Naval Battles

Running the Blockade

The contraband trade which flourished more or less throughout the four years of the war did not want for powerful incentives to impel men to undertake the risks involved. The blockade of the Southern ports caused an enormous rise in the price of cotton in the markets of the world, and as the war progressed the prices of all manufactured articles which the South was accustomed to import rose to higher and higher levels while the Confederacy was prepared to pay the price asked for munitions of war. It is thus evident that greed and necessity, two of the strongest motives which spur men on to action, formed the fundamental basis for the illicit trade. During the earlier months of the war blockade-running was chiefly carried on by the steamers that had belonged to the Southern coasting lines, now thrown out of employment by the war, and by a great variety of small craft which would bring assorted cargoes from Cuba and the Bahamas and make the return voyage loaded with cotton. The risk of capture was small at first, as the blockaders were few in number and inexperienced, while the contrabandists were familiar with every inch of the coast and could make their choice of any port between Chesapeake and the Rio Grande. Gradually, however, the blockading lines were drawn more closely and the vessels on guard increased from a paltry score or two to several hundred. Innumerable cutting out expeditions and frequent captures and burnings, materially reduced the number of these guerrilla vessels by the end of the first year, as they could not be replaced in the South. Meanwhile some English and other European vessels had engaged in the illicit trade, but it was not until the close of the winter of 1861-62, that the enormously enhanced price of cotton abroad, coupled with a correspondingly low price in the South and a high price for war materials and manufactured products, led certain Liverpool merchants and others to risk all for the sake of the enormous profits to be gained. Means to lessen the danger of running the blockade were soon devised and before long operations were carried on in great volume, operations from which immense fortunes were quickly reaped. Prof. Soley has this to say of the profits of the contraband business when it was at its height: "The rates are for a single trip from Nassau to Wilmington and back. Half the amount was given as a bounty at the beginning of the voyage, and half at its successful completion. The amounts are as follows: Captain, 1,000 pounds; chief officer, 250; second and third officer, 150; chief engineer, 500; crew and firemen (about), 50; pilot, 750. Besides the Page 293 money received officers were able to stow away little cargoes of their own, and so to make on each trip a private speculation, and an occasional cotton bale was brought out for a friend, by way of making a handsome present. In fact, the blockade-running captains, after six months of employment, could afford to retire with a snug competency for the rest of their lives. The merchants who withdrew early from the business acquired considerable fortunes, but those who kept on until the end met with heavy losses. Any speculation that brings sudden and excessive profits is likely to be overdone, and large amounts of capital were sunk in the last months of the war. At the close, the thriving business of Nassau and Bermuda suddenly collapsed and they reverted to their former condition of stagnation; while the mercantile enterprise of Liverpool was directed to other and more legitimate channels."

An official statement of the results of blockade-running at Wilmington from January, 1863, to December, 1864, published in the "Manchester Guardian," shows that the total ventures made by English capitalists and speculators, counting the values of ships and cargoes, amounted to £13,240,000 or to more than $66,000,000. The quantity of cotton exported in 22 months (January 1, 1863, to October 31, 1864) was 137,937 bales, weighing 62,860,463 pounds, of which the larger part was of the sea island variety. The value of the export and import trade in one year (July 1, 1863, to June 30, 1864) was $65,185,000, the Confederate government rating exchange at five for one. The total number of vessels which ran the blockade in 15 months (October 1, 1863, to December 31, 1864) was 397.

When the harbor of Charleston was almost entirely closed and that of Mobile efficiently guarded, Wilmington remained the only port of any importance east of the Mississippi river accessible to blockade-runners. The contraband trade Page 294 continued to flourish there, and so daring and successful were many of the efforts to elude the Federal cruisers, that many and loud complaints were made against the naval department for its failure to close the port. Answering these complaints, Sec. Welles was moved to say in his annual report, "Many, who have failed to make themselves acquainted with the facts connected with the Wilmington blockade, have been free and severe in censures of the manner in which it has been conducted. The intelligent officers of the naval and merchant service who have labored with untiring assiduity, and watched with sleepless vigilance through weary months of winter and summer, and in all weather, stimulated by the hope of benefiting their country and receiving its thanks, as well as by every inducement of fame and pecuniary reward, if successful, do not concur in the opinion that the port of Wilmington can be entirely closed by blockade."

