Naval Battles

The Albemarle—Fort Fisher

The operations of the North Atlantic blockading squadron were chiefly confined to blockade duties in 1863, but in 1864 its activities were of the most varied and important character, calling forth all the resources at the command of the naval department. In addition to the arduous work of maintaining the blockade at Wilmington, it was found necessary to maintain a careful watch over the inland waters of Pamlico and Albemarle sounds, as it was known that the enemy had for a long time been constructing some powerful ironclad rams on the Neuse and Roanoke rivers. Operations on an extensive scale, in furtherance of Grant's grand campaign against Richmond, were also conducted in the James river, where it was finally found expedient to maintain a separate squadron. The naval operations on the James commenced with the movement of General Butler's forces up that river on May 5, 1864, the troops being safely convoyed to their landing places at City Point and Bermuda Hundred by the naval gunboats. During the passage up the river the small gunboats Commodore Jones and Shawsheen were destroyed by torpedoes, which was the only disaster recorded. Five ironclads, including the captured ram Atlanta, were stationed above City Point to watch the enemy's fleet in the upper James, and, if possible engage them in action while the smaller vessels of the fleet were busily employed in dragging the river for torpedoes, assailing moving batteries or bodies of the enemy along the shore, and in minor expeditions. The work of the squadron was considerably curtailed in June, when, much to the disappointment of Admiral Lee, who had earnestly desired to engage the enemy's vessels, obstructions were sunk in the channel at Trent's reach, to prevent a sudden Page 269 onslaught by the Confederate fleet on the transports collected at City Point. During the rest of the year the ironclads were often engaged with the enemy's vessels and the powerful batteries at Howlett's bluff, but on account of the difficulties of navigation nothing decisive was accomplished.

Finally, as a part of the comprehensive plan of the general government in 1864 to bring the war to a close, the remaining seaports of the Confederacy were to be captured, thus completing the process of slow strangulation inaugurated earlier in the war. As Wilmington offered especial facilities for blockade-running, it was to be made a principal point of attack, and early in the summer preparations to equip an irresistible attacking squadron were begun. The navy had on several occasions, earlier in the struggle, offered to capture Wilmington with the aid of a cooperating land force, but having in mind the failure at Charleston it declined to undertake alone the reduction of the strong forts at the mouth of the Cape Fear river. Thus far the exigencies of the service elsewhere had prevented the employment of land forces for this specific purpose, but it was now determined to furnish troops enough to insure success. Grant's bloody campaign from the Rapidan to the James called for such constant reinforcements, however, that the necessary body of troops to move against Wilmington was not forthcoming until the close of the year. Meanwhile, the naval part of the program was being matured, and by October a formidable fleet numbering over 50 war vessels, including the New Ironsides and four monitors, had been gathered in Hampton Roads. Farragut was now offered the command of the North Atlantic station, but declined it as his work was not completed in the Gulf. Porter was then appointed and took command on October 12, relieving Admiral Lee, who was transferred to the Mississippi.

The loss of the control of the North Carolina sounds, as Page 270 told in a previous chapter, proved very damaging to the Confederates, who made every effort to reestablish themselves there. The struggle centered in the region between the Dismal swamp and New Berne, which was the scene of a hundred daring exploits by the men on both sides. Chief among those whose names became a synonym for all that was courageous and enterprising was Lieutenant William B. Cushing. On five separate occasions the department "had the gratification of expressing its approbation" of his conduct. He combined extraordinary courage with excellent judgment and his merit soon came to be recognized by his superior officers. "He was constantly looking for something to do," and such a man generally finds his opportunity. Cushing found his when a mere lad of twenty-one. With nearly four years training as a cadet at the naval academy, he had entered the navy as a master's mate in May, 1861, and had risen to the rank of lieutenant by July, 1862, as the result of several "acts of successful daring." He served with Rowan at Elizabeth City, and was placed in command of the captured tugboat Ellis, which vessel he was obliged to destroy in November, 1862, during a daring raid 35 miles up the river from New River inlet. In January, 1863, he captured by surprise an earthwork at Little river, S. C, his force consisting of 25 men in three cutters. In April he commanded the flotilla in the lower Nansemond. He was not long after assigned to the command of the steamer Shokokon and performed daring service at New Topsail inlet in August, 1863. On the night of the 22nd, having discovered a schooner within the inlet, he sent in a small boat expedition, which burned the vessel and some salt works, captured 10 prisoners, a 12-pounder army howitzer and 18 horses. Cushing's next exploits took place while he was in command of the Monticello, on the Wilmington blockade. On the night of February, 28, 1864, while the Monticello was blockading Page 271 the mouth of Cape Fear river, he fitted out two boats, manned by 20 men, and went up the river to Smithville with the avowed objects of capturing the commanding officer and boarding any vessels found in the harbor. He landed directly in front of the hotel, captured some negroes to gain information, after which, accompanied by Ensign Jones, Mate Howarth and a single seaman, he proceeded to General Herbert's headquarters across the street from the barracks supposed to contain 1,000 men. In his report he says: "The party captured the chief engineer of these defenses, but found the general had gone to Wilmington the same day. The adjutant-general escaped from the door after severely wounding his hand, but thinking that a mutiny was in progress, took to the woods with great scarcity of clothing and neglected to turn out the garrison." Though the boats were within 50 yards of the fort and an equal distance from the sentinel, they were abreast of Fort Caswell with their prisoner before the alarm was given.

