Naval Battles

Naval Operations Before Charleston

Charleston, with its elaborate and powerful system of harbor defenses, was the hardest nut the navy had to crack during the war. Neither Du Pont nor Dahlgren, the two able commanders of the South Atlantic squadron, was able to effect the capture of the city, though each succeeded in closing the port against blockade-runners. This was worth all the time, effort and money expended on this stronghold of the Confederacy and was a necessary part of the government's plan to starve the South into subjection. Nevertheless the administration at Washington, and the North generally, chafed under the failure of the navy to subdue this hotbed of secession. Many have professed the belief that a Farragut would have forced his way through the harbor to the city's front, especially after the arrival of the monitors in 1863. The genius of the great admiral might have accomplished the feat, but whether this be true or not, the splendid services actually rendered by the navy before Charleston are deserving of all praise. The city remained the principal center of blockade on the South Atlantic station until the end of the struggle, unceasing vigilance and the most strenuous effort being needed for the dangerous work.

The present channel for shipping runs straight out to sea from Charleston, but during the Civil war, says Spears, "A ship bound Page 126 into Charleston must needs sail in toward the coast several miles south of the harbor, the exact point to be steered for being marked by a tall lighthouse. Arriving within half a mile or so of the beach, the ship turned to the north and followed along the shore of Morris island, which terminates in a long sandy point called Cumming's point, very much like Sandy Hook of New York harbor. Above Cumming's point the channel swept away to the northwest until Fort Sumter was reached, when it turned still further to the west, passing Forts Ripley and Pinckney, and then the piers were reached." In entering the harbor the warships had to pass an almost continuous line of earthworks. The harbor defenses may be briefly described as follows: At Light House inlet, which divides Morris island from Folly island, was a fortification covering the landing. Three miles north of the lighthouse on the beach of Morris island was Fort Wagner, an extensive sand battery of the most powerful construction, and on Cumming's point, a mile north of Wagner, was Battery Gregg, opposite Fort Moultrie. On an artificial island in the middle of the channel stood Fort Sumter, near the entrance of the inner harbor, and about a mile and a half west of Fort Moultrie. On the lower side of the harbor, on James island, were Fort Johnson and the Wappoo battery, the latter in the immediate vicinity of the city commanding the embouchure of Ashley river. On the northern side of the channel, at the upper end of Sullivan's island, guarding Maffit's channel, was a powerful sand battery. Another large sand battery, called Fort Beauregard, stood between this and the Moultrie house. Fort Moultrie, which had been much strengthened since the beginning of the war, and Battery Bee, adjoining Fort Moultrie, stood on the western extremity of Sullivan's island. Between Sullivan's island and Cooper river on the mainland was the Mount Pleasant battery, Castle Pinckney, built on an island about a mile from Charleston, and between it and Fort Johnson on James island was Fort Ripley, a work erected Page 127 on an artificial island in what was known as the "Middle Ground." All these works had been erected and provided with powerful guns before the important operations of 1863 were undertaken. Before the close of the war, the Confederates constructed many additional works on both sides of the harbor. At the time of the attack by the ironclads April 7, 1863, the foregoing works were said to have mounted several hundred guns, comprising the heaviest smooth-bore ordnance, as well as many rifled pieces of English manufacture. In addition to the forts, the channel between Fort Sumter and Sullivan's island was obstructed by rows of floating torpedoes, while the channel between Sumter and Cumming's point was obstructed by rows of piles and chains reaching nearly up to Charleston.

Admiral Du Pont assumed command of the South Atlantic squadron October 29, 1861, and after the successful Port Royal expedition, his efforts, seconded by those of his able captains, were exerted in securing control of the lagoons, inlets and sounds reaching from Charleston to Fernandina. The capture of Fort Pulaski in April, 1862, practically closed the Savannah river to blockade-runners, and from that time on Charleston was the chief concern of both Du Pont and his successor Dahlgren. No effort was made in the early part of the war to capture the city, but numerous measures were taken to strengthen the blockade. At this period of the war the blockade was maintained under great difficulties, as the batteries on Morris island kept the fleet outside the bar. It was not until 1863, that the ironclads, in cooperation with the army, reduced the works on Morris island and enabled the monitors to take their stations inside the bar, to the southward of Cumming's point.

In December, 1861, occurred the first event of importance in Charleston harbor. This was an attempt to close the entrance by placing obstructions in the channel. A number of vessels, principally Page 128 old whalers, were bought by the navy department, and after being loaded with stone were sunk in rows across the bar. The attempt to block the channels in this manner was a complete failure, for the tidal currents soon buried the vessels in the sands or cut new channels around the hulks. Certain it was that blockade-runners could soon pass as easily as before. When the enemy was driven from his works on Morris island and the monitors were stationed inside the bar, the blockade-runners were effectually barred from the main channel and resorted mainly to the Beach channel at the northern side of the harbor. This narrow channel skirted the shore of Sullivan's island and entered the inner harbor under the guns of Moultrie. Its entire course was protected by batteries which lined the beach, chief among which were Fort Marshall near Beach inlet, Fort Beauregard and Fort Moultrie. On numerous occasions blockade-runners stealing in by this channel at night grounded near the inner entrance, where the ironclads could batter them to pieces at their leisure, and a fine accumulation of wrecks was the result.

During the year 1862 little was done by the Union navy off Charleston beyond maintaining the blockade. Aside from the blockade the squadron was chiefly employed in making strategic reconnoissances in the waters and islands on the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia, preparatory to their military occupation. On May 13, 1862, the monotony of the blockade was relieved by a very interesting episode. The steam tug Planter, attached to the engineer department at Charleston and employed in the transportation of ordnance and army stores, was brought out by her negro pilot, Robert Small, a very intelligent slave, and surrendered to the blockading squadron. She had on board 8 men, 5 women and 3 children, all negroes, was armed with a 32-pounder pivot gun and a 24-pounder howitzer, and also had on board 4 large guns, one of which was a 7-inch rifle to have been taken to the new fort on the middle ground that same morning. At 4 Page 129 o'clock in the morning, while the captain was on shore, she left her wharf flying the state and Confederate flags, passed the forts, saluted as usual by blowing her steam whistle, and after passing beyond the range of the last gun, hauled down the Confederate flag and hoisted a white one. The steamer, from her excellent machinery and light draught, was a valuable acquisition to the blockaders. Small himself was a very intelligent man and served as a pilot on the southern coast during the remainder of the war. Acting on information gleaned from this source, Du Pont caused a reconnoissance of Stono inlet to be made on the 19th. Small had told him that the Confederates were erecting batteries on the river and the truth of the report was soon established. The inlet was at once occupied by the gunboats, which thus secured an important base for future operations against Charleston.

