiously, and penetrated the Federal lines. Near Hanover Court House, two or three small bodies of Federal cavalry were met, and skirmishing ensued, but the latter, being unable to withstand the heavy Confederate force, were quickly routed. The camps of these Federal outposts were visited and destroyed; wagons on the road were overtaken and burnt, and the entire route from Ashland by Hanover Court House to Tunstall’s Station, on the York River railroad, was to this force a continuous scene of triumph and destruction. Commissary and quartermasters' stores were seized and burned; prisoners and horses were taken and sent to the rear. The amount of property destroyed, however, was very small.

Upon approaching the railroad, cars were heard advancing, and the whistle sounded. By orders, every man was instantly dismounted and ranged beside the track. Thinking the force to be a friendly one, the train was stopped, when one company of the troop opening fire, disclosed its character. -The train was immediately started under full steam for the Chickahominy, and despite logs placed on the track, made its escape. It consisted chiefly of uncovered platform cars, on which were some soldiers who were fired upon and killed or wounded. A detachment was immediately sent toward the White House on the Pamunkey river, where a number of wagons loaded with stores, and four transport vessels were found. Two of the vessels with their stores were destroyed, and a few wagons at Garlick's Landing. New Kent Court House was made the rendezvous whither the main body had gone, and where they were soon joined by this detachment. Here a halt was made until midnight. Some prisoners were taken, and sutlers' stores consumed or destroyed. At midnight they quietly moved by a lonely road toward the Chickahominy, and passing near a considerable body of the Federal forces, they reached its banks a little before dawn on Sunday, the 11th, and were ready to cross. They had arrived far below the bridges, and where deep water flows, and knew not how to cross. Their perplexity is thus described by a Confederate writer: "Here was an awful situation for a gallant band! Directed to Blind Ford, it was fifteen feet deep! The enemy had blocked up all the main roads, and had thousands scouring the country, eager to entrap or slaughter it. And without means to cross! Quietly taking precautions against all surprise, strict silence being enjoined upon the prisoners, first one horseman plunged into the flood, and then another at different points—all too deep; no ford discoverable, no bridge! The horses, it was thought, would follow each other, and swim the stream—it was tried, and the horses carried away by the current! Breaking into small parties, the cavalrymen swam and reswam the river with their horses, and when some fifty or more had been landed, a strange but friendly voice whispered in the dark, 'The old bridge is a few yards higher up—it can be mended!' 'Twas found, and mended it could be! Quietly working, tree after tree was felled, earth and twigs and branches were carried and piled up on the main props; old logs were rolled and patched across the stream; yet after long and weary labor the bridge was built, and the long and silent procession of cavalry, artillery, prisoners and spoils, safely and quietly passed this frail impromptu bridge, scarcely any sounds being heard but the rush of waters beneath. Once across and in the swamps, all was industry and expedition. Artillery axles sank low in the mire—ten Yankee horses were hitched to each piece, and as the first rays of morning crimsoned the tree tops, the long line rapidly sought the shade of woods away from the Federal lines. Yet the troops had not proceeded far when the advance was halted. 'Who comes there?' cried the Federal horsemen in the swamp. 'Who goes there?' calls another, and quicker than thought the advance guard dashes away into the open ground; the Federals fire half a dozen shots, and rush in pursuit. Into the thicket some half dozen Federal horsemen dart and are surrounded and made prisoners."

The crossing was made thirteen miles from General McClellan's headquarters, and five miles from his pickets. They were now soon within the lines of the Confederate army. The delay caused by the vigorous skirmishing with the enemy encountered, caused them afterward to make so much haste to escape, that the amount of property destroyed was small, and estimated at fifty thousand dollars. Three hundred mules and some prisoners were taken away. This small force of the enemy's cavalry had passed entirely round and in the rear of the Federal army. The hope for the cooperation of General McDowell amid these perilous scenes was again, for the third time, now rekindled in the mind of General McClellan, and not entirely in vain. On the 10th of June, General McDowell wrote as follows:

                                                                                  June 10, 1862.

Major-General G. B. McClellan, Commanding Department of Virginia, before Richmond:

For the third time I am ordered to join you, and hope this time to get through. In view of the remarks made with reference to my leaving you and not joining you before, by your friends, and of something I have heard as coining from you on that subject, I wish to say I go with the greatest satisfaction, and hope to arrive with my main body in time to be of service. McCall goes in advance by water. I will be with you in ten days with the remainder by Fredericksburg.

                                                      IRVIN McDOWELL,

                                              Major-General Commanding.

     On the 12th, he again wrote, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK,

                                                       MANASSAS, June 12, l863.

Major-General G. B. McClellan, Commanding Department of Virginia, before Richmond:

The delay of Major-General Banks to relieve the division of my command in the valley beyond the time I had calculated on, will prevent my joining you with the remainder of the troops I am to take below at as early a day as I named. My third division (McCall's) is now on the way. Please do me the favor to so place it that it may be in a position to join the others as they come down from Fredericksburg.

                                                         IRVIN McDOWELL,

                                                   Major-General Commanding.

Contrary to the expectation of both, the division of General McCall was the only one of General McDowell's corps which subsequently reached the army of the Potomac.

On the next day after the battle of Fair Oaks, above described, General McClellan recovered without resistance the stations of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, and the two armies were once more in the same position as before.

On the 2d of June President Davis issued the following address to the Confederate army:

                                     EXECUTIVE OFFICE, June 2, 1862.

To the Army of Richmond:

I render to you my grateful acknowledgments for the gallantry and good conduct you displayed in the battles of the 31st of May, and the 1st instant, and with pride and pleasure recognize the steadiness and intrepidity with which you attacked the enemy in position, captured his advanced intrenchments, several batteries of artillery, and many standards, and everywhere drove them from the open field.

At a part of your operations it was my fortune to be present. On no other occasion have I witnessed more of calmness and good order than you exhibited while advancing into the very jaws of death, and nothing could exceed the prowess with which you closed upon the enemy when a sheet of fire was blazing in your faces.

In the renewed struggle in which you are on the eve of engaging. I ask and can desire but a continuance of the same conduct which now attracts the admiration and pride of the loved ones you have left at home.

You are fighting for all that is dearest to men; and, though opposed to a foe who disregards many of the usages of civilized war, your humanity to the wounded and the prisoners was the fit and crowning glory to your valor.

Defenders of a just cause, may God have von in His holy keeping!

                                                                      JEFFERSON DAVIS.

General McClellan now set to work to complete in a substantial manner the bridges across the Chickahominy and put the two wings of his army in communication with each other in spite of any inundations. Entrenchments were then thrown up along the whole line. The right wing, consisting of the divisions of Generals McCall, Morrell, and Sykes, was posted on the left bank of the Chickahominy from Beaver Dam Creek to a point below New Bridge. The centre, consisting of Generals Smith's, Sedgwick's, and Richardson's divisions, was stretched in a line from Golding on the right bank of the river to a point south of the York river railroad. The left wing, consisting of Generals Hooker's, Kearney's, and Couch's divisions, extended from the left of General Richardson's position to a point considerably south of the Williamsburg stage road, on the borders of White Oak swamp. The Confederate line pressed so close to the Federal line on the right bank of the river that neither could advance a regiment outside their respective breastworks without provoking a contest. In this position the two armies remained until near the close of the month.

The demonstration in the rear of the Federal army had convinced the commanding general that a change of position might become necessary, and some vessels loaded with ammunition, provisions, and other supplies were wisely sent to James river near City Point, but no further steps for this purpose were taken.

On Wednesday, the 25th of June, the first movement on the part of General McClellan was made. This consisted in directing General Hooker to take up an advanced position of a mile on Fair Oaks farm, near the Williamsburg road leading directly to Richmond. It was calculated that this movement might be followed by a general resistance on the part of the Confederates, which would renew the battle of Fair Oaks, and by the advantage of the bridges the whole army could be concentrated. If the battle was not renewed then it would be one step in advance toward Richmond. The ground General Hooker was ordered to occupy was taken, lost and retaken with a loss of from four to five hundred men. He was ably supported by Brigadier-Generals Grover and Sickles. During the ensuing night information was received that General Jackson, returned from the Shenandoah Valley, was in force near Hanover Court House. This indicated that the Confederate army had now been concentrated, and the object of General Jackson in that position was to attack the Federal communications, and cut them off by seizing the York river railway in their rear. The advance upon Richmond could not therefore be further prosecuted by the diminished forces of the Federal army. General Hooker was consequently recalled from his advanced position on the next day.

