Naval Battles

Mobile

As already stated, the important task of reducing the defenses of Mobile and capturing that city was postponed in favor of the Red river expedition. When Farragut resumed command of the West Gulf squadron in January, 1864, he was well aware that the Confederates were strengthening their forts in Mobile bay below the city, and were finishing a number of ironclads, one of which was a very powerful vessel. Page 251 His desire to proceed at once against Mobile was frustrated, as the troops needed for the reduction of the forts were not available on account of the extensive operations elsewhere. The reader is referred to the chapter "Along the Gulf Shore" for a description of Mobile bay and its principal defenses. While the forts at the entrance to the bay remained intact, the enemy continued to make Mobile an important rendezvous for blockade-runners. The tortuous and shallow side entrances to the city were freely resorted to by the contraband traders, and once vessels reached the city's wharves, they could lie there in perfect security. Possessed of excellent railroad communications, the city was able to furnish the Confederate armies with large quantities of supplies. Of course the main channel from the Gulf, between Mobile point and Dauphin island, was more easily blockaded, and the runners found it difficult to enter the bay by this route. On January 20 Farragut crossed the bar of Mobile bay in the Octorara, accompanied by the Itasca, and made a careful reconnoissance of the defenses. He gained an accurate idea of the number of guns in Forts Morgan and Gaines, and noted the line of piles extending from Fort Gaines to the channel opposite Morgan, compelling entering vessels to pass close under the guns of the latter fort. He was convinced that ironclads were needed to attack these powerful fortifications, but did not have at this time a single vessel of that class, though they were eventually supplied by the department. Of the three forts—Powell, Gaines and Morgan—guarding the approaches to Mobile, Fort Powell was a small earthwork on Tower island, commanding the channel known as Grant's pass, too distant to interfere with the fleet in passing Forts Morgan and Gaines, though it could annoy the fleet when it had passed up into the anchoring ground. Fort Gaines, on the eastern point of Dauphin island, was also too far from the main ship channel to seriously Page 252 interfere with Farragut's plans. Concerning these forts Mahan says: "Fort Gaines was a pentagonal work mounting in barbette three 10-inch columbiads, five 32-, two 24and two 18pounder smooth-bore guns, and 4 rifled 32-pounders. Besides these it had eleven 24-pounder howitzers, siege and for flank defense. In Fort Powell there was one 10-inch and two 8-inch Brooke rifles, which bore on the sound and channels, but the rear of the fort toward the bay was yet unfinished (in 1864) and nearly unarmed. The third and principal work, Fort Morgan, was much more formidable. It was five sided and built to carry guns both in barbette and casemates, but when seized by the Confederates the embrasures of the curtains facing the channel were masked and a heavy exterior water battery was thrown up before the northwest curtain. The armament at this time cannot be given with absolute certainty. The official reports of the United States engineer and ordnance officers, made after the surrender, differ materially, but from a comparison between them and other statements the following estimate has been made: main fort seven 10-inch, three 8-inch and twenty-two 32-pounder smooth-bore guns, two 8-inch, two 6.5-inch and four 5.82-inch rifles. In the water battery there were one 8-inch and four 10-inch columbiads and two 6.5-inch rifles. Of the above, ten 10-inch, three 8-inch, sixteen 32-pounders and all of the rifles, except one of 5.82 calibre, bore upon the channel. There were also 20 flanking 24-pounder howitzers and 2 or 3 light rifles, which were useless against the fleet from their position." 