Early in January, 1863, the first instalment of monitors intended to operate against Charleston arrived, and with a view to testing the efficiency of this class of vessels, the Montauk, Commander John L. Worden, was sent to Ossabaw sound to operate up the Great Ogeechee, and if possible effect the capture of Fort McAllister at Genesis point. The Confederate cruiser Nashville was lying there, awaiting an opportunity to run the blockade and escape to foreign waters. It was hoped that both the fort and the Nashville might be destroyed. On the morning of January 27, the Montauk, supported by several small gunboats, opened fire upon the fort, which was a formidable casemated earthwork with bomb-proofs and mounted 9 guns. The enemy's practice was excellent and the Montauk was struck 13 times, but suffered no serious damage. The fire of the monitor's 15 and 11-inch guns soon caused the fire of the fort to slacken, but obstructions in the river prevented the Montauk from advancing within the most effective range, and she retired after expending her shells. On February 1, the Montauk again engaged Fort McAllister at a distance Page 130 of 1,400 yards, the water being too shoal to permit of a nearer approach. Some damage was reported to the parapets of the fort and the Montauk was struck 46 times, but again suffered no material damage. Finally, on March 2, the admiral had the satisfaction of reporting the destruction of the Nashville, which had been successfully blockaded for 8 months. She was fitted as a Confederate cruiser and was often seen close under Fort McAllister, ready to make a dash if opportunity offered. On February 27 she was discovered to be aground. To protect her, as well as the railroad bridge above, the enemy had driven a diagonal row of piles across the channel of the river, flanked by a line of torpedoes below. Worden brought his vessel close up to the obstructions in the river, and commenced a vigorous bombardment upon her. Inside of 20 minutes the Nashville was in flames and 10 minutes later her magazine exploded with great violence, when every vestige of the vessel disappeared from sight. Meanwhile the monitor was struck a few times by the fire of the fort. In withdrawing beyond the reach of the fort's guns a torpedo exploded under her, blowing a hole in her bottom and forcing her to run aground to avoid sinking. The damage was soon after repaired with a piece of boiler iron and the vessel continued in active service. In the destruction of the swift Nashville a vessel was wiped out which might easily have proven as destructive as the Alabama. Worden viewed his services on this occasion with more professional pride than his famous engagement with the Merrimac.

During the early morning of January 29, 1863, the blockade-runner Princess Royal, an iron propeller, four days out from Bermuda, tried to run past the fleet into Charleston. The gunboat Unadilla, Lieutenant Quackenbush, was on the alert and gave chase, firing 2 shots at the runner. The latter was then run ashore and abandoned by her captain, pilot, supercargo and a number of her other officers. A boat's crew from the Unadilla took possession Page 131 of the prize, which was later floated off without sustaining any injury. Her cargo proved to be one of the most valuable taken in the course of the war, consisting of two complete engines of great power, intended for ironclads, rifled guns, arms, ammunition and other valuable stores. Her loss was a severe blow to the enemy, and as she still lay at anchor off the harbor it was hoped to recapture her when the ironclads made their dash out of Charleston on the 31st.

The Confederates had been building two ironclad rams at Charleston, known as the Palmetto State and the Chicora. Flag-officer D. N. Ingraham, commanding the station, superintended their construction, and the plans were made by John L. Porter, who had built the Merrimac. Though Charleston lacked a shipyard, suitable materials and skilled workmen, "they were well constructed vessels, covered with 4 inches of iron, and would steam about 7 knots. They drew from 12 to 13 feet, and were each armed with 2 Brooke rifled 80-pounders, and two 64-pounder shell-guns." The armor covered the ram-shaped bows and was continued 5 feet below the water-line. Shortly before dawn of the 31st, the rams came out of the harbor and crossed the bar. Aided by a thick haze and a perfect calm they were able to approach the blockaders unperceived. The latter at this time consisted of the steamers Housatonic, Mercedita, Ottawa, Unadilla, Keystone State, Quaker City, Memphis, Augusta, Stettin and Flag. The two largest vessels of the blockading fleet, the Powhatan and Canandaigua, had been sent to Port Royal for coal and repairs, so that the Housatonic was really the only war vessel of any size left on the station. The blockaders lay at wide intervals off the harbor, when the Palmetto State suddenly appeared through the mist abeam of the Mercedita, Captain F. S. Stellwagen. The Mercedita was certainly not off her guard, as she had but recently slipped her cable and overhauled a troopship. Captain Stellwagen hailed the stranger with "What steamer Page 132 is that? Drop your anchor or you will be into us." The reply came from Commodore Ingraham on board the Palmetto State, "The Confederate States steamer Palmetto State," punctuating his answer with a 7-inch shell which entered the starboard side of the Mercedita, cut through the condenser and steam-drum of the port boiler and blew a hole in its exit from four to five feet square. The shell and escaping steam killed and wounded several men. So suddenly had the ram come upon the Mercedita in the haze, that it was impossible to bring any of her guns to bear. The ironclad had them at her mercy and the Mercedita was believed to be in a sinking condition. In reply to a demand for surrender, Lieutenant T. Abbott was sent on board the ram and gave a parole for the officers and crew "not to take up arms against the Confederate States during the war, unless legally and regularly exchanged as prisoners of war." The Palmetto State now left the Mercedita and made for the Keystone State, Commander Le Roy, which was also assailed at the same time by the Chicora, Commander Tucker. The Keystone State returned their fire vigorously, but an exploding shell set her on fire, and she steered away in the fog until the fire could be extinguished, when she turned and made with a full head of steam toward a black smoke, intending to ram the vessel making it. It proved to be one of the Confederate ships, but instead of ramming, the Keystone State received a shot through both steam chests, rendering her powerless. In addition to this she was struck by 10 shells, mostly in the hull near or below the water-line, and at the same time the fire in her fore hold burst out again. The engineers reported the ship taking water rapidly and Le Roy accordingly hauled down his flag, but as the enemy still fired upon him he ordered the colors to be re-hoisted and resumed his fire with the after battery. At this juncture the Augusta, Memphis and Quaker City approached and by diverting the attention of the rams enabled the Keystone State to get out of range of the fire. Page 133 Subsequently she was taken in tow by the Memphis and reached Port Royal in a very crippled state, having lost 20 killed and as many more wounded. The Mercedita also arrived there on the same evening under her own steam.

Meanwhile the rams carried on a sort of running combat with several of the blockading squadron, which, having no guns capable of making an impression on the ironclads, kept prudently aloof. Upon the approach of the Housatonic, the only heavy man-of-war then on the station, the two rams were already making for the harbor. About 7:30 both took refuge in the Swash channel and later were observed anchored in shoal water in the Maffit channel near Fort Moultrie. The Mercedita and the Keystone State had borne the brunt of the battle, during the two hours and a half of the engagement, though the Memphis, Quaker City and Augusta had also participated to some extent, and during the last hour the Housatonic did considerable firing, but inflicted little damage and received none in return.

