Naval Battles

Along the Gulf Shore

Mention has already been made of the inception of the blockade in the Gulf, of the steps taken by the Brooklyn and Powhatan, and of the arrival of Flag-officer William Mervine on June 8, 1861, to assume command of the Gulf blockading squadron. Mervine arrived at his station in the frigate Mississippi, but soon after transferred his flag to the Colorado, when the latter vessel Page 48 arrived. The general plan of operations was similar to that carried on in the Atlantic. The principal ports were blockaded as soon as possible and by the end of July, when the vessels on the station numbered 21, the blockade became fairly effective. It was several months, however, before a thorough blockade was established over the long stretches of coast line between the principal ports, while at the ports themselves an inefficient guard was maintained over some of the shallow side-entrances.

Mervine remained in command of the squadron until September, 1861, when he was relieved by Flag-officer William W. McKean. As soon as a sufficient force arrived in the Gulf, the plans of the department contemplated a division of the squadron, similar to that of the Atlantic squadron. This division was made when Farragut was selected to command the expedition against New Orleans. Accordingly, Farragut assumed command of the Western Gulf squadron February 21, 1862, with a cruising ground reaching from Pensacola on the east to the Rio Grande on the west. He was succeeded by Commander Thatcher late in the fall of 1864. The region from Cape Canaveral on the eastern coast of Florida, to Pensacola, was guarded by the Eastern Gulf squadron, with headquarters at Key West. McKean retained command of this squadron until June 4, 1862, when he was relieved by Captain Lardner. Shortly after Lardner was succeeded by Commander Theodoras Bailey, and two years later, October 12, 1864, when Bailey's health became undermined in the enervating climate of his station, he was succeeded by Commander Cornelius K. Stribling, who retained the command until the close of the war.

In view of the extreme weakness of the Confederate navy little more was demanded of the Union navy during the early period of the war than to complete an effective blockade of Southern ports, and then to convert the blockade into an occupation of important harbors and strategic coast points as rapidly as possible. This work of effecting a lodgment was sometimes carried Page 49 on by the navy alone, but more often in conjunction with the land forces. In 1861 the four principal harbors in the Gulf in the order of their commercial importance were New Orleans, Mobile, Galveston and Pensacola. Manifestly, while a legal blockade could be maintained by vessels cruising or anchored outside the harbors, much more effective service could be rendered by vessels placed within them. To this end the energies of the department were early directed toward the occupation of the above points. The occupation of New Orleans, especially, was essential to the accomplishment of one of the prime objects of the war—the control of the Mississippi—which would cut the Confederacy in twain. Fortunately, Fort Pickens, commanding the entrance to Pensacola, was never lost to the Union. In 1862, the city itself was evacuated and from that time on succeeded Ship island as the depot of the Western Gulf squadron.

Early in October a small squadron, consisting of the steam-sloop Richmond, sailing-sloops Vincennes and Preble, and the little side-wheel steamer Water Witch, entered the Mississippi, and took its station at the head of the passes. The Union fleet took possession of the telegraph station at this point and began work on a fortification. A few days after taking this position occurred the first collision with the vessels of the enemy—an encounter which proved both disastrous and humiliating to the service. The officers of the Union fleet had for some time been apprised that a Confederate naval force was being fitted out at New Orleans under the command of Com. Hollins, and that a powerful ram, the Manassas, would form part of the hostile fleet. Nevertheless, there were no proper precautions taken to prevent a surprise, nor does there appear to have been any prearranged plan of action to meet the enemy when he should arrive. Therefore, the attack, when it came in the early dawn of October 12, was a complete surprise. As Captain John Pope of the Richmond, the senior officer in command, says: "The whole affair Page 50 came upon me so suddenly that no time was left for reflection, but called for immediate action." The following is from Captain Mahan's interesting account of the affair: "At 3130 a. m., October 12, a Confederate ram made its appearance close aboard the Richmond, which at the time had a coal schooner alongside. The ram charged the Richmond, forcing a small hole in her side about two feet below the water-line and tearing the schooner adrift. She dropped astern, lay quietly for a few minutes off the port-quarter of the Richmond, and then steamed slowly up the river, receiving broadsides from the Richmond and Preble, and throwing up a rocket. In a few moments three dim lights were seen up the river near the eastern shore. They were shortly made out to be fire-rafts. The squadron slipped their chains, the three larger vessels, by direction of the senior officer, retreating down the Southwest pass to the sea, but in the attempt to cross, the Richmond and Vincennes grounded on the bar. The fire-rafts drifted harmlessly on to the western bank of the river and then burned out. When day broke, the enemy's fleet, finding the head of the passes abandoned, followed down the river, and with rifled guns kept up a steady but not very accurate fire upon the stranded ships, not venturing within reach of the Richmond's heavy broadside. About 10 a. m., apparently satisfied with the day's work, they returned up the river and the ships shortly after got afloat and crossed the bar. The ram which caused this commotion and hasty retreat was a small vessel of 384 tons, originally a Boston tug-boat called the Enoch Train, which had been sent to New Orleans to help in improving the channel of the Mississippi. * * * At the time of this attack she had a cast-iron prow under water, and carried a IX-inch gun, pointing straight ahead through a slot in the roof forward, but as this for some reason could not be used, it was lashed in its place. Her dimensions were: length 128 feet, beam 26 feet, depth \2y2 feet. She had twin screws, and at this time one engine was running at high pressure and the Page 51 other at low, both being in bad order, so that she could only steam 6 knots, but carrying the current with her she struck the Richmond with a speed of from 9 to 10. * * * In the collision her prow was wrenched off, her smoke-stack carried away and the condenser of the low-pressure engine gave out, which accounts for her 'remaining under the Richmond's quarter,' 'dropping astern,' and 'lying quietly abeam of the Preble, apparently hesitating whether to come at her or not.' * * * It is a relief to say that the Water Witch, a small vessel of under 400 tons, with 3 light guns, commanded by Lieutenant Francis Winslow, held her ground, steaming up beyond the fire-rafts until daylight showed her the larger vessels in retreat."