It appears that on the 25th a council of all the Confederate generals was held at Richmond. Generals Lee, Baldwin, Jackson, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, linger, Longstreet, Branch, Wise, Anderson, Whiting, Ripley, and Magruder were present. It was determined that General Jackson should move upon the right flank of the Federal army, and if General McDowell remained inactive in his position near Fredericksburg, then a general and simultaneous attack was to be made upon the whole line of General McClellan. Page 119 A demonstration along the Richmond road made at that time by General McDowell would have rendered the flank march of General Jackson entirely impracticable. This demonstration was feared by General Lee; but he was unaware that it had then been determined at Washington to concentrate the corps of General McDowell with the other forces before Washington and form the army of Virginia under General Pope. The order for that purpose was issued on the 27th, at Washington, the 2nd day after the council of officers at Richmond; and thus prevented entirely the movement feared by General Lee. (See page 126.)

On the 26th General Jackson reached Ashland, there to commence his flanking operations. His advanced guard drove in the little Federal force posted there and pushed on without loss of time to Hanover Court House, where he threw forward General Branch's brigade between the Chickahominy and the Pamunkey rivers to establish a junction with General Hill, who was to cross the former stream at Meadow Bridge. It was the movement of General Hill's troops, seen pouring out of Richmond by the Federal army, in the direction where General Jackson was known to be, which convinced them of the serious work at hand on their right. General D. H. Hill began his offensive operations about 1 p. m. by an attack upon Mechanicsville and met with a brave resistance. General McCall's Pennsylvania reserves were stationed there supported by General Morrell and General Sykes, and strongly intrenched for defence. Storming attacks were made again and again with fury, and were as often repelled with a cool determination. In vain General D. H. Hill sent his aids in quest of General Branch. The latter did not arrive until night, when the conflict had ended.

At this time eight divisions of the Federal army were on the right bank of the Chickahominy occupying entrenchments fronting Richmond. Before these troops lay the mass of the Confederate army also in 'entrenched positions. Upon the left bank of the river connected by numerous bridges was General Fitz John Porter with two divisions and General Sykes' regulars. It was against this latter force that the Confederate attack was made. Two separate armies of great force were thus about to attack General McClellan, and his position was extremely critical. If he concentrated on the left bank of the Chickahominy, he abandoned the attempt to capture Richmond, and risked a disastrous retreat upon the White House and Yorktown with the entire Confederate army in pursuit, and where he could hope for no support. If he moved to the right bank of the river, he risked the cutting off of his communications with the White House by the enemy, who might seize the railroad over which his supplies came. He would then be forced to open new communications with James river, and move at once in that direction. There he would receive the support of the navy, and if reenforced could operate against Richmond or Petersburg, the fall of the latter place involving the fall of the former. This latter movement had been thought of some time previous, and transports, with a prudent foresight, had been sent to the James river. It was now determined upon. The distance from Fair Oaks to the James river was about seventeen miles. A single road only existed by which the baggage and stores could be moved. This was exposed in front to the enemy, who, by several roads radiating from Richmond, could throw a considerable force at once upon different points. The activity with which this movement was performed was such that it was nearly completed before it was anticipated by the enemy.

During the night in which General D. H. Hill was held in check at Mechanicsville, the whole of General Porter's baggage was sent over to the right bank of the river and united with the long train which was to set out on the evening of the 27th for James river. At the same time orders were given to reship or destroy all the stores along the railroad to White House and to evacuate that depot. This duty was assigned to General Stoneman with a flying column. He was also ordered to delay the advance of the enemy and to fall back after the execution of these orders on Yorktown. All this was successfully done.

For the next day, Friday, the 27th, the orders to General McCall on the extreme right were to fall back on the bridges thrown across the Chickahominy at Gaines's Mill. Joining the other troops of General Porter's corps, consisting of the division of General Morrell and the regulars of General Sykes, their duty was to make a stand in front of the bridges in order to give the army time to execute its general movement. General Porter, with this force, was not to cross the bridges until evening, and then to destroy them. The manner in which these orders were executed will now appear.

Scarcely had the morning of the 27th dawned, when the Confederate forces, under General D. H. Hill, that had been held in check the previous evening, opened a tremendous fire of artillery upon the front of General McCall, who, upon seeing the brigade of General Branch, ordered on the previous day to support General Hill, advancing to attack his right, began to fall back, fighting, further down the stream. This secured the crossing of the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville to the Confederates, and the first reënforcements ordered from their main body during the night, consisting of the veteran corps of General Longstreet, and the division of General A. P. Hill, now arrived. An order to advance was now given all along the Confederate line, except the right wing under General Magruder, which now confronted General McClellan on the right bank of the Chickahominy. The divisions of Generals A, P. Hill, Anderson, and Whiting formed the centre, and moved toward Coal Harbor, while Generals Jackson, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet formed the left nearer the Pamunkey river. Apprehensions were still entertained by General

Page 120 This page contains a map of the Richmond area.

Page 121 Lee of the approach of General McDowell, and it was not until he received reliable intelligence of the latter's inactivity that he resolved upon a general attack. As soon, therefore, as he was informed that General Jackson had reached Coal Harbor, steps were taken for an immediate attack on the retiring corps of General Porter, which was supposed to be the mass of General McClellan's army, and which had taken up the position it was ordered to hold on the left bank before the bridges. The Confederate attack was opened by the columns of General D. H. Hill, Anderson, and Pickett. These brave masses rushed with "thundering hurrahs" upon the musketry of General Porter's corps, and whole ranks went down under the terrible fire that met them. After a fierce struggle the Confederate troops began to give way, and at length all orders anil encouragements were vain. They were falling back in the greatest disorder. Immediately General Cobb appeared on the field with his legion, and the 19th North Carolina, and 14th Virginia, and renewed the attack, but all their efforts were in vain. Broken to pieces and disorganized, the fragments of that legion came rolling back from the charge. The 19th North Carolina lost eight standard bearers, and most of their officers were either killed or wounded. The shattered regiments of Generals Hill and Anderson were again led up, but their foes quietly and coolly held out against every attack that was made. During this moment of success for the Federal army, General McClellan hastened to throw upon the left bank all the troops not absolutely necessary to guard the lines in front of Richmond. It was nearly night when some of the divisions reached the river, and at this time the Confederate loft and reserves had been brought up. The weight of their attack was made on the Federal left, where the troops had sustained an unequal fight all day, and were worn out, having fired almost their last cartridge. The left gave way and disbanded. This disorder extended until it reached the centre of the Federal lines, which fell back in increasing confusion, until the fresh brigades of Generals Meagher and French were met. The vigorous shouts of these troops, and the placing a few guns anew in battery and opening tire served to check the enemy, who paused at this final determination, and darkness closed the contest at Gaines's Mill.

The left wing, under General Porter, subsequently supported from the main body, had accomplished the purpose of holding the Confederates in check, and that night the train of five thousand wagons, the seige train, a herd of twenty-five hundred oxen, and other material was in motion for James river. During the night the troops of General McClellan repassed the bridges of the Chickahominy in perfect order, destroying them after they had passed. The field of battle, with the dead, and those most seriously wounded, a few guns and some prisoners, was abandoned. The corps of General Keyes in the advance toward James river took possession of the road across the White Oak Swamp, and the principal lines of communication by which the Federal army could be annoyed by their enemies.

Meantime the Confederate officers and men supposed, from the manner in which the day closed, leaving them in possession of the field of battle and its spoils, that General McClellan was completely cut off from his base of retreat. The capture or destruction of the entire Federal army was regarded as certain. The rejoicing bordered on frenzy. Their demonstration on the 28th was made to the White House, where the immense stores which were expected to fall into their hands were found to have been destroyed, and nothing but ruins remained. The burial of the dead, and the care for the wounded, and repose for the troops, and uncertainty as to the position of the Federal army, caused the day to pass without any movement of the Confederate troops. The mass of them were now on the left bank of the Chickahominy, over which the bridges had been destroyed, while General McClellan's army united was on the right bank. Time now was worth everything to them. Before they could be attacked, however, it was necessary for the Confederate force to rebuild the bridges, or to fall back some distance to the Mechanicsville bridge. It was not until the reports of the state of affairs at the White House were made in the afternoon of the 28th, and the statements of prisoners, that General Lee comprehended the real movements of General McClellan, and that he was on his way to James river to form a junction with the fleet. The twelve brigades of Generals D. H. Hill and Longstreet were instantly put in motion to give the death blow to the enemy, whom they supposed now to be flying.

