The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.

United States Army Operations, 1862, Part 3

Associated with General Beauregard in command were Generals Albert Sidney Johnston, Bragg, Polk, Pillow, Cheatham, and others. The Confederate force consisted not only of the troops from the adjacent States which had been in service for months, but also of new levies now called out by the governors on the requisition of President Davis. They were encamped principally at Corinth, with detachments at various points on the railroad, so situated that they could be easily concentrated on any point.

Corinth is at the intersection of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston railroads, in Tishemingo county, Mississippi, forty miles from Grand Junction, fifty-eight miles from Jackson, Tennessee, and about eighteen miles from Pittsburg on the Tennessee river. It is situated in a hilly, semi-mountainous country.

The Federal forces at first concentrated at Savannah, a small town of two hundred inhabitants, on the Tennessee river, about one hundred and seventy miles above Fort Henry. The number of transports which arrived by the 18th of March, was eighty-two. This force, comprised all of General Grant's original command, with an additional force of infantry, almost entirely from the State of Ohio. All the steamers that formed the regular line of packets between Louisville and New Orleans and between Louisville and St. Louis, were in the fleet, carrying from 1200 to 1500 men each, and heavily laden. The demonstrations of the inhabitants along the shore of the river were of the most extravagant character. One declared Page 68 it to be " the second coming of Christ." The command of the army was taken by General Grant soon after its arrival at Savannah, and it was advanced seven miles to Pittsburg Landing. Savannah was made a depot for stores, with only a few troops. Here troops and supplies were sent to General Grant by Major-General Halleck, both from St. Louis and Cairo. There had also been such a change in the position of the enemy before General Buell at Nashville, that the original plan was altered, and he was directed by Major-General Halleck to make a junction of his forces with those under General Grant. By General War Order No. 3 of the President, dated March 11th, the Departments of Kansas and Kentucky, respectively under the command of General Hunter and of General Buell, were united with that of the Missouri, under the designation of the Department of the Mississippi, and of this consolidated Department General Halleck was assigned the command.

It was the original plan of General Buell to advance with his army in several columns upon northern Alabama over the principal roads leading to that region from Nashville. "With this object in view, the divisions of General Mitchell, Nelson and McCook left Nashville on the same day, and by different roads. But the Confederates, having retired from Murfreesboro and formed along the new line they proposed to defend, rendered necessary a corresponding change in the plan of General Buell. A direct advance upon Alabama by General Buell's forces would not only have involved an unnecessary amount of labor and slowness of movement, owing to the destruction of bridges over the watercourses, and other impediments, but the passage of the Tennessee into northern Alabama being practicable for a large army at a few places only, the Confederates could by means of the railroad have easily collected a largo force to dispute it at any point. This concentration of the main body of the Confederate forces in localities within the contemplated field of the operations of General Grant's army, not only gave to the latter an opportunity to employ the whole of his force to the best possible advantage, but enabled General Halleck to order General Buell to turn his army toward western Tennessee, to cooperate with General Grant and cross the river. Thus combined, they were regarded as certain to be superior to the Confederate army in the number, armament, and fighting trim of their commands. On the 28th of March, General Buell left Nashville and passed the advance of his divisions at Columbia.

On the 28th, 29th, and 30th the divisions of his army had crossed Duck river on a new bridge, and advanced through Columbia, distant eighty-two miles from Savannah. Meantime most active preparations had been made to assemble a large Confederate force at Corinth, and to fortify that position, which is about eighteen miles south of Pittsburg Landing. The force of General Grant was posted at Pittsburg and along both sides of the river toward Crump's Landing and Savannah, but kept in active service scouring the country. The importance of the approaching contest to the Confederate States could not be concealed. If Corinth fell, Memphis would also fall, and the whole territory of the Gulf States would be open to an army larger than that of the Potomac. The plan adopted by Generals Johnston and Beauregard was to strike an unexpected blow before the arrival of General Buell's forces. On the 3d of April, General Johnston issued the following address to his soldiers:

                      HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF MISSISSIPPI, 

                              CORINTH, MISSISSIPPI, April 3.

Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi:

I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country, with the resolution and discipline and valor becoming men, fighting, as you arc, for all worth living or dying for. You can but march to a decisive victory over agrarian mercenaries sent to subjugate and despoil you of your liberties, property, and honor. Remember the precious stake involved; remember the dependence of your mothers, your wives, your sisters, and your children on the result.

Remember the fair, broad, abounding lands, the happy homes that will be desolated by your defeat. The eyes and hopes of eight million people rest upon you. You are expected to show yourselves worthy of your valor and courage, worthy of the women of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been exceeded in any time. With such incentives to brave deeds, and with the trust that God is with us, your general will lead you confidently to the combat, assured of success.

                      (Signed)                  A. S. JOHNSTON,

                                                             General Commanding.

The orders accompanying the address divided " the Army of the Mississippi " into three corps. General Beauregard was proclaimed to be in command of the whole force. The first corps was assigned to General Polk, and embraced all the troops of his former command, excepting detached cavalry and artillery, and reserves detached for the defence of Fort Pillow and Madrid Bend. The second corps was assigned to General Bragg, and was to consist of the second division of the army of the Mississippi, less artillery and cavalry "hereafter detached." The third corps was assigned to General Hardee, and consisted of " the Army of Kentucky." To General Crittenden was assigned a command of reserves, consisting of not less than two brigades.

From two to three miles out on the road to Corinth from Pittsburg Landing lay the five divisions of General Grant's army. The advance line was formed by three divisions: Brigadier-General Sherman's, Brigadier-General Prentiss's, and Major-General McClernand's. Between these and the landing lay the two others, Brigadier-General Hurlbut's and Major-General Smith's, commanded in his absence by Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace. On the extreme left of the line was one brigade of General Sherman's division, while the other brigades were some two miles distant, forming the extreme right of the advance line. To the left, though rather behind a portion of the line Page 69 formed by Sherman's main brigades, lay General McClernand's division, and between it and General Sherman's brigade, on the extreme left, lay General Prentiss's division. No preparations had been made for any means of defence in case of attack, although the position was an exposed one.

The information that General Buell was near at hand, determined General Beauregard to make the attack at once. The movement of his troops from Corinth commenced on the 3d of April. Owing to the difficulties of the roads, they did not reach the vicinity of the Federal forces until Saturday afternoon, the 5th. It was then determined that the attack should be mad6 on the next morning, at the earliest hour practicable, and in three lines of battle: the first and second extending from Owl Creek, on the Confederate left, to Lick Creek on their right—a distance of about three miles—supported by the third and the reserve. The first line consisted of General Hardee's corps, augmented on his right by Gladden's brigade of Bragg's corps, deployed in line of battle, with their respective artillery following immediately, and the cavalry in rear of the wings. The second line followed the first at a distance of five hundred yards, in the same order as the first. The corps under General Polk followed the second line, at the distance of about eight hundred yards, in lines of brigades, deployed with their batteries in rear of each brigade, the left wing supported by cavalry. The reserve followed closely the third line in the same order, its right wing supported by cavalry. These two corps constituted the reserve, and were to support the front lines of battle by being deployed, when required, on the right and left, or otherwise act according to the exigencies of the battle.

At half past five on the morning of April 6, the Confederate lines and columns were in motion. Like an Alpine avalanche they came, attacking first the left of General Grant, under General Prentiss, who, with two thousand of his men, were soon made prisoners. This attack was in part a surprise. Scarcely had the men time to seize their weapons and form, after knowing of the approach of the Confederates. General Grant himself was at Savannah at the commencement, but early reached the raging field. Gradually, as the Confederate line came up, the engagement had become general, and as General Prentiss's division fell back, abandoning their camp, they were supported by General Hurlbut, and thus for a time checked the progress of the Confederates. At the same time the left of General Sherman's division on the right was forced back, and the brunt of the battle, in the centre, fell upon General McClernand's division. Desperate as was their determination, yet at eleven o'clock this division had been pressed back in a line with General Hurlbut. It still did some gallant fighting; once its right swept round and drove the Confederates for a considerable distance, but again fell back, and at the last it brought np near the position of the camps of General Smith's division, commanded by W. H. L. Wallace. Thus the divisions of Prentiss, Sherman, and McClernand were driven back, their camps were all in the hands of the Confederates, and the whole front line, for which Hurlburt and Wallace were but the reserves, was gone, excepting Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division, on the extreme left. The position of this brigade was along the circuitous road from the Landing to Hamburg, some two miles distant from the former, and near the crossing of Lick Creek. They had remained isolated until after the division of General Prentiss fell back, when the Confederates advanced upon them in such force as to be irresistible m their position, and they fell back a fourth of a mile and made a stand for three fourths of an hour. At this juncture a brigade of General Wallace's reserve, under McArthur, was sent over to their support. They were, however, soon forced to fall back to one ridge, and then to another, and finally at twelve o'clock, badly shattered and disordered, they retreated to the right and rear of McArthur a brigade to reorganize. Six hours had passed since the approach of the Confederates, and at this time only the divisions of Generals Hurlbut and Wallace stood between the army and destruction or surrender. Still all was not lost. The divisions of Generals Hurlbut and Wallace began to make a most gallant stand. The brigade of the latter had been sent to reinforce McArthur's, and thus reunited, filled the space in the line on the left made vacant by the falling back of General Prentiss's division and Stuart's brigade of General Sherman's division, and thus were on the left of Hurlbut's division. By the early breaking of General Prentiss's line, the onset of the Confederates had been made to veer chiefly to the Union left. Here the contest continued stubborn. Four times the Confederates attempted to charge on General Wallace's men. Each time the infantry poured in rapid volleys, and the artillery redoubled their efforts, thus compelling them to retreat with heavy slaughter. Farther to the right, General Hurlbut's division, which had taken an advanced position, was compelled to fall back through its camp to a thick wood behind. Here, with open fields before them, they could rake the approach of the Confederates. Three times their heavy masses bravely charged upon the division, and each time they were repulsed with severe loss. The troops from the driven divisions were reorganized so far as available, and re-sent to the field. Thus the right of General Hurlbut, which was almost wholly unprotected, and the weakness of which does not appear to have been discovered by the Confederates, was in a measure patched out. It had been previously determined that in case of an attack at Pittsburg Landing, the division under General L. Wallace at Crump's Landing, five miles below, should come up on the right and flank the enemy. But no message was sent to this

Page 70-71 This page contains a map of the field of Shiloh.

Page 72 division until nearly noon, and it missed the way on coming up, and did not arrive until night. The division of General Hurlbut at length became exhausted, and fell back out of sight of their camps to a point within half a mile of the Landing. In consequence of losing this support, the division of General Wallace, thus in isolated advance, was compelled to fall back, the last to leave the field. Just at this moment its commander was mortally wounded.

It was now half past four o'clock. The front line of the divisions had been lost since eleven o'clock, and the reserve line was gone too. The Confederates occupied the camps of every division except Smith's, commanded during his sickness by General Wallace, who had just been wounded. The whole army was crowded in the region of Wallace's camp, and to a circuit of one half to two thirds of a mile around the Landing. The next repulse would put it into the river, and there were not transports enough to cross a single division before the enemy would be upon them. Nearly half the field artillery was lost, nearly all the camps and camp equipage. Prisoners had been taken in great numbers.