It is well known that the principal trade of the South during the war was with England. As soon as a vessel cleared for a blockaded port the illegality of the voyage became established and the vessel was liable to capture from the moment of departure. The greater the distance to be traversed, the greater was the risk of capture, and it therefore became highly important to render as much of the voyage as possible technically innocent. With this end in view, English vessels during the early months of the contraband trade would clear for any available neutral port in the neighborhood of the Southern coast, and barely touching there would then leave for their real point of destination— most often Charleston. This subterfuge, however, did not long avail, as the courts early reaffirmed the old English prize court doctrine that the voyage, though technically broken, was in reality continuous, and the ultimate destination of the ship determined the legality of the voyage. The announcement Page 295  of this doctrine of continuity rendered a ship liable to capture as before. The result was that the illicit traders had resort to another plan, which was much more successful, though it was transparently based on perjury and the falsification of the ship's papers. Some neutral port off the coast would be named in the papers as the ultimate destination, where the cargo would be transferred to another vessel, specially adapted for running the blockade. Then the courts promptly ruled that "the ships carrying on this traffic to neutral ports were confiscable, provided the ultimate destination of the cargo to a blockaded port was known to the owner," and that the ships carrying on this trade "were planks of the same bridge, all of the same kind, and necessary for the convenient passage of persons and property from one end to the other." This attitude of the highest courts in the United States provoked much hostile criticism abroad. Soley says: "The United States were accused of sacrificing the rights of neutrals, which they had hitherto upheld, to the interests of belligerents, and of disregarding great principles for the sake of monetary advantage. In truth, however, the principle adopted by the court was not a new one, through a novel application was made of it to meet a novel combination of circumstances. It had formerly been applied to cases where neutrals engaged in illegal trade between two ports of a belligerent, had endeavored to screen the illegality of the voyage by the interposition of a neutral port, With or without the landing of goods and the employment of a new conveyance. In these cases Lord Stowell held that the continuity of the voyage was not broken, unless the cargo was really imported into the common stock of the neutral country. That the principle had not been applied to blockades was due to the fact that circumstances had never called for it, as the practice of breaking a blockade had never before Page 296 been carried out on such a scale, with such perfect appliances, and by the use of such ingenious devices. The really difficult question before the court was as to the sufficiency of the evidence in each case. It was to be expected that every artifice in the way of simulated papers, pretended ownership, false destination, and fictitious transfers would be adopted to escape liability, and it was the business of the court to penetrate all these disguises and to ascertain the real character of each transaction. It is probable that in no case was injustice done in brushing aside and disregarding the various ceremonies, more or less elaborate and artificial, that were performed over blockade-running cargoes at Nassau and Bermuda, and it must often have happened that the ingenuity of shippers was rewarded by a decree of restitution for the want of technical evidence, when there was no moral doubt as to the vessel's guilt."

Final resort was now had to an even bolder and more original method. The daring expedient was adopted of shipping cargoes by the regular lines to New York and there reshipping them to Nassau or Bermuda, whence they would ultimately find their way to one of the blockaded ports. Naturally the large trade between New York and Nassau and Bermuda soon attracted attention, and the New York customs officials were ordered to refuse clearances to vessels, "which whatever their ostensible destination, were believed to be intended for Southern ports, or whose cargoes were in imminent danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, and if there was merely ground for apprehension that cargoes were destined for the enemy's use, the owners were required to give ample security." Despite the protests of the Nassau merchants the United States persisted in her policy of refusing clearances to that port, and the Federal government, in point of fact, showed itself much more efficient in the matter of trade Page 297 regulation, than did Great Britain in the enforcement of the laws of neutrality. The custom house regulations proved even more salutary than the decisions of the courts of last resort.

Of the several points which served as intermediaries for the contraband trade, by far the most important were Nassau, Bermuda, Havana and Matamoras. Of these four, Nassau easily ranked first as a resort for blockade-runners. When the several devices above outlined no longer served to shield the illicit trade, the capital embarked in the business was so large as to secure a change in the form of ships. The use of old and unseaworthy vessels to run the blockade was abandoned, and vessels especially adapted to the work and far more difficult to apprehend were constructed. As heretofore cargoes were shipped direct to Nassau and Bermuda, whence they would be transferred to this new type of vessel,. having a low and slender hull, powerful engines and twin screws or feathering paddles and painted a white or dull lead color, which rendered it almost invisible at 200 yards distance. "There was no spar save that necessary to support a crow's nest for the lookout," and when it could be secured the vessel burned anthracite coal to avoid betrayal by smoke. It is also worthy of note that whatever the risk incurred during the run from abroad to one of these points, a vessel which had successfully eluded the blockade at Charleston, Wilmington, or some other Southern port, was safe as soon as it reached the British ports of Nassau or Bermuda. Nassau was situated on the island of New Providence in the Bahamas, only 180 miles distant in a direct line from the coast of Florida. The chief objective point for the blockade-runners, however, was not the coast of Florida, which lacked suitable harbors and direct connection with the interior, but rather one of the great commercial ports like Charleston, Wilmington or Savannah. The distance from Nassau to Charleston was only 515 miles, or Page 298 about three days' run, and little coal was needed to make the voyage, allowing more room for the stowage of cargo. The island of New Providence was surrounded by numerous small islands, whose intricate channels abounding in reefs and shoals, rendered the navigation difficult and dangerous. All were neutral territory, safeguarded by a marine league, within which a blockade-runner was absolutely safe. Nassau had little importance before the war, when its population lived chiefly by fishing and wrecking. But now its harbor was crowded with shipping, with cotton bales piled high awaiting shipment to Europe and heaps of merchandise destined for Southern ports. The Confederate government kept its agents there, especially charged with the furtherance of the contraband trade.

