The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.

United States Army Operations, 1862, Part 4

Some explanation of these orders is to be found in answers of General McClellan to interrogatories before the court martial above mentioned. In ono answer he said: "The force loft disposable for the defence of "Washington was about 70,000 men, independent of the corps of General McDowell." Again, he said: "My recollection of the suggestions as to the forces to be left varied from forty to fifty thousand. I think General McDowell proposed the latter number. Of ono thing I am confident: that, with the facts fresh in my mind, I thought that I left more than was suggested by any corps commander."

As to the necessity that General McDowell should remain for the defence of Washington, he said: "I think that General McDowell was correct in his opinion that it was safe and proper for him to unite with the Army of the Potomac. I think that immediately after the occupation of Hanover Court House by a portion of the Army of the Potomac, there was no rebel force of any consequence between Hanover Court House and General McDowell. I think that the main object of Jackson's movement against General Banks was to prevent reinforcements from being sent to the Army of the Potomac, and expressed that opinion in a telegram to the President within a day of the time I received information of Jackson's movements. I think that if General McDowell had moved direct upon Hanover Court House, instead of in the direction of Front Royal, Jackson would have rapidly retraced his steps to join the main rebel army at Richmond. With a strong army of our own in the vicinity of Richmond, and threatening it, I do not think that the rebels would have detached a sufficient force to seriously endanger the safety of Washington."

Before General McClellan left Washington, an order was issued placing General Wool and all his troops under his command, and he was expressly authorized to detail a division of about 10,000 men from the troops under General Wool and to attach them to the active army. After operations had commenced on the peninsula, on the 3d of April General McClellan received an order from the Secretary of War countermanding all this. No explanation of this has ever been made.

The design of General McClellan was to make a sure and rapid movement upon Richmond, but other causes still occurred to defeat this purpose The contest between the Monitor and Merrimac took place on the 9th of March (see Naval Operations), and the insecurity of the transports, while the navy really had not entire control of the James river, caused the troops to be landed at Fortress Monroe, and the march to be commenced overland from that point

About the 1st of April the force above stated had reached Fortress Monroe, General McClellan arrived on the 2d, and commenced active operations. On the 4th of April the following order was issued from the War Department:

                 WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 4,1862.

Ordered, 1.—That the portion of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Department and the Blue Ridge shall constitute a military department, to be called the Department of the Shenandoah, and be under the command of Major-General Banks.

2.—That the portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge and west of the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad, including the District of Columbia and the country between the Potomac and the Patuxent, shall be a military district, to be called the Department of the Rappahannock, and be under the command of Major-General McDowell.

                                                     By order of the PRESIDENT.

     EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

The effect of this order was to take from under the control of General McClellan the forces of Generals Banks and McDowell, and the direction of all military operations in his department west of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, and in lower Maryland, and to confine him strictly to the remainder of eastern Virginia. On the 11th of April, the following order was sent to General McDowell:

                                             WAR DEPARTMENT, April 11, 1862.

Major-General McDowell Commanding:

SIR: For the present, and until further orders, you will consider the national capital as especially under your protection, and make no movement throwing your force out of position for the discharge of this primary duty.

                   EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

On the 5th of April, firing was opened by the enemy at Yorktown on the extreme Federal right, to repel a bold reconnoissance. While this was going on, General McClellan heard for the first time that General McDowell was withdrawn from his command. Yorktown is a post village, port of entry, and shire town of York county, Virginia. It is situated on rising ground on the right bank or south side of York river, eleven miles from its mouth. It is seventy miles east-southeast of Richmond, and had before the war about sixty houses, four hundred and fifty inhabitants, and several thousand tons of shipping.

The army of the Potomac had commenced its march upon this place wholly in the dark as to the nature of the country, or the position and strength of the enemy. The maps which were furnished by the commanders at Fortress Monroe were found to be entirely erroneous. The peninsula is bounded on the north by York river, which is commanded by Yorktown and Gloucester, on either side. Both places were strongly fortified to obstruct the entrance of the river by gunboats. The Confederate batteries mounted fifty-six guns, many of which were

Page 91 This page contains a map of the Richmond area.

Page 92 rifled one-hundred pounders, and could have sunk the entire fleet of these gunboats. The James river, which bounded the peninsula on the south, was in full possession of the enemy. The line of defence at Yorktown was selected with great judgment. Taking advantage of the highest ground on the peninsula at that place, and projecting a line of intrenchments and forts bearing a little southwest to a point connecting with the head of Warwick river, the enemy had continued his works down that stream to James river, making the entire distance from point to point eight and a half miles. While the flat and marshy surface of the peninsula, together with streams constantly fed with copious supplies of water from the swamps, afforded peculiar means of defence, it was equally unfavorable to offensive operations, especially when distant from the harbor for supplies and with bad roads. The country was also covered with dense forests of pine, which formed a valuable shield to the positions of the enemy.

From the 5th to the 8th, when the unfavorable weather suspended active hostilities on both sides, there were frequent skirmishes, and firing by artillery, to prevent the enemy from constructing further defences and mounting additional guns, with few casualties on either side. On the 8th, 9th, and 10th there was a succession of extraordinary storms of rain and hail with some sleet and snow. The enemy took advantage of this weather to complete their defences. Much work was done in the interval by the Federal army in making and corduroying roads to the depots, &c.

When the army left Fortress Monroe, General Keyes with three divisions proceeded along the James river until he reached the Warwick. In seeking for a ford he discovered the Confederate line of defence. Dykes had been erected in different parts of this stream, converting it into a kind of pond. These dams were defended by redoubts, artillery, and rifle pits.

The supplies of the army consisted in provisions for two days, which each soldier had taken. After these two days the army was entirely dependent on the "wagons for subsistence. It was therefore necessary to construct roads. These were made by cutting down trees of equal size, and from one foot to eighteen inches in diameter, and placing the pieces from twelve or eighteen feet in length, side by side, on the ground. All the infantry that were not on picket duty on the outposts, were employed up to their knees in mud and water in this labor. By this means the cannon and wagons arrived at places where otherwise it would have been impossible to have brought them.

In order to avoid the delays of a siege, General McClellan had formed a plan to turn the position at Yorktown. This was to be done by effecting a landing on the Severn river, north and in the rear of Gloucester, by which this latter position might be carried, and thus render the York river less difficult of entrance by the gunboats. The Federal force could then have advanced up the left bank of the York river, in the direction of West Point, and rendered the position of the Confederate army most perilous, if they had persisted in holding it. The execution of this movement had been confided to the corps of General McDowell, which was to have embarked the last of all, at Alexandria, and arrive at Yorktown at the moment when the rest of the army, coming from Fortress Monroe, appeared before that place. This corps of General McDowell was detained, as has already been stated. The effect of its detention is thus stated by Prince De Joinville:

"We received the inexplicable and unexplained intelligence that this corps had been sent to another destination. The news was received by the army with dissatisfaction, although the majority could not then foresee the deplorable consequences of an act performed, it must be supposed, with no evil intention, but with inconceivable recklessness. Fifteen days earlier this measure, although it would always have been injurious, would not have had so bad an effect; for new arrangements might have been made. Now, it was the mainspring removed from a great work already begun. It deranged everything. Among the divisions of the corps of General McDowell there was one—that of Franklin —which was regretted more than all the rest, both on account of the troops themselves and of the officers commanding them. The commander-in-chief had carefully superintended its organization during the winter. He held it in great esteem and earnestly demanded its restoration. It was sent back to him, without any explanation, in the same manner as it had been withdrawn. This splendid division—eleven thousand strong—arrived, and for a moment the commander thought of intrusting to it alone the storming of Gloucester; but the idea was abandoned."

The next step was to search the Confederate line of defence for weak points. It was believed that if any were found and forced, the result would be, that the enemy would, as is usual in such cases, believe that his position was turned at both extremities, and his forces would become demoralized. Then if he was vigorously pushed with overwhelming force, a serious, if not fatal disaster might be inflicted on his army. This point was supposed to exist about the centre of the line, on Warwick river or creek, below Winn's Mills and near Lee's Mills. Here the Federal forces had thrown up a considerable work, with wings for riflemen, in which guns were mounted. Directly opposite the enemy, were protected by a demi-lune with two embrasures, with long infantry epaulements extending from each wing. An open field some six or seven hundred yards in width intervened. The enemy's works rested on the skirts of a pine forest, while the Federal were in the centre of the field. The forest extended like a curtain clear across the north edge of the field, in which sharpshooters on either side were posted.

Page 93 On the 16th four Federal batteries of light artillery, under Capts. Ayres, Mott, Kennedy, and Wheeler, opened furiously upon the opposite work, and soon drove the enemy's cannoneers to shelter. Detachments consisting of companies E, F, D, and K, of a Vermont regiment, were ordered forward through the woods to capture the Confederate work. These brave men pushed forward firmly under a scattering fire of musketry, and were struggling through the creek, when the enemy, in superior force, opened upon them a galling fire of rifles and musketry. They still went forward unfalteringly, and their ranks were rapidly thinning, when they were recalled. Not more than half their number had crossed the stream. They reluctantly obeyed, but soon it became more difficult to return than it had been to advance. The enemy suddenly opened a sluice above, and almost overwhelmed them with a flow of water which reached their armpits. They maintained their order firmly, however, under cover of the batteries, which with the sharpshooters kept the enemy within their intrenchments, and in a short time extricated themselves, bringing away all their dead and wounded except six. The casualties exceeded one hundred and fifty. The attempt to force through the enemy's line was afterward abandoned, having presented unforeseen difficulties.

Sharpshooting was a feature of the early part of the campaign on the peninsula. An officer thus describes one or two scenes:

"The operations of our fellows were extremely interesting. One man was securely posted behind an embankment with a glass, and upon discovering an enemy, he signalized the active riflemen. The latter, covered by rifle pits or trees, were constantly blazing away, and at each successful shot would make some satisfactory sign. One of them afforded considerable amusement by his daring antics. Depositing his rifle every now and then behind a tree, he would dash across the field from his cover to our bastion and back again quickly, courting a shot, while his comrades watched for a victim. He must have made twenty trips while we observed him. Once or twice the enemy's balls knocked up the dust a few feet from him, and quicker than thought a leaden messenger would be sent after the unlucky enemy. We left the saucy fellow continuing his hazardous pranks."

The siege of Yorktown was now commenced in earnest. The Federal army was encamped before it in line of battle order. The arrangement of the columns, however, was influenced by the nature and topography of the position invested. It is thus summarily described by Prince de Joinville:

"The last operation, like that on Gloucester, not being accomplished, nothing remained but to begin a regular siege against Yorktown. All this wandering in the dark had, unfortunately, consumed much time, and the siege itself would consume much more, although it should be pushed with the greatest energy. Ten thousand laborers were unceasingly employed cutting through the woods and forming roads, trenches, and batteries. It was a curious spectacle. A straight arm of the sea, fringed by a thick and strong vegetation, mixed with trees of all kinds, living and dead, entangled with withes and moss, approached in a serpentine form to the front of the attack. The first parallel was made. The wood which surrounded us was an admirable protection. This arm of the sea was covered with bridges. Roads were cut along its margin in te midst of tulips, flowers of Judea, and azaleas in full bloom. From this natural parallel others were formed by the hands of man, and we rapidly approached the place. The defenders opened a terrific fire on those works that they could see, as well as upon those which they supposed were in progress. Shells whistled on every side through the large trees, cutting down branches, frightening horses, but otherwise doing very little harm. Nobody cared about it. In the evening, when all the laborers returned in good order, with their rifles on their backs, and their shovels on their shoulders, the fire became more furious, as if the enemy had marked the hour of their return. We went to this cannonade as to a show; and when, on a beautiful night in spring time, the troops gayly marched along to this martial music through the flowering woods; when the balloon, with which we made our reconnoissances, was floating in the air, we seemed to be spectators at a fete, and for a moment were made to forget the miseries of war.