Such were the shore defenses with which a fleet must contend in entering Mobile bay. But in addition to these, "in the waters of the bay there was a little Confederate squadron under Admiral Franklin Buchanan, made up of the ram Tennessee and three small paddle-wheel gunboats, the Morgan, Gaines and Selma, commanded respectively by Commander Page 253 George W. Harrison, and Lieuts. J. W. Bennett and P. U. Murphy. They were unarmored, excepting around the boilers. The Selma was an open-deck river steamer with heavy hog frames. The other two had been built for the Confederate government, but were poorly put together. Their armament was: Morgan, two 7-inch rifles and four 32-pounders; Gaines, one 8-inch rifle and five 32-pounders; Selma, one 6-inch rifle, two 9-inch, and one 8-inch smooth-bore shell-guns. Though these lightly built vessels played a very important part for some minutes and from a favorable position did much harm to the Union fleet in the subsequent engagement, they counted for nothing in the calculations of Farragut. There were besides these a few other so-called ironclads near the city, but they took no part in the fight in the bay, and little, if any, in the operations before the fall of Mobile itself in the spring of 1865. The Tennessee was different. This was the most powerful ironclad built from the keel up by the Confederacy, and both the energy shown in overcoming difficulties and the workmanship put upon her were most creditable to her builders. The work was begun at Selma, on the Alabama river, 150 miles from Mobile, in the spring of 1863, when the timber was yet standing in the forests and much of what was to be her armor was still ore in the mines. The hull was launched the following winter and towed to Mobile, where the plating had already been sent from the rolling mills of Atlanta. Her length on deck was 209 feet, beam 48 feet, and when loaded, with her guns on board, she drew 14 feet. The battery was carried in a casemate, equidistant from the bow and stern, whose inside dimensions were 79 feet in length by 29 feet in width. The framing was of yellow pine beams, 13 inches thick, placed close together vertically and planked on the outside, first with inches of yellow pine, laid horizontally, and then 4 inches Page 254 of oak laid up and down. Both sides and end were inclined at an angle of 45 degrees, and over the outside planking was placed the armor, 6 inches thick in plates of 2 inches on the forward end, and elsewhere 5 inches thick. Within the yellow pine frames were sheathed with 2y2 inches of oak. The plating throughout was fastened with bolts 1% inch in diameter, going entirely through and set up with nuts and washers inside. Her gunners were thus sheltered by a thickness of 5 or 6 inches of iron, backed by 25 inches of wood, and the outside deck was plated with 2-inch iron. The sides of the casemate, or as the Confederates called it the shield, were carried down to two feet below the water-line and then reversed at the same angle, so as to meet the hull again 6 or 7 inches below water. The knuckle thus formed, projecting 10 feet beyond the base of the casemate, and apparently filled in solid, afforded a substantial protection from an enemy's prow to the hull, which was not less than 8 feet within it. It was covered with 4 inches of iron, which was continued around the bows and became there a beak or ram. The pilot-house was made by carrying part of the forward end of the shield up three feet higher than the rest. The casemate was covered with heavy iron gratings, through which the smoke could rise freely, and it was pierced with 10 ports, 3 in each end, and 2 on each side. The vessel carried, however, only 6 guns—one 8j^-inch rifle at each end and two 6inch rifles on each broadside. All were Brooke guns, made in the Confederacy, and threw n0-pound and 90-pound solid shot. The ports were closed with iron sliding shutters 5 inches thick, a bad arrangement as it turned out.

Though powerfully built, armored and armed, the Tennessee must have been a very exasperating vessel to her commander, as she had two grave defects. The first, unavoidable perhaps from the slender resources of the Confederacy, Page 255 was lack of speed. Her engines were not built for her, but had been taken from a high-pressure river steamboat, and though on her trial trip she realized about 8 knots, 6 seems to be all that could usually be got from her. She was driven by a screw, the shaft being connected by gearing with the engines. The other defect was a culpable oversight. Her steering chains, instead of being led under her armored deck, were over it, exposed to an enemy's fire. She was therefore a ram that could only by a favorable chance overtake her prey, and was likely at any moment to lose the power of directing her thrust.