Before the close of the first year of the war Farragut ran the lower defenses of New Orleans and effected the capitulation of that important city, thereby rendering the work of the blockade much easier. On September 16 the Confederates evacuated Ship island and the fort on the island was promptly occupied by a force landed from the Massachusetts. The excellent channel off the island, affording safe anchorage for vessels of the deepest draught, caused it to be selected as the depot of the Western Gulf squadron until the evacuation of Pensacola in 1862. Moreover, the island was a convenient point from which to carry on the blockade of Mississippi sound, and to intercept the light draught vessels running between New Orleans and Mobile. During an engagement here July 9, 1861, between land batteries and the Massachusetts 26 shots were fired from the batteries and 17 shot and shell from the vessel. No damage resulted. Also, on October 19,1861, there occurred a long distance engagement between the Confederate steamer Florida, Com. Hollins, and the converted steamer Massachusetts, Commander Melancthon Smith. The Florida was the faster vessel and of lighter draft, and was therefore able to choose her distance, being never less than 1 ¾  miles distant. The log of the Massachusetts reported the engagement Page 52 as follows: "At 10 40 a. m. saw a steamer 8 miles distant having two masts. At 11 45 she fired a lee gun and slowed down. The rebel steamer then fired shot that fell short.one-eighth of a mile. Hove up and stood for the steamer. She commenced to fire and we answered with 68 and 32 pounders. At 12:30 p. m. received a 68-pound rifle shell, which came in on our starboard quarter, 5 feet above water line and 20 feet abaft mainmast, exploding in wardroom and completely gutting several staterooms. At 1 came in shoal water and could not follow the steamer any farther, and having effectually silenced her guns, bore away for anchorage."

Mobile, the second city in importance on the Gulf, is 30 miles distant from the sea, at the head of the large bay of the same name. This bay varies in width from 15 miles at the lower end to about 6 at the upper. Only a small part of this large sheet of water was accessible to vessels of even moderate draught at the time of the Civil war, as the depth throughout the greater part was only from 12 to 14 feet, shelving gradually to the ripples at the beach. In the lower end of the bay, extending northwest for 6 miles, there is a hole with a depth of from 20 to 24 feet, and the sandy islands that reach out to either side of the mouth narrow the entrance to the channel to a little less than 2,000 yards. Since the war a channel has been dredged from the deep hole at the mouth clear to the city of Mobile, providing a depth of 23 feet the whole length. There was a bar outside over which ships drawing 20 feet of water could pass. On the east of the main entrance is Mobile point, a long, low projection of land jutting out from the mainland, and on the west lies Dauphin island, one of the series of low islands defining Mississippi sound. This sound was used by vessels of light draught to carry on an inland navigation between Mobile and New Orleans, it being possible to enter the bay direct from it by way of Grant's pass. Owing to its peculiar location, Mobile was easily defended and also easily blockaded. Fort Morgan on Mobile point and Fort Gaines Page 53 on Dauphin island guarded the main entrance; Fort Powell, a small earthwork on Tower island, guarded the shallow entrance into Mississippi sound. Inasmuch as the entrance to the main channel was over 5 miles from the forts, the blockading vessels could be stationed close to the bar, where an effective blockade could be maintained by a very small force. It was also found necessary to station additional vessels at the two side-entrances to the .bay. During the first year of the war the blockade of Mobile was usually maintained by a single vessel cruising a few miles from the entrance. Later a larger force was employed, and eventually the vessels would anchor within a few hundred yards of the bar buoy, with perhaps a gunboat stationed within the channel. Despite the comparative ease with which the blockade of Mobile could be maintained, blockade runners were often able, up to the last year of the war, to make the port and twice the Confederate cruiser Florida ran past the blockading squadron. On the first occasion, September 4, 1862, the daring passage was made in broad daylight, when the actual blockading force consisted only of the sloop-of-war Oneida, undergoing repairs, and the gunboat Winona. After remaining for four months at Mobile and thoroughly refitting, the Florida came out on the night of January 16, 1863, and made her bold escape by way of the main channel, successfully eluding the seven vessels, then composing the blockading fleet, including the fast steamer R. R. Cuyler. The subsequent career of the Florida as a commerce destroyer, under her various commanders, Maffitt, Barney and Morris, and her final capture in violation of international law in the neutral port of Bahia, will be found recounted in a separate chapter. These two escapes of the Florida, under her brilliant commander John N. Maffitt, aroused the energies of the blockading officers and from this time on until its capture, the port of Mobile was one of the most difficult for the blockade runners to enter. With the capture of Forts Gaines and Morgan in August, 1864, the Union fleet Page 54 was able to enter the bay, but the city itself was not reduced until in April, 1865.