At this time a lull took place in the firing, the first which had occurred since sunrise. It was thought that the enemy were either preparing for the grand final rush that was to crown the day's success, or that they wore puzzled by the last retreat, and were moving cautiously. These few minutes were golden ones for that driven and defeated army, and they were improved. Colonel Webster, chief of staff, arranged the guns which he could collect of those that remained, in a sort of semicircle to protect the Union centre and left, upon which it was thought the enemy were now sure to advance. Corps of artillerists to man them were gathered from all the batteries. Twenty-two guns were thus placed in position, two of which were long 32's. In front was a victorious enemy; behind were the remnants of the repulsed divisions of the army driven within half a mile of the Landing, beyond which was a deep and rapid river. General Wallace's division at Crump's Landing had not been heard from. Across the river now was seen the first glitter of the advance of General Buell, but it could not be brought over in time to do much good. Suddenly a broad flash of light leaped out from the darkening woods, and the whistling leaden hail swiftly followed. The enemy were about to make their crowning effort for the day. Instantly the artillery replied, and as they approached nearer, the infantry fired volley after volley. At this time the gunboats, Lexington and Tyler, approached the mouth of Lick Creek, and were able with their guns to reach the field occupied by the Confederates near the river. This was a fire in their flank, which disconcerted their plans. Amid this terrible conflict darkness came on. The enemy had been held at bay.

Meantime General Wallace had arrived with his division, and General Buell with his forces, part of which took part in the battle of the afternoon, and it was decided after the sounds of battle had ceased, to attack the Confederates as soon as possible after daybreak. General Wallace's division was to take the right and sweep back toward the position from which General Sherman had been driven during the morning, and General Nelson was to take the extreme left. General Crittenden was to take a position during the night next to General Nelson, and General McCook with his division next to Crittenden. The space between Generals McCook and Wallace was to be filled with the reorganized divisions of General Grant's army. Stealthily the troops crept to their new positions, and lay down in line of battle on their arms. All through the night, General Buell's men were marching up from Savannah to the point opposite Pittsburg Landing, and were ferried across, or were coming up on transports. At nine o'clock, the gunboats commenced a cannonade of the Confederate position, which was kept up all night. It produced little or no effect.

General Beauregard thus reported his position on Sunday night: "At six o'clock p. m., we were in possession of all encampments between Owl and Lick creeks but one. Nearly all of his field artillery, about thirty flags, colors, and standards, over three thousand prisoners, including a division commander (General Prentiss) and several brigade commanders, thousands of small arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage, and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of transportation—all the substantial fruits of a complete victory—such indeed as rarely have followed the most successful battles; for never was an army so well provided as that of our enemy.

"The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the shelter of the heavy guns of his iron-clad gunboats, and we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, admirably provided cantonments, after over twelve hours of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them and the contiguous covert, but only by a sustained onset of all the men we could bring into action."

The Federal forces arranged for the battle of the next day were: the divisions of Generals Nelson, Crittenden, McCook, Hurlbut, McClernand, and Sherman, including in the three latter the shattered and disorganized commands of Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace, which were without commanders, and the fresh division of General L. Wallace. These divisions were arranged in the order above named, beginning on the left. The change produced in the position of the Confederate forces, by the shells of the gunboats during the night, prevented them from opening the battle at daylight.

At seven o'clock in the morning. General Nelson on the extreme left formed his line of battle, and advanced, with skirmishers thrown out, for Page 73 nearly a mile before meeting the enemy in force. They immediately became engaged. There was no straggling, as upon the previous day. General Kelson slowly but steadily advanced, pushing the exhausted enemy before him until half past ten, when under cover of the timber and a furious cannonading they made a general rally. Suddenly the masses of the enemy were hurled with tremendous force against the Federal lines, which now halted, wavered, and fell back. At this moment Terrill's battery of 24-pounder howitzers rushed up, and in a few minutes was unlimbered and firing into the compact and advancing ranks of the enemy. Here was the turning point of the battle on the left. The enemy were only checked, not halted; then followed for two hours a contest of artillery and musketry at short range. The enemy began to waver, when General Buell coming up, saw at a glance the chance and ordered a charge by brigades, at "double quick." The Confederates fell back for a quarter of a mile, became more confused, and at half past two that point of the field was cleared. The nest divisions, of Generals Crittenden and McCook, after an obstinate struggle, were equally successful. The divisions of Generals McClernand and Hurlbut, nothing daunted by the reverses of the preceding day, fought with much bravery. On the right the contest was more severe, and longer continued. A design was manifested by the enemy to turn the flank of General Wallace's division. This was thwarted, and the enemy steadily driven back until four p. m., when a general retreat took place on the right. Thus the original plan of the enemy was frustrated. It was his design to drive General Grant into his transports and the river, or to capture his force in time to profit by the victory, and remove to the rear all the stores and munitions that would be taken. This was to be done before the arrival of General Buell.

On the retreat of the Confederate army, the original ground, and even the tents of General Grant's army, were recovered. No regular pursuit was attempted until the next day. The number of the Federal army engaged on Sunday, was estimated by General Beauregard at five divisions of nine thousand men each, or forty-five thousand men. The reënforcements of Sunday night were estimated by him at twenty-five thousand from General Buell's army, and eight thousand under General Wallace, and the entire force on Monday fifty-three thousand. This estimate slightly exceeds the Federal force engaged, especially in the number of reinforcements furnished by General Buell. On the other hand, the Confederate force was estimated at sixty thousand by the Union officers, which was undoubtedly an overestimate. General Grant had a force somewhat less than the enemy on Sunday, but on Monday he outnumbered them. No official statement of numbers has been afforded on either side. The Federal loss was 1,735 killed, 7.882 wounded, and 3,956 taken prisoners. Total, 13.573. The Confederate loss was killed 1,728, wounded 8,012, missing 959. Total, 10,699.

At the close of the battle on the first day, General Beauregard sent the following despatch to Richmond:

BATTLE FIELD OF SHILOH, April 6,

via CORINTH AND CHATTANOOGA,

General S. Cooper, Adjutant-General:

We have this morning attacked the enemy in a strong position in front of Pittsburg, and after a severe battle of ten hours, thanks to Almighty God, gained q complete victory, driving the enemy from every position.

The loss on both sides is heavy, including our Commander-in-Chief, Albert Sidney Johnston, who fell gallantly leading his troops into the thickest of the tight.

                       (Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD, Gen'l Com'd'g.

In consequence of the reception of this message, President Davis sent the following Message to the Confederate Congress, then in session at Richmond, on the 8th of April:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate Slates of America:

The great importance of the news just received from Tennessee induces me to depart from the established usages, and to make to you this communication in advance of official reports. From official telegraphic despatches, received from official sources, I am able to announce to you, with entire confidence, that it has pleased Almighty God to crown the Confederate arms with a glorious and decisive victory over our invaders.

On the morning of the 6th, the converging columns of our army were combined by its Commander-in-Chief, General A. Sidney Johnston, in an assault on the Federal army, then encamped near Pittsburg, on the Tennessee river.

After a hard-fought battle of ten hours, the enemy was driven in disorder from his position, and pursued to the Tennessee river, where, under cover of the gunboats, he was at the last accounts endeavoring to effect his retreat by aid of his transports. The details of this great battle are yet too few and incomplete to enable me to distinguish with merited praise all of those who may have conspicuously earned the right to such distinction, and I prefer to delay our own gratification in recommending them to your special notice, rather than incur the risk of wounding the feelings of any by failing to include them in the list.

When such a victory has been won over troops as numerous, well-disciplined, armed, and appointed, as those which have just been so signally routed, we may well conclude that one common spirit of unflinching bravery and devotion to our country's cause must have animated every breast, from that of the Commanding General to that of the humblest patriot who served in the ranks. There is enough in the continued presence of invaders on our soil to chasten our exultation over this brilliant success, and to remind us of the grave duty of continued exertion, until we shall extort from a proud and vain-glorious enemy the reluctant acknowledgment of our right to self-government.

But an All-wise Creator has been pleased, while vouchsafing to us his countenance in battle, to afflict us with a severe dispensation, to which we must bow in humble submission. The last long, lingering hope has disappeared, and it is but too true that General Albert Sidney Johnston is no more. The tale of his death is simply narrated in a despatch from Colonel William Preston, in the following words:

"General Johnston fell yesterday at half past two o'clock, while leading a successful charge, turning the enemy's right, and gaining a. brilliant victory. A Minie ball cut the artery of his leg, but he rode on until, from loss of blood, he fell exhausted, and died without pain in a few moments. His body has been intrusted to me by General Beauregard, to be taken to New Orleans, and remain until directions are received from his family."

My long and close friendship with this departed  Page 74 chieftain and patriot forbids mo to trust myself in giving vent to the feelings which this sad intelligence has evoked. Without doing injustice to the living, it may safely be asserted that our loss is irreparable. Among the shining hosts of the great and good who now cluster around the banner of our country, there exists no purer spirit, no more heroic soul, than that of the illustrious man whose death I join you in lamenting.

In his death he has illustrated the character for which through life he was conspicuous—that of singleness of purpose and devotion to duty—with his whole energies. Bent on obtaining the victory which he deemed essential to his country's cause, he rode on to the accomplishment of his object, forgetful of self, while his very life-blood was fast ebbing away. His last breath cheered his comrades on to victory. The last sound he heard was their shout of victory. His last thought was of his country, and long and deeply will his country mourn his loss.

                                                               JEFFERSON DAVIS.

On the 10th of April, President Lincoln, having received reports of the battles at Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, issued the following proclamation:

                                                 WASHINGTON, April 10, 1862.

It has pleased Almighty God to vouchsafe signal victories to the land and naval forces engaged in suppressing an internal rebellion, and at the same time to avert from our country the dangers of foreign intervention and invasion.

It is therefore recommended to the people of the United States that, at their next weekly assemblages in their accustomed places of public worship, which shall occur after the notice of this Proclamation shall have been received, they especially acknowledge and render thanks to our Heavenly Father for these inestimable blessings; that they then and there implore spiritual consolation in behalf of all those who have been brought into affliction by the casualties and calamities of sedition and civil war, and that they reverently invoke the Divine guidance for our national counsels, to the end that they may speedily result in the restoration of peace, harmony, and unity throughout our borders, and hasten the establishment of fraternal relations among all the countries of the earth.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this tenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

                                              ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President—Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.