The Tennessee was completed in March, 1864, and two months later, May 18, she was floated over the mud flats of Dog river bar by means of camels and anchored in the deep water of the lower bay, 6 miles from the entrance. Meanwhile, Farragut was anxiously awaiting his ironclads or the arrival of troops in order to begin the attack on the forts, but was forced to content himself with threatening demonstrations, while the enemy completed his preparations for the defense of Mobile. At the end of February he bombarded Fort Powell for several days, hoping to capture the fort and get his gunboats through the pass into Mobile bay, which would force the enemy to keep their ironclads up the river. But 4,000 yards, the nearest point attainable to Powell, was too. long a range, and besides the enemy had built the fort with such skill that it was practically impervious to shot and shell. Farragut was well aware of the energy and enterprise of the Confederate Admiral Buchanan, and knew that he was not only expediting the work on the Tennessee, but was also pushing the work on three other ironclads, the Tuscaloosa, Huntsville and Nashville, said to be armored almost as heavily as the Tennessee. He privately informed the navy department, that should the ironclads cross the Dog river bar Page 256 and come out and attack his wooden fleet, the issue would necessarily be a doubtful one. He had not yet received a single ironclad, and in reply to his urgent requests for vessels of this type was told by the navy department as late as June, 1864, that the vessels could not yet be furnished because the contractors had not fulfilled the terms of their contract. Nevertheless, Farragut kept his fleet of wooden vessels in readiness to offer battle to Buchanan, if the latter decided to come out and attack him.

In addition to the forts and ships the enemy had planned other means of defense. At the end of the line of piles previously mentioned the Confederates had anchored triple lines of floating torpedoes across the channel, leaving a pass only 100 yards wide, immediately under the guns of Fort Morgan, for the use of blockade-runners, a red buoy marking the narrow channel thus left clear. Of the torpedoes 46 were made of beer-kegs and 134 of tin, all fitted with percussion fuses so that they would explode on contact.

After six months of tedious delay the monitor ironclads began to arrive in the latter part of July, and Farragut was also assured by General Canby, commanding the military division, of a cooperative land force under General Granger. It was arranged between Farragut and Granger that the troops should land August 4 on Dauphin island and invest Fort Gaines, as the force to be furnished was too small to attack both forts at once. On the same day Farragut was to run past Morgan with his fleet and enter the bay, but owing to unforeseen circumstances the attack was deferred until the 5th. Of the four monitors sent to Farragut, two—the Manhattan and Tecumseh—were from the Atlantic coast, and two—the Chickasaw and Winnebago—were from Porter's fleet on the Mississippi. The former were single turreted vessels, armored with ten inches of iron on the turrets and Page 257 carrying 15-inch Dahlgren guns, throwing solid steel shot weighing 440 pounds. The latter had inch armor and carried 11-inch Dahlgrens. All four were screw ships with a speed varying from 5 to 7 knots. On the evening of August 4 the four monitors and the wooden vessels were all assembled off the bar of Mobile bay, awaiting a favoring wind and tide. "In forming his line of attack the admiral wanted two favors from nature—a westerly wind to blow the smoke from the fleet toward Morgan and a flood-tide," and as it happened, he was accorded both. Says Mahan: "As at New Orleans, the preparations were left very much to the commanders of ships. A general order directed spare spars and boats to be landed, the machinery protected, and splinter-nettings placed. As the fleet was to pass between the eastern buoy and the beach, or 200 yards from Fort Morgan, little was feared from Fort Gaines, which would be over 2 miles away. The preparations were therefore made mainly on the starboard side, and port guns were shifted over till all the ports were full. The boats were lowered and towed on the port side. The admiral himself and the captain of the Brooklyn preferred to go in with their topsail yards across, but the Richmond and Lackawanna sent down their topmasts, and the other vessels seem to have done the same." As was done in running the batteries of Port Hudson, the wooden vessels were to be lashed together two and two, the lighter vessels on the off side to better protect them from the fire of Fort Morgan. Then the line was to form two columns, the monitors in a column inshore and abreast of the leading ships, but with the Tecumseh, which led, somewhat in advance of the head of the other column. Accordingly the whole fleet moved up the bay at 5 :40 a. m. of the 5th in the following order of battle: Monitors—starboard column: Tecumseh, 1,034 tons, 2 guns, Commander T. A. M. Craven; Manhattan, 1,034 tons, Page 258 2 guns, Commander J. W. A. Nicholson; Winnebago, 970 tons, 4 guns, Commander Thomas H. Stevens; Chickasaw, 970 tons, 4 guns, Lieutenant-Commander George H. Perkins. Wooden ships—port column: Brooklyn, 24 guns, Captain James Alden; Octorara, 6 guns, Lieutenant-Com. Charles H. Greene; Hartford, 21 guns, Rear-Admiral David G. Farragut, Captain Percival Drayton; Metacomet, 6 guns, Lieutenant-Com. James E. Jouett; Richmond, 20 guns, Captain Thornton A. Jenkins; Port Royal, 6 guns, Commander Bancroft Gherardi; Lackawanna, 8 guns, Captain John B. Marchand; Seminole, 8 guns, Commander Edward Donaldson; Monongahela, 8 guns, Commander James H. Strong; Kennebec, 5 guns, Lieutenant-Com. William P. McCann; Ossipee, n guns, Commander William E. Le Roy; Itasca, 6 guns, Lieutenant-Com. George Brown; Oneida, 9 guns, Commander J. R. M. Mullany; Galena, 10 guns, Lieutenant-Com. Clark H. Wells. Every vessel of the squadron had been built for the naval service, and all were screw ships, except the Octorara, Metacomet and Port Royal, which were side-wheel double enders. Never did officers and men enter upon a fight with greater gallantry and determination. All knew the tremendous obstacles they had to overcome and many of the conservative officers had calculated that at least half a dozen of the vessels must be destroyed in making the passage. But the spirit of their great commander and his evident eagerness for the fray had infected every man in the fleet. None counted the cost, if only the defiant flag of the enemy could finally be displaced by the Stars and Stripes, and the last of the Confederate rams be sent the way of her predecessors. "At 6:10 the bar was crossed by the flag-ship, and by 6:30 the order for battle was fairly formed, the monitors taking their station; in doing this a slight delay occurred. At this time all the ships hoisted the United States flag at the peak and the three mastheads, and the Tecumseh