A second daredevil expedition was undertaken by him in the following June, when he asked and received permission from Admiral Lee to attempt the destruction of the ram Raleigh, supposed to be lying in the Wilmington river. On the night of the 23d, he left the Monticello in the first cutter with Jones and Howarth, the same officers who accompanied him on his previous expedition, and 15 men. The boat pulled swiftly up the river past the forts and the town of Smithville before it was discovered by sentries on shore. Cushing pretended to turn back, but soon doubled and went ahead again under the shadow of the opposite bank. He was on the river for three nights, visited the Raleigh and learned that it had been destroyed and was now a complete wreck, then returned to the mouth of the river, where he was almost surrounded, but succeeded in making his escape with his usual gallantry Page 272 and cleverness. But Cushing's greatest and most audacious exploit was the destruction of the Confederate ram Albemarle on the night of October 27, 1864. Before telling the story of this daring deed it will be in order to briefly relate the career of this formidable vessel.

As part of their plan to regain control of the sounds the Confederates undertook the construction of an ironclad somewhat similar to the Merrimac, capable of navigating the shoal waters of Albemarle sound and armored strong enough to resist the shot of the Union gunboats. None of the Union ironclads could cross the bar at Hatteras inlet and the proposed craft would soon be able to clear the wooden gunboats from the sounds of North Carolina. She was built at Edward's ferry on the Roanoke river by Gilbert Elliott, according to plans of naval constructor John L. Porter. Work was begun on her in January, 1863, but the boat was not completed until April, 1864. "Her keels (she was flat bottomed) were laid in a cornfield. A common country blacksmith shop was the only 'machine shop.' Her engines were put together from the scrap heaps of the iron works at Richmond and Wilmington. The timbers were from good pine logs and her armor was like that of the Merrimac, but the ship, as a whole, excited the amusement even of many of the Confederates until she was afloat." The Albemarle, as she was called, was "122 feet over all, had 45 feet beam, and drew 8 feet of water. The casemate, built of massive pine timbers covered with 4inch planking, was 60 feet long and was covered with two layers of 2-inch iron. The vessel was propelled by twin screws, operated by engines of 200 horse power each. She was armed with an Armstrong 100-pounder in the bow and one in the stern, while her casemate was so pierced that they could be used as broadside or quarter-guns." Lieutenant-Commander Flusser, an officer of recognized bravery and ability, Page 273 in command of the gunboat Miami, and Captain Smith, of the Southfield, were stationed at the mouth of the Roanoke river near Plymouth. As early as June, 1863, Flusser called attention to the formidable ironclad building at the ferry, but his boats were unable to reach that point on account of the shallowness of the water and the Confederate forts along the banks. Flusser's later appeals to Rear-Admiral Lee, to the department, and to General Foster commanding the Federal troops in the Plymouth district, were unavailing and the work on the ram was not interrupted. The enemy planned a combined movement against Plymouth in April, 1864, Captain Cooke of the Albemarle promising to take care of the Union gunboats, though his vessel was not quite completed. When the Albemarle started down the river on the night of the 19th, the mechanics were still at work bolting on the armor plates. The Miami and Southfield were each armed with a rifled 100-pounder and five or six 9-inch guns each. While the troops were assaulting the forts on the 17th and 18th, the Union vessels were actively engaged in repelling the enemy. On the evening of the second day the gunboats were lashed together to make a joint resistance to the ram, which was momentarily expected. The Federals had obstructed the river above with triple rows of piles and torpedoes, but aided by the high water the Albemarle passed these without difficulty. At midnight of the 19th the picket boat above reported the ram descending and the ironclad was soon upon them. She crossed the Miami's bow and then made straight for the Southfield, but her ports were closed and she did not fire a shot, as she was intent only on ramming. She struck the Southfield on the starboard bow, crushed in a great hole 6 or 8 feet square, causing the vessel to fill rapidly and sink. Meanwhile both gunboats were vigorously firing shells, but the projectiles only burst into fragments on striking the Page 274 ram's iron side. One shell fired by Flusser broke into pieces, one of which rebounded over to the Miami's deck and killed him where he stood. The lashings of the two vessels had parted and the crew of the sinking Southfield escaped to the Miami, which now fled to the mouth of the river and the next day Plymouth surrendered.