On the 8th General Sherman, with a body of cavalry and infantry, advanced on the Corinth road. His progress was at first checked by a force of the enemy's cavalry? which afterward was driven back. The roads were found in a bad state, in consequence of the heavy rain on Sunday night, and strewn with abandoned wagons, ambulances, and limber boxes. A general hospital, containing about two hundred and ninety wounded Confederate soldiers, was also found. The force of General Sherman returned to camp at night

It was charged against General Grant that the commencement of the battle was a surprise to the Federal forces, and that he was absent from the field until some hours after. In reply he said: "As to the talk of our being surprised, nothing could be more false. If the enemy had sent us word where and when they would attack, we could not have been better prepared. Skirmishing had been going on for two days between our reconnoitering parties and the enemy's advance. I did not .believe, however, that they intended to make a determined attack, but simply to make a reconnoissance in force. My headquarters were at Savannah, though I usually spent the day at Pittsburg. Troops were constantly arriving to be assigned to the different brigades and divisions. All were ordered to report at Savannah, making it necessary to keep an office and some one there. I was also looking for Buell to arrive, and it was important that I should have every arrangement complete for his crossing and transit to this side of the river."

General Beauregard issued the preliminary orders for his troops to move from Corinth at one o clock on the morning of the 3d of April. The movement did not commence until during the forenoon. It was expected to reach the Federal lines in time to commence the attack on the 5th. They arrived too late in the afternoon of that day to attack. It could not have been with the advance of this force that " skirmishing had been going on for two days."

On the 9th of April, Major-General Halleck, with a portion of his staff, left St. Louis for Pittsburg Landing, to assume command in the field. His first efforts were devoted to reorganizing the army. Two days after his arrival, an expedition was sent under convoy of the gunboats to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, seven miles inland from Chickasaw. This was successfully done by General Sherman, and cut the communication between Richmond, Virginia, and Corinth. The state of the roads delayed for some days any movement of importance. Frequent skirmishes, however, took place with the Confederate infantry and cavalry hovering near. On the 22d of April, General Pope, with his division, numbering about 25,000, arrived at Pittsburg Landing from New Madrid. On the 27th, orders were issued by General Halleck for the army to hold itself in readiness for an immediate movement. General Grant's divisions formed the right wing of the army, those of General Buell the centre, and those of General Pope the left wing. Generals Grant and Buell retained the immediate command of their respective armies. The advance of the army was now gradually commenced. Day after day a division or a brigade was moved a few miles, and the outposts extended. On the 1st of May, Monterey was occupied. It is a small village in McNairy Co., Tennessee, four miles from the Mississippi line, and about midway between Pittsburg Landing and Corinth. A few days previously, an expedition under General Wallace had gone as far as Purdy, about twenty miles west of Pittsburg Landing, and destroyed the bridge of the railroad connecting Corinth with Jackson.

On the 2d of May, General Beauregard issued the following address to his soldiers:

              HEADQUARTERS OF THE FORCES AT CORINTH,

                                              MISSISSIPPI, May 2, l862.

Soldiers of Shiloh and Elkhorn:

We are about to meet once more, in the shock of battle, the invaders Page 75 of our soil, the despoilers of our homes, the disturbers of our family ties, face to face, hand to hand. We are to decide whether we are to be freemen or vile slaves of those who ore free only in name, and who but yesterday were vanquished, although in largely superior numbers, in their own encampments, on the ever-memorable field of Shiloh. Let the impending battle decide our fate, and add a more illustrious page to the history of our revolution—one to which our children will point with noble pride, saying, "Our fathers were at the battle of Corinth." I congratulate you on your timely junction. With your mingled banners, for the first time during this war, we shall meet our foe in strength that should give us victory. Soldiers, can the result be doubtful t Shall we not drive back into Tennessee the presumptuous mercenaries collected for our subjugation? One more manly effort, and, trusting in God and the justness of our cause, we shall recover more than we have lately lost Let the sound of our victorious guns be reechoed by those of the army of Virginia on the historic battle field of Yorktown.

                                                G. T. BEAUREGARD,

                                                        General Commanding.

     J. M. Otey, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 3d of May, the army, commanded by General Halleck, numbering 108,000 men, was within eight miles of Corinth. The bridges burned had been rebuilt, and the roads had become dry enough to render transportation easy. Jew can conceive the difficulty of moving such a mass of men with their tents, baggage, artillery, and supplies, over an uneven, marshy country, covered with woods, and without roads.

Corinth is a small village in the northeast corner of Mississippi, ninety miles east from Memphis, and about twenty miles west from the Tennessee river. The Memphis and Charleston railroad runs through it from east to west, and the Mobile and Ohio from north to south. The country between it and the Tennessee river is very uneven, broken into ridges of hills and abrupt valleys, and covered with a heavy forest. The bridges over the creeks had been destroyed; the roads over the marshes had been torn up, and timber hod been felled in great quantities over them.

On the same day General Paine, with his division, made a reconnoissance to Farmington, five miles northwest of Corinth, and found about 4,500 Confederate troops, who, on being attacked, retreated with a loss of 80 killed and 200 taken prisoners.

At the same time an artillery reconnoissance to Glendale on the Charleston and Memphis railroad, destroyed two trestle bridges and some of the track. At this time the organization of General Halleck's force had been somewhat changed. General Thomas was assigned to the command of the right wing, composed of five divisions, viz.: his own, Hurlbut's, Sherman's, that of General Smith, deceased, and General Davies'; the centre consisted of four divisions under Generals McCook, Wood, Nelson, and Crittenden; the left under General Pope, to which was added one division of General Curtis's army from Arkansas. General Grant was appointed second in command. The reserve under General McClernand consisted of his own and General Wallace's divisions. The advance upon Corinth was made with the extremity of each wing thrown back in echelons to prevent a flank attack.

Meantime the Confederate forces at Corinth were active in strengthening their position and accumulating reinforcements. Pensacola and New Orleans had at this time been captured by the Federal forces, and General Lovell had with his force arrived at Corinth from the neighborhood of the latter city. On the 9th, a strong Confederate force drove in the Federal pickets beyond Farmington, and advanced upon the brigade occupying the farther side of the creek in front of the Federal camp. The brigade maintained its position for some time, hut General Pope, finding it would be necessary to move his whole force across the creek, contrary to orders, in order to sustain it, directed it to retire.

Great as was the army of General Halleck, the Confederates were believed to be stronger, and the people of the Southern States now looked forward to a signal and brilliant victory.

The advance of the Federal lines was slow, and on the 21st their batteries were within three miles of Corinth. The skirmishing of the pickets now increased every day, and soon became constant along the entire line. Almost daily the artillery was engaged, and the hour for battle was close at hand.

The railroad communication to the northward and eastward of Corinth had been destroyed at Purdy and Glendale. With a view to prevent still further, so far as it was in his power, either the reinforcement or the retreat of the Confederate armies at Corinth, General Halleck directed that the railroad to the southward of Corinth and in the direction of Mobile should be also cut. To effect this, Colonel Elliott, with two regiments of cavalry, started on the night of the 27th, and early on the 30th reached liooneville, 24 miles south of Corinth. A large amount of stores was found and destroyed, consisting of five railroad cars loaded with small arms, five loaded with loose ammunition, six with officers' baggage, and five with subsistence stores, harness, saddles, &c. Some hundreds of sick Confederate soldiers were paroled. The trains, engines, and depot were burned.

On the 28th, General Halleck sent the following despatch to Washington:

                  HEADQUARTERS DEPTARTMENT MISSISSIPPI,

                                  CAMP ON CORINTH ROAD, May 28.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

Three strong reconnoitering columns advanced this morning on the right, centre, and left, to face the enemy and unmask his batteries. The enemy hotly contested his ground at each point, but was driven back with considerable loss. The column on the left encountered the strongest opposition. Our loss was twenty-five killed and wounded. The enemy left thirty dead on the field. The losses at other points are not yet ascertained. Some five or six officers and a number of privates were captured. The fighting will probably be renewed to morrow morning at daybreak. The whole country is so thickly wooded that we arc compelled to feel our way.

                                           H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

The following despatches were sent on the 30th:

Page 76

NEAR CORINTH, May 30,1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

General Pope's heavy batteries opened upon the enemy's intrenchments yesterday, about 10 a. m., and soon drove the rebels from their advanced battery.

Major-General Sherman established another battery yesterday afternoon within one thousand yards of their works, and skirmishing parties advanced at daybreak this morning.

Three of our divisions are already in the enemy's advanced works, about three quarters of a mile from Corinth, which is in flames.

The enemy has fallen back of the Mobile railroad.

                                                              H. W. HALLECK.

                                                 NEAR CORINTH, May 30,1862.

Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

Our advanced guard are in Corinth. There are conflicting accounts as to the enemy's movements. They are believed to be in strong force on our left flank, some four or five miles south of Corinth, near the Mobile and Ohio railroad.

                                                       H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

             HEADQUARTERS CAMP NEAR CORINTH, May 30.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War 

The enemy's position and works in front of Corinth were unexpectedly strong. He cannot occupy a stronger position in his flight.

This morning he destroyed an immense amount of public and private property, stores, provisions, wagons, tents, Ac.

For miles out of the town the roads are filled with arms, haversacks, &c, thrown away by his flying troops.

A large number of prisoners and deserters have been captured, and are estimated by General Pope at two thousand.

General Beauregard evidently distrusts his army, or he would have defended so strong a position. His troops are generally much discouraged and demoralized. In all their engagements for the last few days their resistance has been weak.

                                    H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

The Confederate officers began to remove their sick from Corinth preparatory to an evacuation on Monday, the 26th of May. On the next day, Tuesday the 27th, Generals Beauregard and Bragg were making arrangements for falling back, which process was completed in great haste on Thursday night, the 29th. On Wednesday the entire line of General Halleck was advanced from one half to three quarters of a mile and up into easy range of the enemy's works. The heavy siege guns were put into position on that day on the works thrown up by the advanced column. This movement throughout was hotly contested, the enemy doubtless seeking to keep their opponents at a safe distance if possible, until their evacuation should be completed. They continued to show an unbroken front and to work their batteries with energy and without interruption throughout that and the next day. On Thursday morning operations were resumed with the same earnestness as on Wednesday. The enemy appeared still in position, and contested every inch of the Union advance with the utmost determination. At nine o'clock on that morning, however, their musketry firing ceased, and was not again resumed. After that hour there were no further close engagements. The batteries on both sides, however, were kept in play, though a gradual diminution of the enemy's fire was observable as the day won away, and before night it had wholly ceased. During the night heavy explosions were heard in the enemy's works, which were conjectured to be the destruction of their magazines and ammunition, which subsequently proved true. Flames were also seen issuing from the town in the latter part of the night. These indications were plain to those in the advance of the Federal lines, and were understood to be the movements for an evacuation.

As no opposition was made to the advance on Friday morning, some officers dashed ahead to satisfy themselves of the enemy's position. The first party rode into the town at 6h. 30m. in the morning, and then was discovered the whole extent of the success gained. Destruction, waste, and desolation were visible on every hand, huge piles of commissary stores were smouldering in the flames. The remains of buildings destroyed were conspicuous on the streets. The enemy had fled, taking care that what they could not carry away should at least not be left for the victors. One large warehouse, filled with provisions, was all that remained undamaged of boundless stores of similar goods, sufficient to withstand a much longer siege. Sacks were torn open, barrels broken, hogsheads knocked to pieces, and their contents mixed in common piles, upon and about which huge bonfires had been lit.