The position of General McClellan on Saturday night was such that the Confederate officers, who were unaware of his design, were confident of his capture. Having abandoned, and, as they supposed, been driven from all his strongholds on the north side of the Chickahominy, cut off from all communication with his supplies at the White House, and with the Chickahominy in his rear, and the divisions of Generals Longstreet, Magruder, and Huger in his front, all hopes of his escape were thought to be impossible. The morning of the 29th was spent by General McClellan's troops in destroying all that could not be carried away from the camps. A complete railroad train, locomotive, tender and cars, which had been left on the track, was sent headlong over the broken bridge into the river. Nothing was left hut three siege guns which could not be moved.

The corps of Generals Sumner and Franklin had been left in the works at Fair Oaks with instructions to evacuate and protect the baggage and supply trains on their way to the river. Hardly had they commenced to fall back on the railroad and Williamsburg turnpike, when the enemy, perceiving the movement, pressed forward, giving the former barely time to place Page 122 their men in position. The attack was commenced by the Confederates about two o'clock p. m., about one mile and a half above Savage's Station, and the conflict continued until near night. The enemy, advancing in solid masses to within a short distance of the artillery, suffered severely and were repulsed. During the night Generals Sumner and Franklin fell back to White Oak Swamp bridge.

On the morning of Monday, the 30th of June, all the troops and all the trains were in safety beyond White Oak bridge, which presented a new obstacle to the Confederates. Generals Sumner and Franklin were left to act as a rear guard, and hold the passage of the White Oak Swamp, whilst Generals Heintzelman, with the divisions of Generals Hooker, Kearny, Sedgwick, and McCall, were placed at the point of intersection of the roads leading from Richmond, called Charles City cross roads. These movements protected the trains until they arrived at the James river, precisely at the time when the transports with provisions and ammunition and hospital stores arrived from Fortress Monroe.

The advance of the Confederate force was actively resumed early in the morning. Generals D. H. Hill, Whiting, and Ewell, under the command of General Jackson, crossed the Chickahominy by the Grapevine bridge, and followed the Federal retreat by the Williamsburg road and Savage's Station. Generals Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Huger and Magruder took the Charles City road with the intention of cutting off the Federal retreat. At the White Oak Swamp the left wing under General Jackson came up with the Federal force under Generals Franklin and Sumner, about 11 a. m. They had crossed the stream and burned the bridge behind them. An artillery fire was opened upon both sides, which continued with great severity and destruction until night. The result of this battle was to prevent the further advance of the enemy in this direction, which was the single line of road over which the trains had passed. Late on the same day, a battle was fought between the forces under General Heintzelman and the main force of the enemy, which attempted to advance by the Charles City road to cut off the retreat. This force was led by Generals Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and linger. The former, however, being called away, the command devolved upon General Hill. As the masses advanced upon the Federal batteries of heavy guns they were received with such a destructive fire of artillery and musketry as threw them into disorder. General Lee sent all his disposable troops to the rescue, but the Federal fire was so terrible as to disconcert the coolest veterans. Whole ranks of the Confederate troops were hurled to the ground. Says an actor in the conflict, "Tho thunder of the cannon, the cracking of the musketry from thousands of combatants, mingled with the screams of the wounded and the dying, were terrific to the ear and to the imagination." The conflict thus continued within a narrow space for hours, and not a foot of ground was won by the Confederates. Night was close at hand. The Federal lines were strengthened and the confidence of the Confederate general began to falter. The losses of his exhausted and worn out troops in attempting to storm the batteries were terrible. Orders were given to General Jackson to cover the retreat in case the army should have to fall back, and directions were sent to Richmond to get all the public property ready for removal. The Federal forces, perceiving the confusion, began step by step to press forward. The posture of affairs at this time is thus related by a Confederate officer: "The enemy, noticing our confusion, now advanced, with the cry, 'Onward to Richmond!' Yes, along the whole hostile front rang the shout, 'Onward to Richmond 1' Many old soldiers who had served in distant Missouri and on the plains of Arkansas wept in the bitterness of their souls like children. Of what avail had it been to us that our best blood had flowed for six long days?—of what avail all our unceasing and exhaustless endurance? Everything, everything seemed lost, and a general depression came over all our hearts. Batteries dashed past in headlong flight; ammunition, hospital and supply wagons rushed along, and swept the troops away with them from the battle field. In vain the most frantic exertion, entreaty and self-sacrifice of the staff officers 1 The troops had lost their foot-hold, and all was over with the Southern Confederacy.

"In this moment of desperation General A. P. Hill came up with a few regiments he had managed to rally, but the enemy was continually pressing nearer and nearer; louder and louder their shouts, and the watchword, 'On to Richmond!' could be heard. Cavalry officers sprang from their saddles and rushed into the ranks of the infantry regiments, now deprived of their proper officers. General Hill seized the standard of the Fourth North Carolina regiment, which he had formerly commanded, and shouted to the soldiers, 'If you will not follow me, I will perish alone.' Upon this a number of officers dashed forward to cover their beloved general with their bodies; the soldiers hastily rallied, and the cry 'Lead on, Hill; head your old North Carolina boys!' rose over the field. And now Hill charged forward with this mass he had thus worked up to the wildest enthusiasm. The enemy halted when they saw these columns, in flight a moment before, now advancing to the attack, and Hill hurst upon his late pursuers like a famished lion. A fearful hand to hand conflict now ensued, for there was no time to load and fire. The ferocity with which this combat was waged was incredible. . It was useless to beg the exasperated men for quarter; there was no moderation, no pity, no compassion in that bloody work of bayonet and knife. The son sank dying at his father's feet; the father forgot that he had a child—a dying child; the brother did not see that a brother was expiring a few paces from Page 123 him; the friend heard not the last groans of a friend; all natural ties were dissolved; only one feeling, one thirst, panted in every bosom —revenge. Here it was that the son of Major Peyton, but fifteen years of age, called to his father for help. A ball had shattered both his legs. 'When we have beaten the enemy then I will help yon,' answered Peyton; 'I have here other sons to lead to glory. Forward!' But the column had advanced only a few paces farther when the major himself fell to the earth a corpse. Prodigies of valor were here performed on both sides. History will ask in vain for braver soldiers than those who have fought and fell. But of the demoniac fury of both parties one at a distance can form no idea. Even the wounded, despairing of succor, collecting their last energies of life, plunged their knives into the bosoms of foemen who lay near them still breathing.

"The success of General Hill enabled other generals to once more lead their disorganized troops back to the fight, and the contest was renewed along the whole line, and kept up until deep into the night; for everything depended upon our keeping the enemy at bay, counting, too, upon their exhaustion at last, until fresh troops could arrive to reenforce us. At length, about half past ten in the evening, the divisions of Magruder, Wise, and Holmes, came up and deployed to the front of our army.

"So soon as these reinforcements could be thrown to the front our regiments were drawn back, and as far as possible reorganized during the night, the needful officers appointed, and after the distribution of provisions, which had also fortunately arrived, measures were adopted for the gathering up of the wounded and the burial of the dead."

In this conflict General McCall was taken prisoner by the Confederates.

During the same day an attack was made upon the corps of General Porter by the divisions of Generals Wise and Holmes near Malvern Hill, but without success.

On the night of the 30th all the divisions of the Federal army were united at Malvern Hill, a strong position where the whole train, including the siege guns, were sheltered. The army was thus in communication with its transports and supplies. Five days of incessant marching and fighting had passed, during which many had been sun struck by the heat, and others from exhaustion had quitted the ranks and fell into the procession of sick and wounded. Attacked by a force far superior to itself, it had succeeded in reaching a position where it was out of danger and from which, if reenforced, it could have advanced.

General McClellan immediately put his army in a position for defence by arranging his batteries along the high grounds so as not to interfere with the defence by the infantry of the sort of glacis upon which the enemy would be obliged to advance to the attack. About four p. ii. on the 1st of July, the Confederate forces advanced to storm the position. But a destructive fire of grape mowed them down until the fragments of their divisions were compelled to seek shelter in the woods. The position being within range of the gunboats they also opened a destructive fire with their hundred pounders upon the enemy. The attack was' a failure, the loss of the Confederates being immense while that of the Federal troops was insignificant. On the evening after the battle the exhausted enemy retired to Richmond to appear no more, and the army of the Potomac took up a position at Harrison's Bur, a spot chosen by the engineers and naval officers as the most favorable for defence and for receiving supplies.

These battles were fought at a time when the military strength of the Confederate States had been brought into the field and concentrated at Richmond. Thus the Confederate army greatly outnumbered the Federal force, reduced by losses during the campaign and by sickness, on the banks of the Chickahominy. No official reports have appeared of the losses on either side. They were not far from fifteen thousand men. On the 3d of July the War Department published a despatch from General McClellan dated at Berkeley, Harrison's Bar, stating that he had lost but one gun, which broke down and was abandoned, and that the rear of his train was then within a mile of camp and only one wagon abandoned.

