Battle of Gettysburg

From Wikipedia

The Battle of Gettysburg was fought July 1–3, 1863, in and around the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, by Union and Confederate forces during the American Civil War. In the battle, Union Major General George Meade's Army of the Potomac defeated attacks by Confederate General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, halting Lee's invasion of the North. The battle involved the largest number of casualties of the entire war and is often described as the war's turning point due to the Union's decisive victory and concurrence with the Siege of Vicksburg.[12][13]

After his success at Chancellorsville in Virginia in May 1863, Lee led his army through the Shenandoah Valley to begin his second invasion of the North—the Gettysburg Campaign. With his army in high spirits, Lee intended to shift the focus of the summer campaign from war-ravaged northern Virginia and hoped to influence Northern politicians to give up their prosecution of the war by penetrating as far as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or even Philadelphia. Prodded by President Abraham Lincoln, Major General Joseph Hooker moved his army in pursuit, but was relieved of command just three days before the battle and replaced by Meade.

Elements of the two armies initially collided at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863, as Lee urgently concentrated his forces there, his objective being to engage the Union army and destroy it. Low ridges to the northwest of town were defended initially by a Union cavalry division under Brigadier General John Buford, and soon reinforced with two corps of Union infantry. However, two large Confederate corps assaulted them from the northwest and north, collapsing the hastily developed Union lines, sending the defenders retreating through the streets of the town to the hills just to the south.[14] On the second day of battle, most of both armies had assembled.

The Union line was laid out in a defensive formation resembling a fishhook. In the late afternoon of July 2, Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank, and fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the Peach Orchard. On the Union right, Confederate demonstrations escalated into full-scale assaults on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. All across the battlefield, despite significant losses, the Union defenders held their lines.

On the third day of battle, fighting resumed on Culp's Hill, and cavalry battles raged to the east and south, but the main event was a dramatic infantry assault by 12,500 Confederates against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, known as Pickett's Charge. The charge was repelled by Union rifle and artillery fire, at great loss to the Confederate army.[15] Lee led his army on a torturous retreat back to Virginia. Between 46,000 and 51,000 soldiers from both armies were casualties in the three-day battle, the costliest in US history.

On November 19, President Lincoln used the dedication ceremony for the Gettysburg National Cemetery to honor the fallen Union soldiers and redefine the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address.

BACKGROUND

Military Situation

Shortly after the Army of Northern Virginia won a major victory over the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville (April 30 – May 6, 1863), General Robert E. Lee decided upon a second invasion of the North (the first was the unsuccessful Maryland campaign of September 1862, which ended in the bloody Battle of Antietam). Such a move would upset the Union's plans for the summer campaigning season and possibly reduce the pressure on the besieged Confederate garrison at Vicksburg. The invasion would allow the Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich Northern farms while giving war-ravaged Virginia a much-needed rest. In addition, Lee's 72,000-man army[6] could threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and possibly strengthen the growing peace movement in the North.[19]

Initial Movements to Battle

Thus, on June 3, Lee's army began to shift northward from Fredericksburg, Virginia. Following the death of Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Lee reorganized his two large corps into three new corps, commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet (First Corps), Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell (Second), and Lieutenant General A.P. Hill (Third); both Ewell and Hill, who had formerly reported to Jackson as division commanders, were new to this level of responsibility. The cavalry division remained under the command of Major General J.E.B. Stuart.[20]

The Union Army of the Potomac under Major General Joseph Hooker consisted of seven infantry corps, a cavalry corps, and an artillery reserve, for a combined strength of more than 100,000 men.[5]

The first major action of the campaign took place on June 9 between cavalry forces at Brandy Station, near Culpeper, Virginia. The 9,500 Confederate cavalrymen under Stuart were surprised by Major General Alfred Pleasonton's combined arms force of two cavalry divisions (8,000 troopers) and 3,000 infantry, but Stuart eventually repelled the Union attack. The inconclusive battle, the largest predominantly cavalry engagement of the war, proved for the first time that the Union horse soldier was equal to his Southern counterpart.[21]

By mid-June, the Army of Northern Virginia was poised to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland. After defeating the Union garrisons at Winchester and Martinsburg, Ewell's Second Corps began crossing the river on June 15. Hill's and Longstreet's corps followed on June 24 and 25. Hooker's army pursued, keeping between Washington, D.C. and Lee's army. The Union army crossed the Potomac from June 25 to 27.[22]

Lee gave strict orders for his army to minimize any negative effects on the civilian population.[23] Food, horses, and other supplies were generally not seized outright, although quartermasters reimbursing Northern farmers and merchants with Confederate money were not well received. Various towns, most notably York, Pennsylvania, were required to pay indemnities in lieu of supplies, under threat of destruction. During the invasion, the Confederates seized some 1,000 northern African Americans. A few of them were escaped fugitive slaves, but most were freemen; all were sent south into slavery under guard.[16][17][18][24]

On June 26, elements of Major General Jubal Early's division of Ewell's corps occupied the town of Gettysburg after chasing off newly raised Pennsylvania militia in a series of minor skirmishes. Early laid the borough under tribute but did not collect any significant supplies. Soldiers burned several railroad cars and a covered bridge and destroyed nearby rails and telegraph lines. The following morning, Early departed for adjacent York County.[25]

Meanwhile, in a controversial move, Lee allowed Stuart to take a portion of the army's cavalry and ride around the east flank of the Union army. Lee's orders gave Stuart much latitude, and both generals share the blame for the long absence of Stuart's cavalry, as well as for the failure to assign a more active role to the cavalry left with the army. Stuart and his three best brigades were absent from the army during the crucial phase of the approach to Gettysburg and the first two days of battle. By June 29, Lee's army was strung out in an arc from Chambersburg (28 mi (45 km) northwest of Gettysburg) to Carlisle (30 mi (48 km) north of Gettysburg) to near Harrisburg and Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River.[26]