"The siege, however, still went on. Powerful artillery, with great difficulty, had been brought up; 100 and even 200-pounder rifled cannon, and 13-inch mortars were ready to batter the place. Fourteen batteries were constructed, armed, and appointed. If our fire had not been yet opened, it was because it was designed to open all our batteries together along the whole line; and for this reason we waited until nothing was wanting to complete all our preparations. We could not, however, resist the desire to try the 200-pounders. These enormous pieces were handled with incredible ease. Four men sufficed to load and aim them, without any more difficulty than in the working of our old 24-ponnders. At a distance of three miles their fire was admirably precise. One day one of these immense pieces had a kind of duel with a rifled piece of somewhat smaller caliber, in position on the bastions at Yorktown. The curious among us mounted on the parapet to see where the missiles might fall, and, while they communicated their observations to one another, the sentry on the lookout would announce when the enemy was about to fire in turn; but the distance was so great that, between the discharge and the arrival of the projectile, everybody had time to descend without any hurry, and to place himself under the shelter of the parapet. Such, however, was the precision of the fire that we were sure to see the enormous projectile passing over the very Page 94 spot where the group of observers had been standing but a moment before; then it would bound along and tear up the earth some fifty or sixty yards off, and its inflammable composition would burst with a loud explosion, throwing into the air a cloud of dust as high as the water jets of St. Cloud.

"It was evident that with the powerful means at our disposal the capture of Yorktown was but a work of time. Shattered beneath the tremendous Are which was about to be opened Upon it, without casemates to cover their soldiers, without any other defence than outworks and palisades, the place had not even the chance of opposing a lengthened resistance. Everything was ready for the final blow. Not only was a terrific bombardment about to be opened upon the town, not only were the most select troops set apart to follow up this bombardment by a grand assault, but the steam transports only awaited a sign to push immediately up the York river, and to land Franklin's troops at the upper part of the stream, on the line of retreat of the Confederate army. A part of those troops were also to remain on board the transports. They would have taken but a few hours to traverse by water the distance it would have taken the enemy's army two days at least to march by land. Driven from the lines of Yorktown by a powerful attack, pursued sword in hand, intercepted on the route by fresh troops, that army would have been in a most critical position, and the Federals would have obtained what they so much desired—an astonishing military success.

"A great success of the Federal army before Yorktown was therefore of vital importance to the Government at Washington. Unfortunately, the Confederate leaders and generals were of the same opinion, and, as able and resolute men, they took the best means to render it impossible."

On the nights of the 3d and 4th of May, Yorktown and the Confederate lines of the Warwick river were evacuated. This work, doubtless commenced several days before, and was conducted with great skill and energy. On the 3d the fire of the enemies batteries was redoubled in severity. This was done to mask their retreat, and it was highly successful. The absence of all signs of them on the morning of the 4th, caused their lines to be closely examined, when it wa3 soon ascertained that they were abandoned. The capture of this strong position of Yorktown and its armament with scarcely any loss of life, was a brilliant military success.

The impossibility for the navy to cooperate with the army, the want of forces to turn the flank of the enemy, as had been originally planned, and their obstinate courage and efforts to prevent the capture of Yorktown, had caused the delay of a month before that place. During this time the defences of Richmond had been pushed forward, and the spring time of the year had so far passed away, that the hot season was at hand, which would produce diseases in the low lands of the peninsula, and thus greatly aid the enemy. The loss thus far on the Federal side was about three hundred. That of the Confederates has not been ascertained. They left in their works at Yorktown two 3-inch rifled cannon, two 4-inch rifled cannon, sixteen 32-pounders, six 42-pounders, nineteen 8-inch columbiads, four 9-inch Dahlgrens, one 10-inch columbiad, one 10-inch mortar, and one 8-inch siege howitzer, with carriages and implements complete. Each piece was supplied with 76 rounds of ammunition. At Gloucester there was captured nine 9-inch Dahlgrens, two 32-pounders rifled, five 32-pound navy guns, five 42-pound carronades; making at both places a total of seventy-three guns and much ammunition.

Their force has been estimated at 100,000 men. Some of the Federal soldiers were killed and horses injured by the explosion of instruments of destruction left by the enemy. It was at this time that New Orleans was captured.

The next important point before the Federal army was the city of Williamsburg. There were two roads to that city: one direct from Yorktown; and the other, from the left of the Federal army, crossed Warwick river at Lee's Mills, and uniting with the first formed a fork near Williamsburg.

This city is the capital of James City county, and is situated near the narrowest part of the peninsula between the James and York rivers, and is three miles from James river and about five and a quarter from York river. It is one of the oldest towns in the State, and contained a population of about fifteen hundred.

As soon as the evacuation of Yorktown was known, the entire cavalry and horse artillery with five divisions of infantry were advanced in pursuit. General Franklin's division was ordered to move at once by water to the vicinity of West Point to endeavor to check the retreat of the enemy, and to be supported by other divisions as rapidly as water transportation could be obtained. The remaining divisions were massed near Yorktown, ready to move by land or water, as might be necessary. General McClellan meanwhile remained at Yorktown until Monday noon, the 5th, pushing the movement of the troops to West Point by water and awaiting the development of events. It was not until that time that he was made aware of the serious resistance encountered at Williamsburg. All the information up to that time indicated nothing more than an affair of a rear guard. As soon as the true state of affairs was known he moved rapidly to the front and assumed the immediate command.

General Stoneman had led the advance, with his cavalry and four batteries of artillery, on the direct road from Yorktown. After the bridge had been constructed over Warwick river, General Smith advanced on the narrow road from the Federal left to Yorktown. He encountered a Confederate force, which fell back before him. Page 95 A report of this was sent to the commander-in-chief, who ordered General Stoneman on the other road to press forward, and endeavor to intercept this retiring force before its junction with the main body, which was supposed to be at Williamsburg. General Stoneman pushed forward with all the rapidity possible in the miry condition of the roads, and as he came out at the point where the road from Warwick Creek united, he was saluted by an artillery fire from numerous fieldworks known as Fort Magruder. A vain attempt was made to take this work with cavalry, during which Major Williams displayed great bravery, but the column was forced to retreat and await the arrival of the infantry. General Smith's division subsequently arrived, but the lateness of the hour and the heavy rain caused the attack to be put off.

The pursuit by General McClellan's forces had been so rapid that the Confederate officers found it to be necessary to give it a check, in order to continue their retreat with success. This led to the battle of Williamsburg on the next day, and the retreat of the Confederate army. Their plan for the campaign was thus developed. It was to delay the Federal army as long as practicable at Yorktown, and thus secure time to place Richmond in a defensive condition, and also to meet them in final battle near the marshes of the Chickahominy river.

The Confederate position at Williamsburg consisted of thirteen works, extending nearly across the peninsula. Excepting two or three narrow roads, it was approachable only through dense forests. These roads were made worse by a heavy rain which commenced on Sunday afternoon, the 4th, and continued during the next day.

When Sunday night came, the division of General Smith, of Keyes's corps, had reached General Stoneman's position after he fell back from Fort Magruder. General Hancock's brigade formed the advance of this division. General Hooker, of Heintzelman's corps, was approaching on the left by the road from Warwick river. His force consisted of the 11th Massachusetts, 5th, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, 26th Pennsylvania, Sickles's New York brigade, and four batteries. Thus the advance of the Federal line had arrived within about two and a half miles of the works at Williamsburg. The Union troops slept on their arms without tents, without food, and in a hard rain. The Confederates determined to make the attack in the morning upon the Federal left and rear. About eight o'clock they threw out a body of infantry on their right, which soon exchanged fire with the advance of General Hooker's division. This continued intermittently for some time. Some light batteries became engaged, and drove the enemy back until they came within range of his heavy guns, when the former suffered severely. Bramhall's battery lost all its horses, the guns became mired, and the forces of the enemy pressing upon it in greatly increased numbers, it was lost. Encouraged by this success, the enemy pushed forward, and General Hooker was finally forced to give way and fall back, leaving his wounded, about two thousand in number, behind. The Confederates followed him as he fell back, until the division of General Kearney came up and restored the battle. At the same time the enemy was strongly reenforced, and the fight was sharp and fierce. The state of the roads had prevented an earlier arrival of General Kearney's division. His intrepidity was brilliantly shown on this occasion, although General Heintzelman commanded the joint divisions. Meantime the part of the army on the road to the right remained passive. A single division only had come up. Of this the brigade of Brigadier-General Peck, of Couch's division of General Casey's corps, was ordered by General Sumner, who was in chief command, into the woods on the left toward the point where the battle was raging against General Hooker's division. This brigade was composed of the 93d, 98th, and 102d Pennsylvania, the 55th and 62d New York, and West's battery. Placed on the right of that division, with other regiments amounting to six thousand men, it stopped the Confederate advance by repulsing with great obstinacy every attempt made. Supported later in the day by General Palmer's brigade, they formed a strong centre.

General Smith's division had formed on the right of the Federal line, and at an early hour a reconnoissance was made with a view of finding a route to the enemy's left flank. One was finally found, which had been overflowed with water by the enemy, and another was cut through the woods. The only obstacles to reaching the flank were two forts, strong from position and construction. To explore this route in force, and if possible occupy these works, General Hancock was sent forward in the afternoon with his brigade. This consisted of the 6th and 7th Vermont, 5th Wisconsin, 33d and 49th New York, and Kennedy's battery. The two works were found to be unoccupied, and garrisoned by his men. A third at a distance he attacked with artillery and silenced. The enemy, seeing the fatal consequences to themselves from this attack, if successful, sent out two brigades to drive back the Federal force. The latter allowed them to come up, and received them with a most destructive fire of artillery. The enemy unshaken pushed forward within thirty yards of the cannon's mouth, when they wavered. General Hancock, seizing the moment, ordered his brigade to charge upon them with the bayonet, which they could not withstand, and broke and fled, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. General McClellan now arrived, and gave orders to support General Hancock, and to press the advantage already gained in that direction. In a few minutes seven thousand men were on the march for that point. Night fell before they reached it, and no more was done that day. The ploughed land and the day's rain made a soft bed on which the weary soldiers sank down during that night.

The success of General Hancock on the Confederate Page 96 left flank caused them to retreat that night, and at daylight all the forts on the Federal front and Williamsburg itself were found completely abandoned by the entire Confederate army. On the roads and in the woods were found the Confederate dead left unburied, and the wounded in their agonies. Their loss in killed and wounded was estimated at nearly a thousand.

General McClellan evidently had not anticipated so serious a resistance at Williamsburg. In a despatch to the Secretary of War on Sunday evening the 4th, he says: "Our cavalry and horse artillery came up with the enemy's rear guard in their intrenchments about two miles on this side of Williamsburg. A brisk fight ensued just as my aid left. Smith's division of infantry arrived on the ground and, I presume, carried his works, though I have not yet heard. The enemy's rear is strong, but I have force enough up there to answer all purposes."

The force that was actually before Williamsburg would have been routed on the next day, if they had not been sustained by the arrival of fresh troops. These troops were delayed greatly by the bad roads. They were a portion of those whom General McClellan, unaware of the great difficulty of the roads, and uninformed of the true state of the case by correct reports of the front, supposed were before Williamsburg. As it was, General Hooker's division alone for hours withstood the enemy, even within hearing of other troops who were unable to come earlier to his relief.