The raiders had succeeded in surprising the Union vessels, and had forced two of them to surrender, but they were unable to take the surrendered vessels into port. The status of the Mercedita was somewhat peculiar. Says Soley: "When Abbott went on board the ram, he gave his parole, as already mentioned, in the name of the captain, for the officers and crew. The agreement was verbal, and Abbott's report stated that he had given his word that the officers and crew would not 'take up arms against the Confederate States unless regularly exchanged.' It does not appear that Abbott had authority to make this engagement, but no steps were taken by the captain to repudiate it. Possibly there was no opportunity to take any steps. In his report Stellwagen simply says: 'He proceeded aboard, and according to their demand, gave his parole on behalf of himself and all the officers and crew.' In regard to this proceeding, it may be remarked that it is a well recognized principle that prisoners cannot be Page 134 forced to give their parole, and it is manifestly improper to give a parole voluntarily, during the progress of an engagement. It enables the assailant to neutralize portions of the force in detail, without being diverted from his operations by the necessity of guarding prisoners, and it precludes recapture, or rather it takes away any advantage that may be derived from recapture. After the battle she proceeded without assistance to Port Royal. This removal of the Mercedita was afterward the foundation of a charge by the Confederates that the officers of the vessel had violated their parole, by taking the Mercedita out of their hands. The proceeding was, in fact, a questionable one, as it is merely quibbling to draw a distinction between 'taking up arms,' and navigating a ship-of-war out of reach of an enemy. It can only be excused on the supposition that the enemy were unable to take possession owing to the presence of a superior force, and it shows forcibly the predicament in which an officer may place himself by giving a parole which virtually places his ship hors de combat during the progress of an action."

The raid had failed of its object and beyond the temporary disabling of two vessels of the blockading squadron no practical advantage had been gained by the enemy. Nevertheless the Charleston authorities seized upon the occasion to formally declare that the blockade of Charleston had been raised and every effort was made to induce foreign powers to take this view of the case. The Confederate reports show that the rams started for the harbor at 7 30, "leaving the partially crippled and fleeing ,enemy about 7 miles clear of the bar, standing to the southward and eastward." And yet the transport Cossack, having on board the 176th Pa. militia, arrived at the bar at 8:30 o'clock, and reported all but two or three of the blockading squadron in the usual places. Five out of the ten vessels on the station never passed outside the line of blockade either during the engagement or throughout the day. Of these the Housatonic and Quaker City Page 135 had taken some part in the engagement, but the Stettin, Ottawa and Unadilla were not engaged and had no reason to leave the usual line of blockade. As a matter of fact not a single blockade-runner passed in or out during the fight, though a proclamation issued on the afternoon of the 31st, bearing the official signatures of Beauregard and Ingraham, the commanding general and senior naval officer stated: "At the hour of 5 o'clock this morning the Confederate States naval forces on this station attacked the United States blockading fleet off the harbor of the city of Charleston, and sunk, dispersed, or drove off and out of sight, for the time, the entire hostile fleet," and concluded with a formal declaration that the blockade had been raised. Exaggerated reports were also published in the Richmond newspapers announcing that as the result of the naval engagement of Jan 31, 2 vessels were sunk, 4 burnt, and the remainder driven away. It was also asserted that several of the foreign consuls in the city had gone out 5 miles beyond the usual anchorage in a tug, and could see no signs of the blockaders with their glasses. The British, French and Spanish consular agents held a meeting in the evening and declared unanimously that the blockade had been raised. Of course all these statements were essentially false, but were exaggerated abroad, and gained sufficient credence to cast a cloud on the continued efficiency of the blockade, which it took some time to dispel. Even the North was seriously alarmed until DuPont's official reports were received. One excellent result of this attack was the prompt reinforcement of the blockading force before Charleston, which had been previously only fit to cope with blockade-runners. Within two or three days the Powhatan, New Ironsides and Canandaigua arrived before Charleston, and the blockade was thereafter maintained with redoubled vigilance.

On the afternoon of January 30, the gunboat Isaac Smith, Acting Lieutenant F. S. Conover, while engaged in reconnoitering Stono Page 136 river above Legareville, was suddenly attacked by three concealed shore batteries and forced to surrender. The batteries were composed of heavy siege and field guns and subjected the Smith to a heavy raking fire for over a mile, as she endeavored .to steam down past them. To this fire the Smith could only occasionally reply with a pivot gun until she was passing the two lower batteries on John's island, when she delivered a broadside of shell and grape at an estimated range of 200 to 400 yards. But the vessel received a shot in her steam-chimney which at once disabled her. Resistance now appeared useless and the ship was surrendered after 25 men had been killed and wounded. The ambuscade had been carefully planned by the Confederates, who directed their fire at the exposed boilers of the Smith. She was a vessel of 450 tons, bought in 1861, and was armed with a 30pounder Parrott and eight 8-inch Columbiads.

By the end of February several additional monitors intended for the attack on Charleston had arrived and the admiral planned another attack on Fort McAllister in order to test their mechanical appliances in active service, and also to give the officers and men the benefit of target practice with the new ordnance, before entering upon the more important operations at Charleston. This attack took place March 3, the Passaic, Patapsco and Nahant, participating. The three vessels anchored 1,200 yards below the fort, the Passaic squarely in front, and bombarded the works for 8 hours without inflicting any injury that could not be repaired over night, and in return received no serious damage from the fire of the fort. Neither the Patapsco or Nahant was struck except with Whitworth bolts of small size, but the Passaic was hit 34 times. The attack developed several imperfections in the ironclads, which were remedied, as they were in other vessels of their class. It was also established that the slow-firing 15-inch gun in a turret, while possessing considerable breaching force against masonry, was inferior to the quick-firing breech-loading Page 137 rifle against a work constructed of sand-bags. Says Admiral Porter: "More was expected from our iron-clads during the war than they had power to accomplish. Any one of them armed with 15-inch guns could have destroyed a vessel like the Merrimac in half an hour, but against earthworks, sand especially, none of the monitor class were equal to the New Ironsides, with her quick-firing batteries of n-inch guns." It should be born in mind that Du Pont was the first officer to whom these monitors had been assigned, and he was entirely justified in taking every precaution to test their capabilities in action. The movement for secession had been inaugurated at Charleston, and both the public and the navy department were very desirous of bringing about the fall of the secession stronghold at the earliest possible date. A large land force was not available at this time and therefore the duty devolved on the navy to attempt to force its way up to the city.

Du Pont was by no means sanguine of success, but nevertheless decided in conformity with the wishes of the department and the public to attack the powerful batteries in the harbor. By the beginning of April, 1863, the preparations of many months were completed, and on the morning of the 6th the whole fleet crossed the bar, intending to reduce Fort Sumter the same day, and thence move up to the city. The weather proved too hazy on the 6th, and the attack was therefore deferred until the next day, the fleet anchoring 5 miles from Fort Sumter. At noon on the 7th, which was the earliest hour the pilots would consent to move, signal was made from the flag-ship, New Ironsides, and the vessels got under way. The Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, was at the head of the column, with a raft on the bows to explode torpedoes ; the Passaic, Captain Percival Drayton; the Montauk, Captain John L. Worden; the Patapsco, Commander Daniel Ammen; the flag-ship New Ironsides, Commodore Thomas Turner; the Catskill, Commander George W. Rodgers; the Nantucket, Commander Page 138 D. M. Fairfax; the Nahant, Commander John Downes; and the Keokuk, Commander A. C. Rhind. An interval of one cable's length was to be maintained, and "the vessels were ordered to pass without returning the fire from batteries on Morris island. When within easy range of Fort Sumter they were to open upon it and take position to the north and west, at a distance of 800 yards, firing low, and at the center embrasure. The necessity for precision of fire was enjoined." Of these nine ships the New Ironsides was a big broadside steamer with heavy iron-platings, carrying two 150-pounder rifles and fourteen 11inch Dahlgrens. The Keokuk was a sort of monitor with two fixed turrets, and the others were new monitors carrying one 15inch Dahlgren, the solid shot of which weighed 440 pounds, and one n-inch Dahlgren, save only that the Patapsco carried a 150pounder rifle in place of the smaller Dahlgren. A reserve squadron, consisting of the Canandaigua, Unadilla, Housatonic, Wissahickon and Huron, under the command of Captain Green of the Canandaigua, was ordered to remain outside the bar, and be in readiness to support the ironclads, when they should attack the batteries on Morris island, but took no part in the subsequent engagement.