So complete was the evacuation that not only was the Confederate army successfully withdrawn, but they took every piece of ordnance. A large quantity of ammunition was left behind in a damaged state.

At Corinth the Confederate line of fortifications was about fifteen miles long, with strong batteries or redoubts at every road or assailable point. Between the fortifications and a marshy stream covering the whole front, the dense timber had been cut down to form a very strong abattis, through which no cavalry or artillery could have passed, nor even infantry except as skirmishers. The lines thrown up by the Federal troops at the end of the day's advance were mere rifle pits, while the fortifications around Corinth were, as stated above, a strong continuous line, constructed with great care and labor, and, independent of their position, were in themselves immeasurably stronger than the mere precautionary defences on the Federal part against any sudden sortie of the enemy. The Confederate works, moreover, were on the brow of a ridge considerably higher than any in the surrounding country, at the foot of which was a ravine correspondingly deep. The zigzag course of the line gave to the defenders the command of all the feasible approaches, and hundreds could have been mowed down at every step made by an assailing army.

At the time of the evacuation of Corinth the hot weather of summer had commenced and the period of low water in the rivers was close at hand. Even the Tennessee could not be relied upon as a route by which to transport

Page 77 This page contains a map of Corinth.

Page 78 all the supplies required for the Federal army. General Halleck consequently took immediate steps to open a new line direct to Columbus, Kentucky, to which place the railroad was speedily repaired. These circumstances would impose a limit upon the military operations of General Halleck's army for some months. Even if Corinth was evacuated and a part of the Confederate force withdrawn entirely, no serious blow could be struck by General Halleck. These considerations must have presented themselves to the Confederate Government at the time when Richmond was closely pressed by General McClellan, and really in danger of capture. Without doubt they exerted an influence in producing the determination to evacuate Corinth. And when it became evident that the position could not be held against the force that was advancing upon it, they pointed out the manner in which this evacuation could be turned to advantage.

At this time General McClellan had crossed the Chickahominy, General Banks was retreating before General Jackson up the Virginia valley, Forts Pillow and Randolph and the city of Memphis had surrendered, and a Federal force was making an attack on Vicksburg.

The pursuit of the retreating forces of General Beauregard was made as follows: On the morning after the evacuation, General Pope's forces entered the town about twenty minutes before seven o'clock, just as the last of the Confederate cavalry were leaving. One company of cavalry, being General Pope's escort, pushed after them, and had a brisk skirmish, in which several were killed and captured. The pursuit, however, was arrested by the burning of a bridge over a swampy creek, and the cavalry returned. A brigade of cavalry and a battery under General Granger were then sent out by General Pope on the Booneville road. It left Farmington at noon on the 30th, and the same day came up with the rear guard of the enemy posted on Tuscumbia Creek eight miles south of Corinth. The next day they were driven out, and on Sunday, June 1, the pursuit was recommenced. General Granger passed Rienzi only two hours behind the retreating army, and found the bridges between that place and Booneville so recently fired that the timbers were nearly all saved. That afternoon the advance overtook the retreating Confederate rear four miles from Booneville, and pursued it within one mile of the town, and halted for the night. At five o'clock on the next morning the town was entered, and skirmishing was kept up all day with the Confederates on every road leading westward or southward as far as Twenty Mile Creek. On the next day a reconnoissance with force was made toward Baldwin, and the Confederate force driven across Twenty Mile Creek; and on the 4th another reconnoissance was made by Colonel Elliot via Blocklands, with similar results. On the 10th Baldwin and Guntown were occupied by Federal troops, which was the termination of the pursuit. Booneville, above mentioned, is twenty-four miles by the railroad from Corinth. The Confederate force fell back to Tupelo. The position of the forces at Corinth remained unchanged until the 10th of June, when Major-General Buell, under instructions from General Halleck, moved his army along the line of railroad toward Chattanooga. He was then between Huntsville and Stevenson, when it became necessary to move upon Louisville to counteract the designs of General Bragg. Meantime the army under General Grant occupied the line of west Tennessee and Mississippi extending from Memphis to Iuka, and protecting the railroads from Columbus south, which were then their only channels of supply. On 'the 23d of July General Halleck left the department to take the position of general-in-chief at Washington. General Grant continued in the position above stated until a portion of his troops were withdrawn from Mississippi and sent to Kentucky and Cincinnati to give confidence to the new levies brought into the field upon the invasion of Kentucky by General Bragg.

It will have been observed that the division of General Buell's army, under the command of General Mitchell, has not been spoken of as cooperating with the other divisions at Pittsburg Landing and Corinth. This division left Nashville on the same day with the others, but took the road to Murfreesboro. There it remained in occupation of the place and repairing the bridges until the 4th of April. Long before this time the Confederate troops, which occupied Nashville and retreated to Murfreesboro, had withdrawn and united with those under General Beauregard on the new southern line of defence.

On the 4th of April, General Mitchell marched to Shelbyville, the county seat of Bedford county, Tennessee, twenty-six miles distant. On the 7th he advanced to Fayetteville, twenty-seven miles farther, and the next forenoon, the 8th, fifteen miles beyond, he crossed the State line of Alabama. Continuing his march six miles farther, and being within ten miles of Huntsville, Alabama, he halted for the artillery and infantry to come up. No tents were pitched. The men lay round camp fires. Just as the moon was going down, the shrill bugle call was sounded. All were up, and in a few minutes ready to move. A battery was put in advance, supported by two brigades. Four miles from Huntsville, the shrill whistle of a locomotive was heard, and in a few minutes the train came in sight, and was stopped by the call of the brass guns of the battery. The train was captured together with 159 prisoners. On to the town was now the order. The citizens were quietly sleeping as the army entered. Says a spectator of the scene: "The clattering noise of the cavalry aroused them from their slumber ere the dawn of the morning, and they flocked to door and window, exclaiming with blanched cheek and faltering tongue,  They come, they Page 79
come, the Yankees come!' Never in the history of any military movement was surprise so complete. Men rushed into the streets almost naked, the women fainted, the children screamed, the darkies laughed, and for a short time a scene of perfect terror reigned. This state of affairs soon subsided."

Colonel Gazley, of the 37th Indiana regiment, was appointed provost marshal, and his regiment occupied the city as guard. Then commenced an examination of the results of this bloodless capture. At the railroad depot were found seventeen first-class locomotives and a great quantity of passenger and freight cars, and at the foundery two or three cannon, together with several small arms. General Mitchell soon made good use of the engines. Before the close of day, one hundred miles of the Memphis and Charleston railroad were in his possession, stretching in one direction as far as Stevenson, and in the other as far as Decatur. At the latter place, the entire camp equipage of a regiment was captured. From Decatur he pushed on at once to Tuscumbia.

Thus, without the loss of a single life, General Mitchell placed his army midway between Corinth and Chattanooga, prevented the destruction of a fine bridge at Decatur, opened communication with General Buell, and also the navigation of the Tennessee. the occupation of Huntsville also cut off all communication between the east and west by the Memphis and Charleston railroad. The expedition east on the railroad, under Colonel Sill, penetrated as far as Stevenson at the junction of the Chattanooga road, at which place five locomotives and an amount of rolling stock wore captured. An expedition went as far south from Tuscnmbia as Russelville. Lagrange and Florence were also visited, and Confederate property of the military kind was found.

This extension of General Mitchell's lines to hold the railroad rendered his situation precarious. Soon the enemy began to gather in force and threaten him. His course however received the commendation of the War Department. He was raised to the rank of a major-general, and ordered to report directly to the department, and his force was constituted an independent corps. But he got no reinforcements. He was left in such a condition that he at first hardly had anything to report but that he had been gradually driven from those positions, the gaining of which had made him a major-general. On his right, the enemy were now in force, and picket skirmishing was constant. On his left, at Chattanooga, a strong force threatened his rear and the safety of Nashville. In his front, cavalry came up and attacked his line at times. General Halleck sent to him 100,000 rations under convoy of a gunboat. Of these 40,000 were burned to prevent their capture. On the 24th of April, the retreat from Tuscumbia commenced. On the 26th the bridge at Decatur was crossed, when it was fired and burned. It was the only crossing of the Tennessee east of Florence, above the head of navigation, and west of Bridgeport near Chattanooga. The bridge was destroyed in an hour and a half, but before its destruction was complete, the enemy's cavalry appeared on the opposite side. Having returned to Huntsville, the right wing of the force commenced operations toward Chattanooga.

On the 30th of April, an expedition was sent to Bridgeport near Stevenson, the result of which placed under the control of General Mitchell the bridge across the river. As there was no bridge below his position since the destruction of the one at Decatur, and as he had control of the one above near Chattanooga, and as his communication between the extremes of his line was by railroad, which was in his possession, and the Tennessee river lay in front of him, on the farther side of which was all the enemy he anticipated, he thus closed his report to the Secretary of War under date of May 1: "Tho campaign is ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in perfect security, while all of Alabama north of the Tennessee river floats no flag but that of the Union." It was stated that if General Mitchell had been sustained with a sufficient force, he would have crossed the Tennessee river at its extreme southern point in Alabama, and reached Gunter's Landing—a march of forty miles thence would have placed in his possession Gadsden on the Coosa river, where he could have destroyed the steamboats on the river, or seized them and proceeded to Rome and destroyed largo armories and founderies. From Gunter's Landing there is also a fine road to Rome, eighty miles distant. In two days his cavalry could have passed that distance, destroyed the founderies at Rome, and captured engines and cars enough at that place and Kingston to have enabled him to proceed up the road with an armed force to protect them in burning the bridges. This movement would have cut off General E. Kirby Smith, then advancing upon Huntsville, from reinforcements or retreat. The Confederate forces in Knoxville, Greenville, and Cumberland Gap, in east Tennessee, and even in western Virginia, would all have been dangerously exposed by

This page contains a map.

Page 80  little more extended operations along the railroads by General Mitchell.

Subsequently he advanced upon Chattanooga, which compelled the Confederate forces in eastern Tennessee to make a backward movement. Only a single stem of railroad connects Chattanooga with Atlanta, and thence connects with other parts of Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina, and its loss would compel evacuation above, as in the case of Bowling Green. Several expeditions were sent out by General Mitchell during the month of May against small bands of cavalry upon the same side of the river. One or two skirmishes of considerable spirit, and with respectable numbers, also took place. On the 6th of June, General Negley, from the opposite side of the river, made an attack with his artillery upon Chattanooga. This was replied to from some earthworks. On the next day a considerable force under General E. K. Smith opened fire upon General Negley, but were compelled to retire. Chattanooga was finally abandoned by the Federal force in consequence of the difficulty of procuring supplies.

On the advance of General Buell, this division of his army under General Mitchell was placed under the command of General Rosseau, and General Mitchell was ordered to the command at Port Royal South Carolina.