On August 4, 1862, Commander Gansevoort of the Adirondack reported to Sec. Welles the following list of steam vessels, then or lately at Nassau, actively engaged in blockade-running: Melita, Stanley, Leopard, Pacific, Oreto, Minho, Kate, Columbia, Minna, Herald, Scotia, Lodona, Nashville, Hero, Lloyds and Tubal Cain. His description of the Leopard and the Columbia well illustrates the new type of blockade-runner. The former was "a side-wheel steamer, 2 masts, with great rake, and a raking smokestack, straight stern and cutwater, and no head booms. A very fast vessel and the one purchased for Confederates by Huse. An iron vessel. She left for Charleston July 29, at night." The latter was "an iron propeller, 2 masts and 1 smokestack—a beautiful and fast vessel, now loaded and painted, ready for her first attempt to run the blockade to Charleston." His description of the Oreto, which shortly after entered on her famous career as the cruiser Florida, is also of interest. She is described as a propeller, 3 masts, with square sails on fore and main, 1 smokestack, which, with masts, rakes considerably built Page 299 strong and well, cutwater with Sardinian coat of arms surmounting it and head booms. She is pierced for guns and looks to be very fast.

Two days later, August 6, 1862, Sec. Welles issued the following instruction to Flag-Officer Lardner at Key West: "From information obtained from various sources, it is evident that the greater and more important part of the foreign supplies that reach the insurgents do so by the way of Nassau, New Providence. The majority of steamers that have fitted out in England to run the blockade clear for and touch at that port. Those that escape the vigilance of the blockading vessels also touch there with outward cargoes. It is apparently the depot of those abroad engaged in lending aid to the rebellion. The passages to Nassau must therefore be more strictly guarded, and your swiftest steamers should be assigned to this duty. There are several fast vessels employed in running the blockade, among them the steamer Herald, to which attention should be given. In endeavoring to intercept these steamers, and whilst exercising all the rights belonging to cruisers on the high seas, the rights of neutrals must not be violated. No hostile operations must be conducted or committed by our vessels within neutral jurisdiction or a full marine league of the coast." When Commodore Lardner inquired of the department whether, under the above instructions, he was authorized to capture ships en route from Liverpool to Nassau or from one British port to another, he was directed to visit, without regard to their clearance or destination, all vessels, not being public armed ships of war of foreign powers, and in all cases to exercise the unquestioned belligerent right of search, except in the case of regular mail steam packets. The instructions continue: "If upon strict search it shall appear that arms or contraband of war constitute the cargo or such part thereof as would render aid to Page 300 the enemy, then you will exercise the no less unquestioned belligerent right of seizing such vessel and cargo and send in the same for adjudication. This being an ungracious task, should be done in a spirit and manner not offensive. Judgment and discretion must be exercised. To seize does not necessarily involve condemnation. The courts will adjudge the whole question of prize or no prize. The department has made it a special object to obtain and communicate to the commanding officers of the squadrons enforcing the blockade, information in regard to vessels which were preparing or believed to be preparing to give aid to the insurgents. The information derived in various ways may not always be authentic, and is of such a character as should not be communicated to the captured parties. It is a mere indication to our own officers to guide and assist them in their duties. A search will corroborate and confirm the intelligence, if correct, and without a search that shall furnish reason to believe the vessel has contraband of war, or is designed to violate the blockade, or in some way aid the insurgents, she should not be seized."