The squadron of ironclads did not finally get started until 1:15 p. m., because the raft in front of the leading monitor, the Weehawken, became fouled, but the head of the column got within range of Fort Moultrie at 2:50 p. m., when the enemy opened upon the Weehawken, followed shortly after by all the batteries on Sullivan's and Morris islands and Fort Sumter. Says Du Pont in his official report of the engagement: "At ten minutes past two the Weehawken, the leading vessel, signaled obstructions in her vicinity, and soon after approached very close to them. They extended across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, and were marked by rows of casks very near together and in several lines. Beyond these again piles were seen extending from Page 139 James island to the middle ground. Not being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and successively the Passaic, Nahant, and others, were obliged to turn, which threw the line into some confusion as the other vessels approached. This was particularly the case with the flag-ship, which became, in a measure, entangled with the monitors and could not bring her battery to bear upon Fort Sumter without great risk of firing into them. She was obliged on her way up to anchor twice to prevent her from going ashore, and on one of these occasions in consequence of having come into collision with two of the ironclads. The monitors were able to get within easy range of Fort Sumter at distances varying from 550 to 800 yards, in which position they were subjected successively to a tremendous concentrated fire from all the batteries on Sullivan's island, Morris island, Sumter, and others of the most formidable kind and from guns of the heaviest caliber. Not being able to place the New Ironsides where I desired, though she was in a distance of 1,000 yards, and evening approaching, at 4:30 I made signal to withdraw from action, intending to resume the attack the next morning. During the evening the commanding officers of the ironclads came on board the flag-ship, and, to my regret, I soon became convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force under my command. No ship had been exposed to the severest fire of the enemy over 40 minutes, and yet in that brief period, as the department will perceive by the detailed reports of the commanding officers, five of the ironclads were wholly or partially disabled; disabled, too, as the obstructions could not be passed, in that which was most essential to our success—I mean in their armament or power of inflicting injury by their guns. Commander Rhind, with the Keokuk, had only been able to fire three times during the short period he was exposed to the guns of the enemy, and was obliged to withdraw from action to prevent his vessel from sinking, which event occurred on the following Page 140 morning. The Nahant, Commander Downes, was most seriously damaged, her turret being so jammed as effectually to prevent its turning. Many of the bolts of both turret and pilothouse were broken, and the latter became nearly untenable in consequence of the nuts and ends flying across it. Captain P. Drayton, in the Passaic, after the fourth fire from his n-inch gun, was unable to use it again during the action, and his turret also became jammed, though he was, after some delay, enabled to get it in motion again. Commander Ammen, of the Patapsco, lost the use of his rifled gun after the fifth fire, owing to the carrying away of the forward cap-square bolts. On the Nantucket Commander Fairfax reports that after the third shot from the 15-inch gun the port stopper became jammed, several shot striking very near the port and driving in the plates, preventing the further use of that gun during the action. The other ironclads, though struck many times severely, were still able to use their guns, but I am convinced that in all probability in another 30 minutes they would have been likewise disabled." The Keokuk, which differed materially in construction and strength from the other ironclads of the squadron, sustained the only irreparable damage, though at least five of the other vessels were materially damaged. So heavy and continuous was the fire upon the Keokuk that she was struck 90 times in the hull and turrets in 30 minutes, most of the shot piercing her—19 at and near the water line. Her so-called armor-plating proved totally insufficient to withstand the fire of heavy ordnance, and she must have proved a failure, whether against forts or ships. On the other hand the New Ironsides, which also represented a new departure in the construction of ironclads, fulfilled every reasonable expectation and escaped with comparatively little damage. It will be remembered, however, that the flag-ship was unable to get nearer than 1,000 yards to Sumter, and for that reason was not exposed to the severest fire. Besides, her commander had barricaded all Page 141 her vulnerable points with barriers of sand bags. Her chief defect was that she steered badly and became unmanageable in shallow water, if she slowed down or stopped her engines. The commanders of all the vessels complained of the difficulties caused by the strong flood tide which prevailed during the engagement, and the imperfect vision afforded through the peep-holes of the pilot-house and through the smoke. Said Worden, of the Montauk: "I desire to say that I experienced serious embarrassment in maneuvering my vessel in the narrow and uncertain channel, with the limited means of observation afforded by the pilot-house under the rapid and concentrated fire from the forts, the vessels of the fleet close around me, and neither compass or buoys to guide me," and added that he did not believe the city could be taken by the present naval force, "and that had the attack been continued it could not have failed to result in disaster." Ammen, of the Patapsco, reported: "I think a want of vision one of the most serious defects of this class, making it impossible to fight them advantageously, to avoid dangers or to make a satisfactory reconnoissance." The damage inflicted by the monitors was quite insignificant, as the bursting shells from the great 15-inch guns appeared to do little more than throw up a cloud of dust in striking the fort. All told the nine ironclads with their 23 guns fired 139 shot and shells, 96 shells, 30 solid shot and 13 cored shot.

The most effective fire of the enemy was from Forts Sumter and Moultrie, Battery Wagner and Cumming's point battery, though Batteries Bee and Beauregard were also engaged at a range of from 1,600 to 2,000 yards. Major Ehols, of the Confederate engineers, reported that the Confederate batteries discharged 2,209 snot of all sorts, and had a total of 69 guns engaged.