In a dispute over the use of the forces defending the Harpers Ferry garrison, Hooker offered his resignation, and Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, who were looking for an excuse to rid themselves of him, immediately accepted. They replaced Hooker early on the morning of June 28 with Major General George Gordon Meade, then commander of the V Corps.[27]

On June 29, when Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac River, he ordered a concentration of his forces around Cashtown, located at the eastern base of South Mountain and eight mi (13 km) west of Gettysburg.[28] On June 30, while part of Hill's corps was in Cashtown, one of Hill's brigades (North Carolinians under Brigadier General J. Johnston Pettigrew) ventured toward Gettysburg. In his memoirs, Major General Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, claimed that he sent Pettigrew to search for supplies in town—especially shoes.[29]

When Pettigrew's troops approached Gettysburg on June 30, they noticed Union cavalry under Buford arriving south of town, and Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them. When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Union force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. Despite Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, Hill decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front. Around 5 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, two brigades of Heth's division advanced to Gettysburg.[30]

FIRST DAY OF BATTLE

General Lee understood the defensive potential to the Union if they held this high ground. He sent orders to Ewell that Cemetery Hill be taken "if practicable." Ewell, who had previously served under Stonewall Jackson, a general well known for issuing peremptory orders, determined such an assault was not practicable and, thus, did not attempt it; this decision is considered by historians to be a great missed opportunity.[51]

The first day at Gettysburg, more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody second and third days, ranks as the 23rd biggest battle of the war by number of troops engaged. About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged.[52]

SECOND DAY OF BATTLE

Plans and Movement to Battle

Throughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2, most of the remaining infantry of both armies arrived on the field, including the Union II, III, V, VI, and XII Corps. Two of Longstreet's divisions were on the road: Brigadier General George Pickett, had begun the 22 mile (35 km) march from Chambersburg, while Brigadier General Evander M. Law had begun the march from Guilford. Both arrived late in the morning. Law completed his 28-mile (45 km) march in eleven hours.[53]

The Union line ran from Culp's Hill southeast of the town, northwest to Cemetery Hill just south of town, then south for nearly two mi (3 km) along Cemetery Ridge, terminating just north of Little Round Top. Most of the XII Corps was on Culp's Hill; the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill; II Corps covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge; and III Corps was ordered to take up a position to its flank. The shape of the Union line is popularly described as a "fishhook" formation.

The Confederate line paralleled the Union line about a mile (1,600 m) to the west on Seminary Ridge, ran east through the town, then curved southeast to a point opposite Culp's Hill. Thus, the Union army had interior lines, while the Confederate line was nearly five mi (8 km) long. [54]

Lee's battle plan for July 2 called for a general assault of Meade's positions. On the right, Longstreet's First Corps was to position itself to attack the Union left flank, facing northeast astraddle the Emmitsburg Road, and to roll up the Union line. The attack sequence was to begin with Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws's divisions, followed by Major General Richard H. Anderson's division of Hill's Third Corps. [55]

On the left, Lee instructed Ewell to position his Second Corps to attack Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill when he heard the gunfire from Longstreet's assault, preventing Meade from shifting troops to bolster his left. Though it does not appear in either his or Lee's Official Report, Ewell claimed years later that Lee had changed the order to simultaneously attack, calling for only a "diversion", to be turned into a full-scale attack if a favorable opportunity presented itself.[56][57]

Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence, exacerbated by Stuart's continued absence from the battlefield. Though Lee personally reconnoitered his left during the morning, he did not visit Longstreet's position on the Confederate right. Even so, Lee rejected suggestions that Longstreet move beyond Meade's left and attack the Union flank, capturing the supply trains and effectively blocking Meade's escape route.[58]

Lee did not issue orders for the attack until 11:00 a.m. [55] About noon, General Anderson's advancing troops were discovered by General Sickles's outpost guard and the Third Corps—upon which Longstreet's First Corps was to form—did not get into position until 1:00 p.m.[59]

Hood and McLaws, after their long march, were not yet in position and did not launch their attacks until just after 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., respectively.[60]

Evening

General Lee understood the defensive potential to the Union army if they held the high ground of Cemetery Hill. He sent orders to Ewell to "carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army." In the face of this discretionary, and possibly contradictory, order, Ewell chose not to attempt the assault.[1] One reason posited was the battle fatigue of his men in the late afternoon, although "Allegheny" Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps was within an hour of arriving on the battlefield. Another was the difficulty of assaulting the hill through the narrow corridors afforded by the streets of Gettysburg immediately to the north. Ewell requested assistance from A.P. Hill, but that general felt his corps was too depleted from the day's battle and General Lee did not want to bring up Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division from the reserve. Ewell did consider taking Culp's Hill, which would have made the Union position on Cemetery Hill untenable. However, Jubal Early opposed the idea when it was reported that Union troops (probably Slocum's XII Corps) were approaching on the York Pike, and he sent the brigades of John B. Gordon and Brig. Gen. William "Extra Billy" Smith to block that perceived threat; Early urged waiting for Johnson's division to take the hill. After Johnson's division arrived via the Chambersburg Pike, it maneuvered toward the east of town in preparation to take the hill, but a small reconnaissance party sent in advance encountered a picket line of the 7th Indiana Infantry, which opened fire and captured a Confederate officer and soldier. The remainder of the Confederates fled and attempts to seize Culp's Hill on July 1 came to an end.[2]

Responsibility for the failure of the Confederates to make an all-out assault on Cemetery Hill on July 1 must rest with Lee. If Ewell had been a Jackson, he might have been able to regroup his forces quickly enough to attack within an hour after the Yankees had started to retreat through the town. The likelihood of success decreased rapidly after that time unless Lee were willing to risk everything.

Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign [3]

“Lee's order has been criticized because it left too much discretion to Ewell. Numerous historians and proponents of the Lost Cause movement (most prominently Jubal Early, despite his own reluctance to support an attack at the time) have speculated how the more aggressive Stonewall Jackson would have acted on this order if he had lived to command this wing of Lee's army, and how differently the second day of battle would have proceeded with Confederate artillery on Cemetery Hill, commanding the length of Cemetery Ridge and the Federal lines of communications on the Baltimore Pike.[4] Stephen W. Sears has suggested that Gen. Meade would have invoked his original plan for a defensive line on Pipe Creek and withdrawn the Army of the Potomac, although that movement would have been a dangerous operation under pressure from Lee.”[5]

Most of the rest of both armies arrived that evening or early the next morning. Johnson's division joined Ewell and Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's joined Hill. Two of the three divisions of the First Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, arrived in the morning. Three cavalry brigades under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart were still out of the area, on a wide-ranging raid to the northeast. Gen. Lee sorely felt the loss of the "eyes and ears of the Army"; Stuart's absence had contributed to the accidental start of the battle that morning and left Lee unsure about enemy dispositions through most of July 2. On the Union side, Meade arrived after midnight. The II Corps and III Corps took up positions on Cemetery Ridge, and the XII Corps and the V Corps were nearby to the east. Only the VI Corps was a significant distance from the battlefield, marching rapidly to join the Army of the Potomac.[6]

The first day at Gettysburg—more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody second and third days—ranks as the 23rd-largest battle of the war by number of troops engaged. About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged.[7] Union casualties were almost 9,000; Confederate slightly over 6,000.[8]

1. Sears, p. 227; Martin, p. 504; Mackowski and White, p. 35.

2. Mackowski and White, pp. 36–41; Bearss, pp. 171–72; Coddington, pp. 317–21; Gottfried, p. 549; Pfanz, First Day, pp. 347–49; Martin, p. 510.

3. Coddington, pp. 320–21.

4. See, for instance, Pfanz, First Day, pp. 345–46, or Martin, pp. 563–65.

5. Sears, pp. 233–34.

6. Eicher, p. 520; Martin, p. 537.

7. Martin, p. 9, citing Thomas L. Livermore's Numbers & Losses in the Civil War in America (Houghton Mifflin, 1900).

8. Trudeau, p. 272.

Attacks on the Union Right Flank Culp’s Hill

By the morning of July 2, six of the seven corps of the Army of the Potomac had arrived on the battlefield. The I Corps (Maj. Gen. John Newton, replacing Abner Doubleday) and the XI Corps (Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard) had fought hard on the first day, and they were joined that evening by the yet-unengaged troops of the XII Corps (Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum), III Corps (Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles), and II Corps (Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock), and on the morning of July 2 by the V Corps (Maj. Gen. George Sykes). The VI Corps (Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick) was still 30 miles (50 km) away in Manchester, Maryland, on that morning.

They assumed positions in a fish hook shape about three miles (5 km ) long, from Culp's Hill, around to Cemetery Hill, and down the spine of Cemetery Ridge. The Army of Northern Virginia line was roughly parallel to the Union's, on Seminary Ridge and on an arc northwest, north, and northeast of the town of Gettysburg. All of the Second Corps (Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell) and Third Corps (Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill) were present, and the First Corps (Lt. Gen. James Longstreet) was arriving from Cashtown; only Longstreet's division under George E. Pickett did not participate in the battle on July 2.[1]

Robert E. Lee had several choices to consider for his next move. His order of the previous evening that Ewell occupy Culp's Hill or Cemetery Hill "if practicable" was not realized, and the Union army was now in strong defensive positions with compact interior lines. His senior subordinate, Longstreet, counseled a strategic move—the Army should leave its current position, swing around the Union left flank, and interpose itself on Meade's lines of communication, inviting an attack by Meade that could be received on advantageous ground. Longstreet argued that this was the entire point of the Gettysburg campaign, to move strategically into enemy territory but fight only defensive battles there. Lee rejected this argument because he was concerned about the morale of his soldiers having to give up the ground for which they fought so hard the day before. He wanted to retain the initiative and had a high degree of confidence in the ability of his army to succeed in any endeavor, an opinion bolstered by their spectacular victories the previous day and at Chancellorsville. He was therefore determined to attack on July 2.[2]

Lee wanted to seize the high ground south of Gettysburg, primarily Cemetery Hill, which dominated the town, the Union supply lines, and the road to Washington, D.C., and he believed an attack up the Emmitsburg Road would be the best approach. He desired an early-morning assault by Longstreet's Corps, reinforced by Ewell, who would move his Corps from its current location north of town to join Longstreet. Ewell protested this arrangement, claiming his men would be demoralized if forced to move from the ground they had captured.[3] And Longstreet protested that his division commanded by John Bell Hood had not arrived completely (and that Pickett's division had not arrived at all).[4] Lee compromised with his subordinates. Ewell would remain in place and conduct an attack against Culp's Hill, pinning down the right flank of the Union defenders so that they could not reinforce their left, where Longstreet would launch the primary attack as soon as he was ready. Ewell's attack would be turned into a full-scale assault if the opportunity presented itself.[5]

1. Pfanz, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 21. Eicher, p. 521. Pfanz, Second Day, pp. 55–81.

2. Pfanz, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 21. Pfanz, Second Day, pp. 26–29.

3. Pfanz, Second Day, pp. 61, 111–112.

4. Pfanz, Second Day, p. 112.

5. Pfanz, Second Day, pp. 113–114.

Ewell interpreted his orders as calling only for a cannonade.[57] His 32 guns, along with A. P. Hill's 55 guns, engaged in a two-hour artillery barrage at extreme range that had little effect. Finally, about six o'clock, Ewell sent orders to each of his division commanders to attack the Union lines in his front.