Prompt measures were now taken to maintain the Federal naval supremacy of the sounds. Three large double-enders, the Sassacus, Mattabesett and Wyalusing were sent down, and with four other vessels were stationed off the mouth of the Roanoke river. Captain Melancthon Smith was placed in command of the squadron, with instructions to attack and disable the ram at all hazards. On May 5 the Albemarle again came down, accompanied by a steamer with troops and another with coal and provisions. Soley thus describes the action which followed: "At a little before 5 p. m. she opened the engagement by firing two shots at the Mattabesett, the leading vessel. The latter, followed by the Sassacus and Wyalusing, passed up alongside the Albemarle, delivering their broadsides at a distance of about 150 yards. Turning, they came back on the opposite side and the smaller vessels took their place. The ram was thus placed between two fires. The Sassacus, which had drawn off a little from the line, now turned, and gathering headway, struck the enemy fairly with her stem, just abaft the beam. Though the double-enders were not adapted for ramming, it had been decided to try this, as well as every other expedient, in the hope of inflicting some injury. The ram careened a little, but did not sink, and as the Sassacus remained alongside, the Albemarle's port opened and a 100-pound Brooke rifle-shot was discharged through one of the boilers of the double-ender. The escaping steam filled the vessel, scalding many of the crew, and she drifted off, firing until out of range. The other vessels Page 275 continued the action until dark, but without disabling the enemy. At night the ram returned to the river, her armor somewhat battered, but her machinery apparently intact. Though not destroyed, she had been severely hammered; the store-vessel she brought with her was captured; and her projected conquest of the sounds came to naught. The next time she ventured down the river, a shell from the Whitehead caused her to turn back, and she seemed to have no inclination for a second fight."

The safe withdrawal of the Sassacus after she was crippled by the 100-pounder shot was due to Engineer J. M. Hobby, who stuck to his post in spite of the clouds of escaping steam, though every other man had fled.

The Albemarle then tied up at the Plymouth wharf until a second vessel building on the Tar river should be completed. The effort made by five volunteers from the Wyalusing on May 25, to destroy her with torpedoes, was a daring one, but was frustrated by the vigilance of the enemy. Lieutenant Cushing now asked and received permission to undertake the task, and Cushing seldom failed. He proceeded to New York to select the necessary vessels, his plan being to steal up to the ram in two little steamers, each armed with a torpedo and a howitzer. While one boat dashed in the other was to stand by and throw canister. If the first boat failed to do its work it was to renew the attempt. He selected two 30 foot open launches with low pressure engines and propelled by screws. "A 12-pounder howitzer was fitted in the bow of each and a boom was rigged out, some 14 feet in length, swinging by a goose-neck hinge to the bluff of the bow. A topping lift, carried to a stanchion inboard, raised or lowered it and the torpedo was fitted into an iron slide at the end. This was intended to be detached from the boom by means of a heel-jigger leading inboard and to be exploded Page 276 by another line, connecting with a pin which held a grape shot over a nipple and cap. The torpedo was the invention of Engineer Lay of the navy and was introduced by Chief Engineer Wood."