Bermuda was also an active participant in the profits of blockade-running, but in a lesser degree than Nassau. It was. conveniently near the Atlantic ports, being distant from Wilmington only 674 miles. Havana was even closer to the Gulf ports, but on account of the proximity of Key West and the strictness with which the Gulf blockade was maintained, it had not the same attractions for blockade-runners, especially after Farragut's occupation of New Orleans. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence to show that 50 vessels left Havana to run the blockade between April 1 and July 6, 1863. Matamoras was the only town of any importance "on the single foreign frontier of the Confederacy," and was located on the Rio Grande, opposite the Texas town of Brownsville, Page 301 about 40 miles above the mouth of the river. Its location in adjacent neutral territory, gave it especial importance in connection with the contraband trade. The river could not be blockaded; cargoes were transferred at the mouth of the river to lighters and taken to Matamoras, whence they. easily found their way across the river into the insurgent territory. Despite the notoriety which the town soon gained as a flourishing center for the illicit trade, the government could do little to stop the traffic. A neutral port could not be blockaded, vessels could lawfully enter it, and the clearest proof was demanded in the case of vessels seized that their cargoes were destined for the enemy. In a majority of cases when vessels were captured and sent in, a decree of restitution was rendered by the prize court on the above grounds. This condition of affairs will explain why only the contraband part of the cargo of the Peterhof, captured near St. Thomas under suspicious circumstances when bound for Matamoras, was condemned. The following report on the trade with Matamoras, Mexico, was rendered to Sec. Welles, May 16, 1863, by acting volunteer Lieutenant Joseph P. Couthouy, who was well acquainted with conditions there: "There can, I think, be no moral and scarcely a legal doubt that nine-tenths of the cargoes which within the past twelve months have gone up the Rio Grande, nominally consigned to merchants in Matamoras, were, in fact, destined to supply the rebels in Texas, and were securely stored in the warehouses of Brownsville within 24 hours after their simulated sale on the Mexican side of the river. A residence of four years in Brownsville, from October, 1849, to November, 1853, and my position as presiding officer of the branch of the Commercial and Agricultural Bank of Texas there established, enabled me to become well acquainted not only with all the leading merchants and traders on both sides of the Rio Grande as high up as Monterey, but Page 302 with the whole commerce of Mexico, whether of exports or imports, and I can not recall a single instance in all that time of a vessel arriving at Matamoras with a cargo of provisions, groceries and other supplies of such magnitude and value as within the last few months has found its way hither almost weekly, ostensibly for Mexican consumption. Nor can I remember the importation during the whole of those four years of so much as a solitary cargo of provisions or other supplies in an English bottom. The whole of the pseudo Mexican trade by the channel of the Rio Grande, carried on so extensively by English vessels at the present time, has its explanation and origin in the market opened up in Texas by the necessities of that and adjacent states in arms against the Federal government, consequent upon the blockade of their maritime ports. Matamoras is but the Mexican synonym of Brownsville so far as this trade is concerned. The merchants and the warehouses of the one city are those of the other also. From the garita on the Matamoras bank of the river, alongside which a vessel may lie and go through the forms of a sale of her cargo in Mexico, it is but a stone's cast to Stillman's levee in Brownsville, on which it may with impunity be landed immediately after by the Texan purchaser. I have been tauntingly informed by persons engaged in the traffic that this was the course of procedure, and have no doubt they spoke the truth, although owing to the subtlety of the precautions taken to avoid violating the letter of international law, it may be very difficult to establish the fact in a majority of the cases of vessels captured and sent in for adjudication by our cruisers, under suspicion of using the trade with Matamoras as a cloak to cover the real object of furnishing supplies to Texas."

As the war progressed and the blockade became more and more stringent the South began to suffer severely from the effects of trade strangulation. Though the blockade was Page 303 doubtless a merciful and just war measure, in that it eventually starved the South and materially shortened the war, nevertheless, it worked untold hardships, especially to the women and children, who sorely lacked the very necessities of life. The blockade-runners brought in what they could sell at the greatest profit. Liquors were imported where medicines were needed, and fancy dress goods when the commonest articles of necessity were lacking. There was talk at one time of complete assumption of the traffic by the Confederate government, in order that the real needs of the South might be better supplied. Indeed, the government did actually embark in the business to a certain extent. Through its agents in England it bought vessels adapted to the contraband trade, manned them with its own naval officers and put them on the regular trade between Nassau or Bermuda and Wilmington or some other blockaded port. They carried out cotton on government account and brought in munitions of war and other needed supplies. One such vessel, the Clyde-built side-wheel iron steamer, Giraffe, became famous under her new name, the R. E. Lee, Captain Wilkinson, by running the blockade 21 times in 10 months, between December, 1862, and November, 1863, carrying abroad 6,000 bales of cotton. The cotton was landed at Nassau and shipped to Europe under the protection of neutral flags. The government did not directly appear as shipper or owner, but acted through a well known mercantile firm, which appeared as the ostensible shipper.

Such was the perfection of the system to which the business of blockade-running was reduced in 1863 and 1864 that, despite the large number of vessels captured or destroyed by the blockaders, the captures were never numerous enough to seriously interfere with the traffic. The Federal ships captured during the war 1,149 vessels, of which 216 were steamers. In addition 355 vessels were burned, or otherwise destroyed, Page 304 of which 85 were steamers—total number of vessels, 1,504. A low estimate of the value of these vessels and their cargoes is $31,000,000. On the other hand there is little doubt that the total profits of the business, if it were possible to arrive at an accurate estimate of them, would prove to be many times the above amount. The profits were by no means evenly distributed among those engaged in the traffic, for as before stated, those who kept up to the close lost heavily, while those who withdrew earlier often reaped large fortunes. A single firm of Charleston, the Frasers, is reported to have cleared $20,000,000 in gold. Considerable light was thrown on the volume of the contraband trade by Jefferson Davis in his message to the Confederate Congress, in January, 1865, when he declared that the number of vessels arriving at the two ports—Charleston and Wilmington—from November 1 to December 6, had been 43; that only a very small portion of those outward bound had been captured; and that out of 11,796 bales of cotton shipped since July the first, 1864, but 1,272 bales had been lost. The special report of the secretary of the treasury in relation to the same matter stated that since October 26, 1864, there had been received at the ports of Wilmington and Charleston 8,632,000 pounds of meat, 1,507,000 pounds of lead, 1,933,000 pounds of saltpeter, 546,000 pairs of shoes, 316,000 pairs of blankets, 520,000 pounds of coffee, 69,000 rifles, 97 packages of revolvers, 2,639 packages of medicines, 43 cannon, and a very large quantity of other articles. From March 1, 1864, to January 1, 1865, the value of the shipments of cotton on Confederate government account was shown by the secretary's report to have been $5,296,000 in specie, of which $1,500,000 had been shipped out between July 1 and December 1, 1864.