The result of the military operations that have been thus far described, was at this time of the year such as to leave in the hands of the Confederate Government a large military force, which it could use without additional hazard wherever it pleased, while the Federal Government, struck with panic from other causes, was actually calling upon the governors of the loyal States to hurry forward to its protection even three months' volunteers. The acquisition of territory, however, was all on the side of the Federal Government, which had got its hands so full in proportion to its military preparations, that it must either relinquish some portion of it or submit to defeat somewhere, if its antagonist was active, skilful, and dexterous. This state of affairs culminated in the midst of the Virginia campaign, and it was decisive not only of that campaign, but it presented to the world magnificent displays of the skill and power of the respective antagonists.

It has been said that the Confederate Government had a large military force with which it was free to act, without additional hazard. This force consisted of part of the levies of the previous year, some of the levies raised by the governors of the States, under a call from President Davis in February of this year, and some of the troops beginning to come up under the conscription act passed by the Confederate Congress early in April. In Missouri the success of General Curtis had been such as to drive out all the regular Confederate troops, and he had established himself just within the borders of Arkansas. But the requisition upon him to send ten regiments to the assistance of General Halleck, so limited his ability for offensive operations, that the troops of Arkansas were to a considerable extent free to act wherever the Confederate Government needed. Kentucky and middle and western Tennessee had been evacuated by the Confederate forces, which held them at the beginning of the year. These forces congregated at Corinth, and upon its evacuation, the vast army was not in a condition, at that hot season of the year, to follow the fugitives any considerable distance, or to push forward its offensive operations, as has been before observed. A limited Confederate force was therefore kept in the field, to observe the operations of General Halleck. The cessation of military operations against Charleston and Savannah, and also in North Carolina, by the Federal Government, caused the Confederate Government to keep no more than a force of observation in the field, and left it at liberty to concentrate its other troops wherever their presence might be most needed. These troops were therefore sent to Virginia, to engage in the campaign going on in that State.

The position and number of the Federal troops in Virginia at the beginning of the year have already been stated (see page 24). The distinct bodies of men were those under General Wool at Fortress Monroe and Newport News; those under General Hooker south of "Washington; those under General McClellan southwest of Washington; those under Generals Keyes and Casey in and around Washington; those under General Stone at and near Poolesville, and those under General Banks near Jamestown with detachments on the Potomac to Williamsport. Cumberland was the headquarters of General Kelly, and Grafton in western Virginia, on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the headquarters of General Rosecrans, while General Cox was up the Kanawha valley.

On the 5th of January General Lander arrived at Hancock, on his way to Cumberland to relieve General Kelly, who was sick. He found the enemy under General Jackson, on the other side of the Potomac, in considerable strength. It had been designed for two months that General Jackson should move northwest toward Romney; but he was delayed by the impression of the Confederate Government that the Federal army would make a general advance, and risk a battle during the winter. On the 3d or 4th of January he left Winchester and moved northward toward Hancock, a distance of forty miles, and attacked four companies of Federal troops stationed at Bath, driving them to Hancock, where, having been reenforced by General Lander, they made a stand. Here General Jackson made a feint attack by throwing some shells across the Potomac, which did only slight damage. He then moved westward with the intention of coming into Romney, on the Union left, by way of Springfield, and thus cut off the supplies from 'Cumberland and the railroad. The relative positions of Winchester, Hancock, and Romney are at the points of an equilateral triangle: Hancock north of Winchester, and Romney northwest.

Page 81 The day before General Jackson retired from before Hancock, General Kelly, who was in Cumberland, sent an order to Colonel Dunning, the commandant at Romney, to make an attack on the enemy's force stationed at Blue's Gap, a strong position, sixteen miles from Romney, on the road to Winchester. On the night of the 6th on expedition, consisting of the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th Ohio, 14th Indiana, and 1st Virginia, with two companies of cavalry and. a battery, was sent to Blue's Gap, and made an attack upon the enemy, who, being in small force, were completely driven out. At this time General Loring, with a considerable Confederate force, was within "six miles of the gap, expecting the Federal column to push on and attack him. Meantime, as soon as General Jackson loft Hancock, General Lander, anticipating his intentions, proceeded to Cumberland to General Kelly, and assumed the chief command, and thence to Romney, where he arrived on the night of the Tuesday on which the expedition returned from Blue's Gap. Everything was put in readiness for a struggle. On Friday following it was reported that General Jackson, in command of his right wing of ten thousand men, was within twelve miles east of Springfield, resting his men, and waiting for his other forces to get into position. His centre under General Loring, about eight thousand strong, was at Blue's Gap, and his left wing of three thousand had moved up from toward Moorefield, and taken position on the New Greek road, some six miles in the rear of Romney. Thus, excepting at one point, Romney was completely surrounded by General Jackson. If General Lander could march north eight miles, to the Springfield crossing of the South Branch of the Potomac, before General Jackson could march west twelve to Springfield, then General Lander could get beyond him, or fight him with ten thousand men, at a less disadvantage than in Romney, where General Jackson would concentrate twenty thousand. The entire force of General Lander was about four thousand five hundred men. On Friday night everything was ready for the march. The sick, the hospital, and commissary stores were sent forward under a strong guard, and at midnight the rear guard of General Lander withdrew from the town. It had rained during the day, and the rate of advance over the bad roads was a mile and a quarter to the hour. At five o'clock the next morning General Lander reached Springfield. The men were so tired and exhausted that, after making fires of the fences, they lay down in files on the cold, wet ground and slept. In two hours they wore again on the march. But General Jackson, instead of following, went to Romney, and thence retired to "Winchester, leaving the former place occupied by General Loring. He also evacuated it after a few days, partly in consequence of General Lander having gathered his forces, and prepared for a inarch upon it. Subsequently Moorefield was captured, and Bloomery Gap, by General Lander. On the 11th of February General Lander telegraphed to General  McClellan, the commander-in-chief, as follows: The railroad was opened to-day to Hancock; also the telegraph. Papers taken, and my own reconnoissance to the south, prove the country clear, and Jackson and Loring in Winchester. The enemy have been driven out of this department."

The failure of General Lander's health compelled him soon after to resign his command. The time was now approaching when some movement should begin among the vast forces encamped in northeastern Virginia. With the Confederate Government, which still adhered to the defensive policy, the question was, whether it should maintain its advanced position before Washington, or fall back on Richmond? Its position was so well fortified that it could resist any attack in front, but would be in danger if either of its flanks were turned. Winchester, in the Shenandoah Valley, was the extreme point on the northwest occupied by the Confederate army, and Aquia Crock and Matthias Point on the southeast. This extent of line was too great to be maintained before the vast Federal forces organized in front. The flanks might thus be turned by the way of Leesburg on the north, or the Potomac on the south, and serious disaster would ensue. At the same time, the farther General McClellan was drawn from his position before being encountered, so much the easier would his army be overcome, and at a greater cost to the North. These and similar considerations determined the Confederate Government to evacuate the position held by its army at Manassas. This measure was, however, not executed until March.

 On the 30th of January, General Beauregard, having been ordered to command in Kentucky and Tennessee, issued the following address to the soldiers at Manassas:

  HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

                                     NEAR CENTREVILLE, January 30,

Soldiers of the First Corps Army of the Potomac:

My duty calls me away, and to a temporary separation from you. I hope, however, to be with you again, to share your labors and your perils, and in defence of our homes and our rights, to lead you to new battles, to be crowned with signal victories. You arc now undergoing the severest trial of a soldier's life; the one by which his discipline and capacity for endurance are thoroughly tested. My faith in your patriotism, your devotion and determination, and in your high soldierly qualities, is so great that I shall rest assured you will pass through the ordeal resolutely, triumphantly. Still, I cannot quit you without deep emotion, without even deep anxiety, in the moment of our country's trials and dangers. Above all, I am anxious that my bravo countrymen, hero in arms, fronting the haughty array and muster of Northern mercenaries, should thoroughly appreciate the exigency, and hence comprehend that this is no time for the army of the Potomac—the men of Manassas—to stack their arms and quit, even for a brief period, the standards they have made glorious by their manhood. All must understand this, and feel the magnitude of the conflict impending, the universal personal sacrifice:, this war his entailed, and our duty to meet them as promptly and unblanchingly as you have met the enemy in line of battle.

To the army of the Shenandoah I desire to return my thanks for their endurance in the memorable march to Page 82 my assistance last July, their timely, decisive arrival, and for their conspicuous steadiness and gallantry on the field of battle.

Those of their comrades of both corps, and of all arms of the army of the Potomac, not so fortunate as yet to have been with us in conflict with our enemy, I leave with all confidence that on occasion they will show themselves fit comrades for the men of Manassas, Bull Run, and Hall's Bluff.

                                             G. T. BEAUREGAUD,

                                                       General Commanding.

Twelve months had now nearly passed since the first soldiers of the Confederate army took the field, and their term of enlistment was about to expire. This fact is not only referred to in the address of General Beauregard, but it was made the occasion of the following address by General Johnston, now in command of the same forces:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

                                                                         February 4, 1862.

SOLDIERS: Your country again calls von to the defence of the noblest of human causes. To the indomitable courage already exhibited on the battle field, you have added the rarer virtues of high endurance, cheerful obedience, and self-sacrifice. Accustomed to the comforts and luxuries of home, you have met and borne the privations of camp life, the exactions of military discipline, and the rigors of a winter campaign. The rich results of your courage, patriotism, and unfaltering virtue arc before you. Intrusted with the defence of this important frontier, you have driven back the immense army which the enemy had sent to invade our country, and to establish his dominion over our people by the wide-spread havoc of a war inaugurated without a shadow of constitutional right, and prosecuted in a spirit of ruthless vengeance. By your valor and firmness, you have kept him in check, until the nations of the earth have been forced to see us in our true character—not dismembered and rebellious communities, but an empire of confederate States, with a constitution safe in the affections of the people, institutions and laws in full and unobstructed operation, a population enjoying all the comforts of life, and a citizen soldiery who laugh to scorn the threat of subjugation.

Your country now summons you to a noble and a greater deed. The enemy has gathered up all his energies for a final conflict. His enormous masses threaten us on the west; his naval expeditions are assailing us upon our whole southern coast; and upon the Potomac, within a few hours' march, he has a gigantic army, inflamed by lust and maddened by fanaticism. But the plains of Manassas are not forgotten, and he shrinks from meeting the disciplined heroes who hurled across the Potomac his grand army, routed and disgraced. He docs not propose to attack this army so long as it holds its present position with undiminished numbers and unimpaired discipline; but, protected by his fortifications, he awaits the expiration of your term of service. He recollects that his own ignoble soldiery, when their term of service expired, "marched away from the scene of conflict to the sound of the enemy's cannon," and he hopes that at that critical moment Southern men will consent to share with them this infamy. Expecting a large portion of our army to be soon disbanded, ne hopes that his immense numbers will easily overpower your gallant comrades who will be left" here, and thus remove the chief obstacle to his cherished scheme of Southern subjugation.