In the evening after his arrival General McClellan sent a despatch to the Secretary of War, in which he says: "'After arranging for movements up York river, I was earnestly sent for here. I find General Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force—probably greater a good deal than my own.

"I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here while I resume the original plan.

"My entire force is considerably inferior to that of the rebels, who will fight well; but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal."

On a subsequent day General McClellan took occasion to address three of the regiments of General Hancock's brigade, which was engaged on the enemy's loft. His remarks indicate the importance which he afterward ascribed to the action of the brigade on that day.

To the men of the Fifth Wisconsin regiment he said:

My Lads: I have come to thank you for the bravery and discipline you displayed the other day. On that day you won laurels of which you may ever be proud —not only you, but the army, the State, and the country to which you belong. 'Through you we won the day, and Williamsburg shall be inscribed upon your banner. I cannot thank you too much, and I am "sure the reputation your gallantry has already achieved will always be maintained.

          To the Seventh Maine regiment he said:

Soldiers of the Seventh Maine: I have come to thank you for your bravery and good conduct in the action of yesterday. On this battle plain you and your comrades arrested the progress of the advancing-enemy, and turned the tide of victory in our favor. You have deserved well of your country and your State, and in their gratitude they will not forget to bestow upon you the thanks and praise so justly your due. Continue to show the conduct of yesterday, and the triumph of our cause will be speedy and sure. In recognition of your merit you shall hereafter bear the inscription "Williamsburg" on your colors. Soldiers, my words are feeble; but from the bottom of my heart I thank you.

To the Thirty-third New York regiment he addressed the following:

Officers and Soldiers of the Thirty-third: I have come to thank you in person for your conduct and bravery on the 5th of May. I will say to you as I have said to the other regiments engaged with you at that part of the field, that all did well—did all that I could have expected. The other troops engaged elsewhere fought well and did their whole duty, loo; but you won the day, and to you and your comrades belongs the credit of the victory of Williamsburg.

You acted like veterans! Veterans of many battles could not have done better. You shall have " Williamsburg " inscribed upon your flag. I have accorded the same privilege to the other regiments engaged with you.

You have won for yourselves a name that will last you through life.

Soldiers, again I thank you.

It has been stated that the division of General Franklin, belonging to the corps of General McDowell, was subsequently sent to the army of General McClellan. This division arrived previous to the surrender of Yorktown, and remained on board of the transports in order to proceed up the York river as soon as the enemy's batteries might be taken. The division was delayed on the 5th by the weather. On the 6th "it left Yorktown, and landed at Brick House Point on the same day. This is the point where the Pamunkey river enters the York river and on the right bank of the latter. The Pamunkey is navigable for gunboats of light draft some twenty miles above White House. It unites with the Matrapony and forms the York river. On the tongue of land between the two rivers at their junction is West Point opposite to Brick House Point. From West Point a railroad runs to Richmond, and crosses the Pamunkey at White House. Although at this time an insignificant village, West Point was anciently a place of considerable pretensions. It is about twenty-five miles by water from Yorktown and about thirty-five by railroad from Richmond. The troops were lauded on the same night, and encamped on a plain surrounded on three sides by woods, and on the fourth bounded by the river. That evening a part of the division of General Sedgwick, under General Dana, arrived. During the next day the enemy were discovered in the woods, and made an attack in which they had the advantage for a short time, but were repulsed and driven a considerable distance. Two batteries were brought to bear, which caused them to press upon the Federal left. The gunboats then opened upon them and did effective service, contributing materially to the success of the day. The divisions Page 97 of General Porter subsequently arrived on transports, but no further skirmishing took place at that position.

The success at Williamsburg proved to be more complete than had been at first expected. The strong works of the enemy, the town, and his sick and wounded being taken, indicated that his loss had been great, and that his retreat was rapid and disorderly. The retreat was followed up by the Federal cavalry for one or two days, and constant skirmishing kept up with the Confederate rear guard. The terrible condition of the roads rendered a more active pursuit out of the question. Three days wore spent by the army at Williamsburg looking after their wounded, who were scattered through the woods, and waiting for provisions from Yorktown, the arrival of which was delayed by the state of the roads.

At this date a serious blow was given to the Confederate strength by the loss of Norfolk, the destruction of the Merrimac, and the breaking up of their blockade of the James river, which had been caused by the Merrimac taking a position off Craney Island. On the 7th President Lincoln arrived at Fortress Monroe, and after examining the fortress and the camp at Newport News, urged a movement on Norfolk, which had already been reported as abandoned in consequence of the advance of the army of the Potomac up the peninsula. An expedition was accordingly organized, under the direction of Major-General Wool which embarked at Fortress Monroe during the night of the 9th of May, and landed at Willoughby's Point, a short distance from the Rip Raps and eight miles from Norfolk, at daylight on the 10th. The force consisted of the 10th New York, Colonel Bendix; 20th do., Colonel Weber; 99th do.; 1st Delaware, Colonel Andrews; 10th Massachusetts, Colonel Wyman; 58th Pennsylvania, Colonel Bailey; a battalion of mounted rifles, and a company of 4th regular artillery. Generals Mansfield and Weber proceeded over a good road on the direct route to Norfolk, but finding the bridge over Tanner's Creek on fire, and a small force of the enemy on the opposite side with three small howitzers, a march of eight miles was then made by the Princess Anne road, around the head of the creek to Norfolk. The defences of the city were found to have been abandoned. At the limits of the city General Wool was met at half past four in the afternoon by the mayor and a committee of the council, who surrendered it. He immediately took possession, and appointed Brigadier-General Viele military governor, with directions to see that the citizens were protected in "all their civil rights." The troops bivouacked on the field outside of the limits of the city for the night. As soon as these ceremonies were completed, and the custom house and other U. S. property taken possession of, General Wool and his aid for the occasion, Secretary Chase, returned to Fortress Monroe. About four o'clock the next morning, a bright light was observed  from Fortress Monroe, i n the direction of Craney Island, which was supposed at first to be a signal of some description from the Confederate iron-clad steamer Merrimac or Virginia. It was closely watched by the officers of the picket boats, as well as by the various naval vessels of the fleet, and precisely at half past four o'clock an explosion took place, which made the earth tremble for miles around. In the midst of the bright flames that shot up through the distant blaze, the timber and iron of the monster steamer could be seen flying through the air, while immense volumes of smoke rose up and for a time obscured everything. No doubt was entertained that the Merrimac had ceased to exist, and had doubtless been abandoned by the crew.

A naval reconnoissance was immediately sent out toward Norfolk. The fortifications on Craney Island were found to have been abandoned. They were in four or five separate sections, and constructed by the most skilful engineers. They were left in excellent condition, as were also the extensive barracks which had accommodated during the winter a garrison of over two thousand men. The forts were finely sodded, and all the appurtenances for immediate service were in readiness, with supplies of ammunition in sheds near each of the forty heavy guns mounted in different parts of the works. On the main front of the island, commanding the approaches by the river channel, the works were casemated. Nine of these casemates were finished, in each of which were nine or ten-inch guns, principally Dahlgrens, and the work of erecting five more casemates was in progress at the time of the evacuation, in one of which a gun was mounted. The whole number of guns mounted was thirty-nine, of which two were Parrotts and a number rifled Dahlgrens. There were also about six guns in the works which had not been mounted. None of them had been removed.

On the line of the river leading from Craney Island to Norfolk there were not less than six heavy earthworks, mounting in all about sixty-nine cannon, all of which were in position, except those that were in the works near the Naval Hospital. These had been taken to Richmond.

Not far above Craney Island was the river barricade. Although the river is here nearly a mile wide, a line of piles had been driven from shore to shore, with the exception of an opening in the centre of the channel for vessels to pass in and out. Here were two steam piledrivers which had been used for this work, and near the opening was moored the hulk of the old frigate United States, which it was proposed to sink in case Federal vessels should have succeeded in passing the fortifications.

Immediately commanding this river barricade was a casemated battery, forming a half circle, and mounting eleven heavy guns. On the opposite bank of the river was another battery, with two or three other small works, before Page 98 old Fort Norfolk on one side of the river, and the Naval Asylum batteries on the other, were reached.

In addition to the amount of ammunition left in the sheds of the batteries, the magazines, of which there was a great number, were well filled. The amount of powder in the magazines was estimated at five thousand pounds, and the fixed ammunition could be enumerated by the cargo. All the workshops, storehouses, and other buildings at the Gosport navy yard were burned, and the dry dock had also been partially blown up with powder on the night after Norfolk was surrendered. "While this was taking place, another party was engaged in burning the shipping and steamboats in the harbor. There is no doubt this vast sacrifice was permitted by the Confederate Government, only to enable it to summon to Richmond the troops in and about Norfolk under General Huger. They were about eighteen thousand in number.

At the same time when this movement was made on Norfolk, steps were taken to open the blockade of James river. On the 8th of May the gunboats Galena (iron clad), Aroostook, and Port Royal started up the river, and were successful in silencing the batteries at its mouth and on its banks. They were subsequently joined by the Monitor and Naugatuck, and on the ISth wore repulsed by a heavy battery at Drury's Bluff, about eight miles below Richmond. (See Naval Operations.) The blockade of the river below that point was raised.

Meantime the army of General McClellan was advancing toward Richmond. On the 8th of May the advance was beyond Williamsburg, on the 11th it was at Barnhamsville, on the 13th at New Kent Court House, and on the 15th at the White House. This was the point where the railroad from "West Point to Richmond crossed the Pasnunkey river. It took its name from a fine building, once the property of General Washington, but now of his heirs. The railroad was in good order, and locomotives and cars, brought on the transports, were immediately placed on the track. It was intended that the supplies of the army, as it advanced, should be taken over this road. The Pamunkey river, at the White House, was of sufficient depth to float largo vessels, and an immense amount of stores was there collected. A reconnoissance was made on the 16th by one of the smaller gunboats, with two companies of infantry under Major Willard, and one section of Ayres' battery, up the Pamunkey river, a distance of twenty-five miles, to a point known as Russell's Landing. A steamboat, a propeller, and fifteen small schooners were found inflames upon their arrival. Most of these vessels were loaded with corn. On the same day the Confederate troops, consisting chiefly of a corps of observation, were driven over the Chickahominy on the main road to Richmond, at Bottom's Bridge, which was burned. When the Federal troops arrived within a half mile of the bridge, a brisk fire of artillery from the opposite side opened upon them. The Confederate army had now retreated across the Chickahominy, determined beyond that river to dispute the possession of Richmond. The Chickahominy river is formed by the junction of Horsepen Branch, Rocky Branch, North Run, and Brook Run, near Meadow Bridge, five miles directly north of Richmond. All these streams, and several others too small to have names, rise within ten miles northwest of Richmond, in a rough, unfertile country, exceedingly broken and unfit for cultivation.

Meadow Bridge is nearly north of Richmond, five miles in a direct line by railroad, and is the outlet of a considerable swamp, and the place of crossing for Meadow Bridge road and the Virginia Central and Louisa railroad. The stream at this bridge is an insignificant brook, receiving another creek from the Richmond side, a short distance below. Less than two miles from Meadow Bridge is the bridge of the Mechanicsville turnpike, four and one half miles from the Confederate capital and fifteen from Hanover Court House.

Two miles further on, it receives a small creek with the name of Brandy Run, and from this point it grows considerably wider, more sluggish, with swampy shores at intervals, and low banks often overflowed. Near this place is a small bridge, and a road crosses, but little used.