Chief Engineer A. C. Stimers, U. S. N., who witnessed the attack from the deck of the coast-survey steamer Bibb, at the Page 142 mouth of the Swash channel, was very severe in his criticisms of Du Pont and his conduct on the occasion of this attack, asserting that the monitors were in as good condition on Wednesday, April 8, after they had undergone some slight repairs, to renew the attack as they had been to commence it the day before; that they could go into Charleston in spite of guns, torpedoes and obstructions, and that Du Pont was too much prejudiced against the monitors to give them a fair trial." Du Pont in his detailed report of the engagement stated: "Any attempt to pass through the obstructions would have entangled the vessels and held them under the most severe fire of heavy ordnance that has ever been delivered, and while it is barely possible that some vessels might have forced their way through, it would only have been to be again impeded by fresh and more formidable obstructions and to encounter other powerful batteries, with which the whole harbor of Charleston has been lined. I had hoped that the endurance of the ironclads would have enabled them to have borne any weight of fire to which they might have been exposed, but when I found that so large a portion of them was wholly or one half disabled by less than an hour's engagement before attempting to remove (overcome) the obstructions or testing the power of the torpedoes, I was convinced that a persistence in the attack would only result in the loss of the greater portion of the ironclad fleet, and in leaving many of them inside the harbor to fall into the hands of the enemy." Many other acrimonious criticisms in the public prints, and particularly in the Baltimore American, reflected severely on the conduct of the attack on Sumter. In a letter to the secretary of the navy, signed by Capts. Drayton, John Rodgers, Ammen, George W. Rodgers, Fairfax and Downes, which was afterwards seen and approved by two more of the ironclad captains, many of these statements were declared false, and the course of the admiral was fully and cordially sustained. Among other things the captains stated: "Although, Page 143 as might be expected, there were differences of opinion as to the probabilities of taking Charleston, not one of us ever doubted that the attempt should be made, believing as we did that, under the circumstances, almost anything would be better than to give up, without a fair trial, what had so long been prepared for. But after the experience gained under the fire of the enemy, we were unanimously of opinion that a renewal of the attack would be unwise in the extreme." Engineer Stimers had expressed himself as much disappointed because the admiral had declined to make use of the two rafts with the submarine shells attached, which he had brought down, though one of the rafts without the shell was actually used on the Weehawken, and stated that the attack could have few hopes of success without these contrivances. The captains, however, in their signed statement said: "These torpedo rafts had merely a theoretical reputation for removing obstacles, never having been tried at the North or elsewhere, except in blowing up water, and certainly being a source of great danger to our own vessels in fouling each other—a matter very likely to occur, taking into consideration the tide, the shoal water and the imperfect steering qualities of the vessels, and which actually did occur on several occasions. The result of the effort to use these torpedoes against the Keokuk after the action fully sustains the opinion formed of them." Stimers was charged with falsehood and conduct unbecoming an officer of the navy by Admiral Du Pont, but a court of inquiry dismissed the charges. A rather sharp correspondence also ensued between the department and the admiral, growing out of the latter's statement that he had never advised the attack on Charleston, but had warned the department that the trials in the Ogeechee were most discouraging, that the cooperation of troops was necessary to success, and that whatever degree of impenetrability the monitors might have, there was no corresponding quality of aggression or destructiveness as against forts, etc. In reply the department expressed regret that Page 144 he had not been more "frank, cordial, and sincere" in his interviews and reports before the attack took place, and intimated that if his real views regarding the monitors and the probabilities of success in the attack had been known, the department would not have allowed the same to be made in April. The truth is the department at Washington and the public generally, who had confidently counted on success, viewed Du Pont's failure with ill concealed impatience, and certain it is that the admiral's prestige sustained a severe loss. The failure deeply mortified all the officers and men engaged. They had at least counted with confidence on the destruction of Fort Sumter and were much surprised at the small amount of damage actually inflicted by the ironclads.

Immediately after the attack on Fort Sumter of April 7, the flag-officer sent all the ironclads to Port Royal for repairs. As soon as these were finished the vessels returned to the North Edisto, whose inland waters in the judgment of the admiral afforded a better base from which to conduct operations against Charleston, than either Morris or Sullivan's island. In a communication from the department dated April 2, but only received on the evening of the attack, Du Pont was advised that the exigencies of the service required the presence of as many ironclads as possible at New Orleans, to be employed in opening the Mississippi. He was therefore ordered to send all the ironclads that survived the attack to that point, reserving for himself only two. This was the situation when the admiral sent the vessels to Port Royal for repairs, enjoining haste in the work. In another letter from the secretary of the navy, dated April n, which was also sent before the news of the repulse had been received, Du Pont was ordered to continue to menace the enemy, keeping him in apprehension of a renewed attack, in case he was not strong enough to carry the place. General Hunter "will continue to keep the rebels employed and in constant apprehension, so that they Page 145 shall not leave the vicinity of Charleston," in the event the attack proved successful. Despatches from the president, dated April 13 and 14 directed him to hold his position inside the bar, or to return to it if he had left it, and expressed the hope that he could take the batteries on Morris and Sullivan's islands, as well as Fort Sumter, by cordial cooperation with the forces of General Hunter. In any event he was especially enjoined to keep up the demonstration for a time. Lincoln's despatches Were received on the morning of the 16th, but all the ironclads had been sent away to Port Royal for repairs three days before. Writing to the department April 16, Du Pont says among other things: "I have since been doing all in my power to push forward their repairs in order to send them to the Gulf, as directed, but I presume that your despatch of the nth instant, and the telegraphic message from the president, revoke your previous order. I shall spare no exertions in repairing as soon as possible the serious injuries sustained by the monitors in the late attack, and shall get them inside Charleston bar with all despatch in accordance with the order of the president. I think it my duty, however, to state to the department that this will be attended with great risk to these vessels from the gales which prevail at this season, and from the continuous fire of the enemy's batteries, which they can neither silence, nor prevent the erection of new ones. * * * I have deemed it proper and due to myself to make these statements, but I trust that I need not add that I will obey all orders with the utmost fidelity, even when my judgment is entirely at variance with them, such as the order to reoccupy the unsafe anchorage for the Ironsides off Morris island, and an intimation that a renewal of the attack on Charleston may be ordered, which, in my judgment, would be attended with disastrous results, involving the loss of this coast."

The admiral's well known opinion that the monitors could not ride securely to their anchors within the bar off Charleston, was Page 146 shared by the commanders of those vessels, as several monitors had dragged in the comparatively safe waters within Edisto inlet. This opinion was later proved to be a mistaken one, for after Dahlgren assumed command of the squadron in July, several of them were stationed inside the bar and continued there for a period of twenty months. Heavy moorings, with buoys attached, were made use of, and to enable the men to live aboard in this warm climate, where the decks of their vessels were frequently awash, it was found necessary to leave the battle-plates off the hatchways, around which were placed high coamings. In very rough weather, or when going into action the hatches were of course closed. Dahlgren afterwards declared: "No one can form an idea of the atmosphere of these vessels after being closed up and in action for a few hours in a hot climate."