On the 4th of July General McClellan issued the following address to his army:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, July 4, 1862.

Soldiers op the Army or the Potomac: Your achievements of the post ten days hare illustrated the valor and endurance of the American soldier. Attacked by superior forces, and without hopes of reinforcements, you have succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank movement, always regarded as the most hazardous of military operations. You have saved all your guns except a few lost in battle, taking in return guns and colors from the enemy. Upon your march you have been assailed, day after day, with desperate fury, by men of the same race and nation, skilfully massed and led. Under every disadvantage of number, and necessarily of position also, you hare in every conflict beaten back your foes with enormous slaughter.

Your conduct ranks you among the celebrated armies of history. None "will now question what each of you may always, with pride, say: "I belonged to the Army of the Potomac." You have reached this new base complete in organization and unimpaired in spirit. The enemy may at any time attack you—we are prepared to meet them. I have personally established your lines. Let them come, and we will convert their repulse into a final defeat.

Your government is strengthening you with the resources of a great people. On this, our nation's birthday, we declare to our foes, who are rebels against the best interests of mankind, that this army shall enter the capital of the so-called Confederacy; that our national Constitution shall prevail, and that the Union, which can alone insure internal peace and external security to each State, must and shall be preserved, cost what it may in time, treasure, and blood.

                                                        GEO. E. McCLELLAN,

                                                   Major-General Commanding.

On the 5th President Davis issued the following address to the Confederate army:

                                                           RICHMOND, July 5,1862.

To the Army in Eastern Virginia:

SOLDIERS; I congratulate you on the series of brilliant victories which, under the favor of Divine Providence, you have lately won, and as (he President of the Confederate States, do heartily tender to you the thanks of the country, whose just cause you have so skilfully and heroically served. Ten days ago, an invading army, vastly superior to you in numbers and the material of war, closely beleaguered your capital and vauntingly proclaimed its speedy conquest; you marched to attack the enemy in his intrenchmcnts; with well directed movements and death-defying valor, ou charged upon him in his strong positions, drove im from field to field over a distance of more than thirty-five miles, and despite his reinforcements compelled him to seek safety under the cover of his gunboats, where he now lies cowering before the army so lately derided and threatened with entire subjugation. The fortitude with which you have borne toil and privation, the gallantry with which you have entered into each successive battle, must have been witnessed to be fully appreciated; but a grateful people will not fail to recognize you and to bear you in loved remembrance. Well may it be said of you that you have " done enough for glory;" but duty to a suffering country and to the cause of constitutional liberty, claims from you vet further effort. Let it be your pride to relax in nothing which can promote your future efficiency; your one great object being to drive the invader from your soil, and, carrying your standards beyond the outer boundaries of the Confederacy, to wring from an unscrupulous foe the recognition of your birthright, community, and independence.

       [Signed]                                                 JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Early in July General Halleck resigned his command of the army of the West, and in obedience to an order of the President assumed, on the 23d of July, the duties of general-in-chief of the entire army of the United States. This was the position held by General McClellan, previous to his departure from Washington to conduct the peninsular campaign. Its duties had been subsequently performed by the Secretary of War, under the supervision of President Lincoln, assisted by the counsel of Major-General Hitchcock, an elderly officer of the army. General Halleck, upon assuming these duties, had his attention immediately called to the army of the Potomac. He thus relates his action in relation to it:

"The first thing to which my attention was called on my arrival here (at Washington), was the condition of the army at Harrison's Landing, on the James river. I immediately visited General McClellan's headquarters for consultation. I left Washington on the 24th and returned on the 27th. The main object of this consultation was to ascertain if there was a possibility of an advance upon Richmond from Harrison's Landing, and if not to favor some plan of uniting the armies of General McClellan and General Pope on some other line. Not being familiar with the position and numbers of the troops in Virginia and on the coast, I took the President's estimate of the largest number of reinforcements that could be sent to the army of the Potomac.

"On the day of my arrival at Harrison's Landing General McClellan was of opinion that he would require at least 50,000 additional troops. I informed him that this number could not possibly be sent; that I was not authorized to promise him over 20,000, and that I could not well see how even that number could be safely withdrawn from other places. He took the night for considering the matter, and informed me the next morning that he would make the attempt upon Richmond with the additional 20,000, but immediately on my return to Washington he telegraphed that he would require 35,000, a force which it was impossible to send him without leaving Washington and Baltimore almost defenceless. The only alternative now left was to withdraw the army of the Potomac to some position where it could unite with that of General Pope, and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy. After full consultation with my officers, I determined to attempt this junction on the Rappahannock, by bringing McClellan's forces to Aquia Creek.

"Accordingly, on the 30th of July, I telegraphed to him to send away his sick as quickly as possible, preparatory to a movement of his troops. This was preliminary to the withdrawal of his entire army, which was ordered by telegraph on the 3d of August. In order that the transfer to Aquia Creek might be made as rapidly as possible, I authorized General McClellan to assume control of all the vessels in the James river and Chesapeake Bay, of which there was then a vast fleet. The quartermaster-general was also requested to send to that point all the transports that could be procured. On the 5th I received a protest from General McClellan, dated the 4th, against the removal of the army from Harrison's Landing. On the 1st of August I ordered General Burnside to immediately embark his troops at Newport News, transfer them to Aquia Creek, and take position opposite Fredericksburg. This officer moved with great promptness, and reached Aquia Creek on the night of the 3d. His troops were immediately landed, and the transports sent back to General McClellan.

"About this time I received information that the enemy were preparing a large force to drive back General Pope, and attack either Washington or Baltimore. The information was so direct and trustworthy that I could not doubt its correctness. This gave me serious uneasiness for the safety of the capital and Maryland, and I. repeatedly urged upon General McClellan the necessity of promptly moving his army so as to form a junction with that of General Pope. The evacuation of Harrison's Landing, however, was not commenced till the 14th, eleven days after it was ordered."

The following correspondence, respecting this removal of the army of the Potomac, took place between General McClellan and General Halleck:

                                       BERKELY, VIRGINIA, August 4, 12 M.

Major-General Halleck, Commander-in-Chief:

Your telegraph of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous in Page 125 the extreme to our cause. 'I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statement. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We bold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction, and, with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as secure.

We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have reached fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us practically within ten miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water, during its advance, certainly to within twelve miles of Richmond. At Aquia Creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way. From here to Fortress Monroe is a march of about seventy miles, for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material, except by land. The result of the movement would thus be to march one hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aids of the gunboats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army, which would ensue; the terrible depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign Powers to recognize our adversaries; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army, it may be promptly reinforced to enable it to resume the offensive.

It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to General Burnside's force, to that of General Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defence in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defence there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of this nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere, here is the true defence of Washington; it is here, on the bank of the James river, that the fate of the Union should be decided.

Clear in my conviction of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war; I do now what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad heart, obey your order to the utmost of my power, devoting to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be, and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings. I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to arrest disaster from my country.

                                 GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major General.

                 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERALS MCCLELLAN.

                                             WASHINGTON, August 6,1863.

Major-General Geo. B. McClellan, Commanding, &c., Berkeley, Virginia:

GENERAL — Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. You, General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview; and even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, General, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thought than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no other alternative.

Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. You and your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they have received and are receiving large reinforcements from the south. General Popes army, now covering Washington, is only 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You arc thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety. With the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as be may elect, neither can reinforce the other in case of such an attack.

If General Pope's army be diminished to reinforce you, Washington, Maryland,' and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would he too weak to even hold the position you occupy should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the peninsula to some point by water—say Fredericksburg—where the two armies can be united. Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged.

You say that to withdraw from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, which is now in excellent condition and discipline. I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in the demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to your present position was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it.

A new base on the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a reinforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. The change, with such advantages, will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the peninsula would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further from Richmond than Fredericksburg is. Besides the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack by the enemy. The political effect of the withdrawal may at first look unfavorable, but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity; and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separate fragments. But you will reply. Why not reinforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview that you required 50,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have " some chance" of success with 20,000; but you afterward telegraphed to me that yon would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely reenforced.

If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was Page 126 utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reënforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river, and even after you got the reinforcements asked for, vou admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance ou Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest hope of assistance from you. In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers— indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me—are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the peninsula now advise its abandonment. I have not inquired, and do not desire to know, by whose advice or for what reason the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy before them. I must take things as I find them. 1 find our forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better one, I certainly should have adopted it; but all of your plans require reënforcements which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for reënforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. I have written very plainly, as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having carefully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at different conclusions from your own. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,"

                                       H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

(Official Copy.) J. C. Kelton-, Assistant Adj.-General

Thus the campaign was closed. The once proud Army of the Potomac was withdrawn from the peninsula to Aquia Creek and Alexandria, and its corps were immediately ordered into the field to reenforce the army of General Pope southeast of Washington, and to act under his command.