Major General Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's Division had contemplated an assault on Culp's Hill, but they were still a mile away and had Rock Creek to cross. The few possible crossings would make significant delays. Because of this, only three of Johnson's four brigades moved to the attack.[69] Most of the hill's defenders, the Union XII Corps, had been sent to the left to defend against Longstreet's attacks, leaving only a brigade of New Yorkers under Brigadier General George S. Greene behind strong, newly constructed defensive works. With reinforcements from the I and XI Corps, Greene's men held off the Confederate attackers, though giving up some of the lower earthworks on the lower part of Culp's Hill.[70]

Early was similarly unprepared when he ordered Harry T. Hays's and Isaac E. Avery's brigades to attack the Union XI Corps positions on East Cemetery Hill. Once started, fighting was fierce: Colonel Andrew L. Harris of the Union 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, came under a withering attack, losing half his men. Avery was wounded early on, but the Confederates reached the crest of the hill and entered the Union breastworks, capturing one or two batteries. Seeing he was not supported on his right, Hays withdrew. His right was to be supported by Robert E. Rodes's Division, but Rodes—like Early and Johnson—had not been ordered up in preparation for the attack. He had twice as far to travel as Early; by the time he came in contact with the Union skirmish line, Early's troops had already begun to withdraw.[71]

Jeb Stuart and his three cavalry brigades arrived in Gettysburg around noon but had no role in the second day's battle. Brigadier General Wade Hampton's brigade fought a minor engagement with newly promoted 23-year-old Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer's Michigan cavalry near Hunterstown to the northeast of Gettysburg.[72]

THIRD DAY OF BATTLE

Lee's plan

Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday, July 3, using the same basic plan as the previous day: Longstreet would attack the Union left, while Ewell attacked Culp's Hill.[73] However, before Longstreet was ready, Union XII Corps troops started a dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on Culp's Hill in an effort to regain a portion of their lost works. The Confederates attacked, and the second fight for Culp's Hill ended around 11 a.m. Harry Pfanz judged that, after some seven hours of bitter combat, "the Union line was intact and held more strongly than before."[74]

Lee was forced to change his plans. Longstreet would command Pickett's Virginia division of his own First Corps, plus six brigades from Hill's Corps, in an attack on the Union II Corps position at the right center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Prior to the attack, all the artillery the Confederacy could bring to bear on the Union positions would bombard and weaken the enemy's line.[75]

AFTERMATH

Casualties

The two armies suffered between 46,000 and 51,000 casualties, nearly one third of all total troops engaged, 28% of the Army of the Potomac and 37% of the Army of Northern Virginia.[82] Union casualties were 23,055 (3,155 killed, 14,531 wounded, 5,369 captured or missing),[8] while Confederate casualties are more difficult to estimate. Many authors have referred to as many as 28,000 Confederate casualties,[83] and Busey and Martin's more recent 2005 work, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, documents 23,231 (4,708 killed, 12,693 wounded, 5,830 captured or missing).[9] Nearly a third of Lee's general officers were killed, wounded, or captured.[84] The casualties for both sides during the entire campaign were 57,225.[85]

In addition to being the deadliest battle of the war, Gettysburg also had the highest number of generals killed in action. The Confederacy lost generals Paul Jones Semmes, William Barksdale, William Dorsey Pender, Richard Garnett, and Lewis Armistead, as well as J. Johnston Pettigrew during the retreat after the battle. The Union lost Generals John Reynolds, Samuel K. Zook, Stephen H. Weed, and Elon J. Farnsworth, as well as Strong Vincent, who after being mortally wounded was given a deathbed promotion to brigadier general. Additional senior officer casualties included the wounding of Union Generals Dan Sickles (lost a leg), Francis C. Barlow, Daniel Butterfield, and Winfield Scott Hancock. For the Confederacy, Major General John Bell Hood lost the use of his left arm, while Major General Henry Heth received a shot to the head on the first day of battle (though incapacitated for the rest of the battle, he remarkably survived without long-term injuries, credited in part due to his hat stuffed full of paper dispatches). Confederate Generals James L. Kemper and Isaac R. Trimble were severely wounded during Pickett's charge and captured during the Confederate retreat. General James J. Archer, in command of a brigade that most likely was responsible for killing Reynolds, was taken prisoner shortly after Reynolds' death.[86]

Bruce Catton wrote, "The town of Gettysburg looked as if some universal moving day had been interrupted by catastrophe."[88] Nearly 8,000 had been killed outright; these bodies, lying in the hot summer sun, needed to be buried quickly.