On June 17 Du Pont had the satisfaction of reporting the capture of the Confederate ironclad ram Atlanta by two of his monitors. The Atlanta was originally a swift and powerful Scotch steamer called the Fingal, which had run the blockade of Savannah in November, 1861. She was there converted into an ironclad at great expense, by being cut down to within 2 feet of the water and decked over. In the center of the deck rose a casemate large enough to accommodate 4 guns, the sides and ends of which inclined at an angle of 29 degrees. The deck overlapped the original iron hull 6 feet on each side, tapering toward the ends of the vessel and projecting beyond them. The sides were protected by timber running from a point several feet below the water line to the edge of the deck, forming a heavy, solid overhang of wood and armor. The armor plates were 4 inches thick, composed of 2 layers of 2-inch iron plates 7 inches wide, but the material was evidently poor as it shattered like cast-iron under the impact of 15-inch projectiles. The armor was backed with 18 inches of oak and pine. The bow terminated in an iron beak or ram, forming a part of the stem, and attached to this Page 147 was a percussion torpedo. The armament consisted of two 7-inch and two 6.4-inch rifled guns of the Brooke pattern, the former being broadside guns and the latter working on pivots either as broadside or bow and stern guns. Her machinery was good and her dimensions were as follows: Extreme length, 204 feet; extreme breadth, 41 feet; draught, 15.9 feet. Owing to her increased weight her speed was cut down to about 10 knots. It was believed by her builders that she was more than a match for any two monitors. She was commanded by Lieutenant William A. Webb and mustered 21 officers and 124 men. Ever since she ran the blockade she had been closely watched, and early in June the Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, and the Nahant, Commander J. Downes, had been despatched to Warsaw sound in anticipation of her coming out. A few minutes past 4 a. m. she was perceived coming down the Wilmington river and the monitors at once prepared for action. The Weehawken was nearest the enemy and got under way first, standing toward the northeast end of Warsaw island, followed by the Nahant which had no pilot. A few minutes before 5 o'clock the Atlanta, which had grounded and lay across the channel, fired her first shot at a distance of miles, but it failed to take effect. When it was full daylight and all preparations had been made, the Weehawken turned and stood up the sound, heading for the Atlanta, with the Nahant still in her wake. The Weehawken opened on the enemy with her 15inch gun at a distance of about 300 yards. Coming in 100 yards nearer, she fired 4 more shots, whereupon the Atlanta hauled down her colors and hoisted the white flag, after an engagement which had lasted scarcely a quarter of an hour. The enemy fired only 7 shots, none of which struck either of the monitors. The engagement terminated so suddenly that the Nahant was unable to come to close action as was her evident purpose, and she never fired a shot. The Atlanta had started out full of confidence and was accompanied by two wooden steamers filled with spectators Page 148 come to witness the engagement. On examination it was found that the enemy had been struck four times. The first shot knocked a hole in her casemate and strewed the deck with splinters, prostrating about 40 men by the concussion and wounding several by splinters. This is said to have been the first shot from a 15-inch gun fired in a naval combat, and it seems to have had a very demoralizing effect on the crew of the Atlanta, disabling all of one gun's crew and half of another. The second shot struck the edge of the overhang, the third knocked off the top of the pilot-house, wounded two pilots and stunned the men at the wheel, and the fourth. struck a port stopper in the center, broke it in two and drove the iron fragments through the port. The first and third shots decided the battle, the former taking away the desire to fight and the latter the ability to get away. Whatever opinions may have been entertained of the efficacy of ironclads against forts of masonry and sand, few could doubt after this battle that they could do deadly execution when pitted against other ironclads. The Monitor class had suffered in prestige since the attack on Fort Sumter, but this engagement again brought them into favor and they were especially recognized as possessing superior qualities for harbor or coast defense. The brevity of the action and the complete disabling of the Atlanta also reconciled many to the heavy ordnance carried by these vessels, the efficacy of which had occasioned much dispute among professional men.

Though the attack of April 7 had failed, the government was determined to push the operations against Charleston and was especially anxious to occupy Morris island, to prevent any further strengthening of the Confederate works. Ever since the attack of the monitors relations between the department and Du Pont had been somewhat strained and it was determined to relieve him. Rear-Admiral Foote was thereupon appointed to the command of the squadron, June 4, but died in New York city Page 149 June 26, after a brief illness. Rear-Admiral John A. B. Dahlgren, whose name is familiar as a designer of great guns, and who had been serving as chief of the bureau of ordnance, was appointed next in command to Foote. On June 24 Dahlgren was ordered to repair to Port Royal to relieve Du Pont, and entered upon his duties on July 6. On June 12 General Gillmore had relieved General Hunter in command of the Department of the South. Measures were being concerted between Du Pont and Gillmore for the occupation of Morris island by a combined attack of the army and navy when Dahlgren arrived, but the latter was left to make most of the preliminary arrangements as far as the navy was concerned. The Union forces were landed on the lower end of Morris island, and on July 10 the monitors Catskill (flag-ship), Montauk, Nahant and Weehawken cooperated in an attack on Fort Wagner. The flag-ship was selected as an especial mark by the enemy. It was struck 60 times, but came out of the action in good working order after firing 128 rounds and was able to go into action again the next day. The other ironclads escaped with trifling injury. By reason of shoal water the vessels fought at a range of about 1,200 yards, where grape shot was ineffective. The men were employed altogether during the day for 14 hours and 534 shell and shrapnel were fired. Like the attack on Fort Sumter, "the effect of the fire of the vessels on the fort was not so observable as that of the enemy on the vessels." The gunboats withdrew at 6 p. m. and the next morning the troops assaulted, but were repulsed. The monitors again went into action in the morning at Gillmore's request, to prevent reinforcements for Wagner. A few days later the New Ironsides and five of the monitors were brought over the bar. On the 18th another combined attack by the troops under General Gillmore and the ironclads took place. The vessels participating were the Montauk (flagship), Ironsides, Catskill, Nantucket, Weehawken and Patapsco, which advanced to the attack in the order named. Shortly after Page 150 noon the Montauk anchored abreast of Fort Wagner and fired the first gun. At 4 p. m., with a flood-tide, the vessels weighed, and moved in to a distance of 300 yards from the fort, where a most effective fire was maintained, which completely silenced the fort. The troops assaulted after dark, when Dahlgren was obliged to discontinue his fire, as it was then impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. The enemy was therefore able to return to his guns and the assault was repelled with great slaughter. On the 16th an attack was made by shore batteries in the Stono river on the gunboats Pawnee and Marblehead, which was repulsed after an animated contest, during which the Pawnee was struck 42 times.

More troops were needed to successfully carry the works on Morris island, and for over a month after this no important action took place. Every few days some of the ironclads would move up and bombard Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg, on Cumming's point, to serve as a diversion, the vessels escaping without serious injury. Early on the morning of August 17, Gillmore opened all his batteries on Fort Sumter, firing over Wagner and the intervening space. At the same time Dahlgren, with his flag on board the Weehawken, followed by the Catskill, Nahant, Montauk and New Ironsides, took position abreast of Fort Wagner, which was effectually silenced during the day. Later in the day the admiral shifted his flag to the Passaic, and accompanied by the Patapsco—each of the vessels making use of their rifled 150pounders—cooperated with the land batteries in the attack on Sumter. None of the vessels suffered any material damage during the day, but the navy sustained a severe loss in the death of Captain George W. Rodgers, chief of staff to Dahlgren, who was killed while in the pilot-house by a flying piece of fractured plating.

A daring attempt to destroy the New Ironsides was made by a little Confederate torpedo ram on the morning of August 21. Page 151 Captain Carlin, of the ram reported that he failed in the attempt only because the engine of his vessel refused to work properly. Captain Rowan of the Ironsides reported: "On the morning of the 21st, about I o'clock, a very low and apparently swift steamer came up under the stern of the ship. Owing to the state of the atmosphere, she was close to us before discovered. She answered our hail and passed rapidly under our bows, with the intention, we presume, of applying a torpedo. The crew was at quarters and the cable slipped before he had time to operate. He disappeared in the dark under fire of our starboard bow guns."