By an order of the President on the 27th of Juno, Major-General Pope, who had been in command of a force in the West, entered upon the chief command of the army of Virginia.

The following is the order of the President creating the Army of Virginia, and putting General Pope in command, dated June 27, 1862:

I. The forces under Major-Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, including the troops now under Brigadier-General Sturgis, at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the Army of Virginia.

II. The command of the Army of Virginia is specially assigned to Major-General John Pope as Commanding General.

The troops of the Mountain Department, heretofore under command of General Fremont, shall constitute the first army corps, under the command of General Fremont.

The troops of the Shenandoah Department, now under General Banks, shall constitute the second army corps, and be commanded bv him. The troops under the command of General McDowell, except those within the fortifications and the city of Washington, shall form the third army corps, and be under his command.

The creation of the several separate and independent commands which constituted the forces west and southwest of Washington had always been looked upon with distrust. Hence the consolidation of these forces under one commander was regarded with much satisfaction by the public, as a wise and prudent measure.

The appointment of General Pope to the chief command was not favorably received by Major-General Fremont. Consequently the following order was issued from the War Department:

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, JUNE 27, 1862.

Major-General John C. Fremont, having asked to be relieved from command of the First Army Corps of the Army of Virginia, because, as he says, the position assigned him by the appointment of Major-General Pope as commander-in-chief of the Army of Virginia is subordinate and inferior to those heretofore held by him, and to remain in the subordinate command now assigned him would, as he says, largely reduce his rank and consideration in the service—

It is ordered by the President that Major-General John C. Fremont be relieved from command.

Second, that General Rufus King be and he is hereby assigned to the command of the First Army Corps of the Army of Virginia, in place of General Fremont, relieved bv order of the President.

                                EDWARD M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

On the next day General Fremont issued an order declaring his resignation of the command of his forces and assigning it to Brigadier-General Schenck. The ground upon which the resignation of General Fremont was made, was understood to be that General Pope, who had been appointed to the command of the army of Virginia, was his inferior in rank, and he could not consistently command a corps under him. General Schenck, on assuming command, issued the following order:

Brigadier-General Schenck. in assuming the new position to which the General commanding has done him the honor thus to assign him, desires to express his great satisfaction that it will only somewhat change his relation to the troops which nave heretofore been under his command, but without separating him from them. He takes this occasion to say to the officers and men with whom he has been connected, that he congratulates himself on having those who have so commended themselves by their discipline, obedience, and general good conduct, still left in his division. He regrets for similar reasons to part with Capt. Rigby, his officers and men; and he confidently hopes, as to the troops whose accession to the brigade will extend his command, that the relation between himself and them, ns well as with all his old companions, will continue to be mutually agreeable and advantageous.

   By order of Brigadier-General SCHENCK.

                         DONN PIATT, Captain and A. A. G.

At night of the same day he learned that General Rufus King had been ordered to the command of that corps, and sent in his request to be relieved of command in that portion of the army. But on the subsequent day, still further learning that General King had been detached and General Sigel ordered to the same command, he withdrew his resignation.

Meantime Major-General Pope was making his arrangements to take the field. On the 14th of July he issued the following address to his army:

To the officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia:

By special assignment of the President I have assumed command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition, and your wants, in preparing you for active operations and in placing you in a position from which you can act Page 127 promptly and to the purpose. These labors are nearly completed, and I am about to join you in the field. Let us understand each other. I have come to you from the West where we have always seen the backs of our enemies—from an army whose business it has been to seek an adversary and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack and not defence. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving; that opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. In the mean time I desire you to dismiss certain phrases I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them—of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Lei us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable line of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of itself. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success arid glory are in the advance—disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever. 

     (Signed)                   JOHN POPE, Major-General Commanding.

Subsequent orders issued by General Pope at this time indicate the manner in which he proposed to conduct the campaign, as follows:

Headquarters of The Army of Virginia, Washington, July 18,1862.

General Orders, No, 5:

Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In all cases supplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose department they properly belong, under the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war upon sufficient testimony being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the vouchers.

Whenever it is known that supplies can.be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible.

                     By command of Major-General POPE.

     Geo. D. Ruggles, Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA, July 18, 1862.

General Orders, No. 6:

Hereafter in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used unless so stated especially in the order for the movement Two days' cooked rations will be carried on the persons of the men, and all villages and neighborhoods, through which they pass, will be laid under contribution in the manner specified by General Orders, No. 5, current series, from these headquarters, for the subsistence of men and horses.

Movements of cavalry must always be made with celerity, and no delay in such movements will be excused hereafter on any pretext.

Whenever the order for the movement of any portion of the army emanates from these headquarters, the time of marching and that to be consumed in the execution of the duty will be specifically designated, and no departure therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed without the gravest and most conclusive reasons.

Commanding officers will be held responsible for strict and prompt compliance with every provision of this order.

                            By command of Major-General POPE.

     Geo. D. Ruggles, Colonel A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff.

Another order was issued on the same day, declaring that the inhabitants along the lines of railroads and telegraphs and the routes of travel, would be held responsible for any injury done to track, line, or road, or for any attacks on trains or stragglers by bands of guerillas in their neighborhood. In cases of damage to roads the citizens, within five miles, would be turned out in mass to repair the damage. If a soldier or legitimate follower of the army was fired upon from any house, the same should be razed to the ground. By another order all disloyal citizens within the lines of the army, or within the reach of its respective officers, were to be arrested at once. Those taking the oath of allegiance, and giving sufficient security for its observance, were to be allowed to remain; all others were to be conducted to the South, beyond the extreme pickets, and if again found anywhere within the lines, were to be treated as spies and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. These orders of General Pope were followed by the pillaging of private property and by insults to females to a degree unknown heretofore during the war. The Confederate Government, by way of retaliation, issued an order declaring that General Pope and the commissioned officers serving under him, were " not entitled to be considered as soldiers, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of cartel for the parole of future prisoners of war. Ordered, further, that in the event of the capture of Major-General Pope, or any commissioned officer serving under him, the captive so taken shall be held in close confinement so long as the orders aforesaid shall continue in force, and unrepealed by the competent military authority of the United States, and that in the event of the murder of an unarmed citizen or inhabitant of this Confederacy by virtue or under pretence of the order hereinbefore recited, it shall be the duty of the commanding general of the forces of this Confederacy to cause immediately to be hung, out of the commissioned officers prisoners as aforesaid, a number equal to that of our own citizens thus murdered by the enemy."

The main divisions of General Pope's army were now stationed at Culpepper Court House and Fredericksburg. Culpepper Court House is about seventy miles from Washington and equally distant from Richmond. The route crosses the Long Bridge at Washington, thence through Alexandria, Fairfax, Manassas, Warrenton, &c. Fredericksburg is connected with Washington by steamboat navigation on the Potomac to Aquia Creek, thence by railroad, fifteen miles, to Fredericksburg, which is sixty miles by railroad from Richmond. General Pope, although not personally in the field until the 27th of July, had been engaged in concentrating his forces. His delay in taking the field was occasioned by the absence of Major-General Halleck, who arrived at Washington on the 23d of July, and entered upon the duties of general-in-chief.

A show of force had been kept up in the Shenandoah Valley, and east of the Blue Ridge, by the Confederate Government throughout the month of July, chiefly for the purpose of preventing reinforcements to General McClellan. The knowledge which it had of the position and strength of the Federal forces made it manifest that no reënforcement to the Army of the Potomac would come from any other quarter. The departure of the division of General Burnside from Newport News, where it had been for some weeks ready to cooperate with General McClellan in any forward movements to Aquia Creek on the 1st of August, was immediately known in Richmond. It showed not only that no reënforcements were coming to the Army of the Potomac, but also that this army would soon evacuate the peninsula. The star of their fortune now appeared to be in the ascendant. The day, so long and anxiously looked for, had come, in which they should be able to take their great and powerful adversary at a disadvantage, and demonstrate to civilized nations their own military strength and ability to win that independence which they had proclaimed. Consultations were immediately held at Richmond, and their purposes were soon formed. It was resolved to abandon the defensive policy and to repeat the exploit which General Jackson had performed by driving General Banks out of the Shenandoah Valley, on a scale of national magnitude. Rumors were set afloat that Tennessee, Kentucky, and the whole of Virginia were to be recovered at once; Maryland liberated from her oppression, and not only Washington and Baltimore captured, but also Harrisburg and Philadelphia in the east, and Cincinnati in the west. It was a magnificent enterprise for a people situated like those in the Confederate States at that time. Measures were immediately adopted for the execution of these plans. General McClellan was to be left to retire from the peninsula without any further attacks than were necessary to cover their real designs, and their forces were to be prepared for an immediate movement northward. The Confederate forces at this time were greater than ever before. Not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men were at Richmond and in communication with it. All this force, excepting a strong corps of observation, was to be precipitated at onco upon Maryland.