Four miles from Mechanicsville turnpike bridge is New Bridge, in a direct line northeast from the city six miles, and seven and n half miles by the road. Four miles farther, and directly east from the city, is a military bridge. From this bridge three miles farther to Bottom's Bridge the banks of the stream are quite swampy, but it is still of no considerable size, although several creeks have emptied their waters into it. A mile before reaching Bottom's Bridge it is crossed by the Richmond and York River railroad, running to White House and 'West Point. The course of the river from its source is east-southeast, so that it is constantly leaving Richmond, and at Bottom's Bridge is fifteen miles away from the city. Its nearest point is.at Mechanicsville bridge. The bank of the stream on the north side is for the most part rolling bluffs, covered with forests, with an occasional opening, where can be seen finely situated plantations. Upon the south side of the stream, and from one to two miles from the bank, a considerable bluff extends the entire distance to the vicinity of the lower military bridge. This bluff is highest opposite New Bridge, where a point of it is known as Lewis Hill. A road runs along on the brow of this hill, and there are some very fine residences situated upon it, which, as it is only some three or four miles, at most, from the city, are very desirable locations. Other bridges were constructed by orders of General McClellan.

The soil along the York River railroad is of too pliable a nature to admit of the transportation of heavy guns, or, in fact, any others, at the time of severe rains. The same may be said Page 99 of all the localities between the Chickahominy and Richmond. After the passage of a hundred teams it becomes necessary to construct new roads. Some days passed in bringing up the rear of the army, in making preparations to cross the Chickahominy, and in securing the conveyance of the supplies for the army. The railroad from the White House became the base for this purpose, and was kept open until the 25th of June. Meantime the Federal army was diminishing in numbers, while the Confederates were gathering troops by every method they could devise. Prisoners were taken, who belonged to regiments which had opposed General Burnside in North Carolina. And Norfolk had been sacrificed to send her troops to Richmond. The conscription act, passed by the Confederate Congress in April, made every man between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years a soldier. The new levies were now collecting before Richmond.

On the evening of the 21st General McClellan sent the following despatch to the "War Department: "I have just returned from Bottom's Bridge; have examined the country on the other side, and made a reconnoissance on the heels of the enemy, who probably did not like the skirmish of yesterday. The bridge will be repaired by to-morrow morning, and others constructed. All the camps have advanced to-day."

On the nest day the troops began to cross both at Bottom's Bridge and at the railroad bridge, and took up a position one and a half miles beyond. Reconnoissances made during the day gave no assurance that the Confederates were in any considerable force near at hand, but led to the impression that it was their purpose to make a stand in a selected position near Richmond. On the next day, the 23d, the advance was within seven miles of Richmond. The Confederates were at the same time attacked with shells on the opposite side of the river near New Bridge. This was followed up on the next day with more skirmishing. During these days, since the army had reached the river, the unusual quantity of rain that fell had rendered the roads almost impassable for artillery, at the same time it had greatly retarded the construction of the numerous bridges which General McClellan wished to build over the Chickahominy. There were two principal objects now before the commander-in-chief: one was to capture Richmond, and the other to secure supplies for his army. For this latter purpose, it was necessary for him to be prepared to defend the railroad against every attack upon it. The Confederate general, Johnston, by having possession of the bridges over the river on the north of Richmond, could at any moment throw a force over and attack General McLellan’s line of supplies. The river therefore was necessarily made passable to the Federal army at all times, to enable the commander to mass his troops on either side as might be necessary.

While arrangements were making to render the position of the Army of the Potomac safe and secure its successful advance upon Richmond, General McClellan began to look anxiously for the expected cooperation of General McDowell. It was evident that the retreat of the enemy could be made but very little farther. The campaign had ripened for the battle, and the conflict must be near at hand. The enemy had always declared that Richmond would never be captured so long as any men were left to defend it. They had shown their willingness to wait, and no one believed they would retire within the defences of Richmond until they were forced to do it by the disastrous issue of a battle.

On the 17th of May, the War Department sent the following instructions to General McClellan. Unfortunately the reinforcements spoken of therein, were destined never to arrive:

                                              WAR DEPARTMENT,  

                                 WASHINGTON CITY, D. C, May 17,1862

Major-General George B. McClellan, Commanding Army of the Potomac before Richmond:

Your despatch to the President, asking for reinforcements, has been received and carefully considered. The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock, by the way of the Potomac and York rivers, than by a land march.

In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest possible moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city bv the shortest route. He is ordered—keeping himself always in position to cover the capital from all possible attack—so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right, and you are instructed to cooperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, By extending your right wing to the north of Richmond, it is believed that this communication can be safely established, either north or south of the Pamunkey river. In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and fulling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five and forty thousand men.

A copy of the instructions to Major-General McDowell is with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation. At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward to cooperate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington, and you will give no orders either before or alter your junction, which can keep him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise as frequently as may be necessary for efficient cooperation.

When General McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be prepared to supply him by that route.

The President directs that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves forward.

    By order of the President.

                    EDWIN M, STANTON, Secretary of War.

On the 26th, an order was given for a movement, the design of which was to open a communication with General McDowell, as well as to scatter a force known to be collecting near Hanover Court House to threaten the right of General McClellan and his communications.

About four o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the division of General Morrell, of General Porter’s Page 100 corps, commenced its march in a heavy rain which had continued all night. It turned off from the road to New Bridge, and took that to Hanover Court House. The whole column marched fifteen miles steadily, with great rapidity, and with very little straggling. Soon after noon the enemy's pickets wore met and driven in. This was near the railroad and about four miles from the Court House. The advance, consisting of General Martindale's brigade, composed in part of the 18th and 22d Massachusetts, 2d Maine, and 25th New York, had met the enemy in considerable force. The latter regiment suffered severely by the enemy on either flank, until the artillery opened its fire. This continued for half an hour, when the arrival of General Butterfield's brigade soon settled the affair. After an advance of a mile farther the Federal force halted. During this halt the enemy marched be as to flank it and made an attack upon its left, when a severe battle ensued, which finally resulted near sundown in driving the enemy from the field. The Federals, in both contests, had fifty-four killed, and one hundred and ninety-four wounded and missing. The loss was chiefly in the 25th New York. The Confederate force was estimated at eight thousand, and wounded prisoners were taken to the hospitals belonging to fourteen different regiments. Their loss was between two and three hundred killed and wounded, and about five hundred taken prisoners. The expedition was under the command of General Porter. The battle was near Peak's Station, on the Virginia Central railroad. Fredericksburg, the headquarters of General McDowell, was distant about forty-five milos, and his advance was at Bowling Green, distant only fifteen miles. This was the moment for the junction of the two armies. Prince de Joinville thus speaks of the actions of this hour:

"It needed only an effort of the will, the two armies were united, and the possession of Richmond certain I Alas! this effort was not made. I cannot recall those fatal moments without a real sinking of the heart. Seated in an orchard in the bivouac of Porter, amid the joyous excitement which follows a successful conflict, I saw the Fifth cavalry bring in whole companies of Confederate prisoners, with arms and baggage, their officers at their head. But neither the glad confidence of the Federals nor the discouragement of their enemies deceived me, and I asked myself how many of these gallant young men who surrounded me, relating their exploits of the day before, would pay with their lives for the fatal error which was on the point of being committed. Not only did not the two armies unite, but the order came from "Washington to burn the bridges which had been seized. This was the clearest way of saying to the army of the Potomac and to its chief that in no case could they count on the support of the armies of upper Virginia."

General McClellan, in his testimony before the court martial at Washington in the case of General McDowell on December 10, said:

"I have no doubt, for it has ever been my opinion, that the army of the Potomac would have taken Richmond, had not the corps of General McDowell been separated from it. It is also my opinion that had the command of General McDowell joined the army of the Potomac in the month of May, by way of Hanover Court House from Fredericksburg, we would have had Richmond in a week after the junction. I do not hold General McDowell responsible for a failure to join with me on any occasion. I believe that answers the question."

The principal bridge burned was the ono over the South Anna river, one of the tributaries of the Pamunkey river. It was on the line of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, and five hundred feet long. The report of the destruction of this bridge, made from the army at the time, says: "It cuts off the communication by railroad between Richmond and the forces under General Jackson." On the 29th the expedition returned to its original camp.

The explanation of this failure on the part of General McDowell to cooperate "with the army of General McClellan at this critical moment, involves a statement of the military operations which had been taking place in the Department of the Potomac, the Mountain Department, and the Department of the Shenandoah, and which culminated at this time. On the Confederate side, the design of these military operations was not only to prevent this junction of General McDowell with General McClellan, but also to prevent any reinforcement whatever to the latter. In this last object they were also partly successful.

The corps of General McDowell was not allowed to embark for Fortress Monroe with the other forces of General McClellan by order of the President, as has been stated. The Department Page 101 of the Rappahannock created soon after, and placed under the command of General McDowell, became the field of his operations. The division of General Franklin having been sent to General McClellan, the forces of General McDowell consisted of the divisions of Generals McCall and King. These forces were in Virginia, southwest of Washington. On the 15th of April the order for their advance was issued. On the night of that day the advance reached Catlett's Station. On the 17th the march again commenced, and, six miles out, the pickets of the enemy were found and driven in, and several skirmishes took place during the day. On the morning of the 18th the small force of the enemy were driven across the bridges into Fredericksburg, which place they were not prepared to defend, and soon after abandoned it, having destroyed everything of value to themselves which could not be carried away. On the next day the city was surrendered by the authorities. It was so completely under the guns of the Federal force planted opposite the town, that any resistance in its unprotected state would have been useless. The Confederate force which retired before the advance, consisted of one regiment of infantry and one of cavalry. On the 28d of April General McDowell was ordered by the President not to occupy Fredericksburg for the present, but to prepare the bridges and his transportation. On the 80th he was authorized to occupy it. On the 4th of May the bridges across the Rappahannock had been restored, and the city was occupied by the Federal troops. At the same time when the order was given to General McDowell to advance upon Fredericksburg, an order was given to General Shields to withdraw with his division from the corps of General Banks in the Department of the Shenandoah, and to join the corps of General McDowell. Upon the issue, of this order detaching General Shields from the command of General Banks, the War Department was warned by experienced military officers that disaster would certainly follow from it. General Shields immediately moved to comply with the order, and on the 19th his division encamped half a mile south of Catlett's Station. He was ordered then to Fredericksburg, and reached Falmouth on the 22d of May.

On the 17th of May the following instructions were given to General McDowell:

                                                 WAR DEPARTMENT.

                         WASHINGTON CITY, D. C, May 17, 1862.

To Major-General McDowell, Commanding Department of the Rappahannock:

GENERAL: Upon being joined by Shields’s division, yon will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, cooperating with the forces under General McClellan now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York rivers. While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash by any large body of the rebel forces.

General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond and throwing itself upon your column before a junction between the two armies is effected. A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your forces is annexed.

                        EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

A few days previously a small force had crossed over to Fredericsburg by order of General McDowell, but the main body of his corps remained at Falmouth, where it could sustain the advance if necessary. The enemy had retired only a short distance from the town. So far as related to numbers, the division of General Shields was not needed by General McDowell; but the soldiers of the former had been on many a hard field, while those of the latter had hardly stood the shock of battle. The division of General Shields, just from a march of one hundred and ten miles, was appointed to take the advance upon the enemy. This division consisted of the following brigades: first brigade, General Kimball, 4th and 8th Ohio, 14th Indiana, and 7th Virginia; second brigade, General Terry, 7th, 29th, and 66th Ohio, and 7th Indiana; third brigade, General Tyler, 5th Ohio, 1st Virginia, 84th and 110th Pennsylvania; fourth brigade. Colonel Carroll acting Brigadier-General, 7th and 62d Ohio, 13th Indiana, and 39th Illinois.