Page 259 fired the first two shots at the fort." The Brooklyn followed with her two 1oo-pound Parrotts. The squadron now steamed slowly ahead, making for the narrow pass immediately under the guns of Morgan marked by the red buoy. The fort maintained an ominous silence, as the garrison was waiting until the vessels got within the deadliest range, but a few minutes after 7 the fort opened upon the Brooklyn, the leading ship, which promptly replied with her bow rifle, and the action at once became general. The little Confederate squadron at the same time came out from behind the fort and formed in line ahead just above the torpedoes, where they were able to pour in a raking fire on the slowly approaching fleet. By 7:30 the leaders of the Union fleet had arrived abreast of the fort, where they could bring their broadsides to bear, and they rained such a fire of grape and canister on the works, as to fairly smother the fire of the Confederate gunners, hence the ships were able to pass with comparatively small damage. The fate which overtook the monitor Tecumseh at this juncture can best be told in the words of the well known naval historian, Mahan: "The Tecumseh, after firing the first two guns, had turned her turret from the enemy and loaded again with steel shot and the heaviest charge of powder. Intent only upon the Tennessee, she steamed quietly on, regardless of the fort, a little ahead of the Brooklyn, the other monitors following her closely. As they drew near the buoy, Craven from the pilot-house of his ship saw it so nearly in line with the beach that he turned to his pilot and said, 'It is impossible that the admiral means us to go inside that buoy; I cannot turn my ship.' At the same moment the Tennessee, which until that time had lain to the eastward of the buoy, went ahead to the westward of it, and Craven, either fearing she would get away from him or moved by the seeming narrowness of the open way, gave Page 260 the order 'starboard' and pushed the Tecumseh straight at the enemy. She had gone but a few yards and the lock-string was already taut in the hands of an officer of the enemy's ship, Lieutenant Wharton, waiting to fire as they touched, when one or more torpedoes exploded under her. She lurched from side to side, careened violently over, and went down head foremost, her screw plainly visible in the air for a moment to the enemy that waited for her not 200 yards off, on the other side of the fatal line. It was then that Craven did one of those deeds that should always be linked with the doer's name, as Sidney's is with the cup of cold water. The pilot and he instinctively made for the narrow opening leading to the turret below. Craven drew back: 'After you, pilot,' he said. But there was no afterward for him; the pilot was saved, but he went down with his ship." At this moment the Brooklyn, which was about 300 yards astern of the Tecumseh, stopped and began backing her engines to avoid torpedoes, thus temporarily arresting the progress of the fleet. The Hartford, close behind the Brooklyn, also stopped her engines, but drifting ahead with the flood tide kept her way and began to approach dangerously near the Brooklyn, while the Richmond in turn was close astern of the drifting flag-ship. Farragut did not hesitate, but regardless of torpedoes ordered his own ship and her consort ahead, and at once dashed to the head of the column, turning to the westward across the line of torpedoes, as they were no longer able to pass inside of the buoy from their position. Fortunately the Hartford went safely through, though the torpedoes bumped against the bottom of the ship and the primers could be heard snapping. Meanwhile the admiral had climbed into the port main rigging of his vessel, in order to see over the smoke of battle, and had seen the Tecumseh sink. He at once ordered Jouett, of the Metacomet alongside, to send a boat to the aid Page 261 of the Tecumseh's crew. Jouett had already anticipated the order, having seen the disaster, and Ensign H. C. Nields was even then leaving the ship's side in command of a boat's crew. Nields, though only a lad, proved himself another hero.