The preparations to advance into Maryland which were making at Richmond, were immediately known at "Washington and awakened great anxiety. An order was issued to General Cox in western Virginia to send his main forces, with all possible despatch, by railroad to join General Pope. To facilitate the withdrawal of the army from Harrison's Landing, as stated by General Halleck, and to gain time also by a demonstration against the enemy, General Pope was ordered to push his forces across the Rappahannock, and occupy Culpepper and threaten Gordonsville. At the same time President Lincoln issued the following order, calling out an additional three hundred thousand men to serve for nine months:

            WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, August 4,1862.

Ordered First—That a draft of three hundred thousand militia be immediately called into the service of the United States, to service for nine months, unless sooner discharged. The Secretary of War will assign the quotas to the States, and establish regulations for the draft.

Second— That if any State shall not by the 15th of August furnish its quota of the additional three hundred thousand volunteers authorized by law, the deficiency of volunteers in that State will also be made up by a special draft from the militia. The Secretary ot W ar will establish regulations for this purpose.

Third—Regulations will be prepared oy the War Department, and presented to the President, with the object of securing the promotion of officers of the army and volunteers for meritorious and distinguished services, and of preventing the nomination and appointment in the military service of incompetent or unworthy officers. The regulations will also provide for ridding the service of such incompetent persons as now hold commissions.

                                  By order of the PRESIDENT.

   Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

The Confederate army began to move immediately after the 1st of August, and the divisions of Generals Jackson, Ewell, and Hill were hurried to the Rapidan river, which is the south fork of the Rappahannock. On Friday, the 8th of August, General Pope reached Culpepper Court House, from his last encampment near Washington, the county seat of Rappahannock. At the same time the corps of General Banks was in motion in the direction of Culpepper. The corps of General Sigel was encamped at Sperryville, twenty miles from Culpepper, and on the road from Washington, Rappahannock county. At Culpepper Court House was Brigadier-General Crawford, with his brigade belonging to General Banks's corps, and General Ricketts's division, belonging to General McDowell's corps. They had arrived two days previous from Warrenton with General McDowell, who took command of all the forces then at Culpepper. General Bayard with his cavalry had been guarding the fords of the Rapidan from Racoon Ford to a point fourteen miles below, and south of the railroad at Burnett's Ford, where he connected with the cavalry of General Buford. At noon on Friday he sent information to Culpepper Court House that the enemy had early that morning crossed the river and driven in his pickets with such force that he was obliged to retire before them. He was retiring to the north and east side of Robertson's river, about eight miles from Culpepper, there to await a supporting force. The numbers of the enemy he estimated at two regiments of infantry, two pieces of light artillery, and throe small regiments of cavalry. General Buford at the same time reported the enemy to be advancing in heavy force upon Madison Court House, thus leaving it in doubt whether the movement was directed toward Culpepper or Madison. Wishing to maintain the communication with Fredericksburg at all hazards, General Pope resolved to concentrate at Culpepper, in order to keep 'his forces interposed between

Page 129 This page contains a map of Harpers Ferry and Fredericksburg area.

Page 130 the main body of the enemy and the lower fords of the Rappahannock. He accordingly immediately ordered Brigadier-General Crawford to march to General Bayard with his brigade, which consisted of the 28th New York, 10th Maine, 40th Pennsylvania, 25th Connecticut, with ten pieces of artillery. He proceeded rapidly to the front, and occupied a position about seven miles from Culpepper, immediately in rear of the line of General Bayard's cavalry. Soon after, General Pope ordered the remainder of General Banks's corps to move rapidly from Hazel River bridge, nine miles from Culpepper, where it was the night before, to the scene of expected conflict. By eight o'clock that night, the head of General Banks's column was descried marching around the village to its destination, which it reached before midnight. That point was immediately in the rear of General Crawford." General Sigel was at the same time ordered up from Sperryville by a forced march of twenty mile3, his advance reaching Culpepper late in the afternoon, where it was halted.

Throughout Friday night and Saturday fore- noon, skirmishing was continued between General Bayard's cavalry and the advance of the enemy, until the latter had advanced within long range of General Crawford's artillery. The enemy soon developed a strong force, and occupied both sides of Cedar Mountain, a sugar-loaf eminence situated two miles west of the Orange and Alexandria railroad at Mitchell's Station. The artillery of the enemy opened early in the afternoon of Saturday, but he made no advance until near five o'clock, at which time a few skirmishers were thrown forward on each side under cover of a heavy wood, in which his force was concealed. A strong force was pushed forward in the rear of the skirmishers, and General Banks advanced to the attack. The engagement did not fairly open until after six o'clock p. m., but for about and a half was furious and unceasing. The report of General Banks to General Pope had expressed the opinion that no action was imminent that afternoon, and it was not until after it was fully commenced that the latter ordered General McDowell to advance General Ricketts's division to the support of General Banks, and also General Sigel to bring his men on the ground as soon as possible. At 7 a. m., when General Pope arrived, the action was raging fiercely, but General Banks held the position he took early in the morning. During the action he had fallen back about one mile from the spot where it first commenced, but without any disorder or confusion. The enemy wore evidently pressing close, and the artillery was firing at short range. The division of General Ricketts pushed forward and occupied the right of General Banks, taking the place of his right wing, which was ordered to mass upon the centre. Before this change could be effected it was quite dirk, and the musketry firing ceased, but the artillery kept up an intermittent firing until near midnight. The Federal troops rested on their arms during the night in line of battle. At daylight the next morning the enemy fell back two miles, and still higher up the mountain, and the pickets of General Pope advanced and occupied the ground. The army rested during the day. Monday was spent in burying the dead and in getting off the wounded, and during the night the enemy disappeared, leaving many of his dead unburied and his wounded on the ground. The slaughter on both sides was severe; much of the fighting having been hand to hand. A cavalry and artillery force under Generals Buford and Bayard was thrown forward in pursuit, and followed the enemy to the Rapidan, over which his rear guard passed about ten o'clock on Tuesday morning. The Federal loss was fifteen hundred killed, wounded, and missing, of whom near three hundred were taken prisoners. General Pope also lost two Napoleon guns, fifteen hundred muskets, and considerable ammunition. The Confederate loss was severe, among whom were Generals Winder and Trimble. The battle commenced with the advance of General Ewell, consisting of ten thousand men, who were reenforced by General Jackson with five thousand more, and the balance of his command got into position early in the night.

On the Federal side the contest was maintained entirely by the command of General Banks, and was conducted with great skill and bravery. The object of this attack on the part of General Lee was undoubtedly to feel the strength and temper of General Pope's army. His forces retired across the river, a few miles toward Gordonsville, to await the approach of the main army, while General Pope pushed forward his whole force in the direction of the Rapidan, where he occupied a strong position, extending from Robertson's Rise on the right to near Racoon Ford on the left.

On the 16th a party of Confederate cavalry were surprised and captured at Louisa Court House. Upon them were found important despatches, including an autograph letter from General Lee, which informed the Federal Government that General Lee was moving by forced marches the main body of the Confederate army to attack General Pope before a junction could be formed between him and the Army of the Potomac. Thus their plan was to throw overwhelming forces upon him, cut off his rear, and annihilate, if possible, his entire army. In consequence of this reliable information, General Halleck, the general-in-chief, on the 17th ordered General Pope not to cross the Rapidan, but advised him to take a. position in rear of the North Fork, whore he could be more easily reenforced. This movement was commenced by General Pope on the 18th, and during the 19th the main body of his forces was behind that river, and prepared to hold its passes.

Ten miles above Fredericksburg the Rappahannock river receives the two tributaries which form it. The southern stream is called the Rapidan, the northern one is called the North Fork. This latter is the stream behind which General Pope was advised to Page 131 retire, and which he effected on the 18th and the subsequent day. Below the junction of the tributaries the stream is called the Rappahannock. This junction is twenty miles below the spot where the Culpepper or Orange and Alexandria railroad crosses the North Fork.

General Lee commenced reconnoitring on the day that General Pope retired, and at night a considerable body of his troops had crossed the Rapidan. On the 19th he crossed with a large force, comprising cavalry, infantry, and artillery.