On Saturday evening, May 24, the order was received for the division of General Shields and other forces, to fall back.

The following was the order:

                                             WASHINGTON, May 24, 1862.

Major-General McDowell:

General Fremont has been ordered, by telegraph, to move to Franklin and Harrisonburg, to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy Jackson and Ewell’s forces. You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put twenty thousand men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line, or in advance of the line, of the Manassas Gap railroad. Your object will be to capture the force of Jackson and Ewell, either in cooperation with General Fremont, or, in case want of supplies or transportation interfered with his movement, it is believed that the force which you move will be sufficient to accomplish the object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable that, if the enemy operates actively against General Ranks, you will not be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may have even to release him. Reports received this moment are that Banks is fighting with Ewell, eight miles from Harper's Ferry.

                                                        ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The reply of General McDowell to this order was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK,

                                                                     May 24,1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

The President's order has been received, and is in process of execution. This is a crushing blow to us.

                                 IRV1N McDOWELL, Major-General.

     To this the President responded as follows:

                                         WASHINGTON, May 24,1862.

Major-General McDowell:

I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my orders. The change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any one.

Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movements.

                                                                         A. LINCOLN.

The reply of General McDowell to this message is important, as showing the probabilities that his movement would be unsuccessful. It was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK,                        OPPOSITE FREDERICKSBURG, May 24,1862.

His Excellency the President: I obeyed your order immediately; for it was positive and urgent, and, perhaps, as a subordinate, there I ought to stop; but I trust I may be allowed to say something in relation to the subject, especially in view of your remark that everything depends upon the celerity and vigor of my movements; 1 beg to say that cooperation between General Fremont and myself to cut off' Jackson and Ewell is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a practicable impossibility; next, that I am entirely beyond helping distance of General Hanks, and no celerity or vigor will be available as far as he is concerned; next, that by a glance at the map it will be seen that the line of retreat of the enemy s forces up the valley is shorter than mine to go against him. It will take a week or ten days for the force to get to the valley by the route which will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy will have retreated. I shall gain nothing for you there, and lose much for you here. It is, therefore, not only on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter, but I feel that it throws us all back, and from Richmond north we shall have all our large mass paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accomplished. I have ordered Gun. Shields to commence the movement to-morrow morning. A second division will follow in the afternoon. Did I understand you aright that you wish that I personally should accompany this expedition?

                             Very respectfully,

                                         IRVIN MCDOWELL.

The division of General Shields, accompanied by other portions of McDowell's forces, was on the march at noon of the next day, and moved fifteen miles, and the next day, the 2Gth, encamped six miles beyond Catlett's Station. Early the next morning, moving again, it passed Manas3as Junction during the day, where it met a portion of the force driven from Front Royal, and learned that General Banks was flying before General Jackson, and halted at Haymarket. Twelve days previous this division had left General Banks's army to join General McDowell, on his way, as it was believed, to cooperate with General McClellan before Richmond. It had been the division of General Lander, and had become familiar with the Shenandoah Valley, up which they had pursued the enemy from the Potomac to the northern base of the Massanutten Mountains. Now the work of a whole winter and spring was before them to do over again. In cooperation with General Fremont's forces they prepared to aid in cutting off the retreat of General Jackson after having driven General Banks across the Potomac. On the 27th a column under General Kimball, embracing, as a part of it, the entire division of General Shields, commenced its march for Front Royal, which, without serious opposition, it was expected to reach in three days, and Strasburg in four.

The advance of General McDowell at the time it was countermanded had readied Bowling Green, fifteen miles from Hanover Court House, which was two days later occupied by a force from General McClellan's army under General Porter.

The order creating the Mountain Department was issued by the President on the 11th of March. It was supposed at this time that the plan of the campaign for General Fremont was to move up the left bank of the Big Sandy river in Kentucky, to Prestonville and Pikeville, through Cumberland Gap to Knoxville, and thus command the southern railroad, and cut off any retreat from or any reënforcements to Richmond. On the 29th General Fremont, at Wheeling, assumed the command, and General Rosecrans retired and took command of General Pope's corps under General Grant. The new department was bounded on the east by that of the Potomac under General McClellan, and on the west by that of the Mississippi under General Halleck. Active preparations had been made by General Rosecrans for the spring campaign. On the same day General Fremont issued an order assigning Brigadier-General B. F. Kelly to the command of the railroad district, consisting of all of western Virginia, north and east of the counties of Jackson, Roane, Calhoun, Braxton, Lewis, Barbour, and Tucker inclusive, and west of the Alleghanies, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.

Military operations in this department, under General Fremont, commenced about the 1st of April. General Milroy, who had been some time holding the pass of Cheat Mountain in Randolph county in the northern part of the State, advanced twelve miles to Camp Greenbrier, thence nine miles in a northeasterly direction to Camp Alleghany, a position occupied by the enemy, who retreated before him. On the 10th he had occupied Monterey, being an advance of sixteen miles. This position was evacuated by the Confederates, and also Huntersville. The next day he moved toward McDowell, distant ten miles, and occupied it and advanced subsequently to Fort Shenandoah eight miles. Thus far General Milroy had followed the retreating foe from Monterey in the direction of Staunton in the Shenandoah Valley.

On the 3d of May General Fremont left Wheeling and arrived at New Creek on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and on the 5th, accompanied by his staff and body guard, and one or two regiments of infantry and a battery, he advanced about six miles; on the 7th he reached Petersburg, a small town twelve miles beyond Moorefield, and forty-four from New Creek. General Schenck's brigade had left Petersburg on the 3d. Their aim was to effect a junction with General Milroy, whose situation was becoming exposed in consequence of forces of the enemy advancing from the east. General Milroy in his advance had driven the Confederates beyond the Shenandoah Mountains, the boundary of General Fremont's department, and had made his headquarters at McDowell. On the 5th of May the 32d Ohio regiment was advanced beyond the Shenandoah Mountains, about sixteen miles from McDowell, for the double purpose of scouting and foraging. The 75th Ohio and 3d Virginia, with Hyman's battery, were encamped at the foot of the mountain on the west side, and the remainder of General Milroy's force was at

This page contains a map of the Shenandoah area.

Page 104 McDowell. This is a small town on the Bull Pasture river at the foot of mountains bearing the same name, and about forty miles distant from Harrisonburg in the Shenandoah Valley, where General Banks's forces then were. To prevent the junction of these forces, or to cut them up before General Milroy could be reenforced, General Jackson collected all the Confederate forces in the region, and marched against him. On the 7th he attacked the 32d Ohio, which fell back with the loss of their camp equipage and baggage, through lack of transportation. At the same time the force west of the mountain fell back in order to McDowell, where a stand was determined upon. Gen Milroy at the earliest moment sent despatches to General Schenck, who was thirty miles distant, to hasten to his assistance. In the afternoon the enemy appeared in large force on the tops of the mountains in the rear of the town, arranging for an attack. A force was immediately sent forward by General Milroy to occupy the hilltops adjacent to the ones upon which the enemy appeared, more for the purpose of skirmishing and reconnoitering than for bringing on a battle. A fierce contest ensued, which was increased by the arrival of General Schenck with his brigade, and continued until night. The forces of the enemy being manifestly greatly superior, General Milroy determined to retreat. The march was commenced at midnight, and at daybreak they had retired thirteen miles. After a halt of two hours it was continued with the enemy pressing upon them. Upon reaching the camp of General Schenck, arrangements were made for protection. Every hill was surmounted with cannon, and ten different regiments were placed to support them, and for over thirty hours the artillery by a constant fire kept the enemy at a distance. On the morning of the 14th all of the enemy had disappeared, which was subsequently explained by the arrival of General Fremont with Blenker's division. The Federal loss in this conflict was twenty killed, one hundred and seventy-seven wounded, and two missing. The Confederate loss was forty killed, and two hundred wounded. It was nearly a flight of the Federal forces, and only the arrival of Fremont probably saved it from final capture. The Federal loss in tents, baggage, and stores was great. The enemy were present in much superior numbers.

General Fremont now made his headquarters at Franklin, eighty miles south of New Creek, twenty-four miles from Monterey, and sixty-five from Staunton. Here he remained quietly, reorganizing and refreshing his forces for ten days. This repulse of his advance, with his withdrawal to Franklin, now gave General Jackson the opportunity to carry out the plans against General Banks as soon as the moment camo for their execution. Consequently no further movement of importance was made on the part of General Fremont until he was ordered to hurry to the relief of General Banks. This order was received by him on Saturday, the 24th of May, under the form of a despatch from the Secretary of War, directing him to fall back with his entire command to the support of General Brinks. That evening the order was given to be ready for a movement early on the following morning. As early as half past three o'clock on Sunday morning the noise of preparation was heard, and at six o'clock the army was in motion.

It seems that when General Fremont was ordered to go to the relief of General Banks, the order prescribed the route by which he should go. (See p. 109.) This route, thus specified by the President, would have brought General Fremont in the rear of General Jackson; whereas that taken by General Fremont brought him in front of General Jackson. But General Fremont, judging it to be an impracticable route, took the responsibility of going by another. The President telegraphed to him, saying: "You are ordered to go so and so. I hear of you elsewhere. "What does this mean?" To which General Fremont replied, giving the reasons, viz.: that he knew of a shorter and easier route by which he could more effectually perform the service desired, and on which his half-famished troops would meet their transportation and supplies. He also stated that when one is "in the field," it is essentially difficult to obey literally orders transmitted from one necessarily unaware of present exigencies, but that if it was expected of him so to do, he would do it. To this the President, with characteristic simplicity, replied that he was satisfied.

The first six miles of the road were indescribably bad, owing to the recent rains and the heavy wagons that had been passing over it. Wounded and sick had been left at Franklin, but the entire train of wagons was taken. At night the army bivouacked about a mile beyond the upper crossing of the South Branch of the Potomac on the road to Petersburg. the distance marched was fourteen miles. On Monday, the 26th, the advance reached Petersburg after noon, having marched sixteen miles, and halted until the next morning. Orders were here issued that knapsacks, tents, and baggage of every description, which could possibly be dispensed with, should be left behind. Five days' rations of hard bread were given to the troops, and on Tuesday, the 27th, after marching twelve miles, they halted on the highlands east of the village of Moorefield. On Wednesday, the 28th, the army advanced ten miles, passing over Hunting Ridge, and about two o'clock halted to rest and await supplies. The roads continually grew worse, and the rain fell steadily. Thursday, no movement was made. A small force under Colonel Downey, on a reconnoissance, encountered a small body of Confederate cavalry. On Friday, the 30th, an advance of twenty miles was made, and the army bivouacked at Wardensville. A heavy rain fell during the afternoon. On Saturday, the 81st, the last of the intervening mountain ranges was crossed, and the western Page 105 barrier of the Shenandoah Valley alone remained to be traversed. The troops pushed on twelve miles through the rain, and halted at night where the Winchester and Strasburg roads divide. On the narrow ridges, along which the path wound in constant ascent, there was no plane or table land for camp. That rainy night the tired troops dropped and slept by the roadside or in the swimming fields. The next morning, Sunday, June 1, the advance moved at six o'clock, and at eight the whole column was in motion on the road to Strasburg. In about an hour and a half later a skirmish ensued near Strasburg, and General Fremont had reached the position to cooperate with the force of General McDowell against the advance of the enemy upon General Banks.