A list of vessels engaged in running the blockade from Nassau and other ports, between November, 1861, and March, 1864, showed 84 steamers, of which 37 were captured by the Federals, Page 305 12 were totally lost, n were lost, but the cargoes partially saved, and i foundered at sea. They made 363 trips to Nassau and 65 to other ports. Among the highest number of runs made were those of the Fanny—18 times—and the Margaret and Jessie, which performed the same feat before being captured. Out of 425 runs from Nassau alone (including 100 schooners), only 62—about one in seven—were unsuccessful, but as the blockade-runners carried large and valuable inward cargoes of manufactured goods, including "hardware," the name under which munitions of war were invoiced, and frequently returned with outward cargoes of from 600 to 1,200 bales of cotton, which netted the owners a clear profit of 30,000 pounds each way, they could well afford to lose an occasional vessel.

Such was the prominence of Wilmington in the contraband trade a more detailed description of the entrances to the port should prove interesting. Wilmington is located on the Cape Fear river, some 28 miles distant from the mouth. From Wilmington the river flows nearly due south until it reaches the ocean, and directly in front of its mouth lies Smith's island, a long expanse of sand and shoal, terminating on its southern extremity in the long headland of Cape Fear. On either side of Smith's island are the two principal entrances to the river. The southern, or main channel, which is about 2 1/2 miles in width, with a depth of from 10 to 14 feet over the bar, was protected by Fort Caswell, a casemated stone work on Oak island, adjoining the mainland, and by the Light-house battery on Smith's island. The entrance from the eastward, known as New inlet, is less than 2 miles wide and shallower than the other entrance, though neither presents any serious difficulty to the navigator, except that vessels entering from the south occasionally grounded on "The Lump"—a round shoal in the channel. The eastern channel Page 306 was protected by Fort Fisher and by a series of batteries extending in a northerly direction along the sea coast. The dangerous Frying Pan shoals, continuing the line of Cape Fear, extend around the southern and western sides of Smith's island and reach out for a distance of 10 miles, so that the distance by sea between the two entrances of the river is 40 miles, while inside the island it is not more than 8. Each of the channels required a separate blockading force. To the natural advantages of the locality, greatly enhanced by the artificial defenses, on which the best engineering skill of the Confederacy had been expended, must be added the shallowness of the water, which decreases in depth gradually and regularly to the shore line, so that none of the blockade-runners of light draught were under the necessity of making directly for either entrance, but could, by using the lead, run close under the land, where, protected by the batteries, they could pass in at their leisure. In escaping from Wilmington still less danger was incurred in eluding the Federal cruisers. They would drop down the river to Smithville, a small town about half-way between the two entrances, await their opportunity, and take their choice between the main channel and New inlet, as circumstances seemed to favor. Once out of the river, they could pass for some distance up or down the coast before making an offing, or proceed straight out to sea, trusting to darkness, mist, or a full head of steam to make a successful dash. The blockaders were for the most part of too deep draught to run close to the shore, or enter the several smaller channels through which the blockade-runners could pass and were still less able to approach the numerous shallow inlets extending up and down the coast, within which the latter could take refuge. Besides the nature of the coast and the liability at some seasons of constant stormy weather were such that it was almost impossible to station light- Page 307 draught blockaders there on permanent duty. These facts will explain why, with over 50 cruisers stationed at the two main entrances of the Cape Fear river, some of them the fastest in the service, all officered by men who had not their superiors in any service in intrepidity, energy and professional skill, blockade-runners were nevertheless enabled to pass in and out with seeming impunity.

Soley in The Navy in the Civil War, says: "The start from Nassau or Bermuda was usually made at such a time that a moonless night and a high tide could be secured for running in. A sharp lookout was kept for cruisers on the outside blockade, and the blockade-runner, by keeping at a distance could generally pass them unobserved. If by accident or carelessness he came very close, he took to his heels, and his speed enabled him to get away. He never hove to when ordered; it was as hard to hit him as to overtake him; a stray shot or two he cared nothing for. Even if his pursuer had the advantage of him in speed, which was rarely the case, he still kept on, and, by protracting the chase for a few hours, he could be sure that a squall, or a fog, or the approach of night would enable him to escape."