General Pope had thus far received some reënforcements from General Burnside, who landed at Fredericksburg from the mouth of the James river on the 4th of August. On the 6th, at six. p. m., General Reno, with his division of General Burnside's corps, left camp to inarch to General Pope. On the 10th General King, of McDowell's corps, hurried forward to Culpepper Court House for the same purpose, and on the 13th General Stevens, with six regiments of his division, and four of General Wright's, which had been detached from Port Royal, South Carolina, followed. Thus nearly forty regiments of infantry, fully armed and provided with trains and a large force of artillery and cavalry, were sent forward from Fredericksburg. He was also authorized to call the main portion of General Cox's forces from western Virginia.

The Orange and Alexandria railroad, which runs from Alexandria, and connects with the Virginia Central railroad at Gordonsville, was, at the end near Alexandria, the route by which General Pope received his supplies. The stations on that part of the road were as follows: Alexandria, to Springfield, 9 miles; to Burke's, 14 miles; to Fairfax, 18 miles; to Union Mills, 23 miles; to Manassas Junction, 27 miles; to Bristol, 31 miles; to Catlett's, 88 miles; to Warrenton Junction, 41 miles; to Bealeton, 47miles; to Rappahannock, 51 miles; to Brandy, 56 miles; to Culpepper, 02 miles; to Mitchell's, 69 miles. The road crosses the North Fork at the Rappahannock station, ten miles beyond Warrenton Junction. At Manassas Junction the Manassas Gap railroad comes in from the northwest. The first station west of Manassas Junction is Gainesville, distant 8 miles; the next is Thoroughfare, distant from Manassas Junction 14 miles. At the Warrenton Junction comes in from the northwest the Warrenton railroad. It connects Warrenton with Warrenton Junction. All these positions were in the rear of General Pope's army on the North Fork, and were involved in the subsequent movements.

When the retreat of General Pope commenced, General Sigel's command was in the advance. General Reno's held the left in the vicinity of Mitchell's Station, on the line of the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and General McDowell's forces, supported by General Banks, occupied the right centre. At half-past ten on the night of the 18th of August, General Sigel commenced moving back toward Culpepper. Previous to this hour, however, the troops in the rear were in motion. The night was dark and cold, and the march slow in consequence of the immense train of transportation wagons placed in advance of the troops. The usual camp fires were extinguished, excepting those necessary for the safe passage of the trains, and all unnecessary noise was avoided. At midnight the advance of General Sigel reached Cedar Mountain, the scene of the late battle, and at a late hour on Tuesday morning, the 19th, it reached Culpepper. The forces of General McDowell, including General King's division, had then passed through the town. General Banks's division was at an encampment on the right of the road, and General Sigel brought up the rear. Far as the eye could reach, there was to be seen nought but moving masses of infantry, cavalry, and artillery; beyond that it could catch an occasional glimmer of the white-covered tops of the wagon trains slowly winding up the distant hills. All the sick and wounded, excepting eighty-five men whose injuries were of such a kind ns to prevent their removal, and all the stores of the medical department, had been sent off by railroad before five o'clock that afternoon. The rear guard of the army consisted of the cavalry under General Bayard. The movement of the troops during the day, although made in different directions, all tended toward one point, the Rappahannock station on the railroad, at which was the bridge crossing the North Fork. During the forenoon of the 19th, the advance crossed, and the rear, which was that day under General Sigel, encamped at night some four miles from the bridge. All night, long army trains, infantry, and artillery were moving across the bridge, and by noon on the 20th the cavalry composing the rear guard made its appearance just on the west side of the bridge, and was then drawn up in line of battle to meet the enemy's cavalry, with whom General Bayard had been skirmishing from Cedar Mountain. About one o'clock the Confederate cavalry made a charge, but accomplished nothing except wounding a few men. The Federal cavalry then came across the bridge, and the retreat behind the North Fork of the Rappahannock was complete.

During the afternoon and night, the Confederate artillery came up. On the next day, the 21st, being Thursday, an attempt was made by them to cross a few miles above the bridge. The New York battery of Crowell and the Third Maryland regiment, stationed at the ford, would have been driven off except for the additional batteries sent to their support. At the same time an attack was made at Kelly's Ford; this was also repulsed. An attack of the enemy was expected during the night, and the Federal force slept on their arms. Early the next morning a Confederate battery opened at the spo: where the first attempt to cross was made, which kept up a fire for some time. A little farther up the stream a bridge was discovered which the enemy had erected during the night. A Federal battery opened, which Blackened fire soon after and appeared to be silenced by the Page 132 batteries of the enemy. It was apparently withdrawn, when the enemy began to cross. The batteries of General Sigel's command again opened upon their approach, and they were here also driven buck. It was on this occasion that General Henry Bohlen lost his life. Attempts to cross were also made at other fords. On Friday afternoon and night of the 22d, rain fell so heavily as to swell the river and make it unfordable between the mountains and a few miles back of Warrenton Springs, which checked the efforts of the enemy. The firing of artillery at nearly all the fords was kept up on the 23d and 24th with more or less spirit, but with no special results. On the 23d the bridge at the Rappahannock station was burned by General Ricketts. While this was going on during the 24th, General Lee made a flank movement, advanced higher up, and attempted to throw a portion of his force over at Waterloo bridge, about twelve miles above the Rappahannock bridge, which was burned. This attempt was defeated. The strategy of the movements of General Pope consisted in the hope that by his falling back across and holding the fords of the North Fork, sufficient time would be gained for the Array of the Potomac to come to his aid.

On Friday evening, the 22d, while the Federal force was thus in possession of the fords of the Rappahannock, a body of Confederate cavalry under General Stuart, consisting of detachments of the 1st, 4th, and 9th Virginia cavalry, made a dash upon Catlett's Station on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, thirty-five miles from Washington, and thirteen miles in the rear of the Rappahannock station. They met with only slight resistance. There were a great number of trains in a circle round the station at the time, which first occupied their attention; but a terrible storm of rain setting in a few moments after their arrival, the wagons could not be destroyed by fire, and only few were injured. They remained some hours, and left at four o'clock in the morning, their pickets having been driven in. They took away over two hundred horses of General Pope's train, and twenty from General McDowell's. They took all General Pope's baggage and everything belonging to his staff officers. All the sick were taken from the hospitals, and most of them put on the captured horses to ride. A few were killed on both sides, and the number of prisoners taken was about two hundred. This force had crossed the North Fork at Porter's Ford, two miles above White Sulphur Springs. The Federal force at Catlett's consisted of a small guard from the Pennsylvania regiment under Colonel Kane, and the Purnell Legion of Maryland. In the neighborhood were other trains likewise having small guards, upon some of which an attack was made.

After a body of the Confederate force had crossed at Waterloo bridge on the 24th, as above stated, an attack was made upon them by order of General Pope, with the hope of cutting them off. This was unsuccessful, but the enemy was compelled to retire, move farther up the river, and enter the valley which lies between the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run mountains. The object of this movement was to get in the rear of General Pope and cut off his supplies from Washington.

It put the Confederate army in such a position that it could move either upon Washington or upon Leesburg, for the purpose of crossing into Maryland. Nevertheless, General Pope was successful in preventing the enemy from crossing at any of the fords of the North Fork, and compelling him to move still higher up on the west side of the Bull Ruu mountains. Thus, during eight days, General Lee had advanced no nearer to Washington. It now remained for General Pope to guard the passes of these mountains in order to prevent the approach of the enemy any nearer to Washington, or to meet him after crossing the mountains and defeat him. On the other hand it was the object of General Lee to pass the mountains and take General Pope in the rear if possible. At all events it was necessary for him to get rid of the army of General Pope if he intended to cross over the Potomac into Maryland.

When it appeared doubtful if the North Fork river could be held long enough to effect a junction of the forces of General McClellan with those of General Pope, a part of the former were ordered to land at Alexandria and move out by railroad as rapidly as possible. After this movement of General Lee, the remainder of General McClellan's forces were ordered to land at Alexandria, and General Burnside was ordered to evacuate Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek.