Shortly before dawn, on the morning of the 23d, five ironclads opened fire upon Sumter at a distance of about 800 yards. The fort replied with only six shots, but Moultrie returned the fire briskly with large guns, many of their shots striking the monitors. Dahlgren wrote to the department that morning: "I propose passing Sumter into the harbor, if the obstructions are not of such a nature as to prevent it," and added, "the gorge of Sumter has been completely ruined by Union batteries on shore, of which one of four guns was worked by naval men." But neither then nor later did he ever make the attempt to pass the fort. By September 1 Sumter was almost entirely disabled, and with a view to removing the obstructions between it and Fort Moultrie, the ironclads were that night brought up to within 500 yards of Sumter, and for several hours a steady fire was maintained. The vessels also directed their fire to the floating obstructions that had been reported from day to day. Fort Moultrie and the extended line of batteries on Sullivan's island again replied briskly, striking the vessels 71 times, but doing little damage. Sumter fired only two shots on this occasion. Dahlgren withdrew his vessels before daylight, as the flood tide had set in. The Confederate General Beauregard said concerning these night attacks: "This plan of attack could have been repeated every night until the walls of the fort should have crumbled under the enormous missiles which Page 152 made holes two and a half feet deep in the walls, and shattered them in an alarming manner. I could not then have repaired during the day the damages of the night, and I am confident now, as I was then, that Fort Sumter, if thus attacked, must have been disabled."

All day long on September 6 Gillmore's batteries on shore, assisted by the powerful battery of the Ironsides, maintained a steady cannonade against Fort Wagner, and a general assault was to have been made at 9 a. m. of the 7th. General Gillmore's advanced sap was within 40 yards of the enemy's salient. On the night of the 6th the enemy evacuated Morris island and on the following day Dahlgren demanded the surrender of Sumter from Beauregard, who replied: "Refuse to surrender Fort Sumter. Admiral Dahlgren must take it and hold it if he can." It was thereupon planned to capture the fort, and as a preliminary the Weehawken was ordered on the night of the 7th to pass into a narrow channel winding around Cumming's point to cut off all communication by that direction. In making the movement she got hard aground and remained so for two tides. When her condition became known, Fort Moultrie, the batteries on Sullivan's island, and Fort Simkins on James island, all opened on her. She was struck 24 times, but was not much damaged. The Weehawken gallantly replied to the enemy's fire, one of her 15-inch shells disabling an 8-inch columbiad, and glancing, exploded a service magazine, killing 16 and wounding 12 men. The admiral with the other ironclads had moved up to feel, and if possible pass the obstructions between Sumter and Moultrie. A severe cannonade ensued between the vessels and the fort3 with no definite results. It was then thought best to go to the relief of the Weehawken, which finally got afloat in the face of a heavy fire and returned to her anchorage.

The navy next arranged an expedition to carry Sumter by storm, which though it resulted disastrously, was nevertheless Page 153 one of the most daring deeds performed before Charleston. The famous old fort was known to be little more than a wreck, the gorge and southeast face being completely shattered and broken. The night of the 8th was selected for the undertaking and the storming party, comprising 400 sailors and marines who volunteered for the duty, was under the command of Commander Thomas Holdup Stevens, of the Patapsco. The expedition started soon after 10 p. m., in 20 boats in tow of a tug, with the intention of assailing the fort at two points, one party landing at the gorge wall and mounting over the ruins to the parapet, while the other was to attempt an entrance through the lower embrasures. The enemy was prepared for the assault, as all afternoon they had seen boats in tow of tugs from the vessels outside of the bar, and it was afterwards reported that they were able to read the "wigwag" signals by which the orders were transmitted between the ships. Says the report of Stevens: "When within about 800 yards of the fort the tug was ordered to stop, and the final instructions with regard to the operations of the night and the watchword were given. Lieutenant Higginson was directed to move up to the northwest front of the fort with his division, for the purpose of making a diversion, while the remainder of the divisions was ordered to close up and wait for the order to advance on the southeast front. My intention was to wait until we had the full benefit of the diversion Lieutenant Higginson was directed to make in our favor, but mistaking his movement, doubtless, as intended for a general one, and in that spirit of gallantry and emulation which characterizes the service, many of the other boats dashed on; finding it too late to restrain them, the order was then given to advance. As soon as the boats were discovered, they were met with a fire of musketry, hand grenades, lighted shells and grape and canister, and simultaneously, at a signal from the fort, all the enemy's batteries surrounding us, with one of their gun-boats and rams, opened Page 154 fire. Several of the boats, among them two of the Powhatan's, had by this time effected a landing, but the evidences of preparation were so apparent, and the impossibility of effecting a general landing, or scaling the walls, so certain, that orders were given to withdraw. All who landed were either killed or taken prisoners and serious casualties occurred in the boats near the fort." Instead of the debris up which the stormers expected to ascend, those who landed were confronted with a solid wall of sand bags 12 feet high, from which the enemy fired upon them with deliberate aim. No scaling ladders had been provided and the men could neither advance nor retreat. Their boats were swamped by the enemy's fire, 10 officers and 104 men surrendered, and 3 were reported killed. With this attempt ended the important operations before Charleston, in which the navy took a prominent part. The ironclads cooperated with Gillmore's batteries in completing the destruction of Sumter, but no further effort was made by the fleet to pass into the inner harbor, while the wrecked fort was allowed to remain in Confederate hands until Sherman came up in the rear of Charleston, forcing the enemy to evacuate the city and all the forts. A line of interior blockade was established by Dahlgren, extending from Morris island to a point off Fort Moultrie. The ironclads were placed on this line, each taking its turn of picket duty near the entrance of the inner harbor, and as they thereby commanded Maffit's channel, through which most of the blockade-runners entered Charleston, the harbor was effectually closed.

In an elaborate report reviewing the services of the ironclads from July 6 to September 8, 1863, Dahlgren remarks: "The vessels thus shared fully with the army in the operations that led to the abandonment of the works on Morris island, and besides what is already mentioned prevented the access of reinforcements or their accumulation between Wagner and Gregg. A detachment of seamen and marines under Captain Parker participated in the Page 155 practice of the batteries at Fort Sumter by working 4 navy rifle cannon landed for the purpose. * * * Besides the principal attacks in force, there were few days from the first attack on Morris island to its evacuation that some ironclads or gunboats were not engaged in firing at the enemy's works so as to facilitate the labor of our troops ashore." Concerning their endurance he has this to say: "During the operations against Morris island, the nine ironclads fired 8,000 projectiles and received 882 hits. Including the service at Sumter in April, and the Ogeechee, the total number was 1,194. Of the eight monitors, one was always absent at Warsaw to blockade the rebel ram. The Lehigh did not arrive until August 30, therefore was only able to participate in the operations of the remaining 7 days, but did good work. For some time only five monitors were available for general attack, and then six, which was the greatest number disposable at any one time. The consequence of the protracted firing and hard usage to which the monitors were exposed during these two months of incessant service were unavoidably very considerable in the aggregate, and the greater also that all repair that could possibly be dispensed with was postponed to the conclusion. It was therefore necessarily extensive when entered upon. The battering received was without precedent; the Montauk had been struck 214 times; the Weehawken 187 times, and almost entirely by 10-inch shot. What vessels have ever been subjected to such a test?"