The Commanding General calls upon the twelve months' men to stand by their brave comrades who have volunteered for the war, to re-volunteer at once, and thus show to the world that the patriots engaged in this struggle for independence will not swerve from the bloodiest path they may be called to tread. The enemies of your country, as well as her friends, are watching your action with deep, intense, tremulous interest. Such is your position that you can act no obscure part. Your decision, be it fur honor or dishonor, will be written down in history. You cannot, you will not, draw back at this solemn crisis of our struggle, when all that is heroic in the land is engaged, and ail that is precious hangs trembling in the balance.

                                JOS. E. JOHNSTON, Major-General C. S. A.

It was not the purpose of General McClellan while commander-in-chief to move on Centreville, but by the lower Chesapeake upon Richmond. His object was to capture and hold Chattanooga, Tennessee, before the army of the Potomac advanced. In this, however, he was overruled by the President, who, on the 27th of January, issued an order, as above stated, for a general advance of all the armies on the 22d of February. This order was thus undoubtedly premature; and while it served to present the President before the country as anxious for a movement, it was really of no benefit to the cause, but, on the contrary, an actual injury. Previous to its issue a change had been made in the head of the War Department. Secretary Simon Cameron had resigned and was succeeded by Edwin M. Stanton; neither was a man of military education or experience.

The effects upon the Confederate States of the movements made in consequence of this order were thus described at Richmond:  Had not the impatience of the Northern people and the pressure of the European Cabinets forced the hand of McClellan, and had he been able to assemble and arrange his troops and stores in the position he desired, without a conflict to arouse the attention of the Southern people to what was going on, our condition in April and May would have been tenfold more dangerous than it now is. The disasters we have suffered are mortifying to us and exhilarate our enemies; but they have startled without crippling the Confederacy. Had it lain still two months more, with the army dwindling daily under the furlough system, disgusted with the inaction of stationary camps, while the Government was squabbling with the Generals and the people sinking into indifference, we would have been overrun between the loth of April and the 1st of May."

General Lander having cleared his department of the forces of the enemy, a movement was now commenced lower down the Potomac by a portion of General Banks's command. On the 24th of February the 28th Pennsylvania regiment, Colonel Geary, crossed the Potomac from Sandy Hook and took possession of Harper's Ferry. The object of this movement upon Harper's Ferry was to cover the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and at the same time to draw the attention of the Confederates to their left flank, which was threatened by the movement. The operations of crossing the Potomac and the occupation of Harper's Ferry and Charlestown were superintended by General McClellan in person. The bridges were thrown over the Potomac by Captain J. C. Duane, U. S. engineers, on the 26th of February, and on the same day General Banks occupied Harper's Ferry permanently, and the advance took possession of Bolivar Heights. On the 27th reconnoissances were pushed forward to Charlestown, Page 83 and some prisoners taken; London Heights were also occupied. On the 28th of February Charlestown was occupied by a strong force with the intention of holding it against any attack. On the 3d of March Martinsburg was occupied by the 13th Massachusetts, who left camp at Williamsport on the previous afternoon. This is an important town on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad between Harper's Ferry and Hancock. It is distant from the former fifteen miles, and is twenty miles north of Winchester, with which it is connected by a turnpike road. All the iron of the double track of the railroad had been removed excepting half a mile of track made of compound rails. On the 2d, Leesburg was occupied by Colonel Geary. The retreat of the Confederate army had now commenced along its entire line from Aquia Creek to the Shenandoah. This movement threatening its left flank was undoubtedly the cause of this abandonment of Manassas. All their important positions were occupied by the Federal troops during the next ten days, including the strong one at Centreville. Winchester was evacuated by General Jackson on the night of the 11th of March. General Shields, in command of General Lander's division, soon followed up this retreat, and on the 19th he discovered General Jackson reenforced in a strong position near New Market, and within supporting distance of the main body of the Confederate army under General Johnston. In order to draw him from this position General Shields fell back rapidly to Winchester on the 20th, as if in retreat, living marched his whole command thirty miles in one day. On the next day the Confederate cavalry under General Ashby showed themselves in sight of Winchester. On the 22d the entire command of General Banks, with the exception of General Shields's division, evacuated Winchester and marched for Centreville. This movement, and the masked position in which General Shields placed his division, led the enemy to believe that the town was evacuated with the exception of a few regiments to garrison it. That afternoon at 5 o'clock General Ashby attacked the pickets of General Shields and drove them in, but was repulsed by a small force pushed forward by General Shields for that purpose, who now made preparations for a contest in the morning. Only a small Confederate force appearing in the morning, General Shields ordered a portion of his artillery forward to open fire and unmask it. This had the desired effect, when a battle ensued, during which General Shields by an attack upon the Confederate left flank forced that wing back upon its centre and placed the enemy in a position to be routed by a general attack, which was made at five o'clock in the afternoon with great success. The Confederates were driven from the field. Two guns, four caissons, three hundred prisoners, and a thousand stand of small arms were captured. The force of General Shields was between seven and eight thousand men. His loss in killed and wounded was between three and four hundred. On the previous evening the arm of General Shields was broken above the elbow by the fragment of a shell. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was large. Considerable numbers were subsequently found in the houses of tie inhabitants as the force of General Banks advanced. The Confederate force was estimated at near ten thousand men. The brigades of Generals Jackson, Smith, Garnett, and Longstreet were engaged, and prisoners were taken from the 2d. 4th, 5th, 21st, 23d, 27th, 28th, 83d, 37th, and 42d Virginia: 1st regiment of the Provisional Army, and an Irish battalion. For these movements General Shields was complimented by the War Department in the following despatch:

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 26,1862.

To Brigadier-General Shields:

Your two despatches relative to the brilliant achievement of the forces under your command have been received. While rejoicing at the success of your gallant troops, deep commiseration and sympathy are felt for those who have been victims in the gallant and victorious contest with treason and rebellion.

Your efforts as well as your success proves that Lander's brave division is still bravely led, and that wherever its standard is displayed rebels will be routed and pursued. To you and to the officers and soldiers under your command the Department returns thanks.

                                  EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

The following was also received by General Shields:

                        HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

                                    SEMINARY, March 27, 1862.  

To Brigadier-General Shields:

The Commanding General congratulates you and the troops under your command upon the victory gained by your energy and activity and their bravery on the 23a. He is pained to learn that the wound you have received in the skirmish on the day before is more serious than at first supposed.

             By command of

                        Major-General  GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

S. Williams, Assist. Adj.-General The following congratulations and instructions were sent to General Banks:

                                FAIRFAX SEMINARY, March 27, 1862.

To Major-General Banks:

The General Commanding congratulates you and the brave troops under your command on the splendid achievement commenced in your department, news of which he has just received. He desires you to follow up rapidly the enemy’s troops as far as Strasburg if possible.

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

This little affair at Winchester is said to have caused orders to be issued which were attended with momentous consequences. They will be stated hereafter. It occurred on the date of March 23d.

The evacuation by the Confederate army of their positions before Washington was conducted in a most successful manner. When the Union troops entered their intrenchments, all were gone. Their evacuation had been effected by means of the railroad from Manassas to Gordonsville, while the state of the roads was such as to prevent an immediate active campaign by the Union army. Their retreat was arrested at the Rappahannock river, and a new line formed for the purpose of defence. It stretched Page 84 from the Rappahannock by a circle to Cumberland Gap near the extreme southwestern part of the State; embracing the Central and the Virginia and Tennessee railroads, the chief cities of Virginia, and the valley of the James river with its canal and railroads. It was simply a line of defence, and assumed as a necessity in view of the immense Federal force that had been marshalled and put quietly in position.

The design of General McClellan, as above stated, was, so far as he was master of his own movements, to attack Richmond by the water line, on the ground that such a movement would certainly force the Confederate army out of Manassas. By the James river, Richmond could be approached by transports and gunboats of light draft, and without a long line for the transportation of supplies. At this time the President as commander-in-chief issued the following order:

                                                         EXECUTIVE MANSION,

                                                   WASHINGTON, March 8, 1862. 

General War Order, No. 2.

Ordered, I. That the Major-General commanding the Army of the Potomac proceed forthwith to organize that part of said army destined to enter upon active operations (including the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in the fortifications about Washington), into four army corps, to be commanded according to seniority of rank, as follows:

First Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Major-General I. McDowell.

Second Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General E. V. Sumner.

Third Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General S. P. Heintzelman.

Fourth Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General E. L. Keyes.

II. That the divisions now commanded by the officers above assigned to the commands of corps, shall be embraced in and form part of their respective corps.

III. The forces left for the defence of Washington will be placed in command of Brigadier-General James Wadsworth, who shall also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia.

IV. That this order be executed with such promptness and despatch, as not to delay the commencement of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the Army of the Potomac.

V. A fifth army corps, to be commanded by Major General N. P. Banks, will be formed from his own and General Shields's (late General Lander's) division.

                                                 ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

In compliance with this order of the President, General McClellan, on the 13th, issued an order dividing " the active portion of the army of the Potomac" into army corps as follows:

The corps of General McDowell was composed of the divisions of Generals Franklin, McCall, and King.

The corps of General Sumner was composed of the divisions of Generals Richardson, Blenker, and Sedgwick.

The corps of General Heintzelman was composed of the divisions of Generals Kearney, Hooker, and Fitz John Porter.

The corps of General Keyes was composed of the divisions of Generals Couch, Smith, and Casey.

The corps of General Banks was composed of the divisions of Generals Williams and Shields.

On the 11th of March, the President issued another order relieving General McClellan from the command of all the military departments except that of the Potomac, and re-arranging the departments as follows:

                                                EXECUTIVE MANSION,

                                           WASHINGTON, March 11, 1862. 

General War Order, No. 3.

Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

Ordered, further. That the two departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department.

Ordered, also, That the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Fremont.

That all the Commanders of Departments, after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

                                               ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The effect of this order was to put under the charge of the Secretary of War a class of duties which had heretofore been under the direction of the highest military command. It relieved General McClellan from the supervision of military operations in any other department than his own. He retained still under his immediate command the five corps of the army of the Potomac, as is manifest by his despatches, dated March 27, to Generals Banks and Shields, after the battle at Winchester. It also shows that the corps of General Banks was at that date expected to operate under his command, although he had then embarked a portion of his army to Fortress Monroe.

Assuming the distinct command of the Army of the Potomac, as his forces were now designated, for the purpose of conducting a campaign. General McClellan issued the following address to his soldiers:

                    HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

              FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, March 14, 1862.

Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac:

For a long time I have kept you inactive, but not without a purpose. You were to be disciplined, armed, and instructed; the formidable artillery you now have, had to be created; other armies were to move and to accomplish certain results. I have held you back that you might give the death blow to the rebellion that has distracted our once happy country. The patience you have shown, and your confidence in your General, are worth a dozen victories. These preliminary results are now accomplished. I feel that the patient labors o many months have produced their fruit; the Army of the Potomac is now a real army—magnificent in material, admirable in discipline and instruction, excellently equipped and armed—your commanders are all that I could wish. The moment for action has arrived, and I know that I can trust in you to save our country. As I ride through your ranks, I see in your faces the sure presage of victory; I feel that you will do whatever I ask of you. The period of inaction has passed. Page 85 I will bring you now face to face with the rebels, and only pray that God may defend the right. In whatever direction you may move, however strange my actions may appear to you, ever bear in mind that my fate is linked with yours, and that all I do is to bring you, where I know you wish to be—on the decisive battle field. It is my business to place you there. I am to watch over you as a parent over his children; and you know that your General loves you from the depths of his heart. It shall be my care, as it has ever been, to gain success with the least possible loss; but I know that, if it is necessary, you will willingly follow me to our graves, for our righteous cause. God smiles upon us, victory attends us; yet I would not have you think that our aim is to be attained without a manly struggle. I will not disguise it from you: you have brave toes to encounter, foemen well worthy of the steel that you will use so well. I shall demand of you great, heroic exertions, rapid and long marches, desperate combats, privations, perhaps. We will share all these together; and when this sad war is over we will return to our homes, and feel that we can ask no higher honor than the proud consciousness that we belonged to the Army of the Potomac.

                                              GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

                                          Major-General Commanding.

The Prince de Joinville, in a narrative of the campaign on the peninsula, has described with much detail the reasons for the evacuation of Manassas by the Confederate forces, and the change of the plan for the campaign under Gen McClellan. He states as follows:

"While we were riding forward, grave events were occurring in the highest regions of the army. There exists in the American army, as in the English, a commander-in-chief, who exercises over the head of all the generals a supreme authority, regulates the distribution of the troops, and directs military operations. These functions, which have been greatly curtailed in the British army since the Crimean war, were still exercised in all their vigor in America. From the aged General Scott, who had long honorably discharged them, they had passed to General McClellan. We learned, on reaching Fairfax, that they had been taken away from him. It is easy to understand the diminution of force and the restrictions upon his usefulness thus inflicted upon the general-in-chief by a blow in the rear at the very outset of his campaign.

"Yet this was but a part of the mischief done him. McClellan had long known, better than anybody else, the real strength of the rebels at Manassas and Centreville. He was perfectly familiar with the existence of the 'wooden cannon' by which it has been pretended that he was kept in awe for six months. But he also knew that till the month of April the roads of Virginia are in such a state that wagons and artillery can only be moved over them by constructing plank roads—a tedious operation, during which the enemy, holding the railways, could either retreat, as he was then actually doing, or move 'for a blow upon some other point. In any event, had McClellan attacked and carried Centreville, pursuit was impossible, and victory would have been barren of results. A single bridge burned would have saved Johnston's whole army. Such are the vast advantages of a railway for a retreating army—advantages which do not exist for the army which pursues it.

"We have the right, we think, to say that McClellan never intended to advance upon Centreville. His long-determined purpose was to make Washington safe by means of a strong garrison, and then to use the great navigable waters and immense naval resources of the North to transport the army by sea to a point near Richmond. For weeks, perhaps for months, this plan had been secretly maturing. Secrecy as well as promptness, it will be understood, was indispensable here to success. To keep the secret it had been necessary to confide it to few persons, and hence had arisen the long ill feeling toward the uncommunicative general.

"Be this as it may, as the day of action drew near, those who suspected the general's project, and were angry at not being informed of it; those whom his promotion had excited to envy; his political enemies (who is without them in America ?); in short, all those beneath or beside him who wished him ill, broke out into a chorus of accusations of slowness, inaction, incapacity. McClellan, with a patriotic courage which I have always admired, disdained these accusations, and made no reply. He satisfied himself with pursuing his preparations in laborious silence. But the moment came in which, notwithstanding the loyal support given him by the President, that functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A council of war of all the divisional generals was held; a plan of campaign, not that of McClellan, was proposed and discussed. McClellan was then forced to explain his projects, and the next day they were known to the enemy. Informed no doubt by ono of those female spies who keep up his communications into the domestic circles of the Federal enemy, Johnston evacuated Manassas at once. This was a skilful manoeuvre. Incapable of assuming the offensive, threatened with attack either at Centreville, where defence would be useless if successful, or at Richmond, the loss of which would be a great check, and unable to cover both positions at once, Johnston threw his whole force before the latter of the two.

"For the Army of the Potomac this was a misfortune. Its movement was unmasked before it had been made. Part of its transports were still frozen up in the Hudson. Such being the state of affairs, was it proper to execute as rapidly as possible the movement upon Richmond by water, or to march upon Richmond by land? Such was the grave question to be settled by the young general in a miserable room of an abandoned house at Fairfax within twenty-four hours. And it was at this moment that the news of his removal as general-in-chief reached him; the news, that is, that he could no longer count upon the cooperation of the other armies of the Union, and that the troops under his own orders were to be divided into four grand corps under four separate chiefs named in order of rank—a change which would throw into subaltern positions some young generals Page 86 of division who had his personal confidence. It is easy to see that here was matter enough to cast a cloud upon the firmest mind. But the general's resolution was promptly taken.

"To follow the Confederates by land to Richmond at this season of the year was a material impossibility. An incident had just proved this to be so. General Stoneman, with a flying column, had been sent in pursuit of the enemy. This column came up with the enemy on the Rappahannock, along the railway to Gordonsville, and had two engagements with him of no great importance. Then came the rain. The fords were swollen, the bridges carried away, the watercourses could no longer be passed by swimming; they were torrents. Stoneman's column began to suffer for want of provisions, and its situation was perilous. In order to communicate with the army, Stoneman had to send two of McClellan's aides-de-camp, who had accompanied him, across a river on a raft of logs tied together with ropes.

"Such was the country before the army. Furthermore, the enemy was burning and breaking up all the bridges. Now with the wants of the American soldier and the usual extravagance of his rations, and with the necessity of transporting everything through a country where nothing is to be found, and where the least storm makes the roads impassable, no army can live unless it supports its march upon a navigable watercourse or a railway. In Europe our military administration assumes that the transportation service of an army of one hundred thousand men can only provision that army for a three days' march from its base of operations. In America this limit must be reduced to a single day. I need only add that upon the roads to Richmond there were viaducts which it would have required six weeks to reconstruct.

"The land march was therefore abandoned, and we came back to the movement by water. But this operation also was no longer what it had been when McClellan had conceived it. The revelation of his plans to the enemy had allowed the latter to take his precautions. The evacuation of Manassas had preceded instead of following the opening of the Federal campaign. The movement by water could no longer be a surprise. Unfortunately it was also to lose the advantages of a rapid execution."

The movement of troops had been as follows: The last detachment of the Confederate army left Manassas on the 9th of March. On the morning of the 10th General McClellan moved the Army of the Potomac toward the deserted position. The object of moving to Manassas was to verify its evacuation, to take the chance of cutting off the enemy's rear guard, to deceive the enemy, if possible, as to the real intentions of General McClellan, and to gain the opportunity of cutting loose from all useless baggage, and to give the troops a few days' experience in bivouac and on the march. After reaching Manassas, General McClellan returned to Washington on the 13th, and the army at once countermarched, and on Sunday the 16th it was massed in new positions near Alexandria, ready to embark with the least possible delay. During the ensuing week it began to embark on transports at Alexandria for Fortress Monroe. The number of transports promised was to be sufficient to convey fifty thousand men, but the number collected was found to be hardly enough for the conveyance of half that number. Instead of moving the whole army with its equipage at once, as it had been intended; a number of trips were required. The embarkation commenced on the 17th of March.

By reference to the order of the President issued on the 8th of March (see p. 84), it will be seen that the army was divided into five corps. Of these, the corps of Generals Banks and McDowell did not embark. Of the second corps, under General Sumner, one division, that of General Blenker, was withdrawn and sent to General Fremont in the Mountain Department. There remained therefore to be embarked, two divisions under General Sumner, three under General Heintzelman, and three under General Keyes —being in all eight divisions. The Prince de Joinville, in his statement of the numbers of the entire army, says it consisted of "11 divisions of infantry, 8,000 to 10,000 strong; 1 division of regulars (infantry and cavalry), 6,000 strong; 350 pieces of artillery. The total effective force may have been 120,000 men." From this number are to be deducted the corps of General McDowell and the division of General Blenker. This will make the effective force of General McClellan embarked for Fortress Monroe about eighty-five thousand men. Two weeks were occupied in transporting this force to Fortress Monroe.

It has been stated that General Blenker's division was withdrawn from General Sumner's corps, and sent to General Fremont in the Mountain Department. This was done one or two days before General McClellan sailed. The reason given was "political pressure" exercised to get a command for General Fremont No military reason was stated for this withdrawal. The following letter from President Lincoln to General McClellan, produced at a court martial in Washington, thus explains it:

                                             WASHINGTON, April 9,1862.

Major-General McClellan:

MY DEAR SIR: Your despatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it; and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance.

After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position.

General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great

Page 87 temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington.

My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied; I was constrained to substitute something for it myself.

And now allow me to ask, " Do you "really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops?" This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you ou the 6th, saying that you had over one hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making one hundred and eight thousand then with you, and en route to you.

You now say you will have but eighty-five thousand when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of twenty-three thousand be accounted for?

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would bare to do, if that command was away.

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time; and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone.

And, once more, let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is now noting—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act.

                           Yours, very truly,          A. LINCOLN.

When General McClellan sailed he supposed that General McDowell's corps would follow him, and it was not until he was before Yorktown that he received the first intimation to the contrary. The reason of this change should also be stated.

By reference to a preceding page, it will be seen that the battle of Winchester took place on the 23d of March, about the time the army of the Potomac was embarking. It startled the Government by revealing a much stronger force of the enemy in their immediate front than they had supposed. At the same time the number of troops at Washington being limited, it was decided that one of the two corps which had not embarked (either McDowell's or Sumner's) should be withheld, and the decision fell upon General McDowell. The same question came up in Congress on the 26th of May, after General Jackson had made his brilliant dash up the Shenandoah, and driven General Banks across the Potomac. Although it may be anticipating some events, it is proper that the explanation of the Withdrawal of McDowell's corps should be here noticed. In the Senate, Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, said: "I will state that the Secretary of War is not responsible for the movements charged upon him by the Senator from Kentucky. The President alone is responsible for whatever has occurred, both for arresting the advance of General McDowell to Yorktown, and withdrawing a portion of General Banks's forces. The order arresting the advance of General McDowell was made by the President, with the approval of the Secretary of War, General Hitchcock, and several other military men. It was given for the best of purposes, and I am sure there was no intrigue about it, nor personal objects gained. It may have been an error; but, if so, it was an error committed by the President for an honest and patriotic purpose, under the advice of the military men whom he consulted. I understand the fact to be that the President gave written orders—in fact I have seen the orders—that the number of men necessary for the defence of Washington should be left here, and that that number should be agreed upon by the commanders of the various corps of the array. The commanders of corps held a consultation, and decided that forty-five thousand men were necessary to be held for the defence of this city. All the forces were ordered to be withdrawn from this city, with the exception of nineteen thousand, and four thousand of that number were sent for. Nearly all of the regiments left here were recently brought into the service, and four or five of them were cavalry regiments, not mounted, and not in a condition for service. Under these circumstances, apprehending precisely what has taken place, the President withheld thirty thousand men under General McDowell. Ten thousand of this force, under General Franklin, at the urgent request of General McClellan, were sent forward to Yorktown, but McDowell was hold back with twenty thousand men on the Rappahannock to protect the capital and menace Richmond. The President then, in order to concentrate a force here and threaten Richmond, and aid General McClellan's movements, ordered General Shields to unite with General McDowell, thus making an army of about forty thousand men, the intention of which was to move on Richmond by land, so as to cover Washington in their movement. This left General Banks a small force, and a movement has been made upon him, and he has been compelled to evacuate the Shenandoah Valley and recross the Potomac. These movements were directed by the President; and he is alone responsible for them. In doing what he did, I have no doubt he was actuated by honest purposes, and he had the sanction and support of his military advisers, including the Secretary of War."