Wilkinson describes a device which was often employed under these circumstances. In running from Wilmington to Nassau, on one occasion, he found himself hard pressed by a sloop-of-war. His coal was bad, but by using cotton saturated with turpentine, he succeeded in keeping ahead. The chase lasted all day and at sunset the sloop was within 4 miles and still gaining. The engineer was then directed to make a black smoke and a lookout was stationed with a glass to give notice as soon as he lost sight of the pursuer in the deepening twilight. The moment the word came, orders were given to close the dampers and the volumes of smoke ceased to pour out. The helm was put hard-a-starboard, changing the course Page 308 eight points, and the blockade-runner disappeared in the darkness, while the cruiser continued her course in pursuit of a shadow. Having passed the outside blockade successfully and arrived in the neighborhood of his destination, the blockade-runner would either lie off at a distance, or run in close to the land north or south of the port and wait for darkness. Sometimes vessels would remain in this way unobserved for a whole day. If they found the place too hot and the cruisers too active, one of the inlets at a little distance from the port of destination would give the needful shelter. Masonboro inlet, to the north of Wilmington, was a favorite resort for this purpose. At night the steamers would come out of hiding and make a dash for the entrance. The difficulty of running the blockade was increased by the absence of lights on the coast. In approaching or skirting the shore, the salt works in operation at various points served as a partial substitute for lighthouses and temporary lights were used at some of the ports to aid the blockade-runners. At Charleston there was a light at Fort Sumter. At Wilmington, in the first year, the Frying Pan light-ship was taken inside the entrance and anchored under Fort Caswell, where she was burned in December, 1861, by two boat's crews from the Mount Vernon. At New inlet a light was placed on "the Mound," a small battery that flanked the works on Federal point. In the earlier blockade the lights of the squadron served as a guide to the blockade-runners. After the general practice was discontinued, the plan was adopted of carrying a light on the senior officer's vessel, which was anchored in the center of the fleet, near the entrance, a fact which soon became known to the blockade-runners. Indeed, there was little about the squadron that was not known and immediately disseminated at Nassau, the central office of blockade-running intelligence. Thenceforth that light served as a useful guide in making the channel until the Page 309 blockading officer discovered his error and turned it to account by changing his position every night, thereby confusing many calculations. The run past the inshore squadron was always a critical moment, though by no means so dangerous as it looked. It was no easy matter on a dark night to hit, much less to stop, a small and obscure vessel, going at the rate of 15 knots, whose only object was to pass by. But the service nevertheless called into action all the faculties of the blockade runner. It required a cool head, strong nerve and ready resource. It was a combat of skill and pluck against force and vigilance. The excitement of fighting was absent, as the blockade-runner must make no resistance, nor, as a rule, was he prepared to make any. But the chances, both outshore and inshore, were all in his favor. He had only to make a port and run in, and he could choose time, weather and circumstances. He could even choose his destination; always had steam up when it was wanted; knew the critical moment and was prepared for it; and his moments of action were followed by intervals of repose and relaxation. On the other hand, the blockader was in every way at a disadvantage. He had no objective point except the blockade-runner; never knew when the blockade-runner was coming; could choose nothing, but must take the circumstances as they happened to come; and they were pretty sure to be unfavorable. He was compelled to remain in that worst of all situations, incessant watchfulness combined with prolonged inaction. There would be days and nights of anxious waiting, with expectation strained to the tensest point, for an emergency which lasted only as many minutes, and which came when it was least expected. There was no telling when or where the blow would need to be struck, and a solitary moment of napping might be fatal, in spite of months of ceaseless vigilance.