One of the launches was lost in crossing Chesapeake bay, on the way down, but Cushing was not deterred and determined to do the work with the remaining boat. The difficulty of surprising the enemy will be best appreciated when it is understood that the ram was moored at Plymouth, 8 miles from the mouth of the river, the town and forts, as well as both banks of the stream being held by several thousand of the enemy. About a mile below Plymouth lay the wreck of the Southfield and on the hurricane deck which was above water, a Confederate lookout was stationed. Cushing started up the river the first time on the night of October 26, but the launch grounded, it was too late to proceed that night when she got off and she again started at midnight of the 27th. The party consisted of Cushing, Mate Howarth of the Monticello, who had often before been his companion in peril, Mates Gay and Woodman, Paymaster Swan, 2 engineer officers, Steever and Stotesbury, and 8 men. He had in tow a small cutter with 13 men, charged with the duty of boarding the wreck of the Southfield at the first hail in order to prevent the guard there from sending up a rocket. The engines of the little steamer were covered with tarpaulins to shut off light and sound and the vessel could scarcely be heard as she proceeded slowly up the stream. Fortunately the night was dark and stormy. In his report of the affair Cushing says: "We passed within 30 feet of the pickets without discovery and neared the vessel. I now thought it might be better to board her and 'take her alive,' having in the two boats 20 men well armed with revolvers, cutlasses and hand-grenades. To be sure, there were ten times Page 277 our number on the ship and thousands near by, but a surprise is everything and I thought if her fasts were cut at the instant of boarding, we might overcome those on board, take her into the stream, and use her iron sides to protect us afterward from the forts. Knowing the town, I concluded to land at the lower wharf, creep around, and suddenly dash aboard from the bank, but just as I was sheering in close to the wharf, a hail came, sharp and quick, from the ironclad, and in an instant was repeated. I at once directed the cutter to cast off and go down to capture the guard in our rear, and, ordering all steam, went at the dark mountain of iron in front of us. A heavy fire was at once opened upon us, not only from the ship, but also from men stationed on the shore. This did not disable us and we neared them rapidly. A large fire now blazed upon the bank and by its light I discovered the unfortunate fact that there was a circle of logs around the Albemarle, boomed well out from her side, with the very intention of preventing the action of torpedoes. To examine them more closely, I ran alongside until amidships, received the enemy's fire, and sheered off for the purpose of turning a hundred yards away and going at the booms squarely, at right angles, trusting to their having been long enough in the water to have become slimy—in which case my boat, under full headway, would bump up against them and slip over into the pen with the ram. This was my only chance of success, and once over the obstruction my boat would never get out again. As I turned, the whole back of my coat was torn out by buckshot and the sole of my shoe was carried away. The fire was very severe. In a lull of the firing, the captain hailed us, again demanding what boat it was. All my men gave comical answers, and mine was a dose of canister from the howitzer. In another instant we had struck the logs and were over, with headway nearly Page 278 gone, slowly forging up under the enemy's quarter-port. Ten feet from us the muzzle of a rifle gun looked into our faces and every word of command on board was distinctly heard. My clothing was perforated with bullets as I stood in the bow, the heel-jigger in my right hand and the exploding line in the left. We were near enough then, and I ordered the boom lowered until the forward movement of the launch carried the torpedo under the ram's overhang. A strong pull of the detaching line, a moment's waiting for the torpedo to rise under the hull, and I hauled in the left hand, just cut by a bullet." In speaking of Cushing's performance at this juncture, Prof. Soley says: "When it is reflected that Cushing had attached to his person four separate lines, viz., the detaching lanyard, the trigger line, and two lines to direct the movement of the boat, one of which was fastened to the wrist and the other to the ankle of the engineer; that he was also directing the adjustment of the spar by the halliard; that the management of all these lines, requiring as much exactness and delicacy of touch as a surgical operation, where a single error in their employment, even a pull too much or too little, would render the whole expedition abortive, was carried out directly in front of the muzzle of a ioo-pounder rifle, under a fire of musketry so hot that several bullets passed through his clothing, and carried out with perfect success, it is safe to say that the naval history of the world affords no other instance of such marvelous coolness and professional skill as were shown by Cushing in the destruction of the Albemarle," Continuing the narrative of Cushing, he says: "The explosion took place at the same instant that 100 pounds of grape, at 10 feet range, crashed among us, and the dense mass of water thrown out by the torpedo came down with choking weight upon us. Twice refusing to surrender I commanded the men to save Page 279 themselves; and throwing off sword, revolver, shoes and coat, struck out from my disabled and sinking boat into the river." After an exhausting struggle in the cold water, he finally reached the swampy shore below the town, where he lay in a half frozen state in the mud and water until daylight. He then crawled out of the water, made his way into the swamp not far from one of the forts, and finally reached a small clearing, where he fell in with an old negro, whom he bribed to go into the town and bring him back information of the result of his night's work. Assured of his complete success he then went on until he found one of the enemy's picket boats, which he captured, and after 10 hours of laborious paddling reached the Valley City at n o'clock the succeeding night.

Of the crew of the launch, only 2 were killed or drowned, 1 man made his escape and the others, unable to resist or escape, surrendered. Cushing was warmly congratulated by the navy department, received the thanks of Congress, and was promoted to the grade of lieutenant-commander.

On October 30 Commander Macomb's squadron moved up the river and the following day engaged the enemy's batteries on shore. After an hour's spirited engagement a shell from the Shamrock exploded the enemy's magazine, whereupon the Confederates hastily abandoned their works and Plymouth was once more in the hands of the Union forces. Only the seaports of Wilmington and Charleston now remained in the hands of the enemy.