Mr. Trumbull of Illinois said: "While the Senator from Massachusetts is making his statement Page 88 I should like to inquire of him if it was not at the urgent and repeated request of General McClellan that troops should be sent to him to aid in his attack upon Richmond that this has been done?"

Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts: "In response to the Senator's question, I will say that I understand that General McClellan desired to have the forces reserved under General McDowell sent forward to him by the steamers. Upon his request, General Franklin with his division was sent forward to Yorktown. The President, to protect 'Washington, and at the same time to aid General McClellan by menacing Richmond, withdrew General Shields's division from General Banks, thus concentrating on the Rappahannock forty thousand men. This force could move on Richmond, or act directly for the protection of Washington, according to circumstances. Yesterday the President, in view of what has occurred, stated that this force of twenty thousand men, which he had reserved, and for which he takes the entire responsibility, had been reserved by him in apprehension of precisely such a movement of the enemy threatening this city as has already taken place.

"The President may have made a mistake in withdrawing so much of the force of General Banks, but I am sure he acted according to the best lights he possessed. General Banks has been forced to retrace his steps, to abandon the Shenandoah Valley, and to recross the Potomac."

On December 10, before a court martial at Washington, General McClellan, in answer to the question, What communication he received from the President through General Franklin, &c? said: "The substance of the communication of General Franklin from the President was that the President assumed the responsibility of the change of destination of General McDowell's corps, regarding that corps necessary for the defence of Washington, although the troops actually left in Washington and in front of it, disposable for its defence, were rather more than double the garrison fixed by the engineer and artillery officers, and considerably more than the largest number recommended by any of the corps commanders to be left in the vicinity of Washington."

The following orders of General McClellan will show his plans for the protection of Washington:

                  HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE. POTOMAC,

                                                            March 16, 1862.

Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth, Military Governor of the               District of Columbia:

SIR: The command to which you have been assigned, by instruction of the President, as Military Governor of the District of Columbia, embraces the geographical limits of the district, and will also include the city of Alexandria, the defensive works south of the Potomac, from the Occoquan to Difficult Creek, and the post of Fort Washington. I enclose a list of the works and defences embraced in these limits. General Banks will command at Manassas Junction, with the divisions of Williams and Shields, composing the Fifth Army Corps, but you should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in your front, carefully guard the approaches in that quarter, and maintain the duties of advanced guards. You will use the same precautions ou cither flank. All troops not actually needed for the police of Washington and Georgetown, for the garrisons north of the Potomac, and for other indicated special duties, should be removed to the south side of the river. In the centre of your front you should post the main body of your troops, in proper proportions, at suitable distances toward your right and left flanks. Careful patrols will be made to thoroughly scour the country in front from right to left.

It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain the forts and their armaments in the best possible order, to look carefully after the instruction and discipline ot their garrisons, as well as all other troops under your command, and by frequent and rigid inspection to insure the attainment of these ends.

The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges, and ferries within the above-named limits will devolve upon you, and you are to insure their security and provide for their protection by every means in your power. You will also protect the depots of the public stores an4 the transit of the stores to the troops in actual service.

By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour the neighboring country south of the eastern branch, and also on your right, and you will use every possible precaution to intercept mails, goods, and persons passing unauthorized to the enemy lines.

The necessity of maintaining good order within your limits, and especially in the capital of the nation, cannot be too strongly enforced. You will forward and facilitate the movement of all troops destined for the active part of the Army of the Potomac, and especially the transits of detachments to their proper regiments and corps.

The charge of all new troops arriving in Washington, and of all troops temporarily there, will devolve upon you. You will form them into provisional brigades, promote their instruction and discipline, and Facilitate their equipments. Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, composition, and equipment.by every opportunity. Besides the regular reports and returns which you will be required to render to the Adjutant-General of the army, you will make to these headquarters a consolidated morning report of your command every Sunday morning, and a monthly return on the first day of each month.

The foregoing instructions are communicated by command of Major-General McClellan.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Assistant Adjutant-General.

__________

                    HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

                               March 16,1862.

To Major-General N. P. Banks, Commanding Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac:

SIR: you will post your command in the vicinity of Manassas, intrench yourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the front, our first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Manassas and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications with the valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry—say four regiments, with two batteries—at or near the point where that railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley as well as through Chester Gap, which might perhaps be occupied advantageously by a detachment of infantry well intrenched. Block houses should be built at all the railway bridges occupied by grand guard, Warrenton Junction or Warrenton itself, and also some stilt more advanced points on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as soon as the railroad bridges are repaired.

Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Besides the two regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your disposal to scout toward the Occoquan, and probably a fourth toward Page 89 Leesburg. To recapitulate, the most important points that should engage your attention are as follows:

First—A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas, perhaps even Centreville, and another force, a brigade, also well intrenched near Strasburg.

Second—Block houses at the railroad bridges.

Third— Constant employment of cavalry well to the front

Fourth—Grand guards at Warrenton, and in advance as far as the Rappahannock, if possible.

Fifth—Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early information as to the enemy.

Sixth—The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac and Washington.

The foregoing is communicated by order of Major-General McClellan.

__________

                                                                     Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 1st of April General McClellan addressed the following additional note to General Banks:

           HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

             ON BOARD COMMODORE, April 1,1862.  

Major-General J. P. Banks, Commanding Fifth Army Corps:

GENERAL: The change in affairs in the valley of the Shenandoah has rendered necessary a corresponding departure, temporarily at least, from the plan we some days since agreed upon.

In my arrangements I assume that you have a force amply sufficient to drive Jackson before you, provided he is not reinforced largely. I also assume that you may find it impossible to find anything toward Manassas for some days, probably not until the operations of the main army nave drawn all the rebel force toward Richmond.

You are aware that General Sumner has for some days been at Warrenton Junction, with two divisions of infantry, six batteries, and two regiments of cavalry, and that a reconnoissance to the Rappahannock forced the enemy to destroy the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad. Since that time our cavalry have found nothing on this side of the Rappahannock in that direction, audit seems clear that we have no reason to fear any return of the rebels in that quarter. Their movements near Fredericksburg also indicate a final abandonment of that neighborhood.

I doubt whether Johnston will now reenforce Jackson with a view to offensive operations. The time has probably passed when he could have gained anything by so doing.

I have ordered one of Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson) to Alexandria for embarkation. Blenker’s hat been detached from the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to report to General Fremont. Abercrombie is probably at Warrenton Junction to-day; Geary at White Plains.

Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered out, and are now on the way to relieve the two regiments of Sumner. Four thousand infantry and one battery leave Washington at once for Manassas. Some three thousand more will move in one or two days, and soon after three thousand additional.

I will order Blenker to move on Strasburg and report to you for temporary duty; so that, should you find a large force in your front, you can avail yourself of his aid. As soon as possible, please direct him on Winchester, thence to report to the Adjutant-General of the Army for orders; but keep him until you are sure what you have in front.

In regard to your own movements, the most important thing is to throw Jackson well back, and then to assume such a position as to enable you to prevent his return. As soon as the railway communications are reestablished, it will be probably important and advisable to move on Staunton; but this would require communications and a force of 25,000 to 80,000 for active operations. It should also be nearly coincident with my own move on Richmond. At all events, not so long before it as to enable the rebels to concentrate on you and then return to me.

I fear that you cannot be ready in time; although it may come in very well with a force less than I have mentioned, after the main battle near Richmond. When General Sumner leaves Warrenton Junction, General Abercrombie will be placed in immediate command of Manassas and Warrenton Junction, under your general orders. Please inform me frequently by telegraph and otherwise as to the state of things in your front. I am, very truly yours,

                                                          GEO. B. McCELLAN,

                                                                  Major-General Commanding.

P. S. From what I have just learned, it would seem that the two regiments of cavalry intended for Warrenton Junction have gone to Harpers Ferry. Of the four additional regiments placed under jour orders, two should as promptly as possible move by the shortest route on Warrenton Junction.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                                       GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

                                                              Major-General Commanding.

              HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

                STEAMER COMMODORE, April 1,1862.

To Brigadier-General L. Thomas, Adj.-General U. S. A.:

GENERAL: I have to request that you will lay the following communication before the Hon. Secretary of War. The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are about as follows:

General Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient troops to give him five thousand men for the defence of Baltimore, and one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight available for the eastern shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about four hundred men. The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to ten thousand men, other disposable troops now with General Wadsworth being about eleven thousand four hundred men. The troops employed in guarding the various railroads in Maryland amount to some three thousand three hundred and fifty-nine men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send them forward to Manassas. General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force which, including Colonel Geary's at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at their disposal, will amount to some seven thousand seven hundred and eighty men, with twelve pieces of artillery.

I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for serice in Pennsylvania and New York and in any of the Eastern States, maybe ordered to Washington. This force I should be glad to have sent at once to Manassas—four thousand men from General Wadsworth to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a force under the command of General Abercrombie to something like eighteen thousand six hundred and thirty-nine men. It is my design to push General Blenker from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination. The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus—including Blenker’s division, ten thousand and twenty-eight strong, with twenty-four pieces of artillery, Banks's Fifth Corps, which embraces the command of General Shields, nineteen thousand six hundred and eighty-seven strong, with forty-one guns, some three thousand "six hundred and fifty-three disposable cavalry, and the railroad guard, about twenty-one hundred men—amount to about thirty-five thousand four hundred and sixty-seven men.

It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment—say eight hundred and fifty men—being, with five hundred cavalry, thirteen hundred and fifty men on the Lower Potomac. To recapitulate: At Warrenton there are to be seven thousand seven hundred and eighty; at Manassas, say ten thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine; in the Shenandoah Valley, thirty-five thousand four hundred and sixty-seven; on the lower Page 90 Potomac, thirteen hundred and fifty—in all, fifty-five thousand four hundred and fifty-six. There would then be left for the garrisons in front of Washington and under General Wadsworth some eighteen thousand men, exclusive of the batteries, under instructions. The troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn, will probably number more than four thousand. These should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition where their services may be most needed.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                                   GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General Commanding.


Source: The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year, 1861-1865, vols. 1-5. New York: Appleton & Co., 1868.