In view of the above it is small wonder that so many of the Page 310 fast and specially constructed blockade-runners eluded the vigilance of the Federal ships, particularly at the difficult ports of Wilmington and Charleston. And yet the record of captures is a long one. That fortune occasionally favored the blockaders is shown by the fact that, during the week ending November 9, 1863, four well known blockade-runners were captured off Wilmington, including the celebrated Confederate steamer Robert E. Lee. The other three were the Margaret and Jessie of Charleston, a side-wheel steamer of 700 tons, a very fast vessel which had run the blockade 15 times and had the celebrated pilot Lockwood for commander when captured by the Nansemond and Keystone State; the Cornubia of Richmond, a very fast iron side-wheel steamer of 588 tons, which was run ashore and captured n miles north of New inlet by the steamers James Adger and Niphon; the Ella and Annie of Charleston, a vessel of 905 tons burden, loaded with a valuable cargo. Admiral Lee in reporting her capture stated that at 5:30 a. m. of the 9th, the Niphon, returning from an unsuccessful chase and steaming along the beach to the northward of New inlet, made another steamer near Masonboro inlet coming down along the shore. The stranger finding himself intercepted, put his helm up and endeavored to run down the Niphon. This attempt was partly avoided, though the Niphon was struck about the fore rigging, and her bowsprit, stem and starboard boats carried away. At the moment of collision Acting Master Breck reports he opened upon the enemy with shell and canister and carried the prize by boarding. A keg of powder and slow match were found ready to blow her up. The capture was well and gallantly made by Breck, and his spirit and promptness were highly commended by Captain Ridgley, senior officer. The prize was loaded with a valuable cargo consisting of 480 sacks of salt, 500 sacks of saltpeter, 281 Austrian rifles, 500 barrels of beef, 42 cases of Page 311 paper, etc. The following year the Ella and Annie became famous as the flag-ship of Admiral Porter, under her new name, Malvern. The Confederate steamer Robert E. Lee, an iron, side-wheel steamer, with a valuable cargo for the Confederate government, proved a very important prize. She was bound from Bermuda to Wilmington, having left the former port about 5 hours after the Cornubia, whose capture is above noted. On the morning of November 9, at early daylight, the blockader James Adger, when about 20 miles from Beaufort bar, bound in for coal, discovered and gave chase to a steamer bearing northward and eastward, but steering to the southward and eastward. Having Cape Lookout shoals to the eastward, Commander Patterson of the James Adger represents that the chase could not keep off and was compelled to shape her course across the Adger's bow, which enabled the Adger to overhaul her and about 7:30 a. m. she took possession of the stranger, which proved to be the R. E. Lee. The cargo consisted of 214 large cases and bales of shoes and blankets— some bales weighing 2 tons, 150 cases of Austrian rifles, 250 bags of saltpeter, 61 barrels of salt provisions, 30 pigs of lead, etc. When overhauled and captured she had the Confederate flag hoisted, but when the executive officer of the Adger demanded the flag, the master of the R. E. Lee stated that he had burned it. Among the passengers on the vessel were C. E. Stewart, Belgian consul at Charleston, Horace H. Webber and H. W. Rooke, lieutenants in the British royal artillery.

Another brilliant piece of work, which took place a few weeks earlier, was the destruction of the Venus, one of the largest and fastest blockade-runners in the Nassau-Wilmington trade. She was first discovered while trying to run the blockade at New inlet a little after midnight, October 21, by the always alert and energetic Lieutenant Lamson, commanding the Nansemond; was overhauled after a short chase, when Lamson Page 312 immediately opened fire on her, four shells taking effect, the last one fired striking under the guard near the water line, knocked in an iron plate and caused the Venus to make water fast. This was good practice on a dark night, with both vessels making at least 14 knots. The Venus was promptly run ashore by her captain, where she was boarded and her officers and crew captured. All efforts to move her proved unavailing and she was burnt where she lay. Her cargo consisted of lead, dry goods, drugs, bacon and coffee. Says Lamson, "The Venus was 265 feet long and 1,000 tons measurement, and is represented by her captain and officers to have been one of the finest and fastest vessels engaged in running the blockade. She had the finest engines of any vessel in this trade, and was sheathed completely over with iron. She drew 8 feet of water, and when bound out last crossed the bar at low water with over 600 bales of cotton on board." The wrecks of two other blockade-runners, the Hebe and the Douro, lay but a short distance from that of the Venus. Lamson also reported a list of vessels engaged in running the blockade during 1863, together with a list of those captured, obtained from a notebook supposedly belonging to the captain of the Venus. From this list it appears there were 75 vessels engaged in the contraband trade, of which 32 had been captured or destroyed.

At New inlet, which was a favorite entrance, the blockade-runners would frequently get in by hugging the shore, slipping by the endmost vessel of the blockading line. Even on a clear night a properly prepared craft was invisible against the land, and the roar of the surf drowned the noise of her screw or paddles. Having a good pilot and little depth, she could generally run well inside the blockaders. After passing the line, she would show a light on her inshore side. This was answered from the beach by a dim light, followed by another, Page 313 above and beyond the first. These were the range-lights for the channel. By getting them in line, the blockade-runner could ascertain her position, and in a few moments she would be under the guns of the fort. When the practice of blockade-running was reduced to a system, a signal-service was organized on shore and signal officers and pilots were regularly detailed for each vessel. After the fall of Fort Fisher and before the fact was known, the duties of the signal-service were assumed by the officers of the Monticello, under the direction of Cushing, and two well known blockade-runners, the Stag and the Charlotte, were helped in by range-lights from the shore, only to find themselves prizes when they were comfortably anchored in the river. Vessels passed so often between the squadron and the shore that special measures were taken to stop it. The endmost vessel was so placed as to leave a narrow passage. When the blockade-runner had passed, the blockader moved nearer and closed the entrance, at the same time sending up signal rockets. Two or three of her consorts were in waiting and closed up, and the adventurous vessel suddenly found herself hemmed in on all sides, without chance to escape. Whenever a blockade-runner was hard pressed in a chase, it was a common practice for the captain to run her ashore, trusting to favorable circumstances to save a fragment of his cargo. Communicating with the forces in the neighborhood, he would obtain the cooperation of a detachment of infantry, often accompanied by one or two pieces of artillery, which would harass the parties sent from blockading vessels to get the steamer off. At Wilmington lunettes large enough for two guns were thrown up along the shore and a field-battery of Whitworth 12-pounders was kept in constant readiness to run down and occupy them. Sometimes the blockaders were able to command the land approaches, and so prevent the people on shore from doing mischief, Page 314 but generally the latter had it all their own way. It was no easy matter in any case to float off a steamer which had been beached intentionally under a full head of steam, especially if the tide was running ebb, and the fire of one or two rifled guns placed close by on the beach made the operation hazardous. The only course left was to burn the wreck, and even then, if the work was not done thoroughly, the chances were that the fire would be extinguished, and the damaged vessel ultimately recovered. In July, 1863, the Kate, one of the new English-built craft, after running to Charleston and being chased off, put into Wilmington. She attempted to pass the fleet off New inlet, but choosing her time badly was sighted about 5 a. m. and after a chase was run ashore on Smith's island and abandoned. The troops came down, but did nothing. A party was sent in from the Penobscot to get her off, but this failing, she was set on fire, and the officer in charge of the boat party reported that he had disabled her so effectually that she would be of no further use. Three weeks later she was floated off by the Confederates and anchored under the batteries—a position from which she was cut out with some difficulty.