After New Orleans and Mobile, Galveston was the next important port on the Gulf. Like Mobile it was easily blockaded, except against small craft of light draft. In the early part of the war there were no strong fortifications protecting the city and Galveston lay exposed to the fire of the blockaders, which were able to approach near to the shore and anchor. The port was first blockaded by the South Carolina, Captain James Alden, in the latter part of June, 1861. A slight affair took place here August 3, 1861, which is only of importance because it led to a protest from the foreign consuls in the town against what they termed bombardment without notice. A shore battery fired upon a tender of the blockading ship, which returned the fire and then reported the matter to Captain Alden, who "waited all day for some explanation or disavowal on the part of the authorities." This explanation not being forthcoming he took the South Carolina, which drew only 12 feet, within a mile of the works. The enemy opened fire on her and Alden replied with 15 shots, but desisted when he found one or two of his shells had fallen within the town. The Confederates made no protest themselves against the bombardment, but the consular protests, sent under seal to the various governments represented, were flagrant misrepresentations of the affair, and illustrate the official attitude which some of the European governments were eager to assume. The following November, while the frigate Santee was blockading Galveston, Lieutenant James E. Jouett with 40 of the crew in two of the ship's boats, boldly entered the inner harbor, stole along the city's water front, and in a hand to hand encounter, boarded, captured and burnt the privateer schooner Royal Yacht. The Federals lost 3 killed and 6 wounded and carried off 13 prisoners. The undertaking was a most daring one and marked Jouett as a hero. It is a pleasure to record that the intrepidity and bravery Page 55 of Jouett were promptly recognized by the department, and soon after he was placed in command of the U. S. S. Montgomery. Regarding the efficiency of the Galveston blockade shortly after this, a report of Flag-officer McKean, dated February 17, 1862, states: "In consequence of the statement made by the commander of a British war steamer that the harbor of Galveston was not blockaded, I deem it due to Captain Eagle to state that on my arrival at that place I found the frigate Santee anchored in the main ship channel, and as close to the bar as was prudent for a sailing vessel. I visited and inspected the Santee, found her in fine order, and her crew well drilled at the guns."

When Farragut assumed command of the Western Gulf squadron, his great task was to open up the Mississippi, though he found time also to prosecute the established policy of converting the blockade of principal points into an occupation. West of the Mississippi the important harbors and passes were Atchafalaya bay and the Calcasieu on the coast of Louisiana, Sabine pass, at the western boundary of the state, and Galveston, Pass Cavallo, Aransas and Corpus Christi in Texas. A small body of troops, together with a number of small vessels, under Lieutenant-Commander Buchanan, were sent to operate in Atchafalaya. Buchanan was killed in an engagement in the Teche a few weeks after his arrival, but the operations continued here over a long period of time. Generally speaking, during the remainder of the war, blockade and occupation alternated at the various passes on the coast of Texas. In order to break up blockade-running by small craft from Havana at the passes of Louisiana and Texas, expeditions were sent to Corpus Christi, to Calcasieu and Sabine pass, and to Galveston. The expedition to Corpus Christi, under Acting-Lieutenant Kittredge, consisted of 5 small vessels and about 100 men. It met with unexpected opposition and did not succeed in holding the town, but captured and destroyed a number of vessels and established an Page 56 efficient blockade. The expedition to Sabine pass, consisting of the steamer Kensington and the schooner Rachel Seaman, under Acting-Master Crocker, sailed in September, 1862. On his arrival Crocker found only the mortar-schooner Henry Janes, which had been there but a few days, the only blockading force. He acted with commendable zeal, captured Sabine City, destroyed the railroad bridge above the city, made prizes of the steamer Dan and the blockade-runner Velocity, together with a number of other vessels, and on his return to Pensacola in the Kensington, left at the pass the Rachel Seaman, and the prize-vessels Dan and Velocity, to maintain a real blockade.