In planning for the defense of Wilmington the Confederates had expended some of their best engineering skill. The lower entrance was defended by Fort Caswell and the upper one by Fort Fisher. A glance at the map will show that a long arm of land comes down from the north between the Cape Fear river and the sea—"an arm that at last is split like the claw of a lobster into two fingers. One, very Page 280 fat, and extending in toward the channel of the river, is called Federal point, and the other, very slender, continues the coast line to what is called New inlet. A shoal body of water called the basin lies between the two fingers. Fort Fisher was erected right where the two fingers split apart— right on the wrist." This description is taken from Spears History of our Navy. Continuing the description, he says: "Beginning a few yards back from the beach and north of the split of the fingers, the Confederates erected a mound of sand 80 feet high. On this they mounted an 8-inch (150pounder) rifle and a 10-inch medium length (columbiad) shell-gun. From this mound a series of connected batteries or earthworks, of the most approved form, extended away to the north for about 1,400 yards. In this stretch were mounted 17 great guns, including rifles from 4y2 inches up to 7 inches, with a number of 10-inch smooth-bore shell-guns. In height and thickness these batteries were all that could be wished in that day, and there were immense traverses (big mounds of sand) between the guns to protect the gun crews from an enfilading fire, and from shells bursting on either side of them. At the north end of the north-and-south line so far described, the wall of the fort turned at a right angle toward the west. This part of the wall extending to the west was about 500 yards long, and it crossed the arm of dry land to the swamps of the river. Looking from the north, the whole fort was a very good L. The east-and-west arm mounted 21 great guns, and these were, for the most part, placed to defend the garrison from a land attack." The enemy had made one serious mistake. The fort could keep any of the light draught vessels, able to navigate the shoal waters of the inlet, from entering the Cape Fear river by this mouth, but it was built too near the sea and was exposed to the attack of the deep-draught Union ships. Colonel William Lamb commanded the fort.

The vast fleet of war vessels and transports that assembled at Hampton Roads in October could not be supplied with the necessary quota of troops until December. The government then ordered General Ames' division of the 24th corps and General Paine's colored division of the 25th corps to repair to Hampton Roads. These two divisions numbered about 6,500 effective men. The selection of General Butler to command the army forces was unfortunate, because Butler and Porter heartily disliked each other and there was little promise of cordial cooperation. After careful consideration it was determined that of the two entrances to the Cape Fear river, New inlet could be more successfully attacked. By December 19 the war vessels and transports were assembled off that point, but a gale setting in on the 20th, the transports were directed to make for Beaufort, while the naval vessels rode out the three days' storm. On the 23d the wind shifted to the west and the sea became smooth. The transports had not yet returned from Beaufort, but Porter decided to take advantage of the favorable weather and go in and attack the forts on his own account. A curious feature of this first attack on Fort Fisher was the explosion of a powder-boat near the fort on the night of the 23d. The idea originated with General Butler and was suggested by an accidental explosion of a large quantity of gunpowder at Erith on the Thames, England, October 1, resulting in the destruction of property for miles around and the loss of several lives. Porter was willing to try almost any expedient and had made the necessary arrangements to carry the idea into execution. The weather was auspicious for the enterprise on the 23d. The vessel selected was the Louisiana, an old gunboat no longer serviceable. She was stored with 215 tons of powder and placed in charge of Commander A. C. Rhind, with a crew of volunteers. It had been ascertained on the Page 282 previous night that a vessel of 7 feet draught could be placed on the edge of the beach opposite the fort. Says Porter: "At half-past ten p. m. the powder vessel started in toward the bar and was towed by the Wilderness until the embrasures of Fort Fisher were plainly in sight. The Wilderness then cast off and the Louisiana proceeded under steam until within 200 yards of the beach and about 400 from the fort. Commander Rhind anchored her securely there and coolly went to work to make all his arrangements to blow her up." The party then made their escape in the Wilderness, which swiftly ran out to sea for 12 miles and stopped to await the explosion, which had been timed. This took place at 140 a. m. on the 24th and amounted to absolutely nothing. To those watching from the fleet the report seemed scarcely louder than the discharge of a battery of light artillery. In the morning the fort appeared as grim and defiant as ever, apparently uninjured. Though the powder-boat had proved an ignominious failure and the transports had not yet returned, Porter determined to attack at once. The fleet stood in toward the fort in close order of divisions, and opened upon the fort about 11:30 o'clock. "The Ironsides, followed by the monitors, took position as close in as their draught would permit, engaging the north-east face. The Ironsides was followed by the Minnesota, Colorado and Wabash. The enemy replied briskly, but when these frigates found the range and commenced firing rapidly nothing could withstand their broadsides of twenty-five 9-inch guns. It was a magnificent sight to see these frigates fairly engaged, and one never to be forgotten. Their sides seemed a sheet of flame and the roar of their guns like a mighty thunderbolt. Meanwhile all the other ships took positions as detailed, and so perfect were the plans of the admiral, and so well were they carried out by his captains, that not a mishap took Page 283 place. Nothing could withstand such a storm of shot and shell as was now poured into this fort. The enemy took refuge in their bomb-proofs, replying sullenly with an occasional gun. The enemy's fire being silenced, signal was made to fire with deliberation, and attention was turned to the dismounting of the guns." The above is an extract from an article by Captain T. O. Selfridge. It is worthy of note, however, that Colonel Lamb, commanding the fort, states that the guns of Fort Fisher were not silenced. The supply of ammunition was limited in the fort, and orders were therefore given to fire the guns only once in 30 minutes, except by special order. The 44 guns of the fort fired 672 shots on the 24th, and on the 25th 600 shots were expended, exclusive of grape and canister. On the 24th 3 guns were disabled, and on the 25th 5 more, by the fire of the fleet. In addition two 7-inch Brooke rifles exploded, which left the fort on Christmas night with 34 heavy guns after the two days' bombardment. Of the garrison, consisting of 900 veterans, 450 junior reserves (mere lads between 16 and 18 years of age) and 60 sailors and marines, 61 were killed and wounded during the two days' bombardment, 38 being injured by the explosion of the Brooke rifled guns.