"He sat unmoved in the stern of his frail craft as it passed out from the shelter of his ship into the hurtling storm that ripped the water into misty spray. A moment later he remembered that his flag was not flying, and standing up as a Perry might have done, he unfurled the flag, set it to its staff in the face of friend and foe, and then sat down quietly to guide the boat on her mission." (Spears, History of our Navy, pp. 394-5). Of the officers and crew of the Tecumseh, 92 sank with their ship, including the heroic captain, and only 4 officers and 17 men escaped.

During the confusion caused by the stopping of the Brooklyn, the ships were temporarily held under the hottest fire from the forts, and it was at this time that the flag-ship in particular suffered her greatest loss. As she advanced over the line of torpedoes, the three gunboats of the enemy also raked her, while the Hartford could only reply with her bow guns, one of which was soon disabled by a bursting shell. Her forward gun-deck became a slaughter-pen, blood ran in streams from her scuppers, and flying splinters and bits of human flesh even bespattered the deck of her little consort. Captain Drayton spied the admiral in the shrouds near the maintop and ordered a sailor "to make fast a slender rope from one shroud to another in such a way that the admiral could not fall in case he was struck." Thus arose the oft-repeated statement that the great admiral went into the battle of Mobile bay "lashed to the shrouds."

Soon after 8 o'clock the whole fleet had safely passed the fort with only the loss of the Tecumseh. After the passage of the heavier vessels the enemy returned to their guns and the Page 262 ships at the end of the line received a severe pounding. The Oneida, the last ship, received a 7-inch rifle-shell in her starboard boiler, had her wheel-ropes cut away by another projectile, and 2 of her guns disabled, but her consort, the Galena, towed her safely by the fort.

After crossing the line of torpedoes the Hartford followed the slowly retreating gunboats, which kept at a distance of about 700 yards and continued to use their stern guns with good effect. The Tennessee, instead of retreating, made a dash for the flag-ship, the Confederate admiral evidently being bent on sinking his adversary, but the Hartford was the faster vessel and easily avoided the thrust. Soon after abandoning her pursuit of the Hartford, the Tennessee turned back and passed clear through the Union fleet, inflicting some damage and suffering very little in return. The Hartford continued after the three Confederate gunboats and finally placed a shot below the waterline of the Gaines, following it with another which started a leak in the gunboat's magazine. Farragut now ordered the Metacomet to cast off her couplings and pursue and destroy the gunboats, at the same time signalling the lighter vessels in the rear to the same effect. The Metacomet captured the Selma after a brisk engagement, but the Morgan and Gaines succeeded in getting under the protection of Fort Morgan. The former subsequently crept along the shore during the night into Mobile, but the latter was so seriously disabled she was burnt.