The Galveston expedition was of a somewhat more formidable character. It consisted of the ferry-boats Westfield and Clifton, respectively, commanded by Captain W. B. Renshaw and Lieutenant Commander Law, the side-wheel steamer Harriet Lane, Commander Wainwright, and the gunboat Owasco, Lieutenant-Commander Wilson. The squadron was commanded by Renshaw, and each of the vessels carried a powerful armament. Galveston surrendered without a fight and the fleet was able to take up a secure position within the bay. At the request of Renshaw it was decided to send a military force to occupy and hold Galveston, which point was also to be made a base for future military operations. Only a small detachment, consisting of three companies of the 42nd Mass. infantry, under Colonel Burrill, numbering 260 men, without artillery, was sent. The force was clearly too small, but with such a well armed squadron it was deemed sufficient, as the enemy had no known vessels adapted for operation in these waters. The great mistakes made by Renshaw were in underestimating the resources of his enemy and in neglecting to take the simple precaution of destroying the railroad bridge connecting Galveston with the mainland. Renshaw's confidence in the security of his position was destined to be rudely shattered and the defeat of his squadron at Galveston changed the aspect Page 57 of affairs on this part of the coast, and for a time raised the blockade at this point. On the morning of January i, 1863 (see Cyclopedia of Battles), a combined attack was made on the land and naval forces in the bay by Confederate troops and the two cotton-clad steamers Bayou City and Neptune, each manned by about 200 sharpshooters. The battle resulted in the surrender of the land forces, the capture of the Harriet Lane, and the destruction of the Westfield, which was blown up by Renshaw to prevent its capture. The Westfield went fast aground at the very beginning of the action in Bolivar channel. Stationed near her were the schooner Velocity, recently captured at Sabine pass, and some transports and coal-barks. After blowing up the Westfield, it was Renshaw's intention to leave the bay on one of the transports, but through error or carelessness, the explosion occurred prematurely, killing Renshaw and several of his officers and crew. The Harriet Lane happened to be stationed nearest the attacking force, and as the two Confederate steamers came down about daylight she advanced to meet them, firing her bow gun. The vessels fought at close quarters, and both Wainwright and Lieutenant Lea fell mortally wounded early in the engagement. Wainwright was a gallant officer and died at the head of his men while defending his ship. After the death of Wainwright and Lea, the surviving senior officer, an acting-master, weakly surrendered his ship to the enemy who had boarded, though less than a score of the Harriet Lane's crew of n2 had been seriously injured. Captain Law, the senior officer of the squadron after the death of Renshaw, successfully brought the rest of the vessels, with the exception of two coal-barks, safely out of the harbor, and the blockade was abandoned. This whole affair at Galveston aroused the indignation of Admiral Farragut, who thus characterized the surrender of the Harriet Lane: "It is difficult to conceive of a more pusillanimous surrender of a vessel to an enemy already in Page 58 our power." This unfortunate engagement at Galveston was followed on the 21st by the capture of the sailing vessels Morning Light and Velocity off Sabine pass. The attacking force again consisted of two cotton-clad steamers, which came out on a calm day when the blockaders were unable to maneuver and could offer slight resistance. From this time on both Galveston and Sabine pass remained in the hands of the enemy, though prompt measures were taken to continue the blockade at both places. The capture of the Morning Light and Velocity confirmed the belief that sailing vessels were unable to maintain the blockade at points where the enemy possessed steamers. As soon as the news of the event was received by Commodore Bell, who had been sent to Galveston by Admiral Farragut to resume the blockade at that point with the Brooklyn, the Hatteras, and a number of gunboats, Bell despatched the U. S. S. New London and the gunboat Cayuga to Sabine. This prompt action left little excuse for a claim that the blockade had been raised at Sabine pass.

When Bell and his squadron arrived January 8 off Galveston, after an interruption to the blockade of seven days, they narrowly missed finding the Alabama lying in the harbor. On the afternoon of the nth a strange sail was sighted a few miles to the southward and eastward, and the Hatteras, an iron side-wheel steamer bought from the merchant service and armed with a light battery, was sent to overhaul her. The strange sail proved to be the Confederate cruiser Alabama. A brilliant but disastrous engagement ensued. "Semmes pretended to run and so drew the Hatteras away from the other blockaders, and then at 7 p. m. (it was dark of course) lay to for her. When the Hatteras ranged up and hailed, Semmes said his ship was 'Her Britannic Majesty's ship Vixen.' Captain H. C. Blake, of the Hatteras, said he would send a boat, but when the boat had been lowered Semmes shouted, 'We are the Confederate steamer Alabama,' and Page 59 fired a broadside. Semmes was not at any time more than 100 yards away, and the Hatteras, a paddle-wheel steamer, was soon riddled. Blake tried to get alongside the Alabama to board, but could not do it, of course, and the Hatteras was soon rapidly sinking. A lee gun was fired and help called for. The living were all taken off by the Alabama's crew, save the boat's crew that had started to board the Alabama. These escaped to the fleet 20 miles away at Galveston. The Hatteras carried 2 short 32s and 2 small rifles—a 20-pounder and a 30-pounder—that she was able to bring to bear." The prisoners were paroled the same day at sea, and were landed 9 days later at Port Royal, Jamaica.

Another attempt was made by Acting-Lieutenant Crocker, who had commanded the successful expedition of the year before, to recapture Sabine pass, now strongly defended. Though Crocker had a larger force and was aided by a detachment of troops the expedition resulted in disaster. The Clifton and Sachem capitulated to the fire of the fort and the remainder of the vessels, together with the transports, were forced to withdraw.