A few weeks later, in August, the Bermuda steamer Hebe, while attempting to run into Wilmington by the New inlet entrance, was run ashore on Federal point, after being headed off by the Niphon. The wind was blowing a gale from the northeast, with a heavy sea. A boat sent in from the Niphon was swamped alongside, but the crew succeeded in boarding her and the Hebe was set on fire either by the boarding party or by the shells of the Niphon and Shokokon, the latter vessel having come to the assistance of the Niphon. Two more boats sent off from the Niphon were swamped and their crews shot, drowned or taken prisoners by the enemy, who had covered the Hebe with a 2-gun Whitworth battery, some 50 Page 315 or 6b infantry and a force of cavalry. Other boats sent off from the vessels rescued a few of the men on board the Hebe, the others fired the ship and escaped to shore, where they were captured. Thereupon the Hebe was shelled by the Niphon and Shokokon for about 3 hours at from 100 to 300 yards' range, and the vessel was completely destroyed. A few days later the Minnesota and some other vessels of the blockading squadron moved in and again shelled the wreck, silencing the battery and capturing and bringing off 2 rifled pieces.

A complete list of the blockade-runners captured and destroyed off Wilmington by the vessels of the North Atlantic blockading squadron between August 1, 1863 and September 30, 1864, shows that 26 were captured and 24 destroyed. These vessels included some of the finest steamers in the trade, as the following list shows: Kate, Hebe, Arabian, Juno, Phantom, Elizabeth, Douro, Venus, Margaret and Jessie, Cornubia, Ella and Annie, R. E. Lee, Ella, Banshee, Ceres, General Beauregard, Antonica, Bendigo, Vesta, Dare, Ranger, Wild Dayrell, Nuffield, Dee, Emily, Fanny and Jennie, Pet, Spunkie, Scotia, Don, Mary Ann, Young Republic, Minnie, Greyhound, Tristram Shandy, Caledonia, Georgiana McCaw, Thistle, Siren, Pevensey, Rouen, Boston, Little Ada, Lilian, Elsie, A. D. Vance, Florrie, Badger, Lynx and Night Hawk. One of the most valuable prizes taken was the A. D. Vance, which was captured by the Santiago de Cuba, Captain O. S. Glisson, on the evening of September 10, 1864, after an all day's chase. After her capture, Captain Willie, the master of the Vance, stated that he had attempted to run out of Wilmington nine times, and was eight times driven back by the blockaders. In the ninth and successful attempt she was chased and fired upon by the Brittannia, but escaped, and was later discovered and chased between Capes Lookout and Hatteras by the Quaker City, which gave up the chase at night, at which time the runner 1 Page 316 was being pursued by the Santiago de Cuba. The Vance was an iron, side-wheel steamer, two years old and very fast. She had a cargo of 410 bales of cotton and some turpentine. Willie further stated that the Vance was the fastest runner in the trade; that the vessel (formerly the Lord Clyde, English built) had cost $175,000, and $15,000 in repairs had since been put on her. On account of her extreme fleetness Admiral Lee promptly recommended that she be taken to Norfolk, overhauled and placed on the blockading service. Generally speaking those who engaged in the business of blockade running underwent no great amount of personal danger, and the vigilance of the blockaders did not seriously cripple the trade until near the end of the war. While the runners were frequently seen and fired upon, they were seldom hit, and still more infrequently were they seriously damaged by the shot and shell. When the Federal government finally employed a large number of very fast cruisers on the outside blockade, the business was brought to a practical standstill.