Over 3,000 horse carcasses [91] were burned in a series of piles south of town; townsfolk became violently ill from the stench.[92] Meanwhile, the town of Gettysburg, with its population of just 2,400, found itself tasked with taking care of 14,000 wounded Union troops and an additional 8,000 Confederate prisoners.[93]

Confederate Retreat

The armies stared at one another in a heavy rain across the bloody fields on July 4, the same day that, some 900 miles (1,500 km) away, the Vicksburg garrison surrendered to Maj. General Ulysses S. Grant. Lee had reformed his lines into a defensive position on Seminary Ridge the night of July 3, evacuating the town of Gettysburg. The Confederates remained on the battlefield, hoping that Meade would attack, but the cautious Union commander decided against the risk, a decision for which he would later be criticized. Both armies began to collect their remaining wounded and bury some of the dead. A proposal by Lee for a prisoner exchange was rejected by Meade.[94]

Lee started his Army of Northern Virginia in motion late the evening of July 4 towards Fairfield and Chambersburg. Cavalry under Brigadier General John D. Imboden was entrusted to escort the miles-long wagon train of supplies and wounded men that Lee wanted to take back to Virginia with him, using the route through Cashtown and Hagerstown to Williamsport, Maryland. Meade's army followed, although the pursuit was half-spirited. The recently rain-swollen Potomac trapped Lee's army on the north bank of the river for a time, but when the Union troops finally caught up, the Confederates had forded the river. The rear-guard action at Falling Waters on July 14 added some more names to the long casualty lists, including General Pettigrew, who was mortally wounded.[95] General James L. Kemper, severely wounded during Pickett's charge, was captured during Lee's retreat.[96]

In a brief letter to Major General Henry W. Halleck written on July 7, Lincoln remarked on the two major Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. He continued:

Now, if General Meade can complete his work so gloriously prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army, the rebellion will be over.[97]

Halleck then relayed the contents of Lincoln's letter to Meade in a telegram. However, the Army of the Potomac was exhausted by days of fighting and heavy losses. Furthermore, Meade was forced to detach 4,000 troops north to suppress the New York City Draft Riots,[98] further reducing the effectiveness of his pursuit. Despite repeated pleas from Lincoln and Halleck, which continued over the next week, Meade did not pursue Lee's army aggressively enough to destroy it before it crossed back over the Potomac River to safety in the South. The campaign continued into Virginia with light engagements until July 23, in the minor Battle of Manassas Gap, after which Meade abandoned any attempts at pursuit and the two armies took up positions across from each other on the Rappahannock River.[99]

Union Reaction to the News of the Victory

The news of the Union victory electrified the North. A headline in The Philadelphia Inquirer proclaimed "VICTORY! WATERLOO ECLIPSED

However, the Union enthusiasm soon dissipated as the public realized that Lee's army had escaped destruction and the war would continue. Lincoln complained to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles that "Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it!"[101] Brigadier General Alexander S. Webb wrote to his father on July 17, stating that such Washington politicians as "Chase, Seward and others," disgusted with Meade, "write to me that Lee really won that Battle!"[102]

Effect on the Confederacy

In fact, the Confederates had lost militarily and also politically. During the final hours of the battle, Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens was approaching the Union lines at Norfolk, Virginia, under a flag of truce. Although his formal instructions from Confederate President Jefferson Davis had limited his powers to negotiate on prisoner exchanges and other procedural matters, historian James M. McPherson speculates that he had informal goals of presenting peace overtures. Davis had hoped that Stephens would reach Washington from the south while Lee's victorious army was marching toward it from the north. President Lincoln, upon hearing of the Gettysburg results, refused Stephens's request to pass through the lines. Furthermore, when the news reached London, any lingering hopes of European recognition of the Confederacy were finally abandoned. Henry Adams, whose father was serving as the U.S ambassador to the United Kingdom at the time, wrote, "The disasters of the rebels are unredeemed by even any hope of success. It is now conceded that all idea of intervention is at an end."[103]

Compounding the effects of the defeat was the end of the Siege of Vicksburg, which surrendered to Grant's Federal armies in the West on July 4, the day after the Gettysburg battle, costing the Confederacy an additional 30,000 men, along with all their arms and stores.[104]

The immediate reaction of the Southern military and public sectors was that Gettysburg was a setback, not a disaster. The sentiment was that Lee had been successful on July 1 and had fought a valiant battle on July 2–3, but could not dislodge the Union Army from the strong defensive position to which it fled. The Confederates successfully stood their ground on July 4 and withdrew only after they realized Meade would not attack them. The withdrawal to the Potomac that could have been a disaster was handled masterfully. Furthermore, the Army of the Potomac had been kept away from Virginia farmlands for the summer and all predicted that Meade would be too timid to threaten them for the rest of the year. Lee himself had a positive view of the campaign, writing to his wife that the army had returned "rather sooner than I had originally contemplated, but having accomplished what I proposed on leaving the Rappahannock, viz., relieving the Valley of the presence of the enemy and drawing his Army north of the Potomac." He was quoted as saying to Maj. John Seddon, brother of the Confederate secretary of war, "Sir, we did whip them at Gettysburg, and it will be seen for the next six months that that army will be as quiet as a sucking dove." Some Southern publications, such as the Charleston Mercury, were critical of Lee's actions. On August 8, Lee offered his resignation to President Davis, who quickly rejected it.[105]

Gettysburg Address

The ravages of war were still evident in Gettysburg more than four months later when, on November 19, the Soldiers' National Cemetery was dedicated. During this ceremony, President Abraham Lincoln honored the fallen and redefined the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address.[110]

Medals of Honor

There were 72 Medals of Honor awarded for the Gettysburg Campaign. 64 of the awards were for actions taken during the battle itself, with the first recipient being awarded in December 1864. The last Medal of Honor was posthumously awarded to Lieutenant Alonzo Cushing in 2014.[111]

HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT

Decisive Victory Controversies

The nature of the result of the Battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of controversy. Although not seen as overwhelmingly significant at the time, particularly since the war continued for almost two years, in retrospect it has often been cited as the "turning point", usually in combination with the fall of Vicksburg the following day.[13] This is based on the observation that, after Gettysburg, Lee's army conducted no more strategic offensives—his army merely reacted to the initiative of Ulysses S. Grant in 1864 and 1865—and by the speculative viewpoint of the Lost Cause writers that a Confederate victory at Gettysburg might have resulted in the end of the war.[112]

It is currently a widely held view that Gettysburg was a decisive victory for the Union, but the term is considered imprecise. It is inarguable that Lee's offensive on July 3 was turned back decisively and his campaign in Pennsylvania was terminated prematurely (although the Confederates at the time argued that this was a temporary setback and that the goals of the campaign were largely met). However, when the more common definition of "decisive victory" is intended—an indisputable military victory of a battle that determines or significantly influences the ultimate result of a conflict—historians are divided. For example, David J. Eicher called Gettysburg a "strategic loss for the Confederacy" and James M. McPherson wrote that "Lee and his men would go on to earn further laurels. But they never again possessed the power and reputation they carried into Pennsylvania those palmy summer days of 1863."[114]

However, Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones wrote that the "strategic impact of the Battle of Gettysburg was ... fairly limited." Steven E. Woodworth wrote that "Gettysburg proved only the near impossibility of decisive action in the Eastern theater." Edwin Coddington pointed out the heavy toll on the Army of the Potomac and that "after the battle Meade no longer possessed a truly effective instrument for the accomplishments of his task. The army needed a thorough reorganization with new commanders and fresh troops, but these changes were not made until Grant appeared on the scene in March 1864." Joseph T. Glatthaar wrote that "Lost opportunities and near successes plagued the Army of Northern Virginia during its Northern invasion," yet after Gettysburg, "without the distractions of duty as an invading force, without the breakdown of discipline, the Army of Northern Virginia [remained] an extremely formidable force." Ed Bearss wrote, "Lee's invasion of the North had been a costly failure. Nevertheless, at best the Army of the Potomac had simply preserved the strategic stalemate in the Eastern Theater ..."[115] Furthermore, the Confederacy soon proved it was still capable of winning significant victories over the Northern forces in both the East (Battle of Cold Harbor) and West (Battle of Chickamauga).

Peter Carmichael refers to the military context for the armies, the "horrendous losses at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, which effectively destroyed Lee's offensive capacity," implying that these cumulative losses were not the result of a single battle. Thomas Goss, writing in the U.S. Army's Military Review journal on the definition of "decisive" and the application of that description to Gettysburg, concludes: "For all that was decided and accomplished, the Battle of Gettysburg fails to earn the label 'decisive battle'."[116] The military historian John Keegan agrees. Gettysburg was a landmark battle, the largest of the war and it would not be surpassed. The Union had restored to it the belief in certain victory, and the loss dispirited the Confederacy. If "not exactly a decisive battle", Gettysburg was the end of Confederate use of Northern Virginia as a military buffer zone, the setting for Grant's Overland Campaign.[117]

Notes

1. Coddington, p. 573. See the discussion regarding historians' judgment on whether Gettysburg should be considered a decisive victory.

2. Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 1, pages 155–168

3. Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 2, pages 283–291

4. Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 1, page 151

5. Busey and Martin, p. 125: "Engaged strength" at the battle was 93,921.

6. Busey and Martin, p. 260, state that "engaged strength" at the battle was 71,699; McPherson, p. 648, lists the strength at the start of the campaign as 75,000.

7. Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 1, page 187

8. Busey and Martin, p. 125.

9. Busey and Martin, p. 260, cite 23,231 total (4,708 killed;12,693 wounded;5,830 captured/missing).
See the section on casualties for a discussion of alternative Confederate casualty estimates, which have been cited as high as 28,000.

10. Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 2, pages 338–346

11. Robert D. Quigley, Civil War Spoken Here: A Dictionary of Mispronounced People, Places and Things of the 1860s (Collingswood, NJ: C. W. Historicals, 1993), p. 68.

12. The Battle of Antietam, the culmination of Lee's first invasion of the North, had the largest number of casualties in a single day, about 23,000.

13. Rawley, p. 147; Sauers, p. 827; Gallagher, Lee and His Army, p. 83; McPherson, p. 665; Eicher, p. 550. Gallagher and McPherson cite the combination of Gettysburg and Vicksburg as the turning point. Eicher uses the arguably related expression, "High-water mark of the Confederacy".

14. "Battle of Gettysburg". Encyclopædia Britannica. Britannica.com. February 15, 2017.

15. Murray, Williamson; Hsieh, Wayne Wei-siang (2016). "The War in the East, 1863". A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War. Princeton University Press. p. 278.

16. Symonds, pp. 49–54.

17. Loewen, James W. (1999). Lies Across America: What American Historic Sites Get Wrong. New York City, New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, Inc. p. 350. Lee's troops seized scores of free black people in Maryland and Pennsylvania and sent them south into slavery. This was in keeping with Confederate national policy, which virtually re-enslaved free people of color into work gangs on earthworks throughout the south.

18. Simpson, Brooks D. (July 5, 2015). "The Soldiers' Flag?". Crossroads. WordPress. Archived from the original on March 5, 2016. Retrieved March 7, 2016. [T]he Army of Northern Virginia was under orders to capture and send south supposed escaped slaves during that army's invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863.

19. Coddington, pp. 8–9; Eicher, p. 490.

20. Eicher, pp. 489–491.

21. Symonds, p. 36.

22. Trudeau, pp. 45, 66.

23. Moore, Frank (September 25, 1864). "The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, with Documents, Narratives Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc". Putnam – via Internet Archive.