The bombardment of the 24th lasted until sunset. That night Butler and some of his transports came from Beaufort, and the others arrived the following morning. About 3,000 soldiers were landed 3 miles up the beach from the fort under cover of a detachment of small gunboats. Butler had been instructed to assault the fort if he found it feasible, but if not, he was to throw up intrenchments and lay siege to the works in the usual fashion. Meanwhile the ironclads and frigates were sent in and resumed the bombardment of the fort. The reconnoitering column on shore, accompanied by General Weitzel in person, approached so near Page 284 to the fort that several men in the skirmish line were wounded by fragments of shells from the fleet. From a point about 600 yards distant Weitzel made a careful survey of the work and the results of his personal observation, together with information received from other sources, induced him to report to Butler upon his return to the transport fleet, that, under the circumstances, it would be "butchery to order an assault." This opinion coincided with that already formed by General Butler, who had run down the beach in a shoal-draught transport and taken a look at the fort himself. Orders were therefore given to reembark the troops, which task was completed on the morning of the 26th. The troops, while on shore, had captured two little out-works 3 miles north of the landing place, known as the Flag-pond and Half-moon batteries, with their garrisons numbering nearly 300 officers and men. Butler wrote as follows to Porter: "Upon landing the troops and making a thorough reconnoissance of Fort Fisher, both General Weitzel and myself are fully of the opinion that the place could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially uninjured as a defensive work by the navy fire. We found 17 guns protected by traverses, 2 only of which were dismounted, bearing up the beach and covering a strip of land, the only practicable route, not more than wide enough for a thousand men in line of battle. * * * I shall therefore sail for Hampton Roads as soon as the transport fleet can be got in order." On his part, Porter expressed great disappointment at the conduct of the army authorities in not trying to occupy the forts "which," says Porter, "had been so completely silenced by our guns; they were so blown up, burst up and torn up that the people inside had no intention of fighting any longer." The truth is the fort could have been easily captured by the troops, especially if they had pursued the safer route under the river Page 285 bank, taken by General Terry, three weeks later. Porter, however, was certainly mistaken in reporting all the Confederate guns silenced and the garrison unwilling to fight any longer. The enemy had 34 guns still in good condition, while at least 1,000 men of the garrison would have made a good fight, though Scharf says the Confederate officers had to use the flat of their swords to get some of the reserves out to man the parapets.

The fleet had suffered little damage from the guns of the fort. The Osceola received a shell near her magazine and at one time was in a sinking condition, but her commander soon stopped the leak. The Mackinaw had her boiler exploded by a shot and several of her crew were scalded, but not a man. in the fleet was wounded by the enemy's fire, though severe losses were sustained on some of the vessels by the bursting of their 100-pounder Parrott rifles.