As soon as General Pope discovered that a large force of the enemy was turning his right toward Manassas, and that the divisions which he expected to be there from Alexandria had not arrived, he broke up his camps at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction and marched rapidly back in three columns. At this time the corps of General Heintzelman from General McClellan's army had reached Warrenton Junction, although without artillery, wagons, or horses for the field and general officers. One division of the corps of General Porter from General McClellan's army coming by the way of Fredericksburg, arrived at Bealston's Station, eleven miles south of Warrenton Junction in advance of General Heintzelman, about four thousand five hundred strong. The other division was at Kelly's Ford. This corps had marched night and day to join the army under General Pope, and was broken down with excessive labor. Both these divisions were immediately concentrated at Warrenton Junction. When General Pope determined to fall back he had no other course to pursue, except to detach a sufficient force to defeat the Confederate troops attempting to turn his flank, and still preserve his front before the main body of the Confederate army. The reason assigned by General Pope for not pursuing the latter course was the lack of a sufficient force to maintain his front after a suitable body had been detached to defeat General Jackson on his flank. He estimates the number of his troops at forty Page 133 thousand, before the arrival of General Heintzelman with ten thousand. The Confederate army before him was not less than eighty thousand in number. On evacuating Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, General McDowell was ordered to march rapidly with his own corps and that of General Sigel, and the division of General Reynolds, by the turnpike upon Gainesville, the first station west of Manassas Junction, on the Gap railroad, for the purpose of intercepting any reinforcements coming through Thoroughfare Gap to General Jackson, who he learned was on the railroad. At the same time General Reno, from General Burnside's corps, and General Kearny, from General Heintzelman's corps, were ordered to march upon Greenwich, so as to support General McDowell if necessary. Greenwich is a little south of Gainesville, and a little southwest of Manassas Junction. The division of General Hooker, under General Pope, moved back upon Manassas, on the line of the railroad. General Porter was ordered to remain with his corps at Warrenton Junction until relieved by General Banks marching from Fayetteville, and then to push forward in the direction of Gainesville, where the main collision with the enemy was expected.

On Tuesday night, the 26th, the pickets at Manassas Junction wore driven in, and two companies of Pennsylvania infantry, one company of Pennsylvania cavalry, and a battery of artillery stationed there were surprised and attacked by a large force under General Ewell. The Union force, after a brief skirmish, retreated across Bull Run. There, at Union Mills, were the 11th and 12th Ohio regiments under Colonel Scammon, being a portion of General Cox's division brought on from western Virginia. They immediately advanced to meet the Confederate force, and early on Wednesday morning, the 27th, a conflict took place between Manassas Junction and Bull Run. This continued for a couple of hours, when Colonel Scammon was forced to retire across Bull Run bridge, which he attempted to hold. About noon, after considerable loss, he was obliged to retire along the railroad in the direction of Alexandria, halting at a point midway between Centreville and Fairfax Court House. About two o'clock on the same morning, the New Jersey brigade under Brigadier-General Taylor, being a portion of General Franklin's division of General McClellan's army, left their encampment near Alexandria, and proceeding out the Fairfax road some distance, made a detour to the left, and during the forenoon arrived on the old battle ground near Manassas. The enemy, being aware of their approach, were drawn up to meet them. As they emerged from the woods the enemy opened upon them with a severe fire of artillery. General Franklin, having no artillery, was compelled either to make a charge or retire. He resolved to charge upon the enemy's battery, but as these were supported by infantry, it proved ineffectual, and he then fell back in order to Bangster's Station, toward Fairfax, holding the enemy in check. At this station two Ohio regiments, sent to reinforce him, came up, who were at first mistaken for a body of the enemy. The troops of General Taylor were now thrown into confusion, but finding out the mistake, rallied and joined in an attack upon the enemy, who now retired toward Manassas. General Taylor then fell back to Fairfax Court House, having left one regiment at Sangster's Station as a guard. The losses during these actions were about three hundred.

On the same night of the 26th, when Manassas Junction was taken, a body of Confederate cavalry, being a detachment of the force of the enemy at Manassas, made an attack upon a railroad train at Bristow's Station, four miles from Manassas Junction. This train was the one which had conveyed, a few hours previous, the division of General Hooker to Warrenton Junction, and was now returning empty. The cars were destroyed and the track torn up for a considerable distance. This force was increased by the arrival of more troops from General Ewell's division, who had taken Manassas Junction, where was an immense depot of Federal stores valued at nearly one million of dollars. This was the body of the enemy which General Pope had designed to intercept by ordering General McDowell to fall back on Gainesville. Unfortunately, his order was too late, for the first reinforcements to General Jackson, then in the rear of General Pope, had passed through Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville, and were in possession of Manassas at the time when the order was given to General McDowell. The stores captured at Manassas served to sustain the Confederate army in extending its march into Maryland. Vast quantities, however, were burned, because, as General Lee reported, "they had captured more than they could use or carry away." On the 23d, the next day after the attack upon Catlett's Station, General Halleck had sent a despatch to General Pope in these words: "By no means expose your railroad communication with Alexandria. It is of the utmost importance in sending your supplies and reinforcements." General Pope, in his report, says: "Tho movement of General Jackson toward White Plains and in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, while the main body of the enemy confronted me at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo bridge, was well known to me. but I relied confidently upon the forces which I had been assured would be sent from Alexandria, and one strong division of which I had ordered to take post on the works at Manassas Junction. I was entirely under the belief that these would be there, and it was not until I found my communication intercepted that I was undeceived. I knew that this movement was no raid, and that it was made by not less than twenty-five thousand men."

The army of General Pope was now on the 27th on the retreat in three columns. The one moving back along the railroad toward Manassas Junction, under General Hooker, was the first to encounter the Confederate forces in the Page 134 rear. It was the advance of the same force, a portion of which had repulsed Colonel Scammon and General Taylor in separate actions during the forenoon. That portion of the force had ceased to follow them beyond Sangster's Station, as they would thereby have been drawn away from the main body, and also from the support of General Lee's army marching upon White Plains and Thoroughfare Gap, and because . General Pope was falling back upon them. Upon the approach of General Hooker's force to Bristow's Station the Confederate forces fell back about one and a half miles across Kettle Run, and formed upon its left bank. Their main body was at Manassas, a little farther in the rear, to which their line of battle extended. A severe action ensued, which terminated at dark. General Ewell's force was driven from the field, with the loss of his camp equipage and about three hundred killed and wounded. General Hooker's division had brought with them only forty rounds of ammunition, and at night there were only five rounds to the man left. Upon learning this fact, General Pope immediately sent back orders to General Porter to march with his corps at one o'clock that night, so as to be with General Hooker at daylight in the morning, the 28th, with Morell's division, and also directed him to communicate with General Banks the order to move forward to Warrenton Junction. All trains were ordered this side of Cedar Run, and to be protected by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. Owing to insurmountable obstacles and the limited time given him to make the march, General Porter did not arrive as early as expected.

The position of General Jackson after the defeat of Ewell on the night of the 27th was dangerous. Without reinforcements he must retreat before the powerful foe in front. Only two routes were open for him. The one by which he had come, which was through Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap; and the other toward Centreville. If he attempted the first one, he would meet the forces of Generals McDowell and Sigel, and the Pennsylvania reserve under General Reynolds, who were already at Gainesville, whither they had been ordered two days previous by General Pope. His only course of safety was to fall back toward Centreville, which he did that night, and took position on the farther line of Bull Run. At noon on the 28th Manassas was occupied by the troops of General Pope, and on the same day General Heintzelman's corps, consisting of the divisions of Generals Hooker and Kearny, pushed on to Centreville, and entered the place soon after the rear of General Jackson had retired. At this time General Reno, who had cooperated with General McDowell, had reached Manassas Junction, and General Porter was at Broad Run, where he had been ordered to halt. It was now of the utmost importance to General Lee that General Jackson should be reinforced, or he might be cut off. Foreseeing the danger, General Lee had ordered General Longstreet to proceed on the 24-th from Warrenton by way of Thoroughfare Gap, a pass in the Bull Run mountains, fifteen miles west of Centreville, and unite with General Jackson. The advance of General Longstreet appears to have reached Thoroughfare Gap on the evening of the 28th, and encountered General Picket's division, which retired that night to Bristow's Station. The enemy was thus free to join General Jackson both by Thoroughfare and Hopeville Gaps. The advance of General Jackson retiring to join General Longstreet encountered, near Gainesville on the Warrenton turnpike, General Gibbon's brigade of King's division—or all of King's division—which was a part of General McDowell's force. The division behaved handsomely, and suffered severe loss. The contest closed with the darkness, and the division retired to Manassas Junction before day of the 29th. The road was open for the union of General Longstreet with General Jackson, and the junction was effected on the morning of the 29th, at 10 a. m., in person and with large force.

Hopeville is about three miles northeast of White Plains, on the road from White Plains to Aldio. The road across the mountains is some three miles north of Thoroughfare Gap. General Halleck in his report says: "McDowell had succeeded in checking Lee at Thoroughfare Gap; but the latter took the road from Hopeville to Haymarket, and hastened to the relief of Jackson, who was already in rapid retreat."


Source: The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.