The best harbor on the Gulf was at Pensacola, Florida, near the Alabama line. At the time of the Civil war it lacked adequate railroad communication with the interior and therefore possessed only a small commerce. However, it was close to Mobile and the passes of the Mississippi, had 22 feet of water over the bar and spacious anchorage within, facts which gave it first rank as a naval station and caused it to be selected for that purpose when abandoned by the Confederates in 1862. Its importance was early recognized by the South and before the war commenced (January 12, 1861), the navy yard at Pensacola was surrounded by some troops under Colonel Lomax and Major W. H. Chase, who compelled its surrender by Commodore James Armstrong. Worst of all no effort was made to preserve to the use of the government the powder in the magazine and the other valuable stores Page 60 and property within the yard. Armstrong's lamentable failure to hold the yard resulted in his suspension from the navy for five years, though he was not charged with actual disloyalty. It is worthy of note that two of his subordinate officers, Commander Ebenezer Farrand and Lieutenant Francis B. Renshaw, continued to wear the uniform of the government and to draw their pay while doing their utmost to serve the cause of the Confederacy, and only sent in their resignations when they could do no more. Fortunately for the government, one loyal officer dared to disobey the order of his superior, and Fort Pickens, one of the three forts guarding the harbor, was saved to the Union. This officer was Commander Henry Walke, in command of the transport Supply, who was temporarily in Pensacola en route to Vera Cruz. Walke noted the utter demoralization at Pensacola and was keenly alive to the probable results of the vacillating and hesitating course being pursued by Armstrong. Consequently, when he received order on the 9th to assist Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer, U. S. A., in concentrating the little force of troops garrisoning Fort McRee, Fort Barrancas and Fort Pickens at the last named fort, he was eager to obey. But no sooner had he begun the work than his order was modified and he was instructed to merely deliver a supply of food to the men already in Pickens, leaving the soldiers distributed as they were in the several forts. This order he resolved to disobey to the extent of bringing about the concentration of the troops, a work which was accomplished on the 10th. When the yard was surrendered on the 12th, Walke also took the paroled officers and men, together with their families, aboard his vessel and carried them to New York. In doing this act of humanity, he again violated instructions, as his original order directed him to proceed to Vera Cruz. Though subsequently court-martialed and censured for disobedience, the technical findings of the court carried with them no dishonor. When most of the damage had been done and the yard was in Page 61 the possession of the disloyal Southerners, the Buchanan administration was moved to send down the Brooklyn with reinforcements to the number of 86 artillerymen and n5 marines. But Captain H. A. Adams of the Brooklyn advised against landing the men in Fort Pickens lest the proceeding be "viewed as a hostile act," and "bring on, by precipitation, a collision." And this, when the Confederates were straining every nerve to improve the condition of Fort McRee. The Brooklyn was thereupon ordered to lie off the harbor and the men remained on the vessel. It was not until April 12 that explicit orders to land the troops were carried to Captain Adams of the Brooklyn by Lieutenant John L. Worden (later the famous commander of the Monitor) and the same night Fort Pickens received the much needed reinforcements. The garrison had consisted of only 83 men, and General Braxton Bragg of the Confederate forces had planned an attack for the night of the 13th, which must certainly have succeeded by reason of the weakness of the garrison. The result was that the flag continued to float over Fort Pickens throughout the war. The exasperation of the Confederates vented itself in the arrest of Worden in Montgomery, where he remained a prisoner for seven months.

On the night of September 13, 1861, the monotony of affairs about Pensacola was broken by a dashing cutting-out expedition from the flag-ship Colorado. Says the report of Commodore Mervine describing the affair: "A boat expedition was fitted out from this ship on the night of the 13th instant, consisting of the first launch, first, second and third cutters, under the command of Lieuts. Russell, Sproston and Blake, and Midshipman Steece, respectively, assisted by Captain Reynolds of the marines, Assistant Surgeon Kennedy, Assistant Engineer White, Gunner Borton, and Midshipmen Forrest and Higginson. The whole force detailed consisted of about 100 men, officers, sailors and marines. The object of the expedition was the destruction of a Page 62 schooner which lay off the Pensacola navy-yard, supposed to be fitting out as a privateer, and the spiking of a gun, in battery, at the southeast end of the yard. * * * The attack was made on the morning of the 14th inst. at 3:30 o'clock. The schooner, named the Judah, was found moored to the wharf under the protection of a battery and field-piece, and to be armed with a pivot and four broadside guns. Her crew was on her and prepared to receive our forces, pouring in a volley of musketry as the boats neared the vessel. A desperate resistance was made from the decks of the schooner, and her men were driven off to the wharf by our boarders, where they rallied and were joined by the guard and kept up a continued fire on our men. In the meantime the vessel was set on fire in several places. That which finally consumed her was lighted in the cabin by Assistant Engineer White and Patrick Driscoll, who went as a volunteer. She burned to the water's edge and has since, while burning, been set free from her moorings, and has drifted down opposite Fort Barrancas, where she has sunk." The party assigned to the work of spiking the gun was equally successful, its tompion being brought off as a trophy. The gallant deed was not performed without some casualties, as 3 men of the expedition lost their lives and 9 were wounded. It is also worthy of note, that the enemy had a force in the yard—believed to have been 1,000 strong —who were aroused by the firing, but too late to prevent the damage.

On November 22, 1861, the Confederate lines about Pensacola were subjected to a combined bombardment by the troops under Colonel Brown at Fort Pickens and the steamers Niagara and Richmond, commanded by Flag-officer McKean. By previous arrangement the ships were to attack Fort McRee and the adjoining water batteries, but unfortunately the depth of water did not permit either vessel to approach sufficiently near the fort to give full effect to their powerful batteries, though considerable damage Page 63 was done the works. The action was renewed on the following day by Fort Pickens and the Niagara. The principal object of the bombardment—the destruction of the navy-yard—was not accomplished, but the villages of Warrington and Woolsey were partially burned and the marine barracks destroyed. The Niagara escaped without loss, while the Richmond lost i man killed and 7 slightly wounded. Each vessel was struck twice but no serious damages were sustained. (See Cyclopedia of Battles.)