In addition to other measures for the defense of Charleston the Confederates made extensive use of torpedo boats and organized a submarine torpedo corps, of which the leading man was Captain S. D. Lee of the engineers. They achieved one noteworthy success with these little vessels in the destruction of the gunboat Housatonic on the evening of February 17, 1864, but most of their attempts proved failures. Several torpedo boats were constructed at Charleston, and came to be generally known as Page 156 "Davids," on the theory that each was the match for any nautical Goliath afloat. Under date of January 13, 1864, Dahlgren reported that there were 10 Davids building at Charleston, at least one of which is ready for service; also another one known as the "Diver." He says: "The latter is intended to submerge completely, get under the bottom, attach the torpedo, haul off and pull trigger. So far the trials have been unlucky, having drowned three crews of 17 men in all. The Diver can also be used as a David, so that there are really three of these machines ready to operate," including the original David, built by a citizen of Charleston, Mr. Theodore D. Stoney. This original David had a length of about 30 feet, a diameter of about y/2. feet at its middle, and was ballasted so as to float almost submerged. Above the water-line it was painted a bluish-gray color. At the bow it carried a torpedo attached to a hollow iron shaft about 14 feet ahead of the boat. On the night of October 5, this boat made a second attempt to destroy the New Ironsides, lying at her moorings off Morris island. As she approached at 9:15 p. m., she was seen and hailed by a sentinel. Immediately after the ship received a severe blow from an explosion which threw a column of water upon the spar deck and into the engine room. The explosion, however, was 3 feet under water, and did no material harm to the ship. The spouting water almost submerged the tiny craft, and she was abandoned by all but 1 of her crew of 4 men. Two of the crew were picked up out of the water, 1 returned to the vessel, and the two then on board managed to take her back to Charleston. It was the Diver which destroyed the Housatonic. Says the Confederate historian, Scharf: "Lieutenant George E. Dixon, of Captain Cothrart's company of the 21st Alabama infantry, asked permission of General Beauregard to try her against the Housatonic, a splendid new ship-of-war, which lay in the North channel off Beach inlet. Beauregard consented, but only on condition that she should not be used as a submarine machine, Page 157 but operating on the surface of the water with a spar torpedo in the same manner as the David." This was owing to the fact that she had already proved a coffin for her crews on four separate occasions, while diving. "All the 30 or more men who had met death in the 'fish' were volunteers, but Dixon had no difficulty in finding another volunteer crew ready to take the same risks. They were Arnold Becker, C. Simkins, James A. Wicks, F. Collins, and Ridgway, all of the Confederate navy, and Captain J. F. Carlson, of Captain Wagoner's company of artillery. It was a little before 9 o'clock, on the evening of February 17, 1864, when Master J. K. Crosby, officer of the deck of the Housatonic, detected the torpedo-boat, a scant 100 yards away from the ship. It looked to him, he said, 'like a plank moving along the water,' and before he decided to give the alarm, he had lost the seconds in which he might have saved his vessel. When he did pass the word, her cable had slipped, her engine backed and all hands called to quarters, but Dixon had closed on her and fired his torpedo on the starboard side, just forward of her mainmast. A hole was knocked in her side extending below the water line and she went down in 4 minutes. Five of the Housatonic's men were killed by the shock or drowned. The remainder took refuge in the rigging, from which they were rescued by the other vessels of the fleet. But the victory of the 'fish' was fatal to herself and crew. Whether she was swamped by the column. of water thrown up by the explosion, or was carried down by the suction of the sinking Housatonic, will never be known, but she went under never to rise again and the lives of all on board were sacrificed."

Another serious disaster about this time attended the fleet off Charleston. This was the loss of the Weehawken, which sank at her moorings on the morning of December 6, 1863, during the prevalence of a northeasterly gale, carrying with her to the bottom 4 of her engineers and 26 of her crew. The remainder of the ship's company escaped in the boats, or by jumping overboard Page 158 at the moment of going down. The most of those who were drowned were in the turret or immediately below it, while seeking to force their way through the narrow openings which afforded the only means of escape. The disaster was at the time attributed to her hatches being unclosed. Having a full supply of coal and ammunition on board, lying low in the water, it was supposed she was put out of trim by shipping a sea in her hold through her open hatches, and before the pumps could be got to work careened and went down. From the evidence given before the court of inquiry ordered by Dahlgren, it would appear that the cause of her foundering was a rupture between the overhang and the hull of the vessel, produced, as in the case of the Monitor, by the incessant pounding of the waves as the vessel rose and fell in a heavy sea.

During the years 1864-65 the operations of the South Atlantic squadron under Dahlgren, were much curtailed by a variety of circumstances, chief among which was the withdrawal of the troops of the Department of the South to reinforce the Army of the James. Without the cooperation of the army, serious demonstrations against Charleston were out of the question and the fleet in this quarter was. chiefly engaged in enforcing the blockade. In the spring of 1864 a detachment of vessels cooperated in the St. John's river with the army movements in Florida, and subsequently in demonstrations against James island, Bull's bay, and other places. In January, 1865, Dahlgren gave material aid in transferring a part of Sherman's army to Beaufort, S. C, and in February a division of his squadron demonstrated along the approaches from Bull's bay to Mount Pleasant, with a view of embarrassing the Confederate commander at Charleston and deceiving him as to the Federal plan of the campaign.

On the night of January 15, 1865, the monitor Patapsco, Lieutenant-Commmander Quackenbush, while engaged in covering the scout and picket boats, searching the entrance to the lower harbor of Page 159 Charleston for obstructions and torpedoes, struck and exploded a large torpedo on her port side and almost immediately sank. Five officers and 38 men were saved, and 62 officers and men were lost. Two other vessels were also lost on this station during the last year. The gunboat Dai Ching, having gone aground in the Combahee river under the fire of one of the enemy's batteries, was destroyed by her commander, after she had been much cut up and her guns disabled in a 7 hours' engagement. All the officers and crew were brought off safely except 5. On the morning of March 1, 1865, the flagship of the squadron, the Harvest Moon, having on board Dahlgren, was struck by one of the barrel-torpedoes below Georgetown, and sank soon after, but only 1 life was lost by this disaster.

On the morning of February 18 Charleston finally fell without a struggle. Before their departure, the Confederates destroyed most of their effective vessels afloat, but the ram Columbia, which had grounded in coming out of her dock in January, was left by them and was floated on April 26. She was pierced for 6 guns and was plated on her casemate with 6 inches of iron. The harbor was found to be plentifully filled with obstructions and the numerous powerful earthworks, which had so long defied the efforts of the fleet, were uninjured. Georgetown and other places on the coast were immediately occupied by the gunboats.