After the battle of Winchester, on the 28d of March, the retiring Confederate forces in the Shenandoah Valley were followed up by General Banks. On the 1st of April he moved from Strasburg to Woodstock, where his entrance was disputed by a force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery under Colonel Ashby. They however retreated to Edinburg, destroying ono railroad and two turnpike bridges. The advance was subsequently continued with occasional skirmishes, and on the 26th Harrisonburg was occupied. A considerable body of Confederate troops was in the neighborhood, but in a position from which a retreat could easily be made.

The order of the President, which divided the army in Virginia into five corps, placed the fifth under the command of General Banks. It was to be composed of his division and that of General Shields, which had previously been commanded by General Lauder. This was the force now encamped near Harrisonburg. About the 15th of May an order was issued from the War Department withdrawing the division of General Shields from the corps of General Banks, and directing him to report immediately at Catlett's Station on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as above stated. At the same time orders were given to General Banks to fall back to Strasburg and fortify. General Shields left at once, and on his arrival at Catlett's Station he was ordered to join General McDowell at Fredericksburg immediately.

At Strasburg the Massanutten range of mountains rise in the middle of the valley, and divide it. 8trasburg is favorably located for defence against an attack from the south by the western valley. But the eastern valley, by opening out at Front Royal, affords another road to the Potomac, and also a good plank road, which runs direct to Winchester, going round Strasburg.

General Banks had not actually fallen back to Strasburg when General Shields marched over the mountain and down the eastern branch of the valley to Front Royal. At that very time an attack was expected on the front, and a portion of his forces had been daily skirmishing with a Confederate force in the gap of the Massanutten Mountains. It was also known that General Jackson, having attempted to dislodge General Milroy in the Mountain Department, was returning to the Shenandoah Valley, and that General Ewell was with a strong force on the road running from Harrisonburg to Gordonsville, and also that General Taylor was still higher up the valley with another Confederate force. In addition, General Jackson could be easily reinforced from Gordonsville. With this force menacing the valley, General Banks was left with less than six thousand men, including cavalry and artillery, to defend the whole valley, and that, too, before he had time to prepare himself for resistance by fortifications.

Eastward of Front Royal there was another force under General Geary, charged with the protection of the Manassas Gap railroad. The headquarters of General Geary were at Rectortown, and there were only between seven and eight hundred troops at Front Royal. Still farther east, at Catlett's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, about ten miles south of Manassas Junction, was the brigade of General Duryea, consisting of three New York and one Pennsylvania regiment. These forces formed the connection between General Banks and the main body of the army of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell, at Fredericksburg.

The enemy, knowing the position and strength of these forces, formed a plan to capture the entire force of General Banks. This plan was to be executed on the proper signal being given from Richmond. At this time General McClellan was within fifteen miles of Richmond. General McDowell had been reinforced by General Shields, and orders were expected every hour for him to advance toward Richmond. It was all-important for the defence of that capital that reinforcements should be prevented from reaching General McClellan. After the junction of Generals Shields and McDowell, dense columns of smoke could be seen at evening ascending for miles south of Fredericksburg, which were caused by the burning of bridges to retard the Federal advance. Something greater than the mere burning of bridges was needed; for it was not only necessary to prevent the Federal reinforcements to General McClellan, but also to gain time to accumulate the Confederate forces before Richmond from such parts of the South as they could be taken, and by the levies of the conscript law. The moment had come for the dash on General Banks, and the signal from Richmond was given. Meanwhile General Banks, according to the orders of the War Department, had fallen back, and now occupied Strasburg. The first movement of the enemy, who had retired from their advance on Fremont, and were already concentrated under Generals Jackson and Ewell for the purpose, was to advance a heavy column rapidly up the valley between the Blue Ridge, and Massanutten mountain range to Front Royal, with the design of capturing the force there, and then press on by a good plank road to Winchester, and Page 106 thus get in the rear of General Banks. The guard at Front Royal consisted of the 1st Maryland regiment, Colonel Kenly, with three companies of the 29th Pennsylvania, two rifled guns of Knapp's battery, and two companies of the 5th New York cavalry. To their bravery is due the partial defeat of the Confederate plan. On Friday noon, May 23, the enemy were reported to be approaching, and Colonel Kenly formed in a position about one mile east of the Shenandoah river. The fight commenced by a strong dash of cavalry under Colonel Ashby upon this position. After a contest of two hours the enemy were repulsed with considerable loss. Finding that a largo force of infantry was approaching to the aid of the cavalry, Colonel Kenly ordered his men to fall back to the west side of the Shenandoah and to destroy the bridges after them. This was done in good order and the smaller bridge destroyed; but a flanking force of the enemy fording above came upon them before the larger one was destroyed. Colonel Kenly immediately got his guns in position and formed his men, and another struggle ensued, which checked the enemy a couple of hours longer. Finding the force of the enemy increasing, he placed his artillery in the rear and commenced falling back. This was continued for three miles, when the force was overwhelmed by a charge of the enemy, their lines broken, and no further resistance could be made. Colonel Kenly was severely wounded, but afterward recovered. This check retarded the Confederate advance.

The news of this affair reached General Banks that evening, with such details as convinced him that the enemy were at hand with a force from fifteen to twenty thousand strong. It was evident to him from the largo Confederate force, composed as it must be of all their troops in the valley concentrated, that they were close upon him for some purpose not yet developed. That purpose must be nothing less than the defeat of his own command, or its possible capture by occupying 'Winchester, and thus intercepting supplies or reinforcements and cutting off all opportunity for retreat. Under this interpretation of the enemy's plans, one of three courses was open for him to pursue: first, a retreat across the little North Mountain to the Potomac river on the west; second, an attack on the enemy's flank on the Front Royal road; third, a rapid movement direct upon "Winchester with a view to anticipate the occupation of the town by the enemy, and thus place his own command in communication with its original base of operations in the line of reënforcements by Harper's Ferry, and secure a safe retreat in case of disaster.

To remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded; to move over the mountains was to abandon his train at the outset, and to subject his command to flank attacks, without possibility of succor; and to attack the enemy in such overwhelming force could only result in certain destruction. It was, therefore, determined by General Banks that to enter the lists with the enemy in a race or a battle, as he should choose, for the possession of Winchester, the key of the valley, was, for him and his force, the path to safety. Accordingly, the advance guard was called in, and at three o'clock on the next morning several hundred disabled men, left in charge by General Shields's division, were put upon the march to "Winchester, followed by the wagon train under escort of cavalry and infantry. The rear was protected by nearly the whole force of cavalry and six pieces of artillery. The attack of the enemy was expected in the rear. When all the column except the rear guard had passed Cedar Creek, three miles from Strasburg, information was received from the front that the enemy had attacked the train and was in full possession of the road at Middletown. The danger being now in front, the troops were ordered to the head of the column and the train to the rear. After this change the head of the column encountered the enemy in force, fifteen miles from "Winchester, who were attacked with artillery and infantry and driven back some two miles. The neglect of the enemy to attack the train and throw it into confusion when at the head of the column secured a successful continuation of the march. On the remainder of the route to Winchester, the enemy pressed the main column with the utmost vigor, and defeated at every point all efforts of detachments to effect a junction with it. At five o'clock in the afternoon the advance guard arrived at Winchester, and General Banks became satisfied that the force of the enemy was not less than twenty-five thousand men. His command consisted of two brigades of less than four thousand men, with nine hundred cavalry, ten Parrott guns, and one battery of smooth six pounders. To this should be added the 10th Maine regiment of infantry and five companies of Maryland cavalry, stationed at Winchester. During the night General Banks determined to test the strength of the enemy by actual collision, and measures were promptly taken to prepare the troops. The rolling of musketry was heard during the latter part of the night, and before the break of day a sharp engagement occurred at the outposts. Soon after four o'clock the artillery opened its fire, which continued without cessation until the close of the engagement.

The main body of the Confederates was hidden during the early part of the action by the crest of a hill and the woods in the rear.

Their force was massed apparently upon the Federal right, and their manoeuvres indicated a purpose to turn them upon the Berryville road, where, it appeared subsequently, they had placed a considerable force with a view of preventing reënforcements from Harper's Ferry. But the steady fire of the Federal lines held them in check until a small portion of the troops, on the right of the Federal line, made a movement to the rear. This was done under the erroneous impression that an order to withdraw had been given. No sooner was this observed by the enemy than its regiments swarmed upon the Page 107 crest of the hill, advancing from the woods upon the Federal right, which, still continuing its Are, steadily withdrew toward the town.

The overwhelming Confederate force thus suddenly showing itself, made further resistance unwise, and orders were sent to the left to withdraw, which was done in an orderly manner. By this engagement the enemy were held in check five hours.

The retreat was now continued in three parallel columns, each protected by an efficient rear guard, in the direction of Martinsburg, with the hope of meeting reinforcements. The pursuit of the enemy was prompt and vigorous, and the retreat rapid and without loss. At Martinsburg the columns halted two hours and a half, and the rear guard remained in the rear of the town until seven in the evening, and arrived at the river at sundown, forty-eight hours after the first news of the attack on Front Royal. It was a march of fifty-three miles, thirty-five of which were performed in one day. The scene at the river when the rear guard arrived was of the most animated and excited description. A thousand camp fires were burning on the hillside; a thousand carriages of every description were crowded upon the banks of the broad stream between the exhausted troops and their coveted rest. The ford was too deep for the teams to cross in regular succession; only the strongest horses, after a few experiments, were allowed to essay the passage over before morning. The single ferry was occupied by the ammunition trains, the ford by the wagons. The cavalry was secure in its form of crossing. The troops only had no transportation. No enemy appeared in sight. Fortunately there were several boats belonging to the pontoon train brought from Strasburg, which were launched and devoted exclusively to the soldiers. General Banks says in his report: "There never were more grateful hearts in the same number of men than when at midday, on the 20th, we stood on the opposite shore." The loss was as follows: killed, 38; wounded, 155; missing, 711; total, 904 The wagon train consisted of nearly five hundred wagons, of which fifty-five were lost. All the guns were saved. The loss of the enemy has not been stated.

On the morning of the 28th, General Jackson issued the following address to his soldiers:

                                         HEADQUARTERS, V. D.,

                                    WINCHESTER, July, 28, 1862.

General Order, No. 58.

Within four weeks this army has made long and rapid marches, fought six combats and two battles, signally defeating the enemy in each one, capturing several stands of colors and pieces of artillery, with numerous prisoners and vast medical and army stores, and finally driven the boastful host, which was ravishing our beautiful country, into utter rout. The General commanding would warmly express to the officers and men under his command his joy in their achievements, and his thanks for their brilliant gallantry in action, and their obedience under the hardships of forced marches, often more painful to the brave soldier than the dangers of battle.

The explanation of the severe exertions to which the commanding General called the army, which were endured by them with such cheerful confidence in him, is now given in the victory of yesterday. He receives this proof of their confidence in the past with pride and gratitude, and asks only a similar confidence in the future. But his chief duty to-day, and that of the army, is to recognize devoutly the hand of a protecting Providence in the brilliant successes of the lust three days, which have given us the result of a great victory without great losses, and to make the oblation of our thanks to God for his mercies to us and our country in heartfelt acts of religious worship. For. this purpose the troops will remain in camp to-day, suspending as far as practicable all military exercises, and the chaplains or the regiments will hold divine service in the several charges at 4 o'clock p. m., to-day.