At about 8:30 the admiral ordered the men of the Hartford to breakfast, the vessel being then anchored about 4 miles from Fort Morgan, the Tennessee having apparently retired under the guns of the fort. Said Captain Drayton: "What we have done has been well done, sir, but it all counts for nothing so long as the Tennessee is there under the guns of Morgan." "I know it," said Farragut, "and as soon as the people Page 263 have had their breakfast I'm going for her." At the same time Buchanan was remarking to his fleet captain: "Follow them up Johnston, we can't let them off that way." Shortly before 9 o'clock, when the men had scarcely got seated at breakfast, word came down that the Tennessee was standing toward the Hartford, with the desperate intention apparently of fighting single-handed the whole fleet. Farragut has given the following graphic account of the extraordinary combat that ensued:

"I was not long in comprehending his intentions to be the destruction of the flag-ship. The monitors, and such of the wooden vessels as I thought best adapted for the purpose, were immediately ordered to attack the ram, not only with their guns, but bows on at full speed, and then began one of the fiercest naval combats on record. The Monongahela, Commander Strong, was the first vessel that struck her, and in doing so carried away his own iron prow, together with the cutwater, without apparently doing her adversary much injury. The Lackawanna, Captain Marchand, was the next vessel to strike her, which she did at full speed. But though her stem was cut and crushed to the plank ends for the distance of three feet above the water's edge to 5 feet below, the only perceptible effect on the ram was to give her a heavy list. The Hartford was the third vessel which struck her, but, as the Tennessee quickly shifted her helm, the blow was a glancing one, and as she rasped along our side, we poured our whole port broadside of 9-inch solid shot within 10 feet of her casemate. The monitors worked slowly, but delivered their fire as opportunity offered. The Chickasaw succeeded in getting under her stern, and a 15-inch shot from the Manhattan broke through her iron plating and heavy wooden backing, though the missile itself did not enter the vessel. Immediately after the collision with the flag-ship, Page 264 I directed Captain Drayton to bear down for the ram again. He was doing so at full speed when, unfortunately, the Lackawanna ran into the Hartford just forward of the mizzenmast, cutting her down within 2 feet of the water's edge. We soon got clear again, however, and were fast approaching our adversary, when she struck her colors and ran up the white flag. She was at this time sore beset; the Chickasaw was pounding away at her stern, the Ossipee was approaching her at full speed, and the Monongahela, Lackawanna,. and this ship were bearing down upon her, determined upon her destruction. Her smokestack had been shot away, her steering chains were gone, compelling a resort to her relieving tackles, and several of her port shutters were jammed. Indeed, from the time the Hartford struck her until her surrender, she never fired a gun. As the Ossipee,. Commander Le Roy, was about to strike her, she hoisted the white flag, and that vessel immediately stopped her engine, though not in time to avoid a glancing blow. During this contest with the rebel gunboats and the ram Tennessee, and which terminated by her surrender at 10 o'clock, we lost many more men than from the fire of Fort Morgan."

In speaking of the work of the monitor Chickasaw, which hung at the stern of the Tennessee so persistently during the last half hour of the fight, the latter's pilot said afterward: "D-n him, he stuck to us like a leech; we could not get away from him. It was he who cut away the steering gear, jammed the stern port shutters and wounded Admiral Buchanan." Indeed, both the bow and the stern port shutters were so jammed that none of those guns could be used,. and it was while superintending in person the working of the Tennessee's battery, and the clearing of one of the shutters,. that the admiral's leg was broken by an iron splinter. Despite the merciless pounding and ramming she received from