In the Eastern Gulf, embracing the coast of Florida, the blockade required a different management from that of other parts of the coast. The absence of large commercial centers or other points affording ready communication with the interior gave this region little attraction for vessels with valuable cargoes aboard. Nevertheless, the coast of Florida is seamed with innumerable small bays and inlets, often difficult of access, but yielding a safe refuge for small vessels. Once a vessel had entered one of these inlets unobserved, she might remain there indefinitely without much fear of discovery. It was a practical impossibility for the blockading force to entirely break up the contraband trade in these waters. A vigilant watch was maintained and a species of guerrilla warfare was conducted to render the condition of war as onerous as possible to the Southern people. The coast line was constantly scoured, and numerous minor affairs took place on the station, chiefly engagements with small batteries, boarding parties, cutting-out expeditions, raids against saltworks, night expeditions into the many remote and unfrequented inlets, etc. An occasional cotton laden steamer would be captured, a stray boat seized, or a few bales of cotton destroyed. The work was difficult and hazardous and not much was to be gained in the way of glory. Now and then a man or two would be lost, but innumerable deeds of valor went unheralded and unrecorded in the midst of greater and more stirring events. Space permits the mention of only a few of these small affairs. On the night Page 64 of January 16, 1862, Commander Emmons of the Hatteras, which had been ordered to Cedar keys on receipt of information that a number of small vessels had been captured and taken into port there by a Confederate steamer, sent in some boats in charge of Acting Master Hoffner, for the purpose of recapturing them and destroying the hostile steamer. The expedition was entirely successful and captured or destroyed all the public property in the port, including a battery of 2 long 18-pounders, a 6-pounder (at Depot key), the railroad depot and wharf, several cars, telegraph office, a turpentine storehouse, 4 schooners, 3 sloops, a ferry scow, sailboat and launch. Two of the schooners were loaded with turpentine, rosin and cotton, with the intention of running the blockade. A lieutenant and 13 men of the 4th Florida were taken prisoners. The schooner Fanny, which had been captured from Lieutenant Selden, U. S. navy, some months before, partly loaded with turpentine, made her escape over the reefs during the night. On February 23, 1862, while the Tahoma was lying off Sea Horse key, Florida, two boats under command of Lieutenant A. S. Crosman were sent in to cut out a schooner lying in the boat channel between Cedar keys and the main. They captured a sailboat which had been endeavoring to communicate with Depot key from the mainland, but the schooner lay on the other side of the trestle work carrying the railroad from Cedar keys to the mainland. Night coming on, Crosman was obliged to anchor among the small keys of the channel until morning and the schooner slipped her chain and made her escape during the night. When coming out into the boat channel about 8 o'clock in the morning, towing his prize and pulling for open water against the strong flood tide and fresh wind, the boats were fired upon by a body of about 30 infantry in a stockade near the entrance to the channel. Only the two officers of the boats were able to return the fire as the men were all busy at the oars. When beyond reach sail was made, but the prize capsized. Nothing daunted, Crosman pulled back Page 65 and endeavored to right her under fire of the soldiers, but failed in the attempt and scuttled her. Both boats were struck several times, but succeeded in reaching the ship with the loss of only 1 man.

It was ascertained late in March, 1862, that the city of Apalachicola had been evacuated by its garrison of soldiers (some 650) and most of its inhabitants, leaving the city entirely at the mercy of the Union fleet. It was further learned that a number of schooners were anchored some 5 miles up the river, and an armed expedition of eight boats from the Mercedita and the gunboat Sagamore, was sent in to occupy the city and capture the schooners. The expedition was under the command of Lieutenant Abbott of the Mercedita and Lieutenant Bigelow of the Sagamore. Six of the boats started at 9 o'clock on the night of April 2, but losing their way in the strong current and darkness were obliged to anchor until daylight. Says the report of Commander Stellwagen of the Mercedita, who, with Lieut-Commander Drake of the Sagamore, had set out in their respective gigs on the morning of the 3d to support the six boats: "On arriving at the city early in the morning we found the Octavia and all the small vessels in the possession of our men and in due time the party came down the river towing the pilot boats Cygnet and Mary Olivia, schooners New Island, Lloyd and Rose, the latter loaded with cotton. A considerable time was spent in trying to get the two pilot boats and New Island over the bar, but without success; they grounded in 7 feet of water. Late in the afternoon I pulled in with all the boats to the landing place and had an interview with the people of the town, the details of which accompany this. I gave them up their fish boats and two or three schooners, very old and only fit for lighters. Told them they could fish and oyster so long as they were friendly, as I knew there was great distress for the necessaries of life. After trying again to get off the three schooners without success, I ordered Page 66 them to be set afire, which was effectually done. The sloop Octavia and the schooner Rose, with her cotton, I determined to send to Key West for adjudication. I think the demonstration will be very salutary to the people and will be of service to the cause. The men deserve great credit; the boats were gone from 24 to 36 hours, with almost constant heavy work, which was borne very cheerfully." The expedition met with no opposition.