24. Reeves, Frank (June 30, 2013). "Confederates' 'slave hunt' in North a military disgrace". Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.

25. Nye, pp. 272–278.

26. Symonds, pp. 41–43; Sears, pp. 103–106; Esposito, text for Map 94 (Map 34b in the online version); Eicher, pp. 504–507; McPherson, p. 649.

27. Sears, p. 123; Trudeau, p. 128.

28. Coddington, pp. 181, 189.

29. Eicher, pp. 508–509, discounts Heth's claim because the previous visit by Early to Gettysburg would have made the lack of shoe factories or stores obvious. However, many mainstream historians accept Heth's account: Sears, p. 136; Foote, p. 465; Clark, p. 35; Tucker, pp. 97–98; Martin, p. 25; Pfanz, First Day, p. 25.

30. Eicher, p. 508; Tucker, pp. 99–102.

31. Eicher, pp. 502–503.

32. Coddington, p. 122.

33. Eicher, p. 503.

34. Sears, pp. 155–158.

35. "Battle of Gettysburg: Who Really Fired the First Shot – HistoryNet".

36. "The Battle of Gettysburg and the American Civil War – The First Shot Marker".

37. Martin, pp. 80–81. The troopers carried single-shot breechloading carbines manufactured by Sharps, Burnside, and others. It is a modern myth that they were armed with multi-shot repeating carbines. Nevertheless, they were able to fire two or three times faster than a muzzle-loaded carbine or rifle.

38. Symonds, p. 71; Coddington, p. 266; Eicher, pp. 510–511.

39. Tucker, pp. 112–117.

40. Foote, p. 468

41. Tucker, p. 184; Symonds, p. 74; Pfanz, First Day, pp. 269–275.

42. Busey and Martin, pp. 298, 501.

43. Pfanz, First Day, pp. 275–293.

44. Clark, p. 53.

45. Pfanz, First Day, p. 158.

46. Pfanz, First Day, p. 230.

47. Pfanz, First Day, pp. 156–238.

48. Pfanz, First Day, p. 294.

49. Pfanz, First Day, pp. 337–338; Sears, pp. 223–225.

50. Martin, pp. 482–488.

51. Pfanz, First Day, p. 344; Eicher, p. 517; Sears, p. 228; Trudeau, p. 253. Both Sears and Trudeau record "if possible."

52. Martin, p. 9, citing Thomas L. Livermore's Numbers & Losses in the Civil War in America (Houghton Mifflin, 1900).

53. Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1896), pp. 364, 365

54. Clark, p. 74; Eicher, p. 521.

55. James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox. (Philadelphia, PA: J. R. Lippincott company, 1896), p. 365.

56. Sears, p. 255; Clark, p. 69.

57. Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1907), p. 408

58. Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1896), pp. 364, 368

59. Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, p. 366

60. Pfanz, Second Day, pp. 119–123.

61. Pfanz, Second Day, pp. 93–97; Eicher, pp. 523–524.

62. Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, p. 369

63. Eicher

64. Harman, p. 59.

65. Harman, p. 57.

66. Sears, pp. 312–324; Eicher, pp. 530–535; Coddington, p. 423.

67. Eicher, pp. 527–530; Clark, pp. 81–85.

68. Morgan, James. "Who saved Little Round Top?". Camp Chase Gazette. Col. Chamberlain did not lead the charge. Lt. Holman Melcher was the first officer down the slope.

69. Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1907), p. 409

70. Eicher, pp. 537–538; Sauers, p. 835; Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 205–234; Clark, pp. 115–116.

71. Report of Major General R. E. Rodes, CSA, commanding division. June 3 – August 1, 1863. The Gettysburg Campaign. O.R. – Series I – Volume XXVII/2 [S# 44]

72. Sears, p. 257; Longacre, pp. 198–199.

73. Harman, p. 63.

74. Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 284–352; Eicher, pp. 540–541; Coddington, pp. 465–475.

75. Eicher, p. 542; Coddington, pp. 485–486.

76. Longstreet, James (1896). From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA: J. B. Lippincott. pp. 386–387.

77. See discussion of varying gun estimates in Pickett's Charge article footnote.

78. "Pickett's Charge". HistoryNet.

79. McPherson, pp. 661–663; Clark, pp. 133–144; Symonds, pp. 214–241; Eicher, pp. 543–549.

80. "Battle History | Gettysburg PA". www.gettysburgpa.gov.

81. Eicher, pp. 549–550; Longacre, pp. 226–231, 240–44; Sauers, p. 836; Wert, pp. 272–280.

82. "Gettysburg Casualties (Battle Deaths at Gettysburg)". Historynet. Archived from the original Retrieved June 22, 2021.

83. Examples of the varying Confederate casualties for July 1–3 are Sears, p. 498 (22,625); Coddington, p. 536 (20,451, "and very likely more"); Trudeau, p. 529 (22,874); Eicher, p. 550 (22,874, "but probably actually totaled 28,000 or more"); McPherson, p. 664 (28,000); Esposito, map 99 ("near 28,000"); Clark, p. 150 (20,448, "but probably closer to 28,000," which he inaccurately cites as a nearly 40% loss); Woodworth, p. 209 ("at least equal to Meade's and possibly as high as 28,000"); NPS (28,000)

84. Glatthaar, p. 282.

85. Sears, p. 513.

86. "The Battle of Gettysburg | Battlefield Anomalies".

87. Busey and Martin, pp. 125–147, 260–315. Headquarters element casualties account for the minor differences in army totals stated previously.