Page 265 the Union fleet, she would have probably continued the fight had not her chances been ruined by the defects in the shutters and the steering gear. When her smoke stack was shot away her fires went down, the smoke from the stump poured through the iron gratings of the gun-deck, where her crew were at work in an atmosphere of 120 degrees. The fight with the Tennessee lasted an hour and ten minutes, and not a single shot penetrated her casemate. Only one of the Manhattan's 15—inch shot broke through the casemate and bulged the wood backing into a mass of undetached splinters. Buchanan fought his ship with his well known bravery and skill,. but only an impregnable vessel could have survived the determined attack of the Union fleet. After the Tennessee surrendered, the Chickasaw took her in tow and anchored her near the Hartford. Commander Johnston, who commanded the Tennessee after Buchanan was wounded, went on board the flag-ship and surrendered his sword and that of Admiral Buchanan. The loss of the Tennessee was 2 killed and 10 wounded. The Union fleet lost 52 killed by shots and 170 wounded, besides 120 drowned in the Tecumseh, making a total of 172 killed, and 170 wounded. These losses were distributed among the vessels as follows: Hartford, 25 killed, 28 wounded; Brooklyn, n killed, 43 wounded; Lackawanna, 4 killed, 35 wounded; Oneida, 8 killed, 30 wounded; Monongahela, 6 wounded; Metacomet, 1 killed, 2 wounded; Ossipee, 1 killed, 7 wounded; Richmond, 2 wounded; Galena, 1 wounded; Octorara, 1 killed, 10 wounded; Kennebec, 1 killed, 6 wounded. The following men were specially praised for gallantry in Farragut's report: Capts. Percival Drayton and Thornton A. Jenkins; Commanders Mullany, Nicholson and Stevens; Lieutenant-Commanders Jouett and Perkins; Lieutenants Watson and Yates; Acting-Ensigns Henry C. Nields, Bogart and Heginbotham; Ensign Henry H. Brownell, Sec.. Page 266 McKinley, the pilot Martin Freeman, Acting Volunteer Lieuts. William Hamilton, and P. Giraud. Of his own crew he stated: "I have never seen a crew come up like ours. They are ahead of the old set in small arms and fully equal to them at the great guns. They arrived here a mere set of boys and young men, and have now fattened up and knocked the 9inch guns about like 24-pounders, to the astonishment of everybody. There was but one man who showed fear and he was allowed to resign. This was the most desperate battle I have ever fought since the days of the old Essex."

On the afternoon of the fight, the Chickasaw stood down to Fort Powell and engaged it for an hour at short range. Unable to withstand an attack from the rear it was evacuated and blown up the same night. Meanwhile General Granger's troops had landed on Dauphin island and invested Fort Gaines. On the 6th the Chickasaw went down and shelled this work and on the following day the Confederate commander, Colonel Anderson, surrendered his garrison of 818 men unconditionally. The army was now moved over to Mobile point and Fort Morgan, which still held out, was closely . invested in the rear. On the 22nd fire was opened from the fleet and shore batteries, and on the 23d its commander, General Page, surrendered. Mobile was now effectually cut off from all external commerce, but did not finally fall until the middle of the following spring. On account of the shoal water and obstructions Farragut was unable to reach the city and the great operations then being carried forward in Virginia, Georgia and Tennessee, made it unwise to divert any large body of troops to this point in 1864. The works about the city were very strong and could only be reduced by regular siege operations. In the latter part of March, 1865, General Canby, commanding the Army of the West Mississippi, drew his lines about Page 267 Spanish Fort and on the 27th, after first thoroughly sweeping the bay for torpedoes, the fleet, now commanded by Admiral Thatcher, moved up and crossed Dog river bar. The navy's work was to cut off all communication between the city and the fort by water, and it participated in the work of bombarding the defenses until the final surrender of Mobile in April. From a naval standpoint the most important incidents connected with these operations were the serious losses sustained by the fleet from torpedoes. On the 28th the ironclad Milwaukee had been shelling a transport at Spanish Fort and was returning to the fleet, when she struck a torpedo and was sunk, though fortunately no one was drowned or hurt by this accident. Only a day later the Osage, while shifting her anchorage, was destroyed in like manner. This torpedo was probably sent down from above, as the vicinity had been thoroughly swept for torpedoes. Five of the crew were killed and 11 wounded by the explosion, but none were drowned. On April I the wrecking steamer Randolph, while starting to raise the Milwaukee, struck another torpedo and quickly sank, with a loss of 4 killed and n wounded. Even after the enemy had evacuated Mobile and the navy had removed over 150 torpedoes from the channel of the Tombigbee, torpedoes struck and destroyed two tugs and a launch, with a loss of 8 killed and 5 wounded, and the list of similar calamities concluded with the sinking of the gunboat Sciota on April 14, with a loss of 6 killed and 5 wounded.