                   By order of Brigadier-General JACKSON.

                                          R. D. Dandy, Asst. Adj.-General

When the news of the attack on the Maryland regiment at Front Royal on the 23d, reached General Geary, who, with his force, was charged with the protection of the Manassas Gap railroad, he immediately began to move to Manassas junction. His troops hearing the most extravagant stories of the fate of the Maryland regiment, and supposing they were about to be swallowed up, burnt their tents and destroyed a quantity of arms. General Duryea, at Catlett's Station, became alarmed on learning of the withdrawal of General Geary, took his three New York regiments, leaving the Pennsylvania one behind, and hastened back to Centreville, and telegraphed to Washington for help, He left a large quantity of army stores behind, and also for two days his camp equipage. A panic prevailed at Catlett's Station and Manassas Junction for two days. At night the camps were kept in constant alarm by the sentinels firing at stumps or bowing bushes, which they mistook for Confederate guerillas. The alarm spread to Washington, and Secretary Stanton issued orders calling for the militia of the loyal States to defend that city.

The following is the despatch sent to the Governor of Massachusetts:

                                                 WASHINGTON, May 25,1862.

To the Governor of Massachusetts:

Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great force are marching on Washington. You will please organize and forward immediately all the militia and volunteer force in your State.

                                      EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

This alarm at Washington, and the call for its defence, produced a most indescribable panic in the cities of the Northern States, on Sunday, the 25th, and two or three days afterward.

The Governor of New York, on Sunday night, the 25th, telegraphed to Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and other cities as follows:

Orders from Washington render it necessary to forward to that city all the available militia force. What can Buffalo do?

                                                                        E. D. MORGAN.

Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, issued the following order:

                          HEADQUARTERS PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA,

                                                    HARRISBURG, May 26.

General Order, No. 23.

On pressing requisition of the President of the United States in the present emergency, it is ordered that Page 108 the several major-generals, brigadier-generals, and colonels of regiments, throughout the Commonwealth, muster, without delay, all military organizations within their respective divisions or under their control, together with all persons willing to join their commands, and proceed forthwith to the city of Washington or such other points as may be indicated by future orders. By order

A. G. CURTIN, Governor and Commander-in-Chief. (Signed)

                                       A. L. RUSSELL, Adjt.-General

The Governor of Massachusetts issued the following proclamation:

Men of Massachusetts!—The wily and barbarous horde of traitors to the people, to the Government, to our country, and to liberty, menace again the national capital. They have attacked and routed Major-Gen. Banks, are advancing on Harper's Ferry, and are marching on Washington. The President calls on Massachusetts to rise once more for its rescue and defence.

The whole active militia will be summoned by a general order, issued from the office of the Adjutant-General, to report on Boston Common to-morrow; they will march to relieve and avenge their brethren and friends, and to oppose with fierce zeal and courageous patriotism the progress of the foe.

May God encourage their hearts and strengthen their arms, and may He inspire the Government and all the people!

Given at Headquarters, Boston, 11 o'clock, this (Sunday) evening, May 25, 1862.

                                                      JOHN A. ANDREW.

Over three thousand men responded on Monday.

The Governor of Rhode Island issued the following order:

                                         PROVIDENCE, May 25,1862.

Citizens of the State capable of bearing arms will at once report themselves to the nearest military organizations.

The commandants of the chartered and volunteer military companies will at once organize their companies, and. the men so reporting into companies of eighty-three men rank and file, and report to these headquarters, when they will be armed, equipped, and moved under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief to Washington, to protect the national capital from the advance of the rebels who are now rapidly approaching.

General Robbins is directed to organize and command the first regiment, and will order his brigade under arms and form it into a regiment.

The second regiment will be under command of Copt. Bliss, of the United States Army.

The Providence Marine Corps of artillery will be placed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Gallup as captain, and he is directed to organize the same.

Colonel Shaw is ordered to assemble the National Guard for organization. Rhode Island troops will move through Baltimore, and if their progress is impeded by the rebel mob of that city, they will mete out to it the punishment which it has long merited. Our regiments will move to Washington to defend the capital in common with thousands of our patriotic countrymen, who will rush to arms to ward oil the danger which is imminent.

                                                    WM. SPRAGUE.

          AUG. HOPPIN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

         The Governor of Ohio issued the following proclamation:

                                                 COLUMBUS, O., May 20.

To the Gallant men of Ohio: I have the astounding intelligence that the seat of our beloved Government is threatened with invasion, and am called upon by the Secretary of War for troops to repel and overwhelm the ruthless invaders.

Rally, then, men of Ohio, and respond to this call, as becomes those who appreciate our glorious Government. Three classes of troops will be accepted: First. For three years, or during the war. Second. For a term of three months. Third. For guard duty within the limits of the State All are requested to report for duty at Camp Chase, where the organization will take place.

The number wanted from each county has been indicated by special despatches to the several Military Committees.

Everything is valueless to us if our Government is overthrown.

Lay aside, then, your ordinary duties, and help to bear afloat the glorious Sag unfurled bv our fathers.

                                            DAVID TODD, Governor.

At the same time the Secretary of War at Washington, caused the following order to be issued:

                                                     WASHINGTON, May 25,1863.

Ordered. By virtue of the authority vested by an act of Congress, the President takes military possession of all the railroads in the United States, from and after this date, until further orders, and directs that the respective railroad companies, their officers and servants, shall hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of troops and munitions of war, as may be ordered by the military authorities, to the exclusion of all other business.

            By order of the Secretary of War.

                               M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster-General.

When the alarm thus indicated in the headquarters of Government had disseminated itself throughout the military and social ramifications of society, the excitement was almost tumultuous. In Baltimore, crowds pursued persons suspected of sympathy with the cause of the South, until all such disappeared from the streets. The display of flags was demanded from public buildings. Almost half a million of men offered themselves for the defence of Washington within twenty-four hours after the issue of the proclamations.

Meanwhile General Jackson, having seen General Banks safely escaping to the ford of the Potomac, turned away from further pursuit to carryout the other details of his plan, little conceiving of the panic his movements had occasioned in the departments at Washington and the offices of the Governors of States. In fact a captured despatch from General Johnston to General Jackson shows that the chief object of General Jackson's movement was to prevent reinforcements to General McClellan. The effect of this causeless panic on the part of the authorities at Washington was extremely disastrous to the Federal cause; fully as much so as the groundless fears for the safety of the capital, which determined the detention of General McDowell's corps from the army of the Potomac in the beginning of the month of April. The War Department manifestly did not realize the self-evident fact, that Washington being strongly fortified, its surest defence consisted in the presence of a large army threatening Richmond from the peninsula.

On the 28th General Jackson advanced upon Harper's Ferry from Charlestown, driving in before him a Federal reconnoitring force consisting of the 111th Pennsylvania infantry, Colonel Schlandecker Page 109; the 1st Maryland cavalry, Major Deems, and a section of Reynolds's battery. Small bodies of the enemy appeared in the neighborhood during that and the ensuing day, as if with the object of alluring the Federal forces from their strong defensive position to one where they could be more easily attacked and overpowered. This was the opinion of the Federal commander. The whole force of General Jackson was not before Harper's Ferry. Finding the strength of front presented against him, he determined to collect all the plunder he could convey with prisoners, and retire. To effect this object more securely and to deceive his enemy respecting his movements, he left a force with General Ewell, which became his rear guard, and which made the demonstration upon Harper's Ferry. General R. Saxton, who was in command at Harper's Ferry, fearing a flank movement on the part of the enemy, crossing the Potomac above and occupying Maryland Heights on the Maryland side at the same time that an attack should he made in front, determined to defeat it. He therefore withdrew his forces from Bolivar Heights on the Virginia side to an inner line of defence, on the heights known as Camp Hill, immediately above the town of Harper's Ferry. The occupation of this inner line presented a twofold advantage: First, that being much less extended, it could be held by a smaller force—the enemy, from the nature of the ground, being unable to bring into action a larger force than the Federal; secondly, that it would enable General Saxton to bring his naval battery on the Maryland Heights to bear upon the enemy, as they advanced down the declivity of Bolivar Heights into the valley which separates it from Camp Hill. They would thus be exposed for a considerable time to a heavy fire from this formidable battery, where great elevation would enable it to throw shells directly over the heads of the Federal forces on Camp Hill into the face of the advancing foe. With the force rendered by this contraction of his front available for other purposes, he deemed it prudent to occupy the crest of the hill above the naval battery, on the Maryland shore, to frustrate any attempt of the enemy to take this hill in the rear and turn his batteries against him.

On Friday night, the 30th, about dark, the enemy advanced beyond Bolivar Heights to storm the works on Camp Hill. The batteries on Camp Hill, and the ono on Maryland Heights, opened upon them. The scene at this time was very impressive. The night was intensely dark; the hills around were alive with the signal lights of the enemy; the rain descended in torrents; vivid flashes of lightning illumined at intervals the green and magnificent scenery, while the crash of the thunder, echoing among the mountains, drowned into comparative insignificance the roar of Federal artillery.

After an action of about one hour's duration the enemy retired. He made another unsuccessful attack at midnight, with regiments of Mississippi and Louisiana infantry, and after a short engagement disappeared. Signal lights continued to be seen in every direction.

A reconnoissance the next day developed that the rear of the Confederate force passed through Charlestown about one hour before the arrival of the Federal reconnoitring force from Harper's Ferry.

General Jackson was now on his retreat. If he had not accomplished all that he aimed at, the result will show that he was completely successful in cutting off nearly all reinforcements to General McClellan. The fear of having his own retreat cut off now caused his rapid movements. General Fremont from the west, and Colonel Kimball with the division of General Shields from the east, were on the march to intercept him. The Confederate movements, which had been made to prevent the retreat of General Jackson from being cut off, consisted in the march of General Smith up the Shenandoah from Strasburg to prevent General Fremont from crossing over, as he was ordered, to Harrisonburg. If General Fremont could have successfully crossed to this point, he might have taken up a position so far in the rear of General Jackson as to have effectually cut him off. It has been said that it was impossible for General Fremont to cross to Harrisonburg. "When he received the order to come to the aid of Gon. Banks he was at Franklin, sixty-five miles from Staunton, and a less distance from Harrisonburg. Instead of taking this route, he marched a hundred miles to Strasburg. The Confederate forces which attacked General Milroy and drove him back from McDowell, crossed the mountains, whence they retired to Staunton or Harrisonburg. This was some three weeks previous. The enemy also expected General Fremont to cross to New Market or Harrisonburg, thus showing that no local obstacles prevented. The means of transportation were limited; the supplies could hardly have been found by that route.

On Thursday, the 29th, General Jackson ordered a retrograde movement, and sent off his train and prisoners. Early Friday morning, he left camp between Halltown and Charlestown, and his advance rested the first night at or near Middletown, and the next day (Saturday) entered Strasburg. On Saturday morning, General Ewell, disappearing from Harper's Ferry with the roar guard, followed General Jackson, and encamped on Saturday night at Middletown, thus performing a march of thirty-four miles in one day.