88. Catton, p. 325.

89. Sears, p. 391.

90. "Gettysburg's Most Unlikely Hero, An Elderly Citizen Who Volunteered".

91. Sears, p. 511.

92. Woodworth, p. 216.

93. Leonard, Pat (July 7, 2013). "Nursing the Wounded at Gettysburg".

94. Eicher, p. 550; Coddington, pp. 539–544; Clark, pp. 146–147; Sears, p. 469; Wert, p. 300.

95. Clark, pp. 147–157; Longacre, pp. 268–269.

96. "Robert E.Lee (by Freeman) — Vol.III Chap.9". penelope.uchicago.edu.

97. Coddington, p. 564.

98. "New York Draft Riots". History.com. April 16, 2021

99. Coddington, pp. 535–574; Sears, pp. 496–497; Eicher, p. 596; Wittenberg et al., One Continuous Fight, pp. 345–346.

100. McPherson, p. 664.

101. Donald, p. 446; Woodworth, p. 217.

102. Coddington, p. 573.

103. McPherson, pp. 650, 664.

104. "Vicksburg".

105. Gallagher, Lee and His Army, pp. 86, 93, 102–05; Sears, pp. 501–502; McPherson, p. 665, in contrast to Gallagher, depicts Lee as "profoundly depressed" about the battle.

106. Gallagher, Lee and His Generals, pp. 207–208; Sears, p. 503; Woodworth, p. 221. Gallagher's essay "Jubal A. Early, The Lost Cause, and Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy" in Lee and His Generals is a good overview of the Lost Cause movement.

107. "This site is temporarily unavailable". www.brotherswar.com.

108. Conant, Sean (2015). The Gettysburg Address: Perspectives on Lincoln's Greatest Speech. New York: Oxford University Press. p. ix.

109. Holsinger, M. Paul (1999). War and American Popular Culture: A Historical Encyclopedia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. p. 102.

110. White, p. 251. White refers to Lincoln's use of the term "new birth of freedom" and writes, "The new birth that slowly emerged in Lincoln's politics meant that on November 19 at Gettysburg he was no longer, as in his inaugural address, defending an old Union but proclaiming a new Union. The old Union contained and attempted to restrain slavery. The new Union would fulfill the promise of liberty, the crucial step into the future that the Founders had failed to take."

111. Bradley, Mark. "Medal of Honor – 1st Lt. Alonzo H. Cushing". U.S. Army Center of Military History.

112. McPherson, p. 665; Gallagher, Lee and His Generals, pp. 207–208.

113. Catton, p. 331.

114. Eicher, p. 550; McPherson, p. 665

115. Hattaway and Jones, p. 415; Woodworth, p. xiii; Coddington, p. 573; Glatthaar, p. 288; Bearss, p. 202.

116. Carmichael, p. xvii; Goss, Major Thomas (July–August 2004). "Gettysburg's "Decisive Battle"" (PDF). Military Review: 11–16. Archived (PDF) from the original

117. Keegan, pp. 202, 239.

References

· Bearss, Edwin C. Fields of Honor: Pivotal Battles of the Civil War. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2006.

· Busey, John W., and David G. Martin. Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, 4th ed. Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 2005.

· Carmichael, Peter S., ed. Audacity Personified: The Generalship of Robert E. Lee. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004.

· Catton, Bruce. Glory Road. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1952.

· Clark, Champ, and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Gettysburg: The Confederate High Tide. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985.

· Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign; a study in command. New York: Scribner's, 1968.

· Donald, David Herbert. Lincoln. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

· Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.

· Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website.

· Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 2, Fredericksburg to Meridian. New York: Random House, 1958.

· Fuller, Major General J. F. C. Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957.

· Gallagher, Gary W. Lee and His Army in Confederate History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

· Gallagher, Gary W. Lee and His Generals in War and Memory. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998.

· Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008.

· Harman, Troy D. Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003.

· Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983.

· Keegan, John. The American Civil War: A Military History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009.

· Longacre, Edward G. The Cavalry at Gettysburg. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.

· McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

· Martin, David G. Gettysburg July 1. rev. ed. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1996.

· Murray, Williamson and Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh. "A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War". Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.

· Nye, Wilbur S. Here Come the Rebels! Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1984. . First published in 1965 by Louisiana State University Press.

· Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg – The First Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

· Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg – The Second Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987.

· Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.

· Rawley, James A. (1966). Turning Points of the Civil War. University of Nebraska Press.

· Sauers, Richard A. "Battle of Gettysburg." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000.

· Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.

· Symonds, Craig L. American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg. New York: HarperCollins, 2001.

· Tagg, Larry. The Generals of Gettysburg. Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing, 1998.

· Trudeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. New York: HarperCollins, 2002.

· Tucker, Glenn. High Tide at Gettysburg. Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1983. First published 1958 by Bobbs-Merrill Co.

· Wert, Jeffry D. Gettysburg: Day Three. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.

· White, Ronald C., Jr. The Eloquent President: A Portrait of Lincoln Through His Words. New York: Random House, 2005.

· Wittenberg, Eric J., J. David Petruzzi, and Michael F. Nugent. One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2008.

· Woodworth, Steven E. Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign. Wilmington, DE: SR Books (scholarly Resources, Inc.), 2003.

Memoirs and Primary Sources

· Paris, Louis-Philippe-Albert d'Orléans. The Battle of Gettysburg: A History of the Civil War in America. Digital Scanning, Inc., 1999. First published 1869 by Germer Baillière.

· New York (State), William F. Fox, and Daniel Edgar Sickles. New York at Gettysburg: Final Report on the Battlefield of Gettysburg. Albany, NY: J.B. Lyon Company, Printers, 1900.

· U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901.