On April 4, 1862, information having been received by Lieutenant Cate, commanding the bark Pursuit, that the Confederate steamer Florida had run the blockade and was lying in the bay some 20 miles above St. Andrew's town, 30 miles from the bar, a cutting out expedition was sent in under command of Executive Officer Elnathan Lewis. On the way up the bay Lewis captured the sloop Lafayette, with 15 bales of cotton on board. The captain of the Lafayette volunteered his services as pilot, and on the morning of the 6th the Florida was surprised and successfully boarded. Mr. Lewis was severely wounded by a pistol shot in the forehead as he gained the deck of the steamer. Under promise of a substantial monetary reward, the engineers, pilot and mate aided in bringing the captured steamer out. On the way from the bay, provisions being low, Lewis was induced to send the sloop Lafayette, in charge of James H. Barry, master's mate, with 5 men and the pilot Captain Harrison, under a flag of truce, to try and procure some. No sooner had they landed under the supposed protection of a flag of truce, than they saw a party of 30 or 40 armed men running towards them from the woods and they hurriedly returned to the sloop under fire. Reaching the sloop, another volley was fired, instantly killing Samuel Lawrence, seaman, wounding Barry in the wrist, and slightly wounding another seaman and the pilot. The expedition succeeded in crossing the bar on the 8th without further accident and returned with the prizes to St. Joseph's bay.

Of the many expeditions for the destruction of salt works on Page 67 this station, two of the most interesting were against the works near Depot key, October 4 and 6, 1862. Extensive salt works were known to exist at Station No. 4, the terminus of the Fernandina railroad, and on the 4th some boats from the gunboat Somerset, in charge of Acting Master Dennison, were sent to destroy them. He had succeeded in destroying some without resistance, when the party of 15 were suddenly fired upon from a house, in front of which two or three women were walking, and from whose top a large white flag was flying. Seven of the expeditionary force were wounded, and the party was obliged to return without the completion of their work. This act of perfidy was soon revenged. The gunboat Tahoma having arrived at Cedar keys on the morning of the 6th, a much larger expedition was fitted out, consisting of 8 boats from the Somerset and Tahoma, two of them armed with howitzers, numbering in all 111 men, under the command of Lieutenant-Com. Crosman. This expedition met with little resistance, and altogether some 50 or 60 salt boilers were destroyed, together with the houses in the immediate vicinity.

A report of Rear-Admiral Bailey, dated December 28, 1863, details the destruction of extensive salt works at Lake Ocala and St. Andrew's bay, Florida, December 2, 10 and 18, under the direction of Acting Master William R. Browne, commanding the bark Restless. The report recites that as the result of these operations, "the entire damage to the enemy is estimated by Acting Master Browne at $3,000,000." Browne reported that his work was not yet half done, as there were over 100 salt works in East and West bays, which he intended to destroy. Says Bailey in his report of January 27, 1864, "It affords me pleasure to report to the department that the promise made by Acting Master William R. Browne, commanding bark Restless, at the conclusion of his last report concerning the destruction of extensive salt works in the vicinity of St. Andrew's bay, namely, that he would complete the work so handsomely begun, appears to have been well Page 68 kept. He reports that he went on board the stern-wheel steamer Bloomer, with 2 officers and 47 men belonging to the Restless, and proceeded up the bay, against very unfavorable circumstances of darkness, wind and tide, some 10 miles above St. Andrew's, where his force was landed and destroyed some 90 additional salt works, together with all the boilers, kettles and buildings attached to them; whereupon the enemy commenced the destruction of some 200 more, which were in advance of our party, and thus saved us from all further trouble, except skirting along the bay for the distance of 15 miles, to make sure that the work of destruction had been well performed by them. Deserters from both Captain Anderson's and Robinson's companies reported subsequently that both officers and men had broken up and gone home, as the destruction of the salt works, which they were ordered to guard, had been so complete, and 6 of them have enlisted in the navy, after taking the oath of allegiance." This was a very severe blow to the enemy and well illustrates the zeal and energy which animated the Eastern Gulf squadron.

On the night of October 16, 1863, a force of 100 men from the gunboats Tahoma and Adela, under the command of T. R. Harris, the executive officer of the Tahoma, landed in Tampa bay with the object of marching overland to a point on the Hillsboro river, where the steamer Scottish Chief and the sloop Kate Dale were reported to be loading with cotton and about to run the blockade. Meanwhile, the Tahoma and Adela moved in abreast of the town of Tampa and the fort and slowly shelled them during the day in order to divert attention from the real object of the expedition. After a march inland of 14 miles, the force discovered and fired the vessels, captured all but 2 of those on board, then returned to the beach, where they encountered an armed party of the enemy and captured 2 of them in a charge. While here, awaiting the arrival of their boats from the Tahoma and Adela, they were attacked by a force of cavalry and infantry Page 69 under the command of Captain (late U. S. Senator) Westcott, and a sharp fight of 15 or 20 minutes' duration took place during the process of embarkation. The enemy were concealed by the woods, and the third division of the expeditionary force acted with great coolness and bravery as a rear-guard while protecting the retreat—loading and firing with the precision of target practice. Their steadiness and discipline under fire enabled them to withdraw in excellent order, bringing with them their wounded. The loss of the expedition was 3 killed, 10 wounded, and 5 captured. Says Lieutenant-Com. Semmes of the Tahoma in his report: "I regret sincerely our loss, yet I feel a great degree of satisfaction in having impressed the rebels with the idea that blockade-running vessels are not safe, even up the Hillsboro river."

A noteworthy instance of the frequent efficient cooperation of the navy and army took place May 6, 1864. The steamer Honduras, Captain Piatt, the steamer Sunflower, Captain Van Sice, and the bark James L. Davis, Captain Fales, had been ordered by Admiral Bailey to place their vessels at the disposal of Brigadier-General Woodbury, for the purpose of cooperating in a raid on Tampa. A naval force, consisting of 54 men from the three vessels, under command of Acting Master William Fales of the J. L. Davis, was landed with the troops before daylight and materially contributed in the success of the raid. The town was taken possession of at 7 a. m., and a few minutes later the Stars and Stripes were hoisted by the navy, which also captured about one-half of the 40 prisoners taken. In addition the naval force captured the sloop smack Neptune and a quantity of cotton estimated at about 55 bales.

The joint operations of the army and navy in the vicinity of St. Marks, Florida, February 23 to March 7, 1865, will serve as a fitting close to this chapter. The troops, numbering about 900 men, under Brigadier-General Newton, were provided with transportation in Page 70 the Magnolia and Honduras and left Key West for the west coast of Florida, bound for St. Marks or some neighboring point, February 23, 1865. All the blockaders at St. George's sound and those cruising between there and Tampa were ordered by Rear Admiral Stribling to unite with General Newton. The vessels from St. George's sound, with Lieutenant-Corn. Gibson as the senior officer in command, and the vessels transporting the troops, arrived at the same time off St. Marks. At this juncture the naval force was composed of the steamers Mahaska, Fort Henry, Spirea, Stars and Stripes, Hibiscus, Honduras, Magnolia, Brittannia, and the schooners Matthew Vassar, O. H. Lee, and Two Sisters. This fleet was afterwards augmented by the Proteus, Iuka, Isonomia and Hendrick Hudson. On the arrival of the Proteus, Commander Shufeldt of that vessel, as the senior officer present, assumed command of the naval forces cooperating with the army. The plan of operations adopted by the two commanders miscarried largely because of the inability of Commander Shufeldt to get his vessels up the St. Marks river to attack the forts, and because fully two weeks' notice had been furnished the enemy of the contemplated expedition. The plan of operations was briefly: 1st, to land a party composed of seamen and the 2nd Florida cavalry on Light-House island on the night of March 3 to take possession of the bridge over East river, and surprise and capture the pickets there, if possible. 2nd, to land the troops on the same night in readiness to start at daylight on the 4th. 3d, the land expedition was to march to Newport, destroy the public establishments there, cross the river St. Marks, take St. Marks in the rear or strike the railroad between Tallahassee and St. Marks, attacking isolated bodies of the enemy to prevent a concentration, and destroying and capturing such property as might be useful to the enemy. 4th, in order to effect these objects, parties were to be landed to destroy the railroad and other bridges over the Ocklockonee river, the trestle and bridge over Page 71 Aucilla river, and to break up the railroad between St. Marks and Tallahassee. 5th, the naval force was to endeavor to silence the batteries and capture St. Marks, land a force of 500 to 600 seamen at Port Leon to cover the land expedition, and prevent the enemy crossing in the rear between St. Marks and Newport. Only the vessels Honduras, Fort Henry, Hibiscus and Brittannia succeeded in ascending the river for some distance by the expenditure of great efforts, while the Mahaska, Spirea and Stars and Stripes got aground. As the vessels were trying to ascend the river, the troops were landed near the light-house and commenced their march inland. The vessels were quite unable to get up the river to attack the forts, and the best that could be done was to get the vessels above named within a mile and a half of Port Leon. This was on the 6th inst. and information being received that the army was falling back, a party of 40 seamen was ordered ashore, under command of Acting Ensign Whitman, to hold the bridge at East river. This task was successfully accomplished and after the army had crossed the bridge it was burned. Though the expedition failed to accomplish all that was anticipated, substantial results were obtained. Two important bridges, one foundry and two large mills were burned; extensive salt works were partially destroyed; the blockade of St. Marks was thoroughly established, as the blockade vessels now had possession of the mouth of the river inside the bar, the only point which was of any importance from a naval standpoint, and the chief naval object was thereby gained. This was especially important, as the report of Rear-Admiral Stribling states, "There is no doubt that preparations had been made by staking out the channel, removing obstructions and garrisoning the fort, to make St. Marks in some sort a compensation for the loss of Wilmington." Stribling recommended for promotion to the grade of acting master, Acting Ensign John F. Whitman, for efficient services on shore, while General Newton also reported as deserving Page 72 the highest praise for good conduct, gallantry under fire, and for their remarkable efforts in rendering assistance in transporting the guns of the expedition, George Pyne, Thomas Smith, Charles Reed and John S. Land, all of the Magnolia, and George Shultz and John Mack of the Hendrick Hudson.