Where now were the pursuers of General Jackson, who were to cut off his retreat? On Saturday night the advance of General Fremont arrived at Brent's Gap, about six miles northwest of Strasburg. It was at noon of the previous day that General Fremont was expected to be in Strasburg by General Shields, who was advancing from the east, having been ordered to be in Front Royal at that hour, which he was. The advance Page 110 of General Fremont's force on Sunday, June 1, encountered the enemy three or four miles from Strasburg, on the road to Winchester. General Jackson had arrived in Strasburg on the previous day, and tarried to secure the safe arrival and departure of all his force. This encounter of the advance of General Fremont was with the rear of General Jackson. Colonel Cluseret, with the 60th Ohio and 8th Virginia and a battery, formed this advance. The contest was with artillery, and was continued by Colonel Cluseret until about noon, when he was ordered to retire under the hope of drawing General Jackson on to attack the position which General Fremont had in the meanwhile taken. He had formed a line of battle in a strong position, with General Milroy on the left, General Schenck on the right, and General Stahl in the centre, with Banker's division in reserve. In this affair live of the 8th Virginia and two of the 60th Ohio were wounded. While General Jackson's rear was thus engaged with the advance of General Fremont, the main body of his troops was pushing on through Strasburg, which was accomplished on Sunday. Thus General Jackson reached Strasburg just in time to pass between General McDowell on the one side, and General Fremont on the other. The advance of General McDowell reached Strasburg soon after the advance of General Fremont. The afternoon wore away without any appearance of General Jackson. The truth was that the attack on the advance of General Fremont was made to divert his attention from the retreating movement General Jackson was then making. A reconnoissance was made during the night beyond Strasburg. On Monday morning, June 2, General Fremont pushed on to Strasburg only to find that General Jackson was on his way to Woodstock unchecked and uninjured. The advance of General Fremont's main force as it entered Strasburg met the 1st New Jersey and the 1st Pennsylvania cavalry under General Bayard, then just coming in, as a part of General McDowell's force.

Meanwhile the force of General Shields which had been ordered to cooperate, had left Manassas Junction, and halted at Haymarket on Tuesday, the 27th of May, as has been stated. On the 28th this division, followed by other troops from General McDowell's corps, advanced as far as Rectortown, thirteen miles, having passed over steep and rocky roads through Thoroughfare Gap. On Thursday, the 29th, it started at five o'clock p. m., with orders to be in Front Royal, twenty-eight miles distant, on the next day at noon, at which time General Fremont was to reach Strasburg. Their entire train was left behind and at the appointed time their advance brigade, under General Kimball, struck the enemy at Front Royal, completely routing them and taking a number of prisoners and a large amount of commissary and quartermaster's stores. On the next day a party of eighteen cavalry entered the outskirts of Strasburg. Finding that the enemy had retired before General Fremont, and that he was following them, General Shields moved up the cast side of the Massanutten range of mountains to Luray, while General Fremont advanced on the west side. General Shields was in hopes of striking the enemy at New Market, but finding the Whitehouse and Columbia bridges burned, he resolved to push on further up the east side of the Shenandoah, to intercept the enemy at Conrad's Store (Miller's Bridge), Port Republic, or Waynesborough on the railroad eleven miles east of Staunton. Colonel Carroll, in command of the 4th brigade, moved rapidly forward with one regiment, followed by the remainder of the brigade. A violent rain on the night of the 3d caused a delay, and various portions of the command were separated by rapid streams overflowing their bunks. He, however, reached Port Republic in advance of the enemy.

At this time forces were gathering in other quarters. The 5th New York cavalry. Colonel De Forrest, left Williamsport on Friday night, the 80th, at the time the attack at Harper's Ferry was made, and advanced to Martinsburg on Saturday morning, the 31st, and occupied the town. On the 2d of June General Banks, having recrossed the Potomac, reached Bunker Hill, twelve miles from Winchester. Also by special train from Baltimore, General Sigel arrived at Harper's Ferry on Sunday evening, June 1. During the nest forenoon, he inspected the positions of the forces, and ordered a march at four o'clock in the afternoon. The next morning the advance of his division, consisting of General Cooper's brigade, was beyond Charlestown, pushing forward to Winchester, where a junction was formed with General Banks.

Meantime General Fremont was in full chase of the swift-footed foe. Finding that the enemy had escaped him at Strasburg, and being joined by an advance of General McDowell's, consisting of General Bayard's cavalry, he ordered the cavalry and artillery to the front, and pursuit to be given.

A stand was made several times by the retreating enemy, during Monday, the 2d. A mile and a half beyond Strasburg, at a narrow and defensible pass called Fisher's Hill, the road, after crossing a bridge, turns abruptly to the right, and curving to the left passes the base of a thickly wooded hill with a deep ravine on the right, and continues up the hill through a deep and densely wooded defile. Here the first stand was made by the rear guard under Gen, Ewell. His artillery occupied elevated positions overlooking the road on his front for a mile, and commanding a range of hills adjacent to the road on the right of General Milroy. Finding it to be impossible to drive the enemy's centre, General Milroy whose other elevated positions for his guns on the right, and a fierce contest ensued for several hours. The enemy at night encamped three miles beyond Woodstock, while the forces of General Fremont occupied the town.

The pursuit was commenced at seven o'clock Page 111 on the next morning, Tuesday, June 8. The advance to Edinburg was made without incident. A military bridge constructed by General Banks across Stony Creek, a swift, wide stream, was half burned by the flying enemy. The delay in repairing the bridge and crossing gave the enemy time to move to Mt. Jackson, eight miles beyond Edinburg, where he halted until noon of the next day, the 4th, when he was again in motion, owing to the approach of General Fremont's advance. One mile beyond Mt. Jackson, is a long bridge over the Shenandoah, a river too swift and deep to be forded. General Jackson left his artillery in position long enough to delay the advance of General Bayard's cavalry, then crossed the bridge before the guns of his pursuers could be brought up, and burned the bridge in face of their cavalry. The bridge was rebuilt by noon of the next day, the 6th, and the army of General Fremont was again in motion. At three o'clock the advance entered New Market, a distance of seven miles, and encamped two miles beyond. On the 6th, Friday, the advance reached Harrisonburg about two o'clock p. m. None of the enemy were seen on the way. Almost every bridge, however small, was found to have been burned. Information was immediately received that a body of Confederate cavalry was near the town. Cannon were planted on the highlands north, and a force of cavalry, under Colonel "Wyndham, was sent ont to reconnoitre, with instructions to engage the enemy if the force was only two or three companies, but not if it was in force and supported by infantry. Some three miles beyond the town, Colonel Wyndham discovered the Confederate cavalry and made an effort to oppose them, but unfortunately came upon a large force of infantry, which opened such a volley upon him that his troops were thrown into confusion, and suffered severely, and he himself was taken prisoner. Later in the day General Bayard and Colonel Cluseret with a force of cavalry and infantry encountered the enemy. One regiment, the Bucktail rifles of Pennsylvania, numbering one hundred and twenty-five, under Colonel Kane, suffered a severe loss of fifty-five men. This small force was rashly led against an overwhelming Confederate mass. The Union forces were finally withdrawn, and the enemy subsequently disappeared. Among the killed of the Confederate force was Colonel Ashby, a brave and dashing cavalry officer. The forces of General Fremont remained at Harrisonburg on Saturday, the 7th of June. A reconnoissance was made by General Milroy, about seven miles on the road to Port Republic, where the enemy was found in a position well protected by woods. It seems that General Jackson, before reaching the final bridge across the Shenandoah, determined to fight General Fremont, and thereby check his pursuit. For this purpose he had chosen his position as above stated, at a spot called Cross Keys, near Union Church.

At six o'clock on Sunday morning, June 8, the army of General Fremont began to move, and at half past eight his advance opened upon the enemy. General Fremont says:

"The battle began with heavy firing at eleven o'clock, and lasted, with great obstinacy and violence, until four in the afternoon, some skirmishing and artillery firing continuing from that time until dark." The right wing was under General Schenck, the left under General Stahl, and the centre under General Milroy.

The right wing was not assailed, except by skirmish fighting. The contest was hot on the centre, and General Milroy forced the enemy back from point to point. He had penetrated the centre, and almost reached the enemy's guns, when the order to retire was given. This filled him with indignation, but he obeyed.

General Stahl's brigade was all engaged. Of this, the 45th New York and the 27th Pennsylvania first met the enemy, and being threatened by superior numbers, the 8th New York was sent to support them on the left, and the 41st New York on the right. These regiments were soon all engaged, and the enemy appeared to be bearing heavily upon this wing of the army. It finally gave way, and the whole line was ordered back to a more favorable position. The enemy did not advance, but commenced a retreat. The army encamped that night on the ground where their line was first formed in the morning. They drove the enemy's pickets and skirmishers over it at first, for no attempt was made on the other side to support them. The place where the fighting occurred, and the dead and wounded were strewn over the field, was in the enemy's possession all night.

The loss was very severe on both sides. In General Stahl's command the loss was 69 killed, wounded 254, missing 79. The total loss was estimated by General Fremont, immediately after the battle, at 125 killed and 500 wounded. The enemy's loss was less than this, owing to the shelter of their forces.

The despatch of General Fremont to the War Department, dated on the next morning, says:

"There was no collision with the enemy after dark last night. This morning we renewed the march against him, entering the woods in battle order; his cavalry appearing on our flanks. General Blenker had the left, General Milroy the right, and General Schenck the centre, with a reserve of General Stahl's and General Bayard's brigades."

Port Republic is a small town on the south fork of the Shenandoah river, near which is the bridge by which the river is crossed. It is a few miles distant from Cross Keys, where the conflict between Generals Fremont and Jackson's forces took place. It has already been stated that Colonel Carroll, in command of the advance of General Shields's division up the east side of the Shenandoah, arrived at Port Republic in advance of General Jackson. This means, in advance of the main force of the enemy. On Saturday, the 7th, Colonel Carroll received orders to move forward to Waynesborough, distant some thirty-five or thirty-seven miles, by the Page 112 way of Port Republic, for the purpose of destroying the railroad depot, track, and bridge, at that place, and to seize General Jackson's train and throw his force upon General Jackson's flank. Colonel Carroll marched in obedience to these orders, on Saturday afternoon. His infantry, cavalry, and artillery had in the mean time come up, and he started for Conrad's Store with less than a thousand of the former, with one hundred and fifty cavalry, and with a single battery of six guns.

Halting, in the night, six miles before reaching Port Republic, Colonel Carroll sent forward a party of scouts, who returned with the information that General Jackson's train was parked near Port Republic, with a drove of beef cattle herded near by, and the whole guarded by about two or three hundred cavalry. On learning this he pushed forward, with the design of capturing the train and cattle, as his orders directed, he halted some two miles from the town, made a reconnoissance, and received further information confirming the report of his scouts, and then dashed into the town with his cavalry and two pieces of artillery, driving the enemy's cavalry out and taking possession of the bridge. He halted there for his infantry to come up, and disposed his pieces and little force to prevent a repulse from the train guard, when, before he had occupied the village any length of time, he was attacked by a force of the enemy superior to his own, and forced to retire and abandon his further march to Waynesborough. Thus the enemy recovered possession of the bridge and held it.

Colonel Carroll brought his forces to a stand at the first defensible position, about two miles north of the town. At this time the conflict was going on between Generals Fremont and Jackson at Cross Keys, several miles distant, and it was over this bridge that General Jackson must retreat or be placed between the forces of Generals Fremont and Shields. At two o'clock in the afternoon General Tyler arrived to the aid of Colonel Carrol. As commanding one of the brigades of General Shield’s division, he had also been ordered to proceed to Waynesborough. He left Columbia Bridge on the 7th, and reached Naked Creek on the same day, and went into camp under orders to march at four a.m. "When within six miles of Port Republic he learned of the engagement of Colonel (acting Brigadier General) Carroll, and pressed forward immediately with infantry and artillery to his support, and reached him at two p. m.


Source: The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.