Porter remained off New inlet a day or two after the departure of the transports, but finding it hopeless to attempt the reduction of the fort without the assistance of a land force, he withdrew his fleet to Beaufort, in the confident expectation that the troops would be soon ordered back again from Fortress Monroe. Nor was he disappointed. Grant sent back the same force of white troops, reinforced by two colored brigades under Colonel Charles J. Paine, and two batteries, the whole under the efficient command of Major-General Alfred H. Terry. The effective strength of this force was about 8,000. Meanwhile Porter had been busily employed in filling his ships with ammunition and coal. General Terry arrived at Beaufort with the troops on January 8, 1865, where a plan of operations was agreed upon with Porter. Unfavorable weather caused some delay, but on the 12th the fleet, accompanied by the transports, sailed and arrived off New inlet late the same night. The next morning the work of Page 286 disembarkation of the troops began at a point about 5 miles above the fort, the fleet, with the exception of the ironclads, covering the operation. With the aid of 200 boats from the fleet and some steam tugs, nearly the whole force was landed by 3 p. m. of the 13th. Meanwhile the ironclads, increased to five by the arrival of the monitor Saugus, went in and engaged the fort at a range of 1,200 yards or less, where their fire was very effective. The troops having landed, the rest of the fleet, except some of the lighter gunboats which remained to protect the army's flank, steamed in and took the positions assigned to them, opening a terrific fire on the fort. A buoy was placed close to the outer reef as a guide, enabling the ships to anchor much nearer the fort than before, and their fire was correspondingly more effective. Generally speaking, the monitors were anchored at a range of half a mile, with the other vessels outside from three-quarters of a mile up to a mile and a quarter away. The bombardment lasted all day and was continued at intervals during the night and all the next day. Ammunition was still scarce in the fort, the guns of which replied but slowly, and the tremendous bombardment of the fleet forced the enemy to stick pretty closely to his bomb-proofs.

It was arranged that the grand bombardment should begin on the morning of the 15th and that the assault should take place at 3 p. m. The army was to assault the western half of the land face, while a cooperating force of sailors and marines attacked the northeast bastion. During the assault the fire of the fleet was to be directed to the upper batteries. The beginning of the assault was to be signaled to the fleet by a blowing of steam whistles. Porter detailed 1,600 sailors and 400 marines for the assault on the sea face. The sailors were armed with only the old-fashioned cutlass and pistol; the marines had carbines and were charged with the duty Page 287 of keeping down the fire from the ramparts while the sailors scaled the works. Throughout the three days' bombardment the ironclads remained where they first anchored, being supplied with ammunition brought alongside during the night. At 9 a. m. on the 15th signal was made for the fleet to bombard as previously arranged. It moved in three divisions and each vessel took its assigned station without any disorder, the last of the vessels being in position by 11 o'clock. All felt the importance of the bombardment and the storm of shell poured into Fort Fisher was "magnificent alike for its power and accuracy." The fire of the enemy's heavy guns was almost completely silenced, with the exception of the mound battery, which was more difficult to reach. Some time before noon signal was made for the sailors and marines to land, and as the boats, with their flags flying, shoved off from 35 of the 60 vessels of the fleet, it formed a most inspiring scene. Sailor-like, the men regarded the landing in the light of a lark and none dreamed the sun would set with a loss of one-fifth of their number. The force was commanded by Lieutenant-Com. K. R. Breese and was arranged in three divisions, led by Lieutenant-Com. C. H. Cushing, Lieutenant-Commander James Parker, and Lieutenant-Commander T. O. Selfridge, Jr., respectively. The marines were commanded by Captain L. L. Dawson. At 3:30 p. m. the signal was made from the shore to the fleet to change the direction of the fire, in order that the troops might assault. "The attacking column of the army was concealed and protected by the river bank as it approached the left flank of the work, but the naval column came up the open beach upon our center," said Colonel Lamb, commanding the fort. "As its success would have been disastrous, I concentrated all available guns upon this column and met its assault with the larger portion of my men, posting them upon the ramparts so as to fire down upon the sailors Page 288 and marines." The sailors, slightly protected by the inclined beach, charged recklessly toward the parapet of the fort, now swarming with the enemy. Says Selfridge: "We were opened upon in front by the great mound battery, and in flank by the artillery of the Half-moon battery, and by the fire of 1,000 rifles. Though many dropped rapidly under this fire, the column never faltered, and when the angle where the two faces of the fort unite was reached the head halted to allow the rear to come up. This halt was fatal, for as the others came up they followed suit and lay down until the space between the parapet and the edge of the water was filled. * * * The rush of the sailors was over; they were packed like sheep in a pen, while the enemy was crowding the ramparts not 40 yards away and shooting into them as fast as they could fire. There was nothing to reply with except pistols. Something must be done and speedily. There were some spaces in the palisade where it was torn away by the fire of the fleet, and an attempt was made to charge through, but we found a steep, impassable ditch, and those who got through were shot down. Flesh and blood could not long endure being killed in this slaughter-pen, and the rear of the sailors broke, followed by the whole body, in spite of all efforts to rally them." The 400 marines, from their; exposed position on the beach, were unable to keep down the fire of the garrison and some have blamed them for the failure. Says Porter: "I saw how recklessly the rebels exposed themselves, and what an advantage they gave our sharpshooters, whose guns were scarcely fired, or fired with no precision. Notwithstanding the hot fire, officers and sailors in the lead rushed on and some even reached the parapet—a large number having reached the ditch. The advance was swept from the parapet like chaff, and, notwithstanding all the efforts made by the commanders of companies to stay them, Page 289 the men in the rear, seeing the slaughter in front and that they were not covered by the marines, commenced to retreat, and, as there is no stopping a sailor if he fails on such an occasion on the first rush, I saw the whole thing had to be given up." The attack on this part of the fort, though a failure, diverted a large part of the enemy's attention as Colonel Lamb reported, and thus rendered the task of the soldiers correspondingly easier. The troops gained the highest parapet of the disabled land face of the fort without serious loss and then by the most obstinate fighting successively carried the 17 traverses or immense bomb-proofs of the fort. The enemy fought with equal desperation and the battle did not cease until 10 o'clock at night, when, chased from traverse to traverse the Confederates finally reached the mound battery, where they broke and fled to the end of Federal point. During this period the Ironsides and monitors kept up an incessant fire through the traverses in advance of the Federal troops, while the ships enfiladed Federal point to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. According to the report of Lieutenant-Com. Breese, some 60 officers and men of the naval column, including Lieutenant-Commanders James Parker, C. H. Cushing, T. O. Selfridge, and M. Sicard, and Lieuts. N. H. Farquhar and R. H. Lamson, remained near the foot of the parapet until nightfall, seeking such cover as they could find, and then made their escape under cover of the darkness.

Writing in later years of the numbers defending the northeast salient against the naval assault, Colonel Lamb says: "Five hundred officers and men will cover all engaged in repulsing. the naval column, and the destructive fire was from the 300 who, from the top of the ramparts and traverses, fired upon the assailants. The gallant navy need not exaggerate the number opposing them, assisted by the artillery. Page 290 apology or defense is necessary to excuse the repulse. The unorganized and improperly armed force failed to enter the fort, but their gallant attempt enabled the army to enter and obtain a foothold, which they otherwise could not have done."

Says Porter: "I have since visited Fort Fisher and the adjoining works, and find their strength greatly beyond what I had conceived. An engineer might be excusable in saying they could not be captured except by regular siege. I wonder even now how it was done. The work, as I said before, is really stronger than the Malakoff Tower, which defied so long the combined power of France and England, and yet it is captured by a handful of men under the fire of the guns of the fleet, and in seven hours after the attack commenced in earnest."

According to the compilers of the official records of the Union and Confederate navies in the Civil war, the naval forces engaged in the second attack on Fort Fisher lost 6 officers killed and 26 wounded; 82 enlisted men killed, 245 wounded and 34 missing. This includes of the marines 2 officers wounded, and of the men 7 killed, 47 wounded, and 5 missing. The same authority states that the Federal fleet expended, during the first attack on Fort Fisher, 20,271 projectiles and in the second 19,682, as disclosed by an examination of reports and logs.

The attacking squadron mounted upward of 500 guns, and Porter declared that the same fleet which was used at Fort Fisher could silence Fortress Monroe, then considered the strongest and most important work in the United States, in a day, dismount all the conspicuous guns, and that the ironclads could demolish all the casemates in a few hours. (See also Fort Fisher in Cyclopedia of Battles.) The fall of Fort Fisher put an end to Confederate supremacy on the Cape Fear river, as the enemy was forced to Page 291 abandon Forts Caswell, Campbell and Shaw, and the other works defending the entrances to the river, which were immediately occupied by the navy. In February a number of light-draught gunboats ascended the river and cooperated with the troops under Schofield and Terry in the reduction of the strong works guarding the approaches to Wilmington. The capture of this place in the latter part of the month enabled Porter to reinforce the squadron in the James river. The enemy upon his retreat from Wilmington took the large ironclad Chickamauga some distance up the Cape Fear river and sunk her across the stream at Indian Wells. The fall of Fort Fisher likewise made the blockade of Wilmington truly effective and the constant stream of supplies which had filtered in through this port to the Confederate armies was completely shut off. In hastening the end of the war it probably meant more than the capture of either Charleston or Richmond.