Naval Battles

Condition of the Navy

It may be said without fear of successful contradiction that only extraordinary weakness of the South as a naval power saved the North from serious disaster during the early period of the Civil war. The policy of the government in keeping its navy sufficiently modernized is not open to severe criticism, as the United States had kept well abreast of other first-class powers in point of war-ship construction. Many of the vessels built during the decade 1850-1860 were the best of their class, and in the matter of equipping them with heavy ordnance much creditable progress had been made. In personnel the service was top-heavy with a superabundance of old officers and a radical deficiency in the junior grades. The navy was moreover hampered by traditions and a spirit of routine difficult to eradicate in a day. Above all the supineness of the navy department during the closing months of the Buchanan administration—bred of a deliberate policy of inaction and a determination to abstain from any step which might be construed as coercion—had served to seriously cripple the navy when the crisis suddenly developed. If there were not actual treachery on the part of Toucey and many of his subordinates, the effect was nearly the same, and the government in April, 1861, found itself in an almost complete state of naval unpreparedness. While the South was exulting over the capture of Fort Sumter and boasting that this decisive step was both the beginning and the ending of the war, the people of the Page 20 North were painfully realizing that they had a serious war on their hands. Southern naval officers by the hundred were resigning and the service was badly demoralized. Even ample proof of treachery is not lacking, and in the prevailing confusion it is small wonder that serious losses at first befell the North. To these causes may be directly attributed the loss of the Norfolk and Pensacola navy-yards, with their invaluable equipment of war materials. At the beginning of April, 1861, there were stored at the Norfolk yard 2,000 cannon, of which 300 were new Dahlgrens; 150 tons of powder; vast quantities of loaded shells, machinery, castings, material for ship-building, ordnance and equipment stores, etc. It contained a first-class stone dock. The steam frigate Merrimac was there undergoing repairs, the shops of the yard being well fitted for such work. The sailing sloops-of-war Germantown and Plymouth, of 22 guns each and the brig Dolphin, of 4 guns, were there, not manned, but fit for sea. Six other sailing ships, including the famous United States, that were not of much use, but worth something, were also there. On the whole, the material of this yard was of more value, probably, than that in any other two in the country. The Confederates estimated the value of the property abandoned to them at $4,810,056.68 in gold. Effective use was made by the Confederates estimated the value of the property abandoned to them at $4,810,056.68 in gold. Effective use was made by the Confederates of their important capture. Though an attempt had been made by Captain Paulding and his men to complete the work of destruction before abandoning the yard, so hurriedly was the work done that at least 1,200 of the guns were uninjured. These were promptly distributed by the enemy where needed, and many were the occasions when the Federal government had cause to mourn the lack of proper care to prevent this priceless armament from falling into the hands of the enemy. Some of the guns were Page 21 soon mounted at Sewell's point to bar the Federal ships from Norfolk; others were met with at Hatteras inlet, Ocracoke, Roanoke island, and throughout the coast waters of North Carolina; 53 were mounted at Port Royal; still others were met with at Fernandina, in the defenses of New Orleans, at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Island No. 10, Memphis, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf and Port Hudson; they were even found far up the Red river when the Union gunboats penetrated that part of the Confederacy. While it is doubtless true that the Norfolk yard should have been held at any cost, at least until the work of destruction was complete, in reality the result of its capture worked as great disaster to the South as to the North by needlessly prolonging the war. If it took the enemy a whole year to begin the work of casting cannon, may it not be reasonably assumed that the war was lengthened by that space of time?

On March 4, 1861, Buchanan's secretary of the navy, Isaac Toucey of Connecticut, was succeeded by Gideon Welles from the same state. He continued in office throughout the war and until the end of Johnson's administration. His bureau chiefs when he assumed office were as follows: Of yards and docks, Captain Joseph Smith; of construction, John Lenthal; of provisions and clothing, Horatio Bridge; of ordnance and hydrography, Captain George W. Magruder; of medicine, Surgeon William Whelan. Only one of these officers resigned, Captain Magruder, a Virginian. Unfortunately he continued in office during the critical early days and until the Norfolk navy yard was seized, when he tendered his resignation and was dismissed by Lincoln for disloyalty.

The navy in 1861 showed grave defects in the matter of personnel. These defects at once became glaringly apparent under the strain of war, when naval operations on a vast scale and of the most varied kind began. When South Carolina seceded the naval register showed a total of 1,563 officers, both commissioned Page 22 and warrant. Out of this number 677 were southern-born, of whom 321 resigned and espoused the cause of the Southern States, though 350 remained loyal to the Union. Of 38 Southern captains, 16 resigned; of 64 commanders, 34 resigned; of 151 lieutenants, 76 resigned; of 128 acting midshipmen, 106 resigned. In other words over one-fifth of all the officers forsook their allegiance for political reasons. The report of the secretary of the navy, July 4, 1861, recites that after Lincoln was inaugurated 259 officers of the navy resigned their commissions or were dismissed the service. Many others belonging to states that had already seceded had previously resigned. More than a generation has now elapsed since the close of the war, and with the subsidence of passion incident to the great struggle it is possible to justify partially the attitude of these recreant officers, without resort to wholesale charges of treason and treachery. Admiral Ammen writes: "For half a century, perhaps, there had existed a kind of culture of fealty to a state, instead of the government which they served; it was paraded as a dogma and was in a degree acknowledged by some officers from the South in the military service of the government, more than half of whom, prior to the Civil war, either came from the slave states or had married within them. Able and educated men, acknowledging this doctrine, thought they had only to resign to hopelessly embarrass the government. There was certainly for a time great confusion, and in the case of the Norfolk yard, great loss." He then quotes with approval the following lines taken from the above report of the secretary of the navy: "With so few vessels in commission on our coast and our crews in distant seas, the department was very indifferently prepared to meet the exigency that was rising. Every moment was closely watched by the disaffected, and threatened to precipitate measures that the country seemed anxious to avoid. Demoralization prevailed among the officers, many of whom, occupying the most responsible Page 23 positions, betrayed symptoms of that infidelity that has dishonored the service."

In consequence of the wholesale resignations at the outbreak of the war, whereby a full fifth of the officers transferred their allegiance from the nation to their states at the time of greatest need, resort was made at once to volunteers, chiefly from the merchant marine, of whom some 7,500 were appointed altogether. The regular officers continued to form about one-seventh of the whole service and of course filled the most important positions. A large proportion of these volunteers rendered excellent service, though it must be conceded that a previous military training would have contributed greatly to their efficiency. The department deemed itself fortunate when it could secure volunteers with nautical experience, let alone previous military training. * One of the most serious difficulties of the situation arose from the long continued and vicious system of seniority promotion in the navy, combined with the absence of any provision for retirement. The inevitable result was to repress individual initiative—to make routine men. As promotion was sure there was little incentive to effort. The senior grades were filled with men most of whom had passed their sixtieth milestone, and many able officers were stagnating in the lower grades. Some lieutenants had been 34 years in the service and never yet risen to the responsibilities of command. Many of the 78 captains at the head of the list were gallant veterans who had rendered noteworthy service in the "old navy," but had already grown too old for active service afloat. Of the n4 commanders, those at the head of the list were between 58 and 60 years of age; of the 321 lieutenants, those at the head of the list were between 48 and 50. Only a few of the junior officers were graduates of the naval academy, some dozen or more of the younger lieutenants and less than 100 masters and midshipmen at the foot of the list. , Such was the pressing need for trained officers in the subordinate Page 24 grades that the three upper classes at the academy were ordered into active service. Some of these lads became lieutenants at the age of 19, and some of them made names for themselves that will never be forgotten in the annals of naval warfare. A remedy for the above state of affairs was found in December, 1861, when Congress passed a law retiring all officers at the age of 62, or after they had been in the service for a period of 45 years. Though the full complement of the navy was fixed at 7,600 seamen, on March 10, 1861, only 207 of these were immediately available to the navy department by reason of their presence in Atlantic ports and receiving-ships. It was impossible to find men to man the ships ready to be commissioned, or to protect the important exposed stations like Annapolis and Norfolk. However, the government set to work with great energy to provide both men and ships, and in July, 1863, there were 34,000 men in the service, which number was augmented to 51,500 at the end of the war. Though thousands answered the call for naval volunteers, more men were at all times needed than could be supplied. An exceedingly valuable contribution to the volunteer force were the merchant captains and mates from the northern seaports and Great Lakes.

The liberal bounties offered by the states and local communities for army volunteers and the absence of any provision for transfers between the two services, made it more difficult to secure naval enlistments. After the establishment of the draft mariners were equally subject to its provisions. The states were not credited on their quotas with men furnished the navy until the year 1864, and as a result many trained seamen were forced into the army. Eventually extraordinary inducements were held out to secure naval volunteers and sometimes $1,000 was paid to secure a single seaman.

The War of 1861-65 is not commonly looked upon as a naval war, and yet, viewed from the proper standpoint, the work of Page 25 the navy compares favorably with that of the army. The extent of the service rendered by the navy is to be measured, not by the total of casualties sustained and the numbers engaged in the various naval operations, but full account must be taken of the broader aspect of things. The prompt blockade of Southern ports resulted in the almost complete isolation of the Confederacy, seriously crippled its foreign trade, and practically ruined the great cotton industry on which the South depended to furnish the sinews of war. The strength displayed by the Union navy was an important factor in the prevention of foreign interference in behalf of the seceded states. It drove the Southern privateers from the sea, permitted the resumption of foreign commerce by the United States, effectually laid the specter conjured up by the Merrimac and the fear that Northern coasts and shipping must pay their fearful tribute to the god of war. The efficient cooperation of the navy was felt in the work of reducing strong coast fortifications and in the occupation and retention of important harbors along the extended coast line of the enemy. It played an important part in opening up the vast stretches of inland waters and helped to cut the Confederacy in twain. The outcome of the war, if not problematical, must surely have been clouded with a deep uncertainty, save for the gigantic work performed by the men afloat.

The reader will bear in mind that the Civil war was not only the first war in which naval operations on a vast scale were conducted since the introduction of steam, but it was also the first war in which use was made of certain modern appliances that revolutionized the art of naval warfare. Extensive use was made for the first time of ironclads, rifled ordnance, rams and torpedoes. For the first time was witnessed the maintenance of a steam blockade, as well as the employment by the enemy of swift steam cruisers, which proved a deadly menace to the commerce of the nation. It saw a blockade instituted which was Page 26 effective and which was conducted on so vast a scale as to make it without parallel in the history of the world's wars.

The tremendous progress in the manufacture of powerful ordnance having a great range and throwing an unprecedented weight of metal, was the prime factor in causing the application of armor to the sides of vessels. The great rifled guns designed by Parrott and Brooke, and the powerful Dahlgren "smoothbore" guns, brought about a corresponding change in the methods and materials for conducting defensive operations. The experiments of Colonel Bomford and Captain Rodman of the U. S. ordnance department had demonstrated where the greatest strain was exerted on the bore of a gun, as well as the approximate strain all along the bore. Lieutenant John Dahlgren, of the U. S. navy, with the knowledge thus gained, designed the famous gun of smooth outline known by his name. Dahlgren not only accommodated the thickness of metal to the strain, but also made use of an improved quality of iron. An n-inch Dahlgren was cast in 1852, which "was fired 500 times with shells and 655 times with solid shot that weighed 170 pounds, the service charge of powder being 15 pounds." The gun stood the test admirably and the vessels of the navy were thereupon equipped with the Dahlgren guns as rapidly as possible. The U. S. navy before the war was also making use of cast iron rifled cannon, "reinforced over the breech by a wrought-iron jacket that was shrunk on." These guns ranged in caliber from 30-pounders up to 100-pounders, but the larger guns proved dangerous by reason of their tendency to burst and injure the crews. Says Spears in his History of our Navy, "It must be told also that a cast-iron rifle known as the Brooke, because designed by Commander John M. Brooke, of the Confederate navy, was produced in Richmond that was better than the Parrott. It was strengthened in its early service days by a series of wrought-iron bands two inches thick and six wide, that were shrunk on over the breech. Later a second Page 27 series of bands were shrunk on over the first, breaking joints with them, of course, and so a very good 150-pounder was produced. Meantime one Dahlgren smooth-bore, with a bore 15 inches in diameter, had been successfully made, and the shells for all the Dahlgren guns were provided with fuses that could be set to explode just about where and when the gunner wished to have them do so. But whether the damage to be done by a 15-inch round shot smashing its way through a ship's side would be greater or less than that of a rifle projectile boring its way through was a question that had not been decided. It was granted that the rifle had the longer range—with a reasonable elevation a rifle would carry 3 miles, maybe 4, and do some damage when the projectile arrived, while the effective range of the smooth-bore was, say 1,500 or 1,600 yards, though gunners made efforts, when the time came, to run in to a range of 600 yards or less instead. But, on the whole, it was the belief among American naval officers before the Civil war that the big Dahlgren smooth-bore was the best gun afloat. So it came to pass that the newest and best ships of the navy were armed with the Dahlgren gun. The Merrimac, which was not the best of the frigates carried twenty-four 9-inch guns on her gun deck, with fourteen 8-inch and two 10-inch pivots on her spar deck. She could throw 864 pounds of metal from her gun-deck broadside, 360 pounds from her broadside of 8-inch guns, and 200 from her 10-inch, both of which could be fired over either rail." In other words the Merrimac could throw a weight of metal at a broadside of 1,424 pounds. The Minnesota, one of the six screw-frigates built in 1855, and universally regarded as the best man-of-war of the period, mounted, soon after the war began, forty-two 9-inch Dahlgrens, one n-inch, four 100-pounder rifles, and one 150pounder rifle. She was able to throw a broadside weighing 1,861 pounds. In speaking of the progress made by the navy in the matter of ordnance before the war, Prof. Soley says: "In the Page 28 old sailing vessels, the 32-pounder, which was simply a development of the 18s and 24s of 1812, and the Vlll-inch shell-gun were still the usual guns. Since 1850 the powerful Dahlgren smooth-bore shell-guns had been introduced and the new steam frigates and sloops were armed with them. The IX-inch guns of this description were mounted in broadside, and the Xl-inch (with a few X-inch) on pivots. The powers of the Xl-inch had not been fully tested, and the prescribed service-charge was smaller than it was afterwards found that the gun would bear. The latest development of the smooth-bore gun was the XV-inch, one of which was generally mounted in each monitor turret. Rifled guns were gradually introduced during the war. These were chiefly Parrott guns, 20-, 30and 100-pounders. They were cast-iron guns, strengthened by a wrought-iron band around the breech. Later, 60-pounders and 150-pounders were manufactured. The Parrott gun of the smaller calibers was serviceable, but as a heavy gun it was dangerous, and occasionally burst. Besides the Parrott guns, a few light cast-iron Dahlgren rifles were made; and in the Western flotilla, when it was transferred to the navy, there were several army rifled 42-pounders, which were so dangerous as to be nearly useless."

In a consideration of the ships that graced the register of the American navy in 1860 it is at once perceived that an enormous advance had been made in the construction of ships of war. While the navy still comprised a large proportion of sailing vessels, the navy department had for many years been making every effort to replace these ships with steam vessels of the latest and most approved type. The first fruits of this wise policy were the old side-wheelers—the Mississippi and Missouri—and later on the Powhatan, Susquehanna and Saranac. The last named vessels were launched in 1850, at which time no country could boast of better constructed or more efficient warships. In 1855 were built the six fine screw-frigates known as the Niagara, Roanoke, Page 29 Colorado, Merrimac, Minnesota and Wabash. All were vessels of over 3,000 tons, model fighting machines for that day, and each carried a powerful battery similar to that of the Minnesota already described. In the years intervening before the war Congress voted further large sums for the construction of war vessels and there were built and launched six screw-sloops of the first class—the Lancaster, Pensacola, San Jacinto, Brooklyn, Hartford and Richmond—vessels of about 2,000 tons; eight screw-sloops of the second class, of which the Iroquois and Pawnee were types, and five third class screw-steamers of the type of the Mohawk and Crusader. All of these were serviceable vessels, though lacking somewhat in the important element of speed. In addition to the above there were a number of small side-wheel steamers and steam-tenders, and in February, 1861, seven new screw-sloops were provided for. On the stocks at Kittery, Portsmouth Harbor, was the large steam frigate, Franklin.

While the navy register showed a total of 40 steamers and 50 sailing vessels in 1861, only 26 steamers and 16 sailing vessels were actually in commission when the war began. There were available, but not in commission, 18 sailing vessels and 9 steamers, while the rest of the navy, 16 sailing vessels and 5 steamers, was in an unserviceable condition. The whole force of sailing vessels had already become obsolete from the standpoint of ships-of-war, due to the introduction of steam as a motive power within the last 15 years, and several large vessels were still on the stocks, having been superseded by the newer type of steamships before their completion. This revolutionary change in the character of the navy thus narrowed down the effective force to the 40 vessels with steam for a motive power and rendered the Union navy much less formidable than it appeared on paper. The historic old frigates like the Constitution and the United States were chiefly valuable as receiving and practice ships, and many of the other sailing vessels were only used as store ships. The Page 30 tremendous advance in naval science within a quarter of a century made it difficult to secure commanders possessed of the proper technical training for the new types of ships. "It was no uncommon thing in 1861 to find officers in command of steamers who had never served in steamers before, and who were far more anxious about their boilers than about their enemy."

As to the disposition of the fleet on March 4, 1861, when the new administration came into office, a glance will show that the greater part of the vessels were scattered all over the world, many of them on such distant stations as to be out of reach of orders for several months. The home squadron consisted of 12 vessels—5 sailing ships and 7 steamers—of which number only the steamers Pawnee, Mohawk and Crusader, and the sailing store ship Supply were in Northern ports; the sailing frigate Sabine, 50 guns, the sailing sloop St. Louis, 20, and the steamers Brooklyn, 25, and Wyandotte, 5, were at Pensacola; the sailing vessels Macedonian, 24, Cumberland, 24, and the steamers Pocahontas, 5, and Powhatan, n, were en route from the port of Vera Cruz. Stationed on the distant African coast were the sailing sloops Constellation and Portsmouth, 22 guns each, the Saratoga, 18, the store ship Relief, 2 guns, and the steamers Mohican, 6, Mystic, 5, Sumter, 5, and San Jacinto, 13. The Niagara reached the port of Boston from Japan April 20. The first of the vessels on the African station did not reach the United States until September 15. The three steamers Richmond, 16 guns, Susquehanna, 15, and Iroquois, 6, on the Mediterranean station could be reached by the mails, and all reached home by July 3. It took several months for the sailing-frigate Congress and the steamers Seminole and Pulaski to reach home from the coast of Brazil. The sailing-sloops John Adams and Vandalia and the steamers Hartford, Dacotah and Saginaw were still longer in reaching the U. S. coast from the distant East Indian station. Distributed along the western coast of the United States and of Central Page 31 and South America, on the Pacific station, were the ships of war Lancaster, Wyoming, Narragansett, Saranac, St. Mary's and Cyane.

The conclusion is inevitable that such a scattering of the nation's fleet must have been accomplished through sinister motives. Including the ships that were available, but not then in commission, the government would be able to assemble within the space of a few weeks a total force of 39 steamers and 34 sailing vessels. The steamers Pensacola and Mississippi were being prepared for sea at Washington and Boston, while the steam frigates Roanoke, Colorado, Minnesota and Wabash and the side-wheel steamer Water Witch were lying in ordinary at Northern navy yards, ready to be placed in commission without any great delay. The fate of the vessels at the Norfolk navy yard will be told in connection with the disgraceful capture of that valuable government property by the enemy. It should be kept in mind, however, that the large fleet of sailing vessels added little to the effective strength of the navy when the blockade and other active war operations were being carried on. The small screw steamer Michigan, on the Great Lakes, is not to be included in the general list, and a number of the steamers composing the available force were so small as to add very little to the total strength. However admirable the navy of the United States might have been to resist foreign aggression, it was found totally inadequate to carry on the gigantic operations incident to the Civil war. This, too, in spite of the fact that the Confederacy could boast of no navy worthy of the name and was almost entirely lacking in the facilities to construct one. Experience soon demonstrated the tremendous task which lay before the Federal government, but the boundless resources of the North, together with the inventive genius of her citizens, solved the problems as they arose. Just to carry on the great blockading operations alone required at the end over 600 ships, and even then blockade-runners continued to Page 32 slip through. In the work of opening up the rivers another vast fleet was employed. Before the war closed almost every known type of water craft was employed, from the rams, mortar-boats, "tinclads" and "double-enders" of the river service, to the powerful cruisers, sloops, gunboats and ironclads of the sea-going navy. But at the beginning the government lacked more than ships. It lacked officers and men to man the few vessels not yet in commission, to say nothing of those to be constructed, and the large numbers soon to be obtained by charter and purchase. As has been stated, the department had at its disposal on March 4, 1861, "only 207 men in all the ports and receiving ships on the Atlantic coast." Instead of 5,000 men afloat before the war, 50,000 were required after it began, and it was never possible to secure all that the service needed. "It is a striking illustration of the improvidence of naval legislation and administration that in a country of 30,000,000 of people only 200 were at the disposal of the navy department."

One of the earliest and most practical steps taken to prepare the navy for actual war was in May, 1861, when Gustavus V. Fox was appointed assistant secretary of the navy. Mr. Fox had entered the naval service in 1838 as midshipman and at the time of his resignation in 1856 to engage in civil pursuits was serving as a lieutenant. His professional education and practical knowledge of naval matters caused him to be placed in charge of the actual war operations of the various ships, and his services proved invaluable to the department.

The call for volunteers for the navy elicited an eager and patriotic response as has been shown. To supply the pressing need for more ships was a more difficult matter, for Congress was slow to perceive the necessity of a vastly increased naval force. The department acted with praiseworthy energy. All but three of the vessels on foreign stations were recalled and steps were taken to place in commission all the serviceable vessels. Page 33 An effort was made to buy "everything afloat that could be made of service," and where the department could not buy, it chartered ships. Up to July i, 1861, it succeeded in buying 12 steamers, and chartering 9 more. Greed often ruled stronger than patriotism and the department was mulcted in enormous sums during the early months. A better arrangement was then made, the department securing a competent man to act as its responsible agent in the work of purchasing ships, whereupon somewhat better rates were secured. A board of officers inspected each purchase and decided on its fitness as well as the needed alterations, though in the nature of things, a very high standard of excellence could not be exacted. As a result of this policy, the navy eventually came to be made up of almost every conceivable type of vessel, one of the strangest types being the great double-ended ferryboats, which were strong and seaworthy and could be armed with the heaviest guns. A Fulton ferryboat, the Somerset, captured the blockade-runner Circassian, one of the most valuable prizes of the war, off Havana, and netted her captors in prize money $315,371.39. By December 1, 1861, the government had succeeded in buying 137 vessels, including 58 sailing ships. During the continuance of the war its total purchases amounted to 313 steamers, and 105 sailing vessels.

A like energetic policy was pursued in the work of building new vessels for the navy. Congress had already authorized the construction of 7 sloops-of-war, and the department decided to build 8. To expedite the work 4 of the sloops were built to the lines of those of 1858 and two vessels each were assigned to the navy-yards at New York, Boston, Portsmouth, N. H., and Philadelphia. Six more sloops were authorized in the latter part of 1861 and all 14 vessels made excellent warships. Without waiting for the slow action of Congress, the department entered into contracts with private shipyards to build 23 small, heavily armed, screw gunboats. This action emphasizes the great importance Page 34 of the private shipbuilder in augmenting the sea power of a nation. Private shipyards, capable of turning out the best types of war vessels, are a prime necessity if a nation is to maintain a fleet adequate for all purposes. These 23 gunboats were of the Unadilla and Pinola class, of 507 tons each, mounting from 4 to 7 guns, of which one was an 11-inch smooth-bore. They were all wooden boats and because they were so quickly constructed, they were usually known as the "ninety-day gunboats." All these vessels were employed throughout the war and rendered excellent service, 9 of them being with Farragut during his memorable passage of Forts Jackson and St. Philip below New Orleans. The government also took vigorous measures to provide a large fleet of boats adapted to the river service. The first 12 steamers constructed were light draft, paddle-wheel steamers, the famous double-enders of the Octorara class, provided with a double bow and a rudder at either end to obviate the necessity of turning in the narrow river channels. Later there were built 27 larger vessels of the same general design. The Wateree was a side-wheel steamer with double bows, but built of iron. Still later 7 double-enders, the Mohongo class, also of iron, but larger and more heavily armed, were built. At its extra session in August, 1861, Congress appropriated $1,500,000 for the construction of armored vessels upon plans to be approved by a board of able officers composed of Capts. Paulding, Smith and Davis. It was this board which, after considerable delay, entered into the final contract with Ericsson for the construction of the famous vessel known as the Monitor. Upon other plans selected by the board were constructed the New Ironsides and the Galena. Says Prof. Soley in his work on The Blockade and the Cruisers: "In the construction of the new ships-of-war, no attempt was made to reproduce the fine screw-frigates of 1855, as they failed to show their usefulness, except perhaps at Port Royal and Fort Fisher. The Colorado could not be got over the bar when Page 35 Farragut went up to New Orleans, and the Roanoke and Minnesota were helpless at Hampton Roads. In the latter half of the war, however, the department undertook the construction of a class of vessels of considerable size, but very different in character. These were large, wooden steamers, with fine lines, excessively long and sharp narrow, of light draft for their size, in which every quality was sacrificed to speed. In some of these the length was as great as eight times the beam. They were to be sea-going cruisers. Their main purpose was to capture the commerce destroyers, and perhaps, in case of foreign complications, to do a little commerce-destroying themselves. Their armament was heavy; but armament was not their principal feature. Above all things, they were to be fast; and in those that were built, the desired result was generally secured. One of them, the Warapanoag, or Florida, succeeded in attaining for a short time the extraordinary speed of seventeen and three-fourths knots an hour. The plan which comprehended the construction of these vessels was a scheme of somewhat large dimensions and was never completed. Of the three principal types, named respectively after the Ammonoosuc, the Java, and the Coontoocook, twenty-five vessels were projected, and most of them were begun; but few of them were launched and these only after the close of the war. Under the pressure of urgent necessity, they were built of unseasoned white-oak timber, instead of the live-oak which had hitherto been used for ships-of-war; and such of them as were finished were no sooner in the water than they began to decay." The enormous waste of money involved in the construction of these vessels, short-lived and imperfect as they were, gives potency to the old saying "in time of peace prepare for war," yet these vessels served a useful purpose in aiding to modify the hostile attitude of certain foreign powers and their construction would seem